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In this PhD thesis, I challenge animation studies’ conventional notion that animation 
can bring something inanimate to “life”. This emphasis on animation’s capacity to make 
a figure appear to move on screen has led to the problematic notion that movement 
has a synonymous relationship with life. Contesting these discourses, I show in this 
thesis that not every animated figure suggests the impression of life. In order to prove 
this, I put forward as a critical focus the puppet-as-puppet figure, that is, the figure of a 
puppet depicted as a puppet per se in the film diegesis, which problematises the 
impression of life even if appearing to move on screen. A related focus in my thesis is 
the mode of movement which functions as a visual and physical parameter in order to 
analyse what an animated (or static) figure is intended to look like, instead of reducing 
it to a question of life.  
Through case studies of these puppet-as-puppet figures, which I classify into 
four groups, I examine the varying ways in which they are depicted as inanimate or 
sub/nonhuman, even when in human form, in contrast to human or (anthropomorphic) 
animal figures, both in terms of their mode of movement as well as their appearance. 
Examining how these depictions demonstrate anthropocentric views of puppets, I 
consider religio-philosophical, scientific and aesthetic discourses on puppets and 
human/animal simulacra. Further, I explore a selection of puppet-as-puppet figures as 
alternatives to these anthropocentric conventions, examining their defamiliarisation of 
the animating human subject’s mastery over the animated non/subhuman object, and 
the non-anthropocentric sensations which their movements arouse on screen in the 
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This PhD thesis begins with the questions which occurred to me from my 
particular experiences of viewing two animated characters—the details of each 
character will be given later in this Introduction and the following Chapters. First, 
why should the wooden puppet boy character Pinocchio be finally transformed 
into a human boy of flesh and blood? Second, how can the high-tech android 
character Astro Boy be given the equal-to-human rights by legal amendments? But 
the wooden Pinocchio seems to already have as flexible a body as human 
characters on screen. The same can be said of Astro Boy. However, both are 
considered as “not-real” and “not-human” at an early stage in the film diegesis. 
These narratives have raised quite an intriguing issue in me as a viewer because 
animation is said to bring anything inanimate to “life”, but the narratives with those 
two characters function to deny this notion of animation. My thesis is an 
exploration of the questions and issues surrounding those animated figures as 
puppets and human simulacra that can contest and jeopardise the definition of life 
and humanity, and the conventional notion of animation as well.  
 
 
Motivation and theoretical paradigms of my research 
Primarily in this thesis, I contest a well-known discourse which has been reiterated 
in animation studies as well as in the field of animation filmmaking. The discourse 
is that animation can bring anything to life on screen, in which the term of life is 
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not defined in a rigorous way. However, my central concern is not to define the very 
concept of “life” but to examine critically the ways in which animators deal with 
specific figures in terms of the discourse. Drawing in the main on the neoformalist 
method developed by Kristin Thompson and David Bordwell, I seek to provide 
alternative viewing skills to viewers of animated figures on screen, without 
resorting to the overarching discourse which I will criticise in this thesis.  
For this immanent research, I focus on the “puppet-as-puppet” figure, or 
the figure of a puppet which is presented as a puppet per se in animation film. In 
this thesis, the puppet-as-puppet figure refers to the diegetic on-screen 
presentation of a drawn or built puppet; it does not refer to the puppet used in 
production or shooting. Like Pinocchio in Disney’s animated film of the same name 
(Ben Sharpsteen and Hamilton Luske, 1940, US), the puppet-as-puppet figure 
serves well to problematise the discourse because it should be perceived as an 
inanimate object, even though looking like and further moving like an animal or a 
human on screen. In other words, the puppet-as-puppet figure is required to 
provide the impression of not being alive, or of simultaneously being alive and not 
being alive, in contrast to a figure of a human or an animal providing the 
impression of simply being alive.  
These impressions are what I am most concerned with in this thesis where 
animation film is considered as a form of visual art/media. As they are composed 
of a plethora of aspects, in particular, I place emphasis on the aspect of 
“movement”, or the “mode” in which the puppet-as-puppet figure appears to move, 
because animation is the art/media capable of constructing apparent movement, 
using frame-by-frame photography. Describing and analysing the puppet-as-puppet 
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figure’s mode of movement that works as a visual cue of not being alive on screen, I 
also contest another problematic discourse in animation studies, as found in Alan 
Cholodenko (2007) and Thomas Lamarre (2013). It claims that moving is 
equivalent to, or synonymous with “coming to life” in animation film.1 Arguably, 
such a discourse ignores that there are cases, I will examine later, which do not 
warrant the synonymous relationship between the two terms. Ignorance of 
contradictory cases shunts discussions of animation on to a larger scope of visual 
media or philosophy. Supporting the concept of media specificity and extending the 
neoformalist approach, my analysis will shed light on the varying ways in which 
the puppet-as-puppet figure is depicted to move, which are not necessarily 
associated with the impression of being alive.  
For this analysis, I select emblematic cases of puppet-as-puppet figures 
from four groups: (1) hybrid films of hand-drawn animation and live action, (2) 
hand-drawn animation films, stop-motion animation films with (3) 
anthropomorphic2 puppet-as-puppet figures and (4) non-anthropomorphic3 
puppet-as-puppet figures. These four categories function to contextualise a 
puppet-as-puppet figure, its impression of not being alive, and the way in which it 
is dealt with to provide such an impression. In the first category, I aim to 
foreground the power relationship seen on screen between the animating human 
creator and his animated human/animal-like creation, thereby revealing the 
contradiction in which despite his demiurgic performance of bringing a figure to 
life, the animator-creator on screen considers and deals with it as a non-living 
 
1 This kind of discussion goes beyond the scope of animation studies or media studies. 
2 In this thesis, my use of the term, anthropomorphic, considers the way in which a figure 
moves on screen, as well as what its shape looks like. 
3 The application of the term, non-anthropomorphic, to the puppet draws on Buchan (2011). 
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object. In the second and third categories, I focus on several typical cases of 
puppet-as-puppet figures which are depicted as inanimate or non-living in 
conventional films—I will give the details later in the section on Methodology in 
Chapter One—respectively of hand-drawn animation and stop-motion animation. 
In this sense, the use of the problematic terms, life and alive, is delimited by the 
intention of signifying the way in which the puppet-as-puppet figures are depicted 
in contrast to the human or animal figures which represent living humans or 
animals in the film diegesis. In the fourth category, I bring to focus the non-
anthropocentric, as well as non-anthropomorphic, aspect of unconventional stop-
motion animations.  
The puppet-as-puppet figures of each category elicit questions of 
“subhuman” or “nonhuman” objects, particularly when they are either completely 
or partially in human form. I employ the term, subhuman, to qualify the very way 
which deals with such puppet-as-puppet figures, in accordance with Per Schelde 
(1993: 40), Victoria Nelson (2001: 261) and Torben Grodal (2009: Kindle 1533), to 
name a few, who use it to describe respectively mutants in This Island Earth 
(Joseph M. Newman, 1955, US), the robot Maria in Metropolis (Fritz Lang, 1927, 
GER), and zombies in Night of the Living Dead (George A. Romero, 1968, US) and 
other horror films. The questions of subhuman objects on screen bring me to the 
locus of religio-philosophical discourses, along with their relevant traditions, of 
such objects which have been made in the real world. The discourses constitute the 
backgrounds with which the filmmaker and the viewer, both as human agents, are 
involved in producing and perceiving the puppet-as-puppet figures, not to mention 
the motivations of the former agent. Reviewing the terms and concepts which I find 
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relevant to religio-philosophical discourses in the literature of animation practices 
and animation studies, I interpret and evaluate how some cases serve to reproduce 
or extend them and how others demonstrate alternative concepts challenging 
them. In this exploration of the cases, I also seek to conceptualise the terms 
working for them in a more proper way than animation’s conventional vocabulary 
of life or alive, as well as elucidating the aesthetic and the ideological implications 
of animating the puppet-as-puppet figures in film. 
In this thesis triggered by the two puppet-as-puppet figures Pinocchio and 
Astro Boy along with their functional equivalents, I consider in the first place René 
Descartes who in his 1637 treatise, A Discourse on the Method, discerns the human 
being from the “automata” in human form, identifying this mechanical object with 
the animal in terms of movement and behaviour. As I will demonstrate with three 
groups of cases, respectively in Chapters Two, Three and Four, the Cartesian view 
of humanity has had a great influence on the formation of the way in which 
puppets and human simulacra in contrast to human beings are depicted and 
narrated, not only in animation film but also in live-action film (Schelde 1993). Its 
far-reaching influence is indicated and often criticised in philosophies of objects 
and materials (Nelson 2001), religious studies (Harvey 2006) and cosmology 
(Funkenstein 1986). What is highly interesting to me in Descartes’ 1637 thesis is 
that defining and privileging humanity, the philosopher refers to the way in which 
automata and animals move, act and speak. I will bring into play Descartes’ 
characterisation of automata’s movement and behaviour in my analysis of the 
puppet-as-puppet figures employed to function on screen in an anthropomorphic 
and anthropocentric manner. In my thesis, Descartes will also appear as one of the 
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Enlightenment thinkers who around the seventeenth century, imagined new 
cosmologies and the ways in which the Creator exerts His power on the world and 
His creations (Funkenstein 1986). In reference to their views, I discuss and keep in 
mind the ways in which animators exert their power on puppet-as-puppet figures, 
either on screen or in production, throughout the four Chapters where I will 
conduct case studies. 
Analysing how such figures instantiate the Cartesian dualism, I also draw 
on Julien Offroy de La Mettrie who in his 1747 treatise, Machine Man, challenged 
his materialist predecessor, Descartes, by claiming that human beings, too, are 
machines or automata (Vartanian 1999). I believe that La Mettrie’s notion of “man-
machine” helps to reinterpret puppet-as-puppet figures and the film narrative with 
them in an alternative way to what simply identifies them, not as being human but 
as assuming subhumanness, not as being real but as implying fake-ness. This 
pertains to the aims of my thesis include to provide different viewing skills of 
figures and characters performing puppets in animation as well as to clarify and 
tackle conventional viewing skills of them. 
In this sense and focusing on the three-dimensionality of stop-motion 
figures which enables animators or human beings to exist with and touch them in 
the real world (Buchan 2006), I work with the Romantic view of puppets and 
recent studies of it. Centring on Heinrich von Kleist and E. T. A. Hoffmann, the 
studies bring to light anxiety and longing which both in fictional worlds and the 
real world, human beings experience viewing and interacting with puppets or 
human simulacra that in terms of body movement, threaten the sense of human 
subjectivity at the same time appearing as an idealistic or transcendental form 
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(Wilson 2006; Scullion 2009). The Romantic attitude and discourse pertain to what 
I find happens in a complicated way between the stop-motion animator and the 
animated model in Chapters Four. Their complicated relationship is found when he 
or she seeks to deal with a stop-motion model as a puppet in the narrative, while 
all the models including it are literally puppets to work as characters in one and the 
same film.  
The three-dimensionality of stop-motion models also provides a much 
stronger impetus for observing them in terms of phenomenology rather than the 
two-dimensionality of hand-drawn figures on which Buchan remarks:  
 
Although they offer ample spatial cues that can mimic our lived experience 
of space, and techniques like the Multiplane camera and planar focus shifts 
can actually introduce 3D space and perspective to graphic animation, the 
worlds that conventional 2D animation represents do not have a corollary 
in our lived experience. (2006: 20).  
 
In contrast to two-dimensional hand-drawn animation, Buchan goes on to suggest 
the formal elements of stop-motion animation as “are extant, tangible and 
constitute a part of the real world” (p.21), at the same time identifying these traits 
in live-action film. As encouraged by Buchan (pp.26-27), the strong need of a 
phenomenological approach to stop-motion animation is due to the human-like or 
animal-like models’ three-dimensional inorganic bodies that can above all work as 
media to which human beings connect and extend, as McLuhan notes that “all 
media are extensions of our own bodies and senses” (2013: Kindle 1678). With his 
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notion of media in mind and conducting the case studies of stop-motion models in 
Chapters Four and Five, I take stop-motion models as bodily and sensory 
extensions of animators and also spectators, aiming to shed light on the 
intersubjective aspect of the relationship between the animated object and the 
animating subject. This phenomenological approach to stop-motion animation 
comes to involve the agency of spectators as well as animators, and I will discuss 
the former agency as an issue pertaining to the entirety of this thesis after 
explaining main philosophical paradigms which I will draw on specifically for 
analysis of non-anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric stop-motion models in 
the last and fifth Chapter. 
Although non-anthropomorphic stop-motion models are usually viewed 
within the context of stop-motion animation (Buchan 2006), in my thesis they are 
classified as different from the stop-motion models which are manipulated to 
represent living beings like humans and also animals in accordance with narrative 
motivation and other conventions. Such models are primarily intended to present 
themselves as they are: objects, and further, as objects challenging human 
awareness of them. This perceptual and cognitive strategy demands viewing those 
models/objects from aesthetic and religio-philosophical perspectives specifically 
developed in a non-/pre-/post-Cartesian way for objects, including puppets, and 
the relationship between these and human beings. Working with discourses of 
minimalism (Batchelor 1997), Neoplatonism (Shaw 1995; Wallis 1995), new 
animism (Harvey 2006) and Shintoism (Yamakage 2006) which I have found to be 
object-oriented and non-anthropocentric in varying ways, I will borrow much from 
“vital materialism” as a recent and comprehensive perspective which Jane Bennett 
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(2010) develops to propose a horizontal relationship between human beings and 
materials. I claim that her project pertains to an unconventional relationship which 
animators or animating agents explore and demonstrate interacting with objects 
presented as objects on screen in a human or nonhuman form—the cases of such 
objects will be analysed in Chapter Five. 
The relationship between animator and object should be connected with 
that between spectator and object, as noted by Buchan (2006) who drawing on 
neoformalism and phenomenology, discusses “animation spectatorship” with 
emphasis on the physicality of puppets and objects in stop-motion animation. 
Referring to the neoformalist concept of the “consciously aware viewer” suggested 
by Robert Stam et al.,4 Buchan (2006: 21-22) elaborates animation spectatorship in 
which the spectator can form his or her viewing skills in a specific way to each of 
two traditional animation categories, drawn animation and stop-motion animation, 
as well as being able to learn and assume the production process of each 
category—this formative ability of the spectator is one of the central assumptions 
in the neoformalist approach (Thompson 1988; Christie 1998).  
Building on Buchan’s (2006) study of animation spectatorship which is 
focused on the point of view in film, I extend it to animated figures’ on-screen 
movement. As indicated in Buchan’s (2006) above-cited differentiation of stop-
motion animation from drawn animation in terms of dimensionality involved in the 
profilmic materials and events of each category of animation, in my thesis the 
viewer is considered to differ in the way in which he or she perceives and responds 
 
4 Buchan cites Robert Stam, Robert Burgoyne and Sandy Flitterman-Lewis (1992) New 
Vocabularies in Film Semiotics: Structuralism, Post-structuralism, and Beyond. London: 
Routledge: 146-147. 
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to animated figures’ on-screen movement between the two animation categories. 
But what comes into the viewer’s conscious awareness when he or she focuses on 
an animated figure moving on screen in either category of animation? In paper or 
cel-based hand-drawn animation, for example, she is aware that it cannot be 
touched by any human being; it is only paper or cel, often with colours applied, that 
can be touched. In stop-motion animation, on the other hand, she is likely to expect 
that she can touch and interact with it, possibly going on to guess how its body is 
constructed for the manipulation of stop-motion animation in the real space. Here I 
do not intend that hand-drawn animation lacks something that stop-motion 
animation does not. As I will show with drawn figures presented as puppets in this 
thesis, rather, “drawn-ness” enables them to show body movements the degrees 
and modes of which seem to be quite impossible for stop-motion figures which are 
composed of solid parts and surrounded by the gravitational field.  
With these two types of animation spectatorship in mind, I define myself as 
a “hypothetical viewer” who in terms of neoformalist approach, is supposed to 
interact with and respond to formal cues in viewing film (Thompson 1988: 30). My 
function as this kind of viewer is not only to articulate what takes place in a viewer 
of puppet-as-puppet figures on screen in animation. It is also to contest or develop 





To achieve my aim in this thesis, animation studies’ problematic terms such as life 
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and coming-to-life need to be contested and redefined in a rigorous manner. In the 
Literature Review, I define and contextualise the main terms, including those two 
ones, with which I will work in this thesis. The definition of such working terms in 
animation studies is a crucial issue which Andrew Darley addresses, remarking on 
Cholodenko’s theorising of animation as “rhetorical extemporization: a kind of 
poetical ‘riffing’ with theoretical concepts and ideas that bear very little relation to 
the real-world practices into which they are being ‘shoe-horned’” (2007: 71).  
As I stated above, in this thesis I work on specific results of the real-world 
practices of animation, in particular, on the puppet-as-puppet figures of the four 
groups, and this will show that the very discourse of ‘animation-can-bring-
anything-to-life-as-motion’ makes invisible something that animation does not or 
even cannot bring to life. Indeed, the impression of the puppet-as-puppet figures 
being alive on screen is not warranted by motion, but rather their subhuman or 
nonhuman state in the films’ narratives as not a real life is demonstrated and 
accentuated in contrast to that of human and (anthropomorphic) animal figures by 
specific modes of movement from an anthropocentric perspective. This will lead to 
revealing that not every figure is depicted and/or perceived to be “alive”, despite its 
illusory on-screen state of motion in animation film.  
Further, I challenge the concept of the animating human subject’s artistic 
mastery over the animated sub/nonhuman object that will be illuminated 
examining the group of hybrid films of hand-drawn animation and live action. The 
concept is found both in production and on screen because in this group of films 
such as Gertie the Dinosaur (Winsor McCay, 1914, US), live-action human 
performers play animators or artists, when the animator or artist of each of the 
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films does, or is supposed to, play himself. This double status of the on-screen live-
action human performers helps me observe the concept of the human mastery 
over subhuman or nonhuman objects at the profilmic and diegetic levels.  
Questioning the concept in relation to the religio-philosophical discourses 
and backgrounds that I find to be relevant to it, I seek to show that the convention 
of “animation-can-bring-anything-to-life-as-motion” is based on and even has been 
exploiting the anthropocentric view of matter as inanimate or “dead”, in light of the 
political philosopher Bennett who exploring a non-anthropocentric sensibility of 
objects and materials, criticises that “the image of dead or thoroughly 
instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris and our earth-destroying fantasies of 
conquest and consumption” (2010: Kindle 89).  
For an alternative to this view, I investigate the puppet-as-puppet figures 
of the fourth group that on screen embody a non-anthropocentric, intersubjective 
relationship which the human animators seek to build in production and show on 
screen working with objects and materials. This investigation will contribute to 
advancing the study of animation beyond the terms, movement and life, those 
which are not necessarily specific to animation, towards findings from the cases of 
animation practices. These findings will possibly inform other fields and 
disciplines, in particular, where scholars take an interest in such a subject as 
movement or life.  
Drawing on interdisciplinary methodologies ranging from film studies to 
religious studies, I am inspired by Paul Ward who suggests that animation studies 
can and should inform other disciplines the scholarship of which is applied to 
animation, in his indication that “[a]nimation’s overlapping relationship with film 
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and other media has meant that the theoretical paradigms applied to these other 
areas are often applied to animation, without first fully thinking through how 
animation’s theory and practice might inform them” (2006: 235). I believe that 
animation studies has seen a host of scholarly achievements along with this vision 
of Ward’s, but it seems to me that the terms, movement and life, still tend to act as 
an alibi for “theorising” of animation, despite Darley’s criticism (2007: 71), or even 
as a pitfall in the discipline. My pursuit of the implications of the puppet-as-puppet 
figures’ different modes of movement as a signifier of inanimacy has the express 
aim of stimulating animation studies into engaging with specific cases of animation 
by means of the terms and methods which I employ, instead of attributing them to 





This thesis consists of this Introduction, five Chapters and the Conclusion. In 
Chapter One, I problematise the terms of life and also movement by revisiting 
discussions made of them by animation scholars, animators and animation 
filmmakers, and then contextualise the central terms, like “puppet” and “force”, 
which I will work with in this thesis. In the Literature Review, the second part of 
Chapter One, I introduce and define the terms with which I will work to examine 
and analyse the four groups of cases in the following Chapters. In the Methodology, 
the third and last part of the Chapter, I discuss and develop the methods which will 
help me classify, analyse and interpret puppet-as-puppet figures.  
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Chapter Two Group INT Hand-drawn animated figures of human or animal 
simulacra as puppets appearing together with live 
human actors on screen 
Chapter Three Group CEL Hand-drawn figures of puppets as puppets in 
conventional cel animation 
Chapter Four Group STM Three-dimensional models of puppets as puppets 
in conventional stop-motion animation 
Chapter Five Group PMT Three-dimensional models of puppets as puppets 
in unconventional stop-motion animation 
Table i. Organisation of the four Chapters in my PhD thesis 
 
Chapters Two to Five are organised to correspond to each of the four 
groups (See Table i) into which I classify the puppet-as-puppet figures selected for 
a corpus from countless designs and representations of puppets throughout 
animation film history—the method of this classification will be explained later in 
the Methodology section.  
Chapter Two focuses on a group, which I call Group INT (Interaction), of 
puppet-as-puppet figures each of which appears on screen along with a live-action 
human being who performs the animation of his figures by drawing on paper as if 
he creates human-like or animal-like life forms in the film’s diegesis, as seen in Out 
of the Inkwell: The Tantalizing Fly (Max Fleischer, 1919, US; See Figure i-a). In this 
Chapter, I examine the way in which as a puppet-as-puppet figure, each creation 
interacts with its creator on screen in terms of the binary oppositions: human vs. 
 15 
sub/nonhuman, master vs. slave and live action vs. hand-drawn animation. My 
examination in Chapter Two is intended to reveal the power relationship between 
animator and animated, creator and created, as a basis for application to the cases 
in the subsequent Chapters. 
In Chapter Three, the puppet-as-puppet figures classified in Group CEL 
(See Figure i-b from Pinocchio) are pictorial representations of puppets and 
human/animal simulacra in cel animation, which in the diegesis appear along with 
hand-drawn figures of humans or (often anthropomorphic) animals. With the 
Cartesian view in mind, I investigate the way in which non/subhumanness and 
fake-ness are demonstrated by the puppet-as-puppet figures, using techniques of 
Figure i. Examples of the four Groups;  
top-left (a), top-right (b), bottom-left (c), bottom right (d) 
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cel animation, in contrast to humanness and realness. This investigation will show 
that Descartes’ (1637/2006) view of humanity is a dominant ideology under which 
many of the hand-drawn figures of puppets per se in Group CEL are subsumed, 
with the element of movement separated from the notions of life, in the films’ 
narratives, and further how effectively La Mettrie’s (1747/1996) view of humanity 
functions as an alternative to contest Descartes’s dualism.  
Chapter Four centres on puppet-as-puppet figures in stop-motion 
animation. Unlike those of Group CEL, the puppet-as puppet figures I classify in 
Group STM (Stop-motion) are not only three-dimensional representations of 
puppets and human/animal simulacra but also are materials-based real puppets of 
a form at the profilmic level, as seen in The Bachelor Machines (Dokushinsha No 
Kikai) (Tenshi Iwai, 1998, JPN; See Figure i-c). In the film diegesis, the three-
dimensional puppet-as-puppet models are dealt with in contrast to the same 
materials-based three-dimensional models built to represent humans and (often 
anthropomorphic) animals. Extending the questions which I raise with Group CEL 
in Chapter Two and applying them to Group STM in Chapter Three, I bring into 
focus the material bodies of puppet models, as intersubjective, to which the 
animating human subject’s body, usually unseen on screen, is connected and 
extended in the production of stop-motion animation. Here, one of my concerns is 
that as I will prove, such an intersubjective relationship between artist and artefact 
develops to the extent that the latter threatens the subjectivity of the former.  
Proceeding with the concept of intersubjectivity, in Chapter Five I employ the 
philosophical framework that Bennett (2010) has developed which she terms vital 
materialism, possibly embracing post/non-Cartesian and East Asian views of 
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objects in relation to the concept of life, as an alternative to the binary opposition 
between human and non/subhuman, subject and object, animate and inanimate. As 
with the puppets moving on screen in Jabberwocky (Jan SŠvankmajer, 1971, CZ; See 
Figure i-d), the three-dimensional models of puppets which I classify in Group PMT 
(Parametric) feature their own materiality and objecthood in terms of the mode of 
movement. Building in the main on the vital-materialist concepts put forward by 
Bennett (2010), I will describe and analyse the non-anthropomorphic and non-
anthropocentric ways in which those puppet-as-puppet figures move on screen. In 
this Chapter, I explore the ways in which moving on screen, the puppet-as-puppet 
figures do not present themselves as alive nor as lifeless from the Cartesian, 
anthropocentric, perspective, while the animating human subject’s sense of 
mastery over objects and materials seems to be missing in production. This 
exploration is also to conceptualise the terms which instead of the grand term of 
life, inform us of something yet unknown about the specific cases of puppet-as-
puppet figures seen in animation films.  
Based on the analysis of Chapters Two to Five, in the Conclusion I summarise 
and evaluate the varying ways in which the puppet-as-puppet figures of each 
Group appear to move on screen. I also attempt to apply the central findings from 
the analysis of Group PMT for re-interpretation and re-evaluation of the rest of the 
Groups. This will serve to highlight my academic achievements in exploring the 
puppet-as-puppet figures and their modes of movement in animation film.  
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Chapter One 




In this Chapter, I explain what my thesis calls into question and aims at, what terms 
and concepts I work with in this thesis while reviewing the literature and 
scholarship relevant to them, and what methods I adopt to find answers and 
achieve the aims. First, I problematise the two conventional notions of animation 
studies. One is that (1) animation can bring something and even anything to life, 
and the other is that (2) movement has a synonymous relationship with life in 
animation. Then, I define the puppet-as-puppet figure and the mode of movement 
as my critical foci, by locating them in the theories and discourses of life and 
humanity, puppets and human simulacra, and movement and force. Finally, I 
discuss why I adopt the following methods, classification, iconology, neoformalist 
film analysis and film vector analysis, and how I revise and develop them in a way 
specific to animation. 
 
 
1.1. Main Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Problematising the use of the term of life in animation 
As a category of visual art, animation provides a variety of aesthetic experiences to 
spectators. Their responses to such experiences tend to converge on a dramatic, 
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often pedantic, compliment to the movement which the art represents or presents 
on screen in projection. In this PhD thesis, I call into question animation’s 
convention, claimed by two significant filmmakers, Sergei Eisenstein and Osamu 
Tezuka, among others, in which such a compliment exploits the overarching terms, 
life and also soul.  
   In his influential volume, Eisenstein on Disney (1988), the Russian film 
director and theorist Eisenstein observes, “The degree to which—not in a logically 
conscious aspect, but in a sensuously perceiving one—we too are subject every 
minute to this same phenomenon becomes evident from our perception of the 
‘living’ drawings of none other than Disney” (1988: 54-55). In response to the 
impression of animated drawings as living on screen beyond his knowledge of their 
material and technical reality, the director continues to stress the effect of 
animation: 
 
   We know that they are . . . drawings and not living beings.  
   We know that they are . . . projections of drawings on a screen.  
   We know that they are . . . ‘miracles’ and tricks of technology, that such 
beings don’t really exist.  
   But at the same time:  
   We sense them as alive.  
   We sense them as moving, as active.  
   We sense them as existing and even thinking! (1988: 55) 
 
For Eisenstein, animated drawings not only arouse the sensation of life in the 
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viewers. He goes so far as to state that they are brought to life: 
 
That which is known to be lifeless, a graphic drawing, is animated.  
Drawing as such—outside an object of representation!—is brought to life. 
(1988: 43) 
 
Outlining six traits1 from Disney’s hand-drawn cel animation at another place in 
the volume, Eisenstein links animation furthermore with the concept of soul as 
well as life, when observing that Disney’s drawings of animals are 
anthropomorphised. Elements of Eisenstein’s theories are evident in the remarks 
which the Japanese animation filmmaker Tezuka made in a 1986 filmed interview:  
 
I think animation originates from animism. In a sense, animation is the art 
of imbuing something inanimate with life. Something not alive, the drawing, 
totally static, created by the human being using a pen, moves freely and 
unlimitedly, with voice and sound, and with colours, as if it were alive, and 
further, even something unexpected appears to move in animation. Drawing 
something, I feel superior as if I were the Creator. At the same time, 
something alive, such an interesting point is that I have brought it to life . . . 
The very attraction of animation is I feel really as if it were a living child of 
my own creating, even though on the two-dimensional plane. When it comes 
 
1 The six traits observed by Eisenstein are as follows: “A. They are animated drawings; B. 
Stroke drawings; C. Humanized animals; D. Further animated (with humanlike souls); E. 
Absolutely synesthetic (audio-visually); F. Metamorphic, and again in two (both) senses—both 
as subject and as form” (1988: 41). In my reading, they also suggest a multiplicity of aspects 
which a viewer can perceive in animated figures, in particular, representing animals. 
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to manga, it is only a drawing because it is static. However, when it begins to 
move in a three-dimensional sense and speaks to me, it looks really like a 
life form existing in the world, and further, a performer and actor 
entertaining audiences, set free from my hands. (2003; English translation 
mine) 
 
Eisenstein’s and Tezuka’s notion about animation and life is focused on two-
dimensional hand-drawn cel animation, but a similar account is also found in the 
book, Stop Motion: Craft Skills for Model Animation, where the author Susannah 
Shaw begins by introducing, “If you want to make great animation, you need to 
know how to control a whole world: how to make a character, how to make that 
character live and be happy or sad” (2004: 1; emphasis mine). This exemplifies that 
the term of life is a discursive convention prevailing in animation. 
      Acknowledging that animation provides the viewers with a medium-specific 
experience not commensurable with other art/media forms, I argue that the 
material and technical conditions of animation which enable such an experience 
are neglected in those discourses where animation is reduced to the terms, life or 
soul. More importantly, my central argument which I will prove in this thesis is that 
the life or soul with which animation is alleged to imbue a figure is an 
unquestioned concept of the art form in which in reality, a plethora of figures are 
also depicted as lifeless or soulless even when appearing to move on screen. 
In animation studies, the relationship alleged between animation and the 
problematic term, life, is theorised by Alan Cholodenko (2007), Thomas Lamarre 
(2013) and other scholars. They have in common a tendency of seeking to theorise 
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that animation brings something or even anything to life. Such theorising has been 
criticised within disciplines related to media as well as animation, as seen in Darley 
(2007) and Alexander Zahlten (2013). Regarding the rhetorical convention of life 
as one of the perennial prejudices in animation studies, Darley points out that in 
Cholodenko’s philosophical approach to animation, this art form “is no longer a 
complex object of study and understanding but becomes, rather, an alibi for so-
called theorizing” (2007: 71).  
My project has nothing to do with the kind of theorising which Darley 
criticises. I do not focus on a general discussion of animation’s capacity of “bringing 
something to life”. Rather, I ask a specific and contesting question: why and how are 
some figures depicted and perceived as lacking a quality called life or soul even if 
appearing to move on screen in projection, while the others are depicted and 
perceived as suggesting it? This question is central to my research aim to address 
the multiplicity of animation practices which Darley (2007: 71) suggests is 
disregarded by Cholodenko and other animation theorists.2 My approach is to 
place animation and find its meanings within socio-historical and ideological 
contexts in relation to the material and technical conditions of the art form. In this 
sense, I also examine discourses—ranging from physics and philosophy to religion 
and religious studies—relevant to my research questions, in which the concept of 
life is associated with movement, a term indicated in Eisenstein’s and Tezuka’s 
above-cited account of animation.  
As a critical focus in this interdisciplinary exploration, and also as the 
 
2 Darley notes that such theorists are involved in “a deliberate collapsing and liquification of 
distinct categories and senses of the idea of animation” (2007: 71). 
 23 
substantial momentum for my PhD thesis, the puppet will serve to epitomise the 
different ways in which a specific figure is not depicted or manipulated in specific 
techniques and types of animation to provide the viewer with the impression of life 
or soul. In an accurate sense, I employ the term, the puppet-as-puppet figure, to 
refer to a figure which is depicted or presented as a puppet per se in human or 
animal form, yet different to human or animal figures, in an animated world seen 
on screen.  
 
 
Puppets as a critical focus of animation-bringing-something-to-life 
Why the puppet? It is because the puppet-as-puppet figure problematises the 
impression of hand-drawn or constructed material figures looking and/or moving 
like a human or an animal, yet remaining as a “lifeless” object in projection. The 
term of puppet raises a further question: how can the hand-drawn figure of a 
puppet with a human appearance—for example, the wooden puppet in Pinocchio 
(See Figure i-b in the Introduction)—be discerned from the hand-drawn figure of a 
human being on screen—Geppetto in the same film—when both figures are based 
on the same material condition of drawn lines and colours on cel? The same kind of 
question can be raised with the puppet-as-puppet figure in stop-motion animation; 
for example, it is almost impossible for the viewer to identify which is the figure of 
a human girl and which is the figure of an android—a form of puppet in my 
definition of this term given later in detail—in The Batchelor Machines (See Figure 
i-c). In stop-motion animation, both types of figures are constructs of physical 
materials and parts like wood, metal, cloth, armatures, nuts and bolts.  
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In this sense, the puppet-as-puppet figure in human or animal form does 
not only reproduce the audience’s perceptual convention of puppets. It can also 
contest and complicate conventional definitions of puppets like: “a model of a 
person or animal that can be moved either by strings or by a hand inside it; a 
person under someone else's control” (Oxford American English Dictionary and 
Thesaurus 2009). The first definition can help bring into focus the material and 
technical aspect in which a puppet-as-puppet figure is depicted or manipulated to 
move on screen. When the hand-drawn figure of the wooden marionette appears to 
be moved by Geppetto using strings in Pinocchio (See Figure i-b), all its movements 
are a result of the frame-by-frame photography and screen projection; there are no 
physical but drawn strings on screen. The second can draw attention to human 
agency in the profilmic processes of animation. Not only the puppet-as-puppet 
figure but also the human or animal figure on screen is under the control of the 
human agent in front of the camera. Another interesting point about the second 
definition is that in the real world, even a human being can be described or 
perceived as a puppet when being under an external power.  
These conventional definitions should be augmented by religious and 
philosophical accounts of the puppet which serve in a rigorous way to connect the 
object to the problematic term of life in animation studies. Among an expanded 
scholarship on the puppet is Nelson’s The Secret Life of Puppets (2001) in which 
she makes inquiries into the cultural implications of puppets and human simulacra 
with which the creation of life is envisaged and narrativised in science as well as 
philosophy and religion. In her historical coverage ranging from Ancient Greek and 
Roman sculptures of gods to modern cultural products like comics, video games, 
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and live-action and animation films, including the puppet animation of the Quay 
Brothers and Jan SŠvankmajer, Nelson places emphasis on “[looking] at discourses 
about puppets and other human simulacra rather than puppets in performance” 
(2001: 60). In an attempt to illuminate the religious and philosophical implications 
of the puppet-as-puppet figure in animation film, I work with Nelson’s discussion 
of puppet-related discourses, which include Neoplatonism, Gnosticism and 
Christianity, that pertain to my main question of how a puppet-as-puppet figure in 
human or animal form is (or is not) made to appear different from a human or 
animal figure in an animation film. Of great relevance to my thesis is this question 
she poses: “[I]s the great mystery of instilling life and motion an ability reserved 
for the gods, Hellenistic priests and philosophers wanted to know, or can humans 
replicate the process?” (Nelson 2001: 35). As an answer to the question, Nelson 
puts forward the “attempt of man to know God by the art He uses in order to create 
men” (2001: 35).3 I take this phrase as indicative that puppets as puppets are 
considered as inanimate, or not-yet-animated, objects by animators in the real 
world, as well as by human (or anthropomorphic animal) figures in the diegetic 
worlds of animated films. 
Further, I take into account the religio-philosophical views on puppets in 
East Asia, because they help understand different cultural and religio-philosophical 
implications of the objects. According to a Shinto priest and writer Motohisa 
Yamakage (2006), for example, hitogata, a kind of puppet in human form—hito 
means human and gata means form in Japanese—serves as an artefact called 
 
3 This phrase is given by Nelson as Moshe Idel’s paraphrase of “the imitatio dei by generatio 
animae”, for which she refers to Idel (1988: 69-70) Hermeticism and Judaism. In: Merkel, Ingrid 
and Idel, Allen Moshe (eds) Hermeticism and the Renaissance: Intellectual History and the Occult 
in Early Modern Europe. Washington: Folger Shakespeare Library.  
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katashiro to mediate between human beings and deities in Shintoist rituals. 
Yamakage claims, “There is a mysterious belief that if our sincerity and prayer is 
contained in a katashiro, then it can be transformed into a great offering in the 
world of Kami” (2006: 74). In a Japanese religious tradition called Shintoism, the 
puppet works as an object for deities, souls and spirits to directly dwell in or 
possess (NHK 2012). The Shintoist view, too, takes puppets as different from 
human beings which they resemble, but does not suggest human beings’ attempt to 
bring it to life by a “demiurgic” art.  
From this observation of the views of puppets, I establish three hypotheses. 
In an animation film, first, additional devices like drawn strings in Pinocchio are 
deployed to impart the impression of an inanimate object to a puppet-as-puppet 
figure with a human or animal appearance in contrast to a human or animal figure. 
Second, whether intended to look and/or move like a human being or as a puppet 
in the production phase, the impression of an animated figure is not only 
determined by its appearance but also by the way in which its movement is 
created. Specifically, I do not focus on movement itself, but rather the “mode” of 
movement which the animator chooses and creates in his or her intention with 
successive drawings of a figure or successive modifications to a stop-motion model. 
The third hypothesis is that the mode of movement embodies the way in which the 
animator envisions and executes power over the figure or the model as a material 
for his or her creative aims, and also the relationship which the human agent seeks 




Subproblems and questions with the puppet-as-puppet figure 
My examination of the puppet-as-puppet figure in animation film also aims to 
reveal and interpret the ways in which such demiurgic attempts with puppets and 
their related forms, like automata and robots, are not only conducted but also 
contested. In this thesis, another critical way in which the puppet-as-puppet figure 
functions is to address the issue of its lesser rank, often given to it as subhuman or 
nonhuman in contrast to the human or animal figure in the film narrative. 
Observing the scene of the Blue Fairy bringing the wooden puppet to life in 
Pinocchio, Scott Bukatman raises a similar issue by asking, “What is it that makes 
Pinocchio a real boy? The easiest answer, for both book and film, is morality—
morality defines the human” (2012: Kindle 3352). Expanding on Bukatman’s 
question, I develop a further hypothesis that discourses of humanness serve as 
parameters with which the manner of a puppet-as-puppet figure’s behaviour is 
created in production by the animators and perceived in projection by the viewers. 
What I focus on among philosophical accounts of humanness are A Discourse on the 
Method, the 1637 treatise by Descartes, and Machine Man, the 1747 treatise by La 
Mettrie; both define human beings in contrast or comparison to animals and 
automata with a human or animal appearance. Drawing on these two materialist 
thinkers, I assess their resultant influences on the conception of life and/or soul by 
analysing and interpreting puppet-as-puppet figures (centring in the main on 
Groups INT, CEL and STM) in animation. 
   In doing so, I criticise a discursive attempt to generalise or essentialise the 
relationship between animation and animism (Eisenstein 1988; Tezuka 2003; 
Cholodenko: 2007), and this criticism expands beyond the category of cel 
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animation to include the category of stop-motion animation. Instead, my approach 
with the concept of the puppet in animation intends to clarify the way in which a 
specific religio-philosophical view of humanity, as well as of life and soul, works or 
does not work in each case of puppet-as-puppet figures in contrast to that of 
human or anthropomorphic animal figures in the world of animation film; animism 
might work in one case but does not in another. This exploration leads to the 
examination of animism and other non-Cartesian religio-philosophical views of life 
and soul which I expect will help elucidate the meanings of the puppet-as-puppet 
figures in animation. These views under examination range from Homer and his 
contemporaries’ Greek beliefs (Bremmer 1993), to Neoplatonism (Shaw 1995; 
Wallis 1995; Nelson 2001), Western spiritual traditions (During 2002), Japanese 
Shintoism (Yamakage 2006; Hosaka 2006), and the new animism and other non-
Western religious traditions (Harvey 2006).  
In the same intention to investigate factors influential on the sense of 
humanness and sub/nonhumanness, I also seek to tackle the concept of movement 
as the supposed correlative of life and soul, although primarily I focus on the mode 
of movement and behaviour demonstrated by on-screen figures and characters in 
animation. What I am concerned with are Cholodenko’s (2007) and Lamarre’s 
(2013) attempts, which I detail and challenge in the Literature Review, to theorise 
movement or motion as equivalent to life in a philosophical approach beyond 
animation or media studies. My intention is not to claim that movement is simply a 
physical term, but rather has different cultural implications, even in the hard 
science of physics, in particular, before and after Isaac Newton’s mechanics (Crowe 
2007). In this sense, I examine a scientific mysticism, which Max Jammer (1999) 
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considers as forgotten in the process of the systematisation of physics’ central 
terms like motion and force. This examination aims at making clear that in 
animation studies, the question of the triad, motion-life-soul, has been dealt with in 
an insufficient or inadvertent way, which results in ignoring the specific practices 
and the material reality of animation. My PhD research seeks to connect these 
interdisciplinary findings to the way in which puppet-as-puppet figures are not 
depicted to appear “alive” or to “come to life” on screen, in relation to the material 
and technical conditions of the four groups of films: (1) hybrid films of live action 
and hand-drawn animation, (2) cel animation films, stop-motion animation with 
(3) anthropomorphic puppet-as-puppet figures and (4) non-anthropomorphic 
puppet-as-puppet figures. My corpus of the films and their classification into four 
groups are explained in the Methodology section. 
 
 
1.2. Literature Review 
 
Focusing on the puppet-as-puppet figure on screen, in this section I review 
animation studies’ scholarship relevant to the concept of animation-bringing-
something (or even anything)-to-life which I problematise in this thesis. In doing 
so, I introduce three terms: belief system, value system and power relationship. In 
particular, the third term will function as a key throughout all the four Groups: INT, 
CEL, STM and PMT. Another key term for them is sub/nonhumanness which in my 
hypothesis is demonstrated by a specific mode of movement on screen and leads to 
the suggestion that the figure is not intended to depict a real life but an inanimate 
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object in the film diegesis. In order to prove this hypothesis, I build on Grodal’s 
(1997) account of the sub/nonhuman figure in film, further, developing it towards 
animation film because the film scholar’s focus is on live-action film. Groups CEL 
and STM share the issue of real and fake and other binary oppositions. The 
framework for Groups STM and PMT involves phenomenological concepts of the 
body and extension, and for Group PMT, I extend them, with the term of force 
brought into focus, to pre/post-Cartesian and East Asian views of matter, materials, 
objects and things as not-necessarily-inanimate. By and large, I set the scope of the 
theoretical frameworks to converge towards Group PMT (See Table 1.1). 
 
Group INT Group CEL Group STM Group PMT 
Power relationship 
 
Binary opposition  
between real and fake 
 
  The body and extension 
   Objects and forces 
Table 1.1 Scope of my theoretical frameworks 
 
 
Revisiting animation studies’ scholarship of life and movement 
In his chapter, “Coming to Life: Cartoon Animals and Natural Philosophy”, a recent 
contribution to scholarship on the two concepts of life and movement, Lamarre 
states, “The basic definitions of animation include both bringing to life and making 
something move”, going on to suggest, “Thus moving and coming to life appear 
synonymous in animation” (2013: 117). On the basis of this premise, he addresses 
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and seeks to resolve the issue of movement-as-life as a general experience for the 
viewer of animation centring on the technique of cel animation. The issue of 
movement-as-life is also the main subject of Cholodenko‘s chapter, “Speculation on 
the Animatic Automaton”, in which like Lamarre, the author proposes that “life and 
motion are always coimplicated; and they are coimplicated in the very double 
definition of animation” (2007: 498). Engaging with the illusion of life rather than 
that of movement, however, Cholodenko attempts to reduce the question of life to 
two terms, animistic and mechanistic, which he describes as opposite (p.489). In 
these discussions, animation is not seen as a material-based and technically-
processed medium of filmmaking but rather, is replaced with ever-expanding 
derivatives of animation as a notion. Acknowledging a close relationship between 
the impression of life and that of movement in animation, in my thesis I contest the 
very hyphenated framework of movement-as-life in which the two terms are not 
necessarily synonymous. Unlike Cholodenko, I focus on movement and its mode, 
rather than the illusion of life, in animation as a form of moving image and 
filmmaking which should be first examined in technical and artistic aspects.  
In this sense, I agree with Lamarre’s approach, which is to investigate the 
movement and technical aspects of cel-based, hand-drawn character animation, 
importantly resisting the concept of movement as an illusion in animation. In terms 
of perception as experienced by the viewer, Lamarre states, “Movement in 
animation is not a matter of illusion or representation . . . It affords a real 
experience of movement, of actual movement” (2013: 127). As an essential stance 
of my research, this anti-dualistic view of perceived movement is supported by 
psychological findings. For example, in terms of the visual receptor of movement, 
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the film scholar Jacques Aumont notes, “After many experiments, it seems that 
complex (or proximate) stimuli in apparent movement are often dealt with via the 
same processes as real movement” (1997: 31). In his emphasis of perceived 
movement, Lamarre goes so far as to argue that “animation, as an art of movement, 
promises to bring anything to life” (2013: 132), thereby coming close to reiterating 
the conventional discourse of animation’s life-creating capacity. Darley asserts, 
“Animation doesn’t create life in any real or normal sense of the word”, while 
admitting, “Even figuratively speaking, it doesn’t do so, or at least no more than a 
host of other media such as painting, theatre, cinema and literature” (2007: 72).  
Despite his contention of animation creating life, Darley suggests one 
possible approach to the controversial issue, which is to take the term, life, as 
figurative. At the same time, I challenge Darley’s jumbling comparison of animation 
with other art forms in terms of creation of life as a figurative concept, because the 
former involves different techniques and materials than the latter and vice versa. In 
animation, furthermore, life as a figurative concept needs to be defined in a way 
corresponding to the technical and stylistic aspects of each different type of 
animation, e.g. hand-drawn animation and stop-motion animation. Providing in 
passing a hint of this issue, Lamarre comments that “when plants and brooms 
become mobile and animated, they tend to sprout limbs and sport faces, which 
makes for a sense of animal vitality and mobility” (2013: 135). This suggests that a 
figurative concept of life in animation tends to be demonstrated by figures 
mimicking animals or humans with respect to movement as well as appearance on 
screen. As Lamarre refers to “modes of anthropomorphism” (2013: 122), in this 
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thesis I work with the two terms, anthropomorphic and theriomorphic,4 to 
describe the mode of movement demonstrated by the puppet-as-puppet figure. A 
third qualifier that will function in contrast to them is one of my own coinage: 
“mechanicomorphic” (See the two figures of automata, respectively in human and 
animal form, yet suggesting mechanical-ness in term of look and movement in 
Figure 1.1), which relates to mimicking a mechanical appearance and/or 
movement.5  
 
4 Not using the very term, Lamarre observes a theriomorphic mode, too, when describing the 
scenes of “dogs acting like human soldiers (or maybe it is human soldiers taking on features of 
dogs), the sun sprouting arms and other humanoid features, and a bed with humanoid face 
galloping on four legs” (2013: 122; emphasis mine) in Private Norakuro (Norakuro nitōhei). 
5 Conventional mechanicomorphic traits in live-action film are suggested in Grodal’s (1997) 
and Schelde’s (1993) conceptualisation of machine, which I introduce later in the Literature 
Review. 
Figure 1.1 Automata in Pinocchio 
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I also distinguish coming-to-life from life in the sense that the former 
relates to the transition through which a figure on screen changes from a lifeless to 
life-implying status at a specific moment in a film. In addition, it should be noted 
that the phrase of come-to-life has another signification both in animation and live-
action film. Damian Sutton indicates, “Cinema relies on the photography that comes 
to life, of which the still and projected image are both constituents” (2009: 122-
123). In this account, Sutton’s concept of come-to-life in film pertains to a 
transitional moment in which the film strip is engaged and starts to move through 
a film projector.6  
I term this kind of come-to-life as “kinematic transition”, which should be 
discerned from the transition of come-to-life that Lamarre takes as synonymous 
with moving in animation. His concern is discrete figures depicted on cel, any of 
which in his view are expected to undergo the event of come-to-life on the start of 
projection or at a subsequent moment, which I term “animatic transition”. 
Lamarre’s idea in the same chapter that “anything can come to life in animation” 
 
6 A similar use of the phrase is found in Pathé’s 1902 catalogue which advertises, “When the 
kinematograph appeared, its only goal was . . . to bring photography to life” (Gaudreault 2011: 
96). 
Figure 1.2 Primary and secondary animatic transitions in Pinocchio 
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(2013: 135) is likely to mask much of the continuum on which different animatic 
transitions are found with hand-drawn figures, built models and other materials 
(See Pinocchio going under two different types of animatic transition in Figure 
1.2). In this thesis, I aim to shed light on the varying ways in which those discrete 
puppet-as-puppet figures on screen are (or are not) made to undergo animatic 
transition by the artist’s agency; they are not necessarily made to appear to, nor 
are perceived to ”come to life” in projection, even if undergoing animatic transition, 
in the cases I will discuss in the following Chapters. This discussion will extend to 
address the question of whether and how animatic transition gives the puppet-as- 
puppet figures the same status as human or (anthropomorphic) animal characters 
in a film narrative. 
 
 
Movement to performance, life to liveness 
As outlined above, I will examine Groups INT to PMT in terms of perceived 
movement as a physical and visible parameter which enables textual description. 
In particular for Groups INT, CEL and STM, I draw on Crafton’s (2013) 
conceptualisation of the hand-drawn character’s body performance on screen, in 
which the animated character functions as a live performer on and often across 
screen. This helps find a larger range of vocabulary, instead of reiterating the terms 
like life or soul, to describe a specific movement demonstrated by a figure in 
animation film. As Lamarre does in his 2013 essay, Crafton challenges the dualist 
opposition between the two-dimensional hand-drawn character as illusory and the 
human actor as real; he claims that “toons are not living people, yet they exhibit 
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agency and liveness just as human movie actors do” (2013: 6). What is in contrast 
to Lamarre is that Crafton replaces movement and life, respectively, with the 
animated character’s body “performance” and the sense of “liveness” experienced 
by the audience in their involvement. In this thesis, I work with performance as a 
concept which brings to light the manner in which the animated figure moves 
specifically before and/or after animatic transition.  
Liveness in animation draws to attention the way of enacting and 
dramatising a hand-drawn figure or a stop-motion model as a performer on screen 
to involve the audience. What Crafton (2013: 72-73) refers to as liveness is the 
effect of the viewer’s physical, corporeal and immediate immersion in a 
constructed world. As he notes using the term of “co-animator” (2013: 75), this 
immersion depends on a belief system in which animators and viewers are ready 
to take part. Ranging from the religious or philosophical tradition to the governing 
ideology to the code of film genre, belief systems pertain to the way in which 
puppets and other human/animal simulacra are perceived by the viewer both in 
the real world and animated worlds. This is why I replace the term of life with 
liveness in this thesis. The latter calls to attention the perceiving viewer’s role and 
the background of a belief system in the sensation aroused by an animated figure’s 
body performance.  
Observing the animated cartoon character acting in what he calls the 
“Tooniverse”, the zone in which a belief system works well, Crafton (2013: 22-23) 
indicates how the two acting modes, figurative and embodied, demonstrate the 
notion of humanness as a belief system, in an attempt to discern between these 
two modes by addressing the issue of humanisation. Citing an anonymous Disney 
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supervisor’s comment in relation to the embodied mode that “animal and 
inanimate objects had to be humanized, not just physically but mentally as well” 
(2013: 19), Crafton advances that the animated character needs to perform 
emotion and intellect in order to motivate the viewer’s empathy with its action 
(p.44). In contrast, noting that “Disney . . . belittled what I am calling the figurative 
approach as shallow or primitive (p.22), Crafton points out that “[r]ather than 
providing insight into a character’s psyche or suggesting a moral, the narratives of 
films adhering to the figurative approach make their points through repetition and 
symbolic visuals” (p.32). In other words, the animation scholar suggests that an 
animated character’s repetitive body movement is related to the lack of mind and 
morality. This implies that modes of body performance in animation are judged 
and ranked in a specific value system, in which Crafton is not as interested as in the 
system of belief. In this sense, I suggest that humanness is not only a belief system 
but also a value system.  
I believe that puppet-as-puppet figures can tackle belief systems, in 
particular, Cartesian and anthropocentric, operating in the Tooniverse. As 
suggested in the use of the derogatory words, shallow and primitive, the value 
system addresses the issue of hierarchy—human and sub/nonhuman, in terms of 
the mode of body performance. For this issue, I draw on Grodal’s (1997) discussion 
on the nonhuman behaviour in films centring on live action. In his Moving Pictures: 
A New Theory of Film, Genres, Feelings, and Cognition, Grodal posits the relationship 
between humanness and the mode of behaviour with respect to the viewer’s 
perception situated differently in film genres. Examining the question of what 
mode of movement stimulates the viewer to perceive a fictional live-action film 
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character as nonhuman, he remarks, “Normally, schematic behaviour and 
schematic communication are sure signs of non-humanness: clowns walk with 
rigid steps and speak in a ritualized manner” (1998: 108).7 Among such nonhuman 
film characters is the robot, which Grodal finds to be “controlled by simple models 
of behaviour” (1997: 108). In live-action films produced before digitally created 
CGI characters are put to use, of course, nonhuman film characters like robots are 
performed by human actors, who obviously differ from hand-drawn animated 
figures or stop-motion models.  
In order that findings of the modes of body performance or behaviour work 
across different media forms, I adopt the concept of re-performance which Crafton 
(2013: 33) introduces to his discussion of figurative performance. For the concept, 
the animation scholar draws on performance theorist Richard Schechner’s 
definition of performances as behaviour restored, rearranged and reconstructed in 
circulation independently crossing between the real world and constructed worlds. 
Restored modes of behaviour, according to Schechner, “have a life of their own” 
(cited in Crafton 2013: 33).8  
This notion of re-performance is also found in Heather Crow’s essay 
“Gesturing towards Olympia”. Crow suggests, “Even though a turn of the head or 
the slow raising of a shoulder can be isolated and attributed to an individual 
subject, it cannot be owned by the subject, whose corporeal articulations are 
themselves subject to the systems of representation which render those 
articulations intelligible, to the bodies which make those movements possible” 
 
7 This schematic mode of behaviour and communication is located quite close to the figurative 
mode of body performance conceptualised by Crafton (2013). 
8 Crafton cites Schechner (1987: 52) Between Theater and Anthropology. 3rd ed. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
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(2006: 49). In her view, corporeal articulations, or modes of body movement, are 
subject to and circulated in such systems of representation as theatre, film, 
animation and puppetry through different forms of bodies—human actors, hand-
drawn figures and stop-motion models.9  
In the following sections, I review and introduce the accounts, the terms 
and the concepts in the preceding scholarship that I work with, considering the 
subjects and the aspects that I will bring into focus in each of the four Groups. 
 
 
Group INT: Creator and created 
Group INT is an epitome of the value system of humanness bound with the issue of 
power, in which a live human actor animates a hand-drawn figure of a human or an 
animal on screen in the double meaning—technical and metaphorical—of the verb. 
Discussing the way in which Disney animators depict Minnie Mouse in the hand-
drawn animated short, Blue Rhythm (Burt Gillett, 1931, US), Crafton observes, “The 
animator-animated power distribution evokes that of master and slave” (2013: 
123), while suggesting that animated figures are not completely under their 
animators’ control (p.6). This means that the relationship between the live-action 
animator and the hand-drawn figure shown in Group INT can imply that between 
 
9 In circulation across different nations and communities, culturally specific modes of body 
movement are also reperformed, inflected and reproduced in the value system of humanness, 
the system in which “others” in Asia and Africa are ranked subhuman from the perspective of 
Orientalism. In his seminal book, Orientalism, Edward Said indicates that Western people are 
self-qualified as “a true human being . . . and anthropocentrism allied with Eurocentrism” 
(1995: 108). Connecting this postcolonial issue of power with animation, Kim (2013) indicates 
that in the US animated cartoon series Private Snafu (1943-1945) produced as propaganda 
during World War II, repetitive body movements found in Japanese society are exploited to 
impose subhumanness on the human characters representing Japanese soldiers and people. 
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master and slave, possibly in relation to socio-political concepts like race, gender or 
class. I examine how such a power relationship is demonstrated in Group INT and 
will apply the findings to the rest of the Groups. 
Of much relevance to my central concept of the puppet is Bukatman (2012) 
who focuses on the power relationship between human-subject and machine-
object on screen. Taking cartoon or animated characters and even human actors on 
screen as what he calls the “disobedient machine” (2012: Kindle 342), Bukatman 
provides conceptual hints of the mode of behaviour which they show in fictional 
worlds of comics, and animation and live-action films. Disobedience or autonomy is 
a dominant feature in terms of which Bukatman accounts for the relationship 
between animated and animator, created and creator, as indicated by Koko the 
Clown and Max Fleischer in Out of the Inkwell: The Tantalizing Fly (See Figure i-a). 
However, Bukatman’s appreciation of disobedience and autonomy tends to ignore 
such hand-drawn creations’ mechanical, sub/nonhuman aspect, which I illuminate 
in this thesis, in contrast to their creators assuming the agency of an animator, not 
least because as with Lamarre (2013), he is quite engaged with how much quality 
of “living” they suggest on screen (2012: Kindle 330). With this in mind, I scrutinise 
the enslaved, sub/nonhuman aspect of the on-screen animated creations, as a 
puppet-as-puppet figure, in relation to the on-screen live-action creators’ 
demiurgic performance with which the process of animatic transition takes place 
in film. 
The concept of machine, too, is as central as that of the puppet throughout 
my thesis in a couple of senses. In a narrow sense, many of the puppet-as-puppet 
figures which I examine in this thesis represent mechanical puppets like robots, 
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automata, wind-up toys and marionettes. In a wide sense, the concept of machine 
serves to challenge the value system of humanness which is a crucial issue for the 
puppet-as-puppet figures in animation films. Machine has more implications than 
Bukatman (2012: Kindle 977) suggests by taking it as a metaphor of the labouring 
human body in industry since the mid-nineteenth century. “The comparison of the 
universe to a great machine”, Amos Funkenstein points out, “is an old metaphor 
that referred to the regular circular motion of the heavens”, continuing, 
“Complicated astronomical clocks were designed and built that visualized, 
represented, and facilitated the computation of celestial orbits” (1989: 317). 
Machine did not only imply the operation of the universe but also that of the 
human body. In the seventeenth century when the fusion between theology and 
physics culminated in the West (Funkenstein 1989: 72), automata, clockwork-
embedded puppets or sculptures, appeared as a conceptual model “to understand 
the actions of living bodies” (Chene 2001: 14).  
The seventeenth-century discussions of the machine address the 
relationship between God the Creator and the universe as His creation. Significant 
among them are the opposing positions of Descartes and Newton on God’s mode of 
exercising power. According to Funkenstein, Descartes assumes, “God imparted a 
constant quantity of motion to the universe and then left it to its own devices”, 
going on to conclude, “God is not even needed; all we need is the quantity of 
motion” (Funkenstein 1989: 74). This suggests that the world-as-machine obtains 
autonomy once created and put in order and the demiurgic power is not engaged 
in it any more. Unlike Descartes, Newton argues, focusing on the issue of 
acceleration as an external force in change, that God keeps engaged in the motion 
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of the world because “[a]ll the bodies in space would collapse into one body, unless 
God held them apart: since holding them apart would have to be in proportion to 
the attractive force, this would presuppose an additional law of repulsion” 
(Funkenstein 1989: 95). In this thesis, I term Descartes’ view of the Creator’s 
power as the mode of “retreat” and Newton’s as the mode of “intervention”, which I 
appropriate to primarily the animator-as-creator’s performance interacting on 
screen with the animated character-as-creation in Group INT. My finding from this 
discussion of power relations in Group INT will underlie my examination of the 
rest of the four Groups. 
My investigation of power relations goes on to bring into focus the 
materiality of the puppet-as-puppet figures. This is an attempt to challenge the 
discourse, quite prevalent yet problematic, of the animator’s supposed 
omnipotence, as Eisenstein argues: 
 
What magic of reconstructing the world according to one’s fantasy and will! 
A fictitious world. A world of lines and colours which subjugates and alters 
itself to your command. You tell a mountain: move, and it moves. You tell an 
octopus: be an elephant, and the octopus becomes an elephant. You tell the 
sun: ‘Stop!’—and it stops. (1988: 3)  
 
This view is criticised by Darley in a proper way. Observing that “there has been a 
tendency . . . to laud it as a kind of super medium limited only by the imaginations 
of those who practice it”, the media scholar states, “All media are limited (and 
limiting): they enable certain things and constrain others” (Darley 2007: 64), in 
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contrast to Eisenstein’s optimistic view of hand-drawn animation, well known for 
his use of the term, plasmatic (1988: 70).10  
With much emphasis on the term, Eisenstein ignores that both the 
drawing-based technique and the human agent are limited and remediated, for 
example, by pens, ink, paints, paper, celluloid sheets and other materials. Indicative 
in this sense is Richard Fly’s (1976) account of the artist’s changing relationship 
with materials in art history. Fly comments, “Even Michelangelo . . . cannot sustain 
godlike supremacy over his material, and in several provocative works he appears 
to acknowledge that the invincibility of inert matter can almost neutralize even his 
creative powers” (1976: 29). In this account, materials are supposed to act as a 
kind of agent in the creation of an artwork. By extension, I work with this view of 
Darley’s and Fly’s in analysis of the material aspect of Group INT and of the 
relevant cases of the other three Groups. In addition, Fly suggests a controversial 
view of the resisting material as “something demonic and negating in [its] ability to 
distort, frustrate, and debilitate the artist’s effort at creation” (1976: 30; emphasis 
mine). This claim will be identified in my analysis of the first three Groups in which 






10 In his seminal essay on Disney, Eisenstein (1988: 54) also appropriates the Latin word, 
anima, in order to appreciate an aesthetic capacity of hand-drawn animation. For him, the 
capacity is imagined as demiurgic omnipotence supposedly given to the human agent through 
the method of hand-drawn animation. Such artists and theorists of animation have, Darley 
notes, “deliberately confound[ed] the techniques involved in producing moving images in a 
certain way with . . . quasi-theological speculation” (2007: 71). 
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Group CEL: Puppets between real and fake 
What I am particularly concerned with about the puppet-as-puppet figures in 
Group CEL is that they are likely to raise the binary opposition between real and 
fake, as well as master and slave, in contrast to the figures representing humans or 
animals, because both are constructed through artists' drawings in cel animation.11 
An emblematic case is Pinocchio that I analyse with the Disney film of the same 
name in Chapter Three. Despite their human or animal appearances, the hand-
drawn figures of puppets as puppets are depicted and narrativised as artefacts 
which are made of natural or processed materials, and are frequently owned by the 
hand-drawn figures of humans or anthropomorphic animals in film.  
In addition to Bukatman and Grodal who I referred to as pertaining to the 
issue of machine above, I work with Schelde’s (1993) study of machine figures in 
film. Concerned with the issues of power and labour engaged in the notion of 
machine as is Bukatman, Schelde delves into on-screen machine figures, going so 
far as to criticise the Cartesian definition of humanity. Centring on live-action films 
for the most part, Schelde (1993: 220) puts forward two different types of on-
screen machine figures, “docile” and “evil”, in relation to the characters of human 
masters. Obviously, such figures in live action should be distinguished in terms of 
media specificity from those in cel animation. Nonetheless Schelde’s interpretation 
and typology of machine characters in live action are useful when I develop a 
typology to help analyse the puppet-as-puppet figures in terms of the mode of body 
performance, in particular involving human interests. On the one hand, Schelde 
 
11 The same can be said with Group STM (of anthropomorphic stop-motion animations), the 
detail of which I will give below in this section of Literature Review. 
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defines docile as “not given to protesting, asking questions or other disruptive 
behavior that slows down the work process” (1993: 151), and on the other, 
describes evil as “faceless, unindividuated, totally homogenized” and as something 
“which we have no emotional or intellectual access to” (p.158). Building on Schelde 
as well as Bukatman, I develop a typology in terms of the way in which the puppet-
as-puppet figures become involved with the figures of humans (or 
anthropomorphic animals) who invent, rule or own in animation films allocated to 
Group CEL.  
Noteworthy is that when discussing on-screen robot figures moving and 
performing as much as human actors in live-action science-fiction films, Schelde 
does not engage with the issue of life, and further of coming-to-life. Instead, he 
focuses on soul as a key concept of humanness, asserting that “the soul is the locus 
of individuality, of self . . . Soul is free will” (1993: 20). These ethical and 
philosophical qualities resonate with Bukatman (2012: Kindle 701) who places 
emphasis on autonomy as a behavioural quality which should be distinguished 
from the traits of the movement that automata show up in the real world. 
In order to explore the question of real and fake which the puppet-as-
puppet figures raise in this Group CEL, I connect it with Descartes’ (1637/2006) 
account of the automaton with a human or animal appearance. The philosopher 
states that “if any such machines resembled us in body and imitated our actions 
insofar as this was practically possible, we should still have two very certain means 
of recognizing that they were not, for all that, real human beings” (1637/2006: 46); 
one is language ability and the other behavioural flexibility (pp.46-47). In my 
reading, the two means are reduced to the automaton’s lack of reason in his 
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description of the rational soul as proper to the human being (p.47). What is of 
great significance in Descartes is his contradiction of the concept of movement-as-
life which as reviewed above, Cholodenko (2007) and Lamarre (2013) seek to 
theorise.  
In contrast to these two scholars, Descartes equates animal lives with 
machines, and their natural movements with mechanical movements, different and 
inferior to human beings and their reason-ruled movements, when he claims that 
“natural movements . . . can be imitated by machines as well as animals” 
(1637/2006: 47). Aware that the automaton referred to by Descartes is not a hand-
drawn figure in cel animation but a physical object located and moving in three-
dimensional space, I aim to reveal that the Cartesian anthropocentric view still 
works with hand-drawn figures of automata, robots and other human (and 
anthropomorphic animal) simulacra in Group CEL. For this aim, I scrutinise, on one 
hand, the way in which using the technique of cel animation, animators depict 
those machine, or puppet-as-puppet, figures as not having reason, being irrational 
and soulless, and, on the other, the way in which some of the figures seemingly 
resists such a view in animated worlds.  
My investigation of this latter way builds on La Mettrie’s treatise, Machine 
Man (1747/1996), in which extending Descartes’ view of animal-as-machine, the 
radical materialist philosopher goes so far as to regard even the rational soul as 
resulting from animal movement and thereby the human being as an automaton. La 
Mettrie claims that “the soul is only a principle of motion or a tangible material 
part of the brain that we can, without fear of error, consider as a mainspring of the 
whole machine” (1747/1996: 31). Contesting Descartes’ anthropocentric concept 
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of animal-as-machine, I work with La Mettrie’s view of man-as-machine to shed 
light on the meanings of the puppet-as-puppet figures which I argue have been 
neglected in animation studies. 
 
 
Group STM: Connected and extended to the puppet 
In Group STM, the stop-motion models of puppets as puppets have a number of 
material and technical traits in common with those of humans or 
(anthropomorphic) animals. In particular, both are located in three-dimensional 
space, like that which the audience inhabits. Further, their bodies are based on the 
same material and technical principles of constitution. In other words, all the 
models for stop-motion animation are made of tangible materials, on a range from 
solid to malleable.  
This means that a crucial issue arises in this Group, which is that the 
models of humans or animals do not differ in profilmic materiality from those of 
puppets per se, even while the film diegesis is still intended to raise the issue of the 
binary opposition—real and fake, human and sub/nonhuman, and possibly master 
and slave. To put it another way, it is not the latter but the former that is likely to 
come to a crisis, exposing to the viewer their fake-ness, sub/nonhumanness and 
possibly enslaved-ness in projection. With this materiality in mind, and stretching 
the terms and discussions which I developed above for Group CEL to Group STM, I 
reconsider the Tooniverse to define its three-dimensional counterpart, I will call 
the “Puppetopos” in this thesis, as a zone where stop-motion models work as live 
performers in the convention of a belief system shared by the animators and the 
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spectators. 
The Tooniverse put forward by Crafton (2013) involves the animator, the 
spectator, the place and the belief system. As suggested by “toon”, part of the term, 
it revolves around classical hand-drawn animated cartoons, most of which were 
produced in the conventions of Hollywood with narrative or comic motivation. As   
I postulated two categories of spectatorship in two-dimensional and three-
dimensional animations in the Introduction, the conventionality of stop-motion 
animation films has a different background from that of hand-drawn animation 
films easy to find in the Tooniverse. In terms of the active involvement—as he calls 
“co-animation”—of the spectators in the Tooniverse, Crafton (2013) goes so far as 
to cover SŠvankmajer’s stop-motion animation, but this is an insufficient approach 
which is read as his not being concerned with phenomenological questions specific 
to each category of animation (Cook 2013: 307).  
A stop-motion model’s profilmic materiality of three-dimensionality entails 
tangibility and co-sited-ness, in terms of which the animator can touch and interact 
with its nonhuman body. These media-specific capacities are often reported, for 
instance, by Peter Lord, to embody a physical, personal, irreplaceable relationship 
between the animator and the model. The stop-motion animator and co-founder of 
Aardman Animations writes:  
 
Model animation has never been a crowded profession. It’s always been a 
specialist area, very exclusive and slightly eccentric, populated by a 
handful of pioneers and geniuses . . . It’s a form of film-making, which 
refuses to be mass-produced. In the early twentieth century ‘classic’ 
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animation—the drawn kind—became big business precisely because 
people worked out how to industrialize the process, but model animation 
has always been a craft-based activity that won’t be cloned. (Lord 2008: 9) 
 
Here, Lord indicates that stop-motion animation differs from hand-drawn 
animation in terms of the communities of the artists and the processes of 
production—what is peculiar about his indication is the concept of a craft-based 
activity, which I construe as emphasis on the embodied-ness and irreproducibility 
of the relationship between animator and animated. Barry J. C. Purves, who did a 
stint at Aardman studios, also notes: 
 
The unavoidable truth about any stop-motion puppet or animated object is 
that the animator is going to have to touch it for every single frame. This is 
the most appealing aspect of the process. (2014: Kindle 1238). 
 
Unlike the animator who replaces one drawing with the other by rendering 
on a new sheet for every single frame in cel animation, it is noteworthy that the 
stop-motion animator keeps a constant relationship with one and the same model 
in a tactile way, while the former touching and being touched by the latter. 
Maintaining such a relationship is seen as influential on the animator’s 
achievement of a puppet’s resultant performance on screen, as Purves points out, 
“[A]ssuming you are the only animator touching the puppet, this leads to strong 
continuity in the performance” (2014: Kindle 389). In terms of animation 
spectatorship discussed by Buchan (2006), I claim that spectators of stop-motion 
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animation build up a tactile relationship between themselves and three-
dimensional puppets in projection through viewing experience. 
Given that Purves’ (2014) account is focused on anthropomorphic, 
narrative-oriented, stop-motion animation films which he refers to as illustrative 
cases, it is not that such craft-based characteristics have impeded the extensive 
production, reception and imitation of stop-motion animation films to the extent 
that they cannot form any conventions associated with Hollywood filmmaking and 
a zone where stop-motion animators and spectators work together with the 
conventions. As called “Walt Disney of the East” (Dutkar 2000; Harryhausen and 
Dalton 2008; 164), for example, Jiřı ́Trnka was a central filmmaker of puppet 
animation in Czechoslovakia’s state-owned film industry and abroad. In the 
country and other communist countries, interestingly, Nobuaki Doi notes, “the 
state-owned animation studios had a similarity to the market-oriented animation 
studios of the capitalist region in the sense that the former adopted the production 
system of the division of labour, with a large number of crews employed” (2016: 
65). This is the sense in which I conceptualise the Puppetopos as the stop-motion 
counterpart of the Tooniverse. No matter how experimental or innovative Trnka’s 
films have been evaluated to be, I claim that the puppets performing in them rely 
on anthropomorphism and narrative motivation for the most part. In the zone, film 
festivals, as well as theatres and television, have served as a locus in which puppets 
are supposed to turn into live performers on screen through the involvement of 
spectators. The Puppetopos will be a term in analysis of Group STM, not Group 
PMT, because the former Group is defined to involve anthropomorphism, narrative 
motivation and other conventions in this thesis. 
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In stop-motion animation inside and outside the Puppetopos, three-
dimensionality not only allows animators in production to stay and interact with 
their stop-motion models, but also can evoke in viewers the sensation of physical 
access to and contact with the objects. This material trait of models, or puppets, for 
stop-motion animation is, indeed, a common issue which animation scholars and 
animators call to attention, leading me to address the profilmic specificity of stop-
motion animation. Crafton indicates, “In filmed puppet shows and shadow plays, 
whether animated or not, the puppet bodies are images of objects that exist, or did 
exist, somewhere in our physical world”, adding that “the puppets retain some of 
their residual corporeality in the imagined puppet space” (2013: 66). Concerned 
with the constructed-ness of animated worlds, Buchan, too, points out, “[A]lthough 
the events we see on screen did not occur, the objects do exist” (2006: 21).  
Like Buchan, the stop-motion animator Purves places emphasis on the 
media specificity of stop-motion animation, suggesting that “stop-motion is 
different from most other forms of puppetry as it is not performed or filmed in real 
time, nor is it played in front of an audience and, unusually for puppets, the 
operators are not seen” (2014: Kindle 254).12 In this emphasis, Purves provides 
practice-based, highly informing points on the material reality of the 
puppets/models as objects: “A puppet has limitations; it has a mechanical skeleton, 
which usually has far fewer joints than its human or animal equivalent, and it must 
contend with the force of gravity" (Purves 2014: Kindle 2655). In this account, the 
two parameters with which I will work in analyse of Group STM belonging to the 
 
12 Purves (2014: Kindle 250) still admits a close relationship of stop-motion animation with 
the ancient tradition of puppetry. 
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Puppetopos are pointed out as generally influential on the body performance of a 
stop-motion model; one is the mechanical skeleton—the armature—that forms the 
central structure of the puppet body, and the other the gravitational field 
surrounding and affecting the puppet body.  
Three-dimensionality also enables animators in production to physically 
touch and be touched by the puppet bodies, the bodies of stop-motion models, 
themselves—unlike them, hand-drawn figures allow animators to physically touch 
the sheets of paper in the first place on which they are drawn. Discussing the 
power of touch and its extension to the world, Marshall McLuhan indicates: 
 
It may very well be that in our conscious inner lives the interplay among 
our senses is what constitutes the sense of touch. Perhaps touch is not just 
skin contact with things, but the very life of things in the mind? (2013 
Kindle 1545) 
 
This intimates that through the sense of touch, an object can be extended and 
interconnected to a human subject. This is the sense in which Crafton (2013: 66-
67) suggests that the puppet body can be an extension of the stop-motion animator 
when she or he animates it in production.13 In his conceptualisation of the co-
animator, it also follows that the puppet body in projection can be an extension of 
 
13 Such extension is also found in animators’ performance with two-dimensional hand-drawn 
figures, as discussed about Hayao Miyazaki by Kim (2014). In my PhD thesis, it is not only 
extension but also touching the body which I place emphasis on. Two-dimensionality does not 
give the animator and the audience any physical access to the supposedly three-dimensional 
body of the hand-drawn figure working as a live performer in Crafton’s definition of the 
Tooniverse. 
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the audience.14 Yet, Crafton tends to focus on how such puppets/models can 
successfully act as live performers on screen in a belief system. Emphatically, my 
concern is the models of puppets presented as puppets in film, whose diegetic 
status shifts or drifts between an inanimate object and something much like a live 
performer; some of them are not given the role of a performer but marginalised to 
be inanimate objects as meaningless to the audience. A crucial point in Group STM 
is that the puppet-as-puppet figures are regarded as inanimate objects both in the 
profilmic and diegetic levels.15 
Focusing on the status of such puppets/models in Group STM tempts me to 
draw on Heather Crow (2006), who examines an incongruent relationship between 
the human body and body movement. In her view, the human being is a “haunted” 
puppet, rather than an ideal model, for stop-motion animators to possibly imitate 
with stop-motion puppets/models in terms of body performance. Observing live-
action films and stop-motion animation films by the Quay Brothers, and taking the 
concept of the gesture as a wandering and haunting “ghost”—which in my reading, 
is distinct from a soul, Crow claims that “our gestures are some of our most 
 
14 Similarly, Purves notes clearly that “the physicality of the puppets gives their actions . . . an 
immediate connection with the audience” (2014: Kindle 1214). 
15 In this sense, my research contests Fauzi Naeim Mohamed and Nurul Lina Mohd Nor’s 
(2015) recent study focused on stop-motion puppets/models. In their essay, the authors 
discuss the way in which the puppets’ on-screen gestures serve perceptual and emotional 
communication with spectators in terms of phenomenology and cultural context. Fauzi Naeim 
and Nurul Lina’s concern is the puppets’ communication with the human spectators through 
anthropomorphic and theriomorphic body movements which they consider are perfected in 
screening. The authors’ emphasis on the puppets’ successful imitation of life forms like human 
beings or an animal results in the reiteration of the conventional phrase, “come-to-life”, without 
advancing towards the issue of the puppet body’s objecthood, about which only in passing they 
indicate, “Despite their limitation as mechanical objects, rich meanings are still communicated 
to viewers thanks to the unseen puppeteers, the puppets’ attire, background design, lighting 
and camera placements” (2015: 116). In my PhD thesis, the limitation of the puppets as 
mechanical objects is not taken as an issue of concession, as is the case in the authors, but 
rather as that of philosophical and aesthetic significance. 
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intimate performances of identity, and though we cannot own them, they are 
somehow our own nonetheless” (2006: 50), going on to note, “The bodies 
constructed cinematically, graphically, and sculpturally through [stop-motion] 
animation techniques unsettle conventional notions of a stable, bounded, coherent 
body” (p.51). According to Crow (2006: 55), this is exemplified by hysterical 
human bodies seized with mechanical repetition like convulsions, tics and 
grimaces; body movement is not entirely under the human subject’s control.16 Her 
view helps problematise the subjectivity of the stop-motion animator as a human 
agent in production, which is to say, the very animator is a mechanical object 
animated by gestures as a ghost. In other words, the animator’s body is a resisting 
material, which can be experienced by him/herself in a tactile manipulation of 
stop-motion puppets/models—this can be alternative to Fly’s notion of the artist’s 
changing relationship with resisting materials that I reviewed above focusing on 
Group INT. I take such a doubled relationship—which I connect to the Romantic 
discourse later in this subsection—between animator and animated, in particular, 
for analysing Group STM in Chapter Four. 
Interestingly, Crow (2006: 55) likens neurologist Jean-Martin Charcot and 
his hysteria patients respectively to an animator and animated mechanical 
puppets. This comparison reminds me of the way in which the Czech puppet 
animator Břetislav Pojar discusses puppet animation: 
 
Animation is like hypnotism. But when you animate dolls you have to 
 
16 A usual form of out-of-control body movement is termed as manipulator (or adapter) by 
Paul Ekman, the psychologist of human body movement, who observes people stroking, 
pressing, scratching, licking, biting and sucking, going on to indicate, “Manipulators appear to 
be performed on the edge of awareness” (2004: 43). 
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hypnotise pieces of wood. Puppets’ movements are clumsy. Yet if you are a 
good hypnotist you can make them come to life as if they are human beings. 
(cited in Moins 1997: 202)17 
 
Here, Pojar suggests that a stop-motion animator is a psychiatrist of patients with 
psychogenic kinetic disorders rather than a creator of “life” in a literal sense of the 
problematic term. In his view, stop-motion models/puppets should be considered 
as repressed subjects with the potential of movement within themselves. However, 
this psychological conceptualisation still retains an anthropomorphic and 
anthropocentric view in which animators should seek human form as ideal for 
puppets in terms of body movement, thereby proving that they are “good” 
animators. The puppet-as-puppet figures contest such a self-figuration of a good 
animator because they are stop-motion animated to show “clumsy” movements 
which I will prove in the following Chapters. The account of the hypnotist and the 
patient by Crow and Pojar addresses a further question: which in the phases of 
production can the stop-motion animator be, the animating hypnotist or the 
animated patient, the hypnotising subject or the hypnotised object?18  
With this question in mind, I proceed to review Richard Weihe (2006), who 
reflects on the relationship of on-screen stop-motion puppets and objects with the 
animator and the spectator in relation to two Romantic literary works respectively 
about the marionette and the automaton. One is Kleist’s essay, “On the Marionette 
 
17 Philippe Moins indicates the source of this remark: Anonymous (1974) “Břetislav Pojar” in 
Retrospectives, brochure published by the Zagreb Festival, quoted by Giannalberto Bendazzi 
(1991: 495) Cartoons, Liana Levi.  
18 Crow raises the issue of power relationship in her comparison of Charcot’s performance to 
animating touch, indicating that “the doctor would induce hysterical attacks through hypnosis 
or pressure on certain areas of his patients’ bodies” (2006: 53). 
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Theatre” (1810), and the other Hoffmann’s story, The Sandman (1817). In contrast 
to Crow (2006) who focuses on Olympia, the gynomorphic automaton of 
Hoffmann’s story in psychoanalytic, feminist terms, in his short essay (2006) Weihe 
attempts to observe the mechanical puppet in the novelist’s contemporaneous 
philosophy of subjectivity. “In 18th-century literature”, he comments, “the 
automaton becomes a prominent motif at a time when philosophy debates whether 
the individual is autonomous or heteronomous, e.g. governed by external forces” 
(2006: 42). 
In “Kinaesthetic, Spastic and Spatial Motifs as Expressions of Romantic 
Irony in E. T. A. Hoffmann’s The Sandman and Other Writings” (2009), Val Scullion 
advances such an interpretative attempt towards reading the ontological anxiety of 
the human being, in particular, the individual artist, along with kinaesthetic motifs, 
metaphors and imagery used by Romantic writers including Hoffmann and Kleist. 
In comparison to the automaton’s mechanical body, the so-called Romantic anxiety 
is caused by the uncertainty of who or what the human body is controlled by. 
Scullion writes, “The set of kinaesthetic motifs that Hoffmann weaves through the 
narrative shows Nathanael failing to gain control over his body or to move it 
forward” (2009: 4), continuing, “He admired their [automata’s] ergonomics and 
made use in his literary writing of that brief moment when the onlooker could not 
be quite sure whether they were mechanical or sentient, dead or alive” (p.12).19 
 
19 The Romantic anxiety lurks in the discussion of androids of some types by Eric G. Wilson, 
who seeks to find an answer to the question of “our own melancholy hovering between matter 
and spirit” (2006: 18) in the Western world. His typology of androids covers the mummy, 
Golem and the automata, and extends to the vampire’s victims and the somnambulist. 
Referring to the term, animated, to discuss androids, Wilson does not mean any technical 
aspects of filmmaking, but connects it to Romantic thoughts in an attempt to overcome the 
dualism of body and soul. 
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Scullion’s observation of the Romantic anxiety is of great relevance to my 
examination of Group STM in two ways. In stop-motion animation, first, the bodies 
of animators are intersubjectively connected and extended to those of 
puppets/models in production. In the definition of Group STM, second, the stop-
motion puppets/models under analysis are presented and narrativised as puppets 
per se on screen. In my hypothesis, the contested and challenged subjectivity of the 
animators is implied by the puppet-as-puppet models’ modes of movement in 
projection.  
The motif of transcendence in Scullion’s essay is another point that I find is 
highly pertinent to my research; the author refers to “the Romantic impulse to 
transcend or escape material, sensory constraints” (2009: 13). Indeed, in his 
fictional characters’ conversation Kleist asserts that “a mechanical puppet can be 
more graceful than a living human body . . . where grace is concerned, it is 
impossible for man to come anywhere near a puppet” (2012: Kindle 244), because 
“consciousness can disturb natural grace” (Kindle 250). The marionette is even 
considered as transcendental, divine entity by the Romantic writer, who suggests:  
 
Only a god can equal inanimate matter in this respect. This is the point 
where the two ends of the circular world meet. (Kleist 2012: Kindle 245) 
 
Scullion locates this Romantic notion of puppets and materials within the context 
of technologies, including “telescopic and optical lenses, electrical equipment for 
animal magnetism, and the vogue for building automata” (2009: 2). Her approach 
is not to reduce Kleist’s essay to the psychoanalytic term, uncanny, as Crow (2006) 
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does, but to articulate its complex attitude towards objects and materials in change 
at a time when those technologies underwent remarkable development. “Whether 
one takes a historicist or psychological interpretive approach to Nathanael’s 
downfall,” Scullion stresses, “it is clear that the release of his repressed fears and 
desires is largely triggered by the incongruous movements of a mechanism that 
simulates human kinetics” (2009: 13). Taking this impact of mechanical 
engineering on human viewers who not only exist in the real world but also appear 
as characters in diegetic worlds, I consider the Romantic concept of transcendence 
when I seek to clarify the philosophical and aesthetic implications of the puppet-
as-puppet figures’ sub/nonhuman mode of movement in Groups STM and also 
PMT.  
 
In Groups STM and PMT, the puppets are objects and materials while some of them 
are depicted as such in the film diegesis. Conversely, objects and materials are 
employed as puppets in the two Groups, as Purves indicates, “Sometimes [stop-
motion] animators don’t use puppets at all, but use objects or materials such as 
sand and salt” (2014: Kindle 1218). This material heterogeneity of stop-motion 
animation raises a question relevant to my research: how can such a variety of 
objects and materials in stop-motion animation be created and perceived as a live 
performer on screen? Similarly, Buchan asks the question: “How can a piece of 
metal be endowed with a gesture that moves us emotionally? . . . Or for that matter, 
what entails the experiential difference between a screw animated and one that we 
twirl in our fingers?” (2006: 36). Calling attention to the role of kinaesthesia 
working within the spectator’s body, Rudolph Arnheim claims: 
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As a rule, it [the observer’s muscular sensation] will be provoked only by 
human figures or animals with “human-like” movements (bears, monkeys, 
etc.). However, Rorschach says, occasionally there are subjects who are 
capable also of kinesthetic empathy with animals of any kind, with plants, 
and even with geometrical figures and single lines. (1966: 83; emphasis 
mine) 
 
This implies that non-anthropomorphic forms and further non-anthropomorphic 
movements give kinaesthetic stimuli to spectators. What interests me here is that 
Arnheim’s focus is not the stimulating capacity of figures and lines in motion but 
spectators’ empathetic potential which he (1996: 83) terms M-response, because 
this subjective aspect leads to the issue of the cultural context which influences 
spectators’ degree of empathy.  
In this sense, Weihe’s concept of “anthropomorphic leap” is contestable, 
which means that spectators “shift from the perception of movement in the 
inanimate figure to motion in human life” (2006: 39). While the concept is likely to 
answer to anthropomorphic puppets or anthropomorphic movements in Group 
STM, I suspect that it does not work for the movement of the screws which 
observing a scene in Street of Crocodiles (The Quay Brothers, 1986, UK; See Figure 
1.3), Weihe describes as “[a]ll of a sudden rusty screws wind themselves out of 
dirty floor-boards, whirl across the surface like skaters, before gracefully re-
turning into the wood elsewhere” (2006: 44-45). This description seems to 
reiterate animation’s conventional discourse of bringing-anything-to-life, and 
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further, to be inconsistent with Jonathan Romney’s remark, cited by Weihe, that 
“the Quays do not so much animate dead matter, as dramatize the deadness of 
matter” (cited in Weihe 2006: 47).20 Romney focuses on matter itself and the way 
in which it is presented on screen, rather than on the human agent’s act of 
animating. Yet, Romney’s comment is still fettered by the Cartesian or 
anthropocentric view of matter. In the next subsection, I review the existing 
literature of matter with which I work focusing on Group PMT in which the human 
agent manipulates puppets and/as objects in an unconventional, non-
anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric, way. 
 
 
20 Weihe cites Romney (1992: 25) The same dark drift. Sight and Sound 1(11) March: 24-27. 
Figure 1.3 Screws in Street of Crocodiles 
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Group PMT: Objects and forces 
As I explain in the Methodology, I classify and examine a selection of stop-motion 
animation films by the Quay Brothers, SŠvankmajer and Kihachiro Kawamoto in 
Group PMT (Chapter Five), each of which is located outside or drifting near the 
Puppetopos where Group STM is dominant. In this subsection, I review the existing 
literature, focusing on their idiosyncratic views on puppets and objects—in 
particular, they evince a non-anthropocentric intention which I will indicate below 
drawing on citations from them.  
Despite his inconsistent tendency to privilege anthropomorphism as I 
pointed out in the preceding subsection, Weihe offers an insight into the way in 
which the Quay Brothers manipulate objects in Street of Crocodiles (Figure 1.3): 
 
In aesthetic liberation the screw has abandoned its actual purpose to join 
two independent objects. It is shown in its essential ‘screwyness’ and 
observed merely for the sake of its specific grammar of movement—a left- 
hand turn means appearing as shape, a right-hand turn means 
disappearing into the wood. (2006: 45) 
 
What Weihe observes here is the literalness and the aimlessness—screwyness—of 
the mode of movement demonstrated by the object. For my use of the term, literal, 
I draw on David Batchelor who comments on three-dimensional objects by 
Minimalist artists that “they are quite literal: the materials are not disguised or 
manipulated to resemble something they are not” (1997: 11). What I mean by this 
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citation is not that the Quay Brothers, SŠvankmajer and Kawamoto are minimalists. 
Rather, literalness and the other concepts of Minimalism help locate the 
filmmakers of Group PMT within discourses about the human agent’s relationship 
with objects and materials which can include puppets per se in animation 
production.  
In his seminal 1968 essay, Minimalist artist Robert Morris (2000: 244) 
considers that the visibility of process leads to revealing matter itself, while an 
artistic process is usually made invisible by the finished form and its use. Among 
the process-oriented matter-revealing21 methods which Morris (2000) puts 
forward are using tools in relation of materials, focusing on gravity and other 
ambient elements, accepting chance, rejecting forms and orders for things. I 
develop these concepts and methods of Morris’s so that they serve to elucidate the 
way in which the puppet-as-puppet figures of Group PMT are manipulated both on 
screen and in front of the camera in time during shooting. In doing so, I also aim at 
developing concrete, non-mystical terms with which an animated figure’s 
movement on screen can be viewed and described, instead of relying on the 
problematic ones, life and soul.  
This aim is similar to what Buchan (2006; 2011; 2013) seeks in her study 
of the work of the Quay Brothers. Observing the movements of the puppets which 
she describes as non-anthropomorphic in Street of Crocodiles, Buchan (2011: 87) 
points out that they emphasise their own artificial or nonhuman condition, after 
claiming that “in distinction to most anthropomorphized animated puppets, they 
 
21 In the essay, Morris suggests “the more direct revelation of matter itself” (2000: 244). This 
idea is part of his concept known as a post-object, process-oriented, type of work (Batchelor 
1997: 40). 
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do not perform a soul” (p.33). This observation develops towards the introduction 
of vitalism which Buchan (2013: 151) considers to work well for explaining a 
quality of “life” in the Quays’ animated mechanical objects.22 Drawing on her 
significant study of the Quays’ non-anthropomorphic puppets, I put into question 
Buchan’s discernment of vitalism from animism which she rejects as a view which 
presupposes the concept of soul. The question is not of whether or not animism is 
a belief system in which the filmmakers’ models, puppets and objects are 
successfully perceived by the viewer to assume a quality of life. Rather, my focus is 
on the revised definition of animism.  
As regards the religious term, Graham Harvey, a scholar of religious studies, 
indicates, “[Tylor] picked up Georg Stahl’s ‘animism’ but used it to refer to a theory 
of souls rather than of life-forces” (2006: 7).23 Unlike Tylor, according to Harvey 
(2006: 3-4), the eighteenth-century scientist Stahl originally conceptualised 
animism not as a religion but as a vitalist theory, opposing materialism, in which 
anima is defined as the living stuff. Further, there was no determined principle for 
discernment of animism from vitalism, as Harvey notes, “[Tylor] seems to have 
reanimated the earlier notion so that many references to animism at least blend 
‘belief in spirits or soul’ with ‘belief in life-energies’” (2006: 7). Criticising Tylor’s 
theory of animism as “old” animism, Harvey (2006: 3) puts forward the “new” 
animism as alternative to the predecessor. With this coined term, he (Harvey 2006: 
20-21) reconceptualises animism as relational epistemology, a non-
 
22 Buchan terms the Quays’ figures as vitalist machines, which in her definition, “are 
constructed using inanimate materials: wood, fabric and inorganic materials, including metal 
and machine parts” (2013: 144).  
23 For Tylor, as Harvey adds, “Evidence of [animism], formed at the beginning of human 
cultural evolution, is still found among the ‘lower races’ and in ‘survivals’ in the ‘civilised 
nations’” (2006: 7). As indicated here, the term itself has been used for racist discrimination. 
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anthropocentric philosophy of relationship with animals, plants, rocks and places 
as well as human beings.  
This theory is distinct from animism of the kind Bukatman (2012: Kindle 
512) refers to as primitive in double quotes and makes use of when he examines 
comics and hand-drawn animation films in an attempt to revive the religious 
concept in a critical sense. Bukatman comments on animism, “Sometimes it 
referred to a belief that inert objects possessed a soul; sometimes it referred to the 
attribution of ‘living character’ to those inert objects—one was innate, the other 
projective” (2012: Kindle 521). “However”, Harvey remarks on such a conventional 
view of animism, “it is a mistake to see this as a projection or attribution of human-
likeness or life-likeness onto ‘inanimate’ objects” (2006: 18). As my focus is on the 
human agent’s relationship with the puppet-as-puppet figures which I classify in 
Group PMT, what is eligible for this is the concept of the new animism and not that 
of the (old) animism which in my reading, Buchan and Bukatman draw on.  
A specific concept of the “person” is one of the central terms which the new 
animism puts emphasis on. Mentioning what Irving Hallowell24 found from the 
Ojibwe, one group of indigenous peoples in Canada during the first half of the 
twentieth century, Harvey states: 
 
While they do distinguish between persons and objects, the Ojibwe also 
challenge European notions of what a person is. To be a person does not 
require human-likeness, but rather humans are like other persons. Persons 
 
24 Harvey cites Hallowell (1960) Ojibwa ontology, behavior, and world view. In: Diamond, 
Stanley (ed.) Culture in History: Essays in Honor of Paul Radin, Columbia University Press, 19-52 
(Reprinted in Graham Harvey (ed.) (2002) Reading in Indigenous Religions: A Companion, 
London: Continuum, 18-49). 
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is the wider category, beneath which there may be listed sub-groups such 
as ‘human persons’, ‘rock persons’, ‘bear persons’ and others. (2006: 18) 
 
The new animist concept of the person involves not only humans but also the 
objects which are spoken with—termed other-than-human persons by Hallowell—
in contrast to those which are spoken about (Harvey 2006: xvii-xviii). The 
Canadian animists do not regard all objects as persons but those who they expect 
or learn to communicate with (Harvey 2006: 18).  
Such emphasis on the relationship with other-than-human entities is 
where I try to draw on the new animism for analysis of the Quay Brothers’ work. In 
correspondence with the critic Chris Robinson, the filmmakers state, “Puppets 
always held a strange mystique for us—the power of the mask, its ‘otherness,’ the 
fact that you had to ‘read’ them” (cited in Buchan 2011: 103). In this comment, 
puppets are something, located outside human beings’ perception, or the human 
world, that calls for a philosophy of relationship which Harvey (2006) defines the 
new animism to be.  
As Buchan associates the Quay Brothers’ films with “alchemy into a ‘world’ 
that we experience, respond to emotionally and interpret” (2006: 25), I connect 
their view of puppets as material and objects—both in production and screen 
projection—to Neoplatonism, a philosophy which influenced alchemy.25 In a 
 
25 Given that Harvey (2006: 195) classifies Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus as animist, 
Neoplatonism can be said to be a ‘survival’ in the Western civilisation. Nelson writes: 
In that critical [sixteenth] century, battlefield for the clash of what Keith Thomas aptly 
described as the “Neoplatonic versus Aristotelian views of the properties of matter,” 
the Aristotelian view won, effectively removing gnosis belief in a supernatural world 
with causal and moral links to the material world as a cornerstone of Western 
intellectual culture. (2001: 56) 
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published interview, the Quays (2012: 23) intimate that puppets as matter have 
their own realm or universe, going on to state that “matter was never dead; the 
lifelessness was only for hiding unknown forms of life; that it was in a constant 
state of fermentation and migration” (p.25). In conversation about objects, 
including puppets, with Peter Hames, similarly, SŠvankmajer replies, “I prefer the 
kind of objects which, in my opinion, have some kind of inner life” (1995b: 110). 
Roger Cardinal comments of SŠvankmajer’s stance of objects, “The implication may 
indeed be an alchemical one, that even base matter such as mud and clay is capable 
of transcending inertia, so that, nothing in the world can really be written off as 
dead” (1995: 89). Both filmmakers’ mode of relationship with objects triggers me 
to review central Neoplatonists’ concept of objects, either organic or inorganic.  
Gregory Shaw’s explanation on the theory of Iamblichus, a founding 
philosopher of Neoplatonism, is indicative of the relationship between humans, 
objects and the world: 
 
The continuity (sunecheia) and kinship (sungeneia) of the cosmos were 
essential to Iamblichus’s theory of theurgy. Based on the principle that 
there was an unbroken continuity throughout the cosmos (DM 20, 5), 
Iamblichus could defend rites that used material objects. Theoretically, any 
object could connect the human soul with the gods because the entire 
world was their energia and therefore manifested their presence. As 
Iamblichus put it, the gods were “present immaterially within material 
 
Being defeated at the philosophical clash, however, Neoplatonism was influential in the cultural 
history of the West, according to Richard T. Wallis (1995: 173-174), in particular on Spinoza, 
Leibniz and Schelling on the one hand, and Willian Blake and British Romantics in the field of 
literature on the other. 
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things” (DM 232, 15-16), and therefore invoked the gods in accord with 
their different expressions (DM 30, 13). (1995: 133-134) 
 
Richard T. Wallis also summarises a Neoplatonic principle expounded by Proclus, 
another founder of the religio-philosophy, which states that “the whole material 
world is the mirror of invisible divine powers; hence in virtue of the network of 
forces linking image to archetype, manipulation of the appropriate material objects 
brings the theurgists into contact with deities they represent” (1995: 107; 
emphasis mine). Justified with this doctrine is “theurgy”, a ritual performance or 
process with animals, plants, stones and other objects. For Iamblichus, theurgy 
involves the act of evocation, which is to conjure the gods and their powers from 
objects in which they are already inherent (Shaw 1995: 177).  
I appropriate the three Neoplatonic terms, theurgy, evocation and force, to 
theorise the unconventional and the non-anthropocentric of SŠvankmajer, the Quay 
Brothers and Kawamoto with respect to the mode in which their puppets appear to 
move on screen. First, I consider that these filmmakers are “theurgic” animators in 
contrast to the demiurgic animators, like Fleischer, who perform as creators on 
screen in Group INT. Second, the theurgic animators do not seek to make objects 
appear to come to life, but to “evoke forces” inherent in them on screen. 
Accordingly, I develop the hypothesis that the movements seen in Group PMT can 
give the viewer the impression of a non-anthropocentric (as well as non-Christian) 
origin from which they come, without being reduced to any anthropocentric 
purposes or concepts. I take force as one of the most influential on the non-
anthropomorphic impression of movement. As a quality demonstrated and 
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visualised in a form of motion by puppet bodies in animation, this third term can 
replace life and soul, the terms which I criticised above as problematic in animation 
studies.  
Today force is a quantitative physical concept of Newtonian mechanics—
also called classical. In this modern science, the concept is defined simply in the 
equation, F=ma, in which the force on an object is equal to its mass multiplied by its 
acceleration; this is called Newton’s second law of motion. Importantly, the English 
scientist’s three laws of motion are highly influential on the way of dealing with 
figures of humans, animals and objects in stop-motion animation and also hand-
drawn animation. Explaining the difference between a real human dancer’s 
performance and a stop-motion puppet’s on-screen performance, Purves refers to 
Newton’s laws of motion: 
 
Many techniques from the world of dance can be used in stop-motion, as 
long as they are properly adapted. Dancers often ‘pop’ or ‘snap’ into a 
strong pose to accent it. This energetic flick is hard to translate directly into 
stop-motion as it would simply take too many frames, and it could easily 
look like an awkward jolt. However, it is possible to play with changes of 
rhythm that give the same effect. In dance, this movement works by 
suddenly stopping and seemingly ignoring the physical rules of inertia. 
With stop-motion, it is almost the opposite. A puppet’s movement works 
when the audience sees it affected by gravity, weight and inertia, as long as 
the effects are expressed clearly and deliberately. (2014: Kindle 2681) 
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What is significant in Purves’ account is that the effect of gravity as a force on a 
puppet body should be demonstrated and visualised with the frame-by-frame 
photography, in the process of which the body does not move in the same way as in 
live action. The body does not fall because it is held up or fixed at a position every 
time shooting.  
There is a similar expectation of the effect of gravity in hand-drawn 
animation, in particular which pertains to Groups INT and CEL. In their book, 
Timing for Animation, focused on the production of hand-drawn and CG animation 
for entertainment industry, for example, the authors, Harold Whitaker, John Halas 
and Tom Sito, state: 
 
You can draw a circle and declare it to be anything from a soap bubble to a 
cannon ball. We the audience will only understand what it is when we see 
how it moves and interacts with its environment. Newton’s first law of 
motion stated that things do not move unless a force acts on them. So in 
animation the movement itself is of secondary importance; the vital factor 
is how the action expresses the underlying causes of the movement. With 
inanimate objects these causes may be natural forces, mainly gravity. With 
living characters the same external forces can cause movement, plus the 
contractions of muscles but, more importantly, there are the underlying 
will, mood, instincts and so on of the character who is moving. (2009: 
Kindle 251; emphasis mine) 
 
In this citation, the authors are concerned with the conventional way of 
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demarcating between figures animate and inanimate, by postulating that the latter 
lacks any underlying cause like will, mood and instincts. For them, force is an 
external condition rather than a cause underlying in a figure moving in animation.  
However, Neoplatonic and other similar religio-philosophical traditions 
take force as inherent in objects, either organic or inorganic. Jammer summarises: 
 
As to the concept of force, taken originally in analogy to human will power, 
spiritual influence, or muscular effort, the concept became projected into 
inanimate objects as a power dwelling in physical things. Omitting at 
present some intermediate stages, the concept of force became 
instrumental for the definition of “mass,” which in its turn gave rise to the 
definition of “momentum.” Subsequently classical mechanics redefined the 
concept of force as the time rate of change of momentum, excluding 
thereby, at least prima facie, all animistic vestiges of earlier definitions. 
Finally, “force” became a purely relational notion, almost ready to be 
eliminated from the conceptual construction altogether. (1999: 7) 
 
In my thesis, force works not only as a term defined in Newton’s classical 
mechanics but also involving those non-Newtonian implications. In his wide-
ranging study of the concept of force varying in the history of philosophy as well as 
science, Jammer remarks on the work of the seventeenth-century leading scientist 
Johannes Kepler: “Indeed, in one and the same work the concept of force is 
sometimes referred to as a soul and sometimes as a physical, almost mechanical 
corporeal quantity” (1999: 81). The German scientist’s view is preceded by the 
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comparison of the motive force—termed “impetus”—with soul in pre-Newtonian 
mechanics, as Jammer writes of the discussion of the fifteenth-century philosopher, 
theologian and astronomer Nicolas of Cusa: 
 
In the continuation of this discussion the circular motion of the globe is 
compared to the soul inherent in the body. The impetus animates the globe 
as the soul animates the human body. (1999: 71) 
 
Examining the puppet-as-puppet models which I classify in Group PMT, I 
focus on the term of force, as a material and nonhuman part of the force-soul 
comparison, which is regarded as inherent in all the objects, including the puppet-
as-puppet models, by the filmmakers of the Group. This focus is pertinent to the 
case studies which I conduct in terms of movement, as a physical and visible 
parameter in animation, the mode of which varies from an animator or a human 
agent’s view of objects to another’s. My examination of Group PMT in terms of 
force is of the way in which the puppet-as-puppet models of the Group appear to 
inflect or elude the laws of motion taken for granted in the conventional 
production of stop-motion animation which I locate in Group STM.  
I stress that force is not only a conceptual but also a technical issue, which 
draws to attention how the filmmakers of Group PMT manipulate and interact in a 
physical sense with puppet bodies in production to evoke a non-anthropomorphic 
and non-anthropocentric sense of movement. This issue brings me to the Quay 
Brothers who in the 2012 published interview, put forward “a ‘listening eye’—one 
that would allow you to hear the infinitesimal hum inside the lips of the puppet” 
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(Quay Brothers 2012: 23). In the conversation, further, the Quays agree that 
fingertips become eyes listening to puppets’ lips in the same way as Braille. For 
these filmmakers, touching objects does not merely mean to exert a physical force 
on, but rather to look at and listen to them in a synesthetic way.  
The “tactile” and the “manual” are involved in the concept of concrete 
animation elaborated on by an experimental animation filmmaker George Griffin 
who proposes, “A brush stroke, a paper texture, a smeared pencil mark—all are 
evidence of human intelligence and labor” (2007: 260). Such evidence makes 
visible an artistic process with tools and materials, gravity and other ambient 
elements, and chance against forms and orders, in terms of Morris’s (2000) 
process-oriented conceptualisation as I reviewed above.26  
SŠvankmajer’s film work is where Griffin observes the concept of touching 
objects in terms of concrete animation. Indeed, touch is the sense which the Czech 
filmmaker puts most emphasis on. In conversation with Hames, SŠvankmajer states: 
 
In addition to hermetic sciences, I believe in the “conservation” of certain 
contents in objects which people touch under conditions of extreme 
sensitiveness. The “emotionally” charged objects are then under certain 
conditions capable of revealing these contents and touching them provides 
associations and analogies for our own flashes of the unconscious. Thus, in 
several of my films I used an object or a whole group of objects which I 
“heard”. (Hames 1995b: 110) 
 
26 The concept of evidence in the artistic process is discussed in the use of the term, faktura. 
This will be explained in detail, when I analyse Group PMT in Chapter Five. 
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Like the Quay Brothers, SŠvankmajer believes that the sensation of touch enables 
him to hear what they speak. As touching a model, a puppet or an object in 
animation production takes place alternately with frame-by-frame shooting, in my 
hypothesis this artistic process can present itself as and results in a mode of a 
puppet’s movement on screen.  
I term as “trajectory” the mode, or the path, which the puppet-as-puppet 
figures of Group PMT follow on screen, to signify its two aspects. One is that it 
rejects a goal-oriented implication of animated characters’ on-screen performance 
which Crafton conceptualises. As I reviewed above, the Quay Brothers and 
SŠvankmajer do not intend to make a puppet or an object on screen seem to perform 
what it is not. A possible alternative term to such goal-oriented performance might 
be “choreography” which the Quays use to indicate their work with models, 
puppets and objects as Buchan (2011: 99) discusses, interviewing them, in her 
study of their aesthetics. However, choreography is still too inclusive a term to 
signify the concreteness of non-anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric details 
of the movement which the filmmakers of Group PMT seek to present on screen.  
For this reason, I work with trajectory, a term involving the sense of 
evidence in which a stop-motion animator exerts action force on a puppet or an 
object, during frame-by-frame shooting, at the same time when the latter exerts 
reaction force on the former.27 Given that the Quay Brothers and SŠvankmajer 
conceive their physical interaction with models, puppets and objects as 
communication with them, the trajectory which I describe and interpret in Group 
 
27 This action-reaction pair is the way in which force works in Newton’s third law of motion. 
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PMT should be discerned from the mechanical trajectory along which as 
formularised in Newton’s classical mechanics, an object is supposed to move in the 
gravitational field.  
Of the filmmakers I classify in the Group, I need to explain that as distinct 
from the Quay Brothers and SŠvankmajer, Kawamoto has an East Asian, Japanese, 
religio-philosophical background including Shintoism, in relation to Japanese 
theatrical traditions like bunraku and noh. As for Shintoism, a religion dominant in 
Japan, I draw on Yamakage who notes:  
 
The sensitivity through which Japanese people can see the vital energy of 
Kami [deities of Shinto] in all of nature is also rich in spirituality, since it 
feels and perceives various kinds of spirits. From a Western point of view 
this way of perception is called pantheism or animism, which means a way 
that perceives the spirit in every living organism or natural formation. 
(2006: 31) 
 
Like other animist traditions including Neoplatonism, this Shintoist view goes as 
far as to embrace puppets and inorganic objects. Here, I do not intend to equate the 
Japanese religion with Neoplatonism; this is not a subject in my thesis. What is 
pertinent to the thesis is a view, I find in common among them, of the relationship 
between human beings, objects and the world. Considering this commonality of the 
worldviews, and rejecting the binary opposition between the West and the East 
(Said 1995), I am also tempted to draw on Wallis (1995: 13-15; 86; 90; 130; 169; 
175) who observing the history of Neoplatonism, frequently remarks that there 
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were relations in demographic and geographic terms between the philosophy and 
Eastern or “Oriental” mysticism. This allows me to discuss Kawamoto’s Shintoist 
and other Eastern religio-philosophical backgrounds along with Neoplatonism 
which I find influential on the Quay Brothers and SŠvankmajer.  
Influenced by Trnka’s view of puppets during his on-the-job training at the 
Czech puppet master’s studio in Prague in the mid-1960s, Kawamoto states of the 
puppet’s movement for stop-motion animation in relation to bunraku: 
 
What matters is . . . simply speaking, animators should understand what 
the puppet is. The point is not to make it [the movement of the puppet] 
look like human, but create it . . . This issue is similar to that of bunraku. In 
their early days, bunraku puppeteers tried to make the movements of 
puppets close to those of human beings, but it was impossible. Instead, 
they turned to seeking the essence of movement by excluding unnecessary 
movements. I mean that the created action is not an imitation of human 
actions in which otiosity abounds, but rather the essence of movement. In 
other words, a puppet’s action created by an excellent animator is more 
refined and essential than that of a human being. (2015: 113; English 
translation mine) 
 
This view is found in the essay on bunraku by Donald Keene (1990), who also 
observes puppets used to perform for religious or folkloric traditions. Keene 
writes, “These Shinto puppets are not representations of divinities (in the manner 
of Buddhist or Christian images) but, rather, wooden creatures temporarily 
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“possessed” by gods whose actions they recreate, much as the medium herself is 
believed to repeat, when “possessed,” words uttered by the god himself” (1990: 
129). Kawamoto is located in and conscious of these religio-philosophical and 
theatrical contexts. Asked, “What is the puppet?”, Kawamoto does not hesitate to 
answer, “It is a serving god” (Yokota 2007: 123).  
Further, the Japanese animator suggests a non-anthropocentric stance of 
the material condition of the bunraku puppet’s movement in relation to kabuki, a 
form of traditional Japanese theatre performed by human actors. In conversation 
with Kawamoto, Bunjaku Yoshida, the master bunraku puppeteer, points out: 
 
When human bodies move, their movement usually begins at the shoulder. 
In kabuki, the actors move at the elbow as a viewpoint. I guess this came 
from bunraku in which the three-puppeteer system resulted in puppets 
moving at the elbow as a viewpoint. (2007: 114; English translation mine) 
 
Bunraku puppets’ influence on human kabuki actors in terms of 
performance is supported by Keene who remarks, “The supremacy of Bunraku was 
undisputed in Osaka, and in Edo, where Kabuki remained more popular, the actors 
felt obliged to borrow jōruri28 texts and even details of performance from the 
puppets” (1990: 142). This implies that in Kawamoto’s work, the puppet-as-puppet 
models are not only presented on screen to form a similar trajectory to bunraku 
puppets, but also that Kawamoto, the human agent himself, is part of the network 
of forces at the profilmic level to form such a bunraku-like trajectory in production.  
 
28 This term is the older name of the puppet theatre in Japan. 
 77 
Analysing Group PMT in Chapter Five, my aim is to show that when the 
filmmakers of the Group animate models, puppets or objects, they have 
unconventional concepts of animating which are not simply reduced to the 
conventional concept of “bringing something inanimate to life”. The trajectory of 
forces exchanged between the filmmakers and their materials inflects, eludes and 
disturbs a sense of the gravitational field which conventional animation seeks to 
instantiate and reproduce in accordance with the belief system of classical 
mechanics.  
This is where I am tempted to build on Bennett’s politico-philosophical 
discussion of a non-anthropocentric relationship with and sensibility of objects 
and materials, as she suggests that “to experience the relationship between persons 
and other materialities more horizontally[,] is to take a step toward a more 
ecological sensibility” (2010: Kindle 452).29 This worldview is termed “vital 
materialism” by Bennett (2010). What interests me is that in exploration of such a 
non-anthropocentric experience, the philosopher refers to “films, religious 
practices, news media rituals, neuroscientific experiments, and other noncanonical 
means of ethical will formation” (2010: Kindle 134). This suggestion supports my 
research of the non-anthropocentric of the modes of movement demonstrated by 
the puppet-as-puppet figures in Group PMT. At the same time, asking herself a 
question of how to develop the ability of sensing and perceiving such experiences, 
Bennett proposes, “One tactic might be to revisit and become temporarily infected 
by discredited philosophies of nature, risking ‘the taint of superstition, animism, 
 
29 The term, persons, is used along with people in Bennett (2010). In my reading, both 
basically signify human beings or a group of human beings; the term does not involve 
nonhuman animals, plants and objects that Harvey (2006) reports are referred to as persons in 
the context of the new animism. 
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vitalism, anthropomorphism, and other premodern attitudes’” (2010: Kindle 17).30 
This wide-ranging scope in Bennett’s discussion pertains to my research which 
revisits and reviews religio-philosophical discourses and traditions relating to the 
puppet and human simulacra. As Bennett develops recent thoughts in 
consideration of such premodern predecessors, I will foreground the former rather 
than the latter in analysis of the cases of Group PMT—for example, quasi-agency 
and thing-power, which I will explain later in Chapter Five which the Group is 
allocated to. 
The trajectory of forces which the filmmakers of Group PMT evoke in a 
model, a puppet or an object in production results in creating and presenting 
another force field on and across screen. Such a physico-aesthetic sensation can be 
viewed within the context of film-making/viewing from Buchan’s (2013) 
conceptualisation of a “cinema of apprehension”. Focusing on the Quay Brothers’ 
films, Buchan puts forward the term:  
 
Because the spectator’s experience is one of uncertainty, indeterminacy 
and undecidability, apprehension is the name which I will give to this 
ambivalent oscillation. Apprehension is the cognitive condition of partial 
understanding (as opposed to comprehension which claims understanding 
of wholes), of grasping something with the intellect, but only partially. 
Apprehended knowledge can be: first-hand and sensory; knowledge that 
comes from others, or abstract concepts that conflict with our direct 
 
30 Here, Bennett cites W. J. T. Mitchell (2005: 149) What Do Pictures Want? The Lives and Loves 
of Images. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
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sensory—or phenomenal—apprehension. (2013: 160-61; emphasis mine) 
 
The concept of a cinema of apprehension is helpful for discussion of Group PMT 
because it addresses the two aspects; one is the materiality of cinema as a medium 
and the other the communicative, yet unlikely to be fulfilled, relationship between 
viewer and viewed. Further, Buchan (2013) considers a cinema of apprehension in 
relation and contrast to the sensation aroused by filmed and photographed ghosts 
or sprits that Tom Gunning (2007) discusses. Buchan comments that Gunning’s 
approach: 
 
precisely targets the phenomenological, how ghosts present themselves to 
the living, their mode of apprehension if not perception. The mode of 
appearing becomes crucial with ghosts and spirits because they are 
generally understood, by both believers and skeptics, to be apparitions 
rather than ordinary material objects” [sic] (cited in Buchan 2013: 154-
155).31 
 
Discussing the sensation aroused in and by a cinema of apprehension, Buchan 
discerns the Quay Brothers’ on-screen objects in terms of material existence from 
the images of ghosts allegedly signifying the human beings believed to no longer 
exist or be alive in the real world. Buchan indicates: 
 
The Quay Brothers' objects, however, are not apparitions of this sort 
 
31 Buchan cites Gunning (2007: 103). See the Bibliography for the detail of the reference. 
 80 
[ghostly photographs]; they are experienced as cinematic actants made of 
ordinary materials that can be modally experienced as physical objects 
with the material and cultural origins of the matter they are made from 
intact. (2013: 155).  
 
In much the same terms of materiality, in Chapter Five for Group PMT I will 
work with Gunning’s (2007) discussion of ghosts in film and photography because 
such supernatural phenomena are associated with ordinary materials and objects 
in Jean-Claude Schmitt’s (1998) comprehensive study of ghosts in the Middle Ages 
in the West. Schmitt remarks clearly: 
 
But a ghost did not always have a human appearance. In reported tales, 
unlike autobiographical tales, the dead person sometimes took on the 
shape of a material object (a haystack) or, more often, of an animal—a bird, 
a dog, a reptile, or a horse. (1998: 196) 
 
Similarly, material objects or artefacts as ghosts are given the name, 
tsukumogami, in Japan.32 According to the yokai (ghost and apparition in Japanese) 
scholar Kazuhiko Komatsu (2003: 150), tsukumogami are ghosts which emerge 
from old artefacts or objects used by their human owners for a long time. The 
Japanese scholar’s approach is similar to Gunning’s in that both develop their study 
 
32 The belief of tsukumogami in Japan is still alive in the religious practice known as ningyo 
kuyo (NHK 2012). Puppets and dolls are believed to have tamashii, a kind of soul, and this 
belief makes their human owners feel guilty when they want to dispose the objects. Rituals for 
such puppets and dolls are held for the sake of the owners both in Shinto shrines and also 
Buddhist temples. 
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of the paranormal or preternatural subjects by examining the mediated imagery of 
them; the former takes up emaki, the traditional Japanese scroll form of a narrative 
painting, and the latter photographs and films. Examining the stop-motion 
animation films of Group PMT in Chapter Five as alternative to Group STM, I 
explore with the concept of apprehension and ghosts the force, movement and 
trajectory evoked from the puppet-as-puppet models and other objects in a 
physico-aesthetic communication with the filmmakers who I refer to as theurgic in 
this thesis.  
In the next section of Methodology, I explain how I will examine and 
analyse the cases I classify in the four Groups, not to mention the meaning and 





My research focuses on the relationship between animation practices with and 
concepts of puppets specifically presented as puppets on screen. In other words, I 
explore the way in which such concepts are demonstrated, instantiated in 
animation practices, and further the way in which animation practices engender 
alternative concepts to conventional ones. This approach is inspired by Gilles 
Deleuze (2003) who in his book, Francis Bacon: Logic of Sensation, discusses the 
titular artist’s paintings. In the Translator’s Introduction, Daniel W. Smith 
comments on the French philosopher’s approach to the paintings: 
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Yet art itself is an equally creative enterprise of thought, but one whose 
object is to create sensible aggregates rather than concepts. Great artists 
are also great thinkers, but they think in terms of percepts and affects 
rather than concepts: painters think in terms of lines and colors, just as 
musicians think in sounds, filmmakers think in images, writers think in 
words, and so on. None of these activities has any priority over the others. 
Creating a concept is neither more difficult nor more abstract than creating 
new visual, sonorous, or verbal combinations in art; conversely, it is no 
easier to read an image, painting, or novel than it is to comprehend a 
concept. Philosophy, for Deleuze, can never be undertaken independently 
of art (or science). (2003: viii) 
 
As in this thesis I consider animation films to be created by filmmakers, I take 
Deleuze’s approach in examining puppet-as-puppet figures and their movements 
on screen in animation.  
Unlike Deleuze who scrutinises the paintings of Bacon alone and as 
referred to in Smith’s above-mentioned account, I am not engaged in animation 
filmmakers, or animators, from the perspective of “great artists”. Rather, one of my 
aims in this thesis is to revisit and criticise the puppet-as-puppet figures employed 
in conventional hand-drawn and stop-motion animation films (respectively Groups 
CEL and STM). As regards my stance on filmmakers and animators in relation to 
their work under analysis, I draw on Thompson’s neoformalist assumption of 
filmmakers or artists, as she puts forward: 
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I want to make clear that neoformalism's stress on inventiveness and 
originality does not place us back in the "Great Man" theory of history, 
which would assume that the individual's inspirations are the source of all 
innovations in art. Neoformalism assumes that artists are rational agents, 
making choices they judge appropriate to an end they have in view. (1988: 
35) 
 
The neoformalist concept of the rational agent also provides the alternative view 
to the concept of great artists’ artworks. The view assumes that “films are artificial 
constructs” and “involve a specifically aesthetic, non-practical type of perception” 
(Thompson 1988: 35). These two assumptions help examine each case of the 
puppet-as-puppet figures, which I select from the films possibly classified in 
different categories, e.g. “children’s film” or “art film”, in terms of the way in which 
it functions in the film narrative, instead of its being subsumed under the debate of 
whether the film is artistic or creative. Following the neoformalist assumptions, 
Thompson asserts, “[B]ecause playfully entertaining films can engage our 
perceptions as complexly as can films dealing with serious, difficult themes, 
neoformalism does not distinguish between ‘high’ and ‘low’ art in films” (1988: 9). 
In this thesis focused on puppet-as-puppet figures in animation, I conduct 
the studies of the cases which I find are emblematic of each of the four Groups. The 
method of the case study has been referred to as valid and helpful by Darley 
(2007) and Buchan (2014) within the context of animation studies. Criticising a 
perennial approach—to distinguish animation from live-action film—in animation 
studies, Darley stresses, “My point is that we must establish and explore these 
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differences and the implications they hold comparatively and case by case rather 
than through generalization based on essentialist claims to superiority in some 
respect or other” (2007: 67; emphasis mine).33 The media scholar urges us to 
engage with different aesthetic motives and aims within a multiplicity of animation 
practices, and yet in my view, he does not give sufficient clues of how to work with 
those cases of animation practices. 
In her essay, “Animation, in Theory”, Buchan seeks to elaborate on how to 
conduct case studies in more detail. Building on Noël Carroll’s (2009: 13) notion of 
criticism in art, she suggests that each different technique of animation “requires 
its own unique description, classification, and a set of suitable and applicable 
formal parameters that would allow analysis based on distinctive aesthetic 
qualities and technical properties of artistic media” (2014: Kindle 2577). This calls 
attention to three activities as a specific answer to the issue of method I addressed 
above. In short, they mean to (1) classify cases under examination, to (2) describe 
each of them and to (3) define formal parameters for analysis. Proceeding with 
case studies, I build on and develop the methods theorised by Carroll for 
classification; and by Thompson, Erwin Panofsky, Arnheim and Herbert Zettl for 
textual and visual analysis, focusing on hand-drawn and stop-motion figures and 
their movements. These methods should not be separated from, but rather be 
interwoven with each other when applied in the progress of research in the thesis.  
 
 
33 This encouragement of case studies follows Darley’s stress of the variety and difference of 
animation practices: “Practices which operate against or outside the established modes are 
also possible, indeed necessary: alongside the operation of traditional media systems, not just 
the perfecting but also the stretching or breaking of established rules or practices is part of the 
process” (2007: 64). 
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Classification of cases in four Groups 
In this subsection, for the case studies I explain how to select and classify puppet-
as-puppet figures or the films in which they appear. In my PhD research project, 
selecting and classifying them took place in quite a simultaneously way. The very 
method of classification is informed by Carroll (2009), who discusses the validity 
and effect of the method for the evaluation of disparate artworks. In his view, 
classification is “[f]undamental . . . because, once we know the category (or 
categories) to which the artwork belongs, we have a sense of the kind of 
expectations that it is appropriate to bring to the work—which knowledge, in turn, 
provides us with a basis for determining whether the work has succeeded or failed, 
at least on its own terms” (2009: Kindle 1207). For puppet-as-puppet figures, the 
subject of my thesis, there are no categories generally shared in animation studies. 
This situation requires developing and defining them in terms of appropriate 
criteria.  
At the same time, I proceeded with selecting cases of puppet-as-puppet 
figures by means of neoformalist assumptions and concepts. One of the 
assumptions is that the viewer is active or consciously aware (Thompson 1988; 
Christie 1998; Buchan 2006). Over more than four decades, as such a viewer I have 
developed different sets of viewing skills for different categories of animation films 
circulated through television, theatres, video cassettes and discs, film festivals and 
other media platforms. In this experience of viewing animation and further, while 
conducting this PhD research, I found transtextual motivation with specific themes, 
across animation films of different types, one of which is puppets or 
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human/animal simulacra animated in the figurative sense of this term. This finding 
led me to inquire into the symptomatic meaning of the animated puppets on 
screen, that is to say, what belief systems or philosophical backgrounds are 
involved in the formal devices. And conversely, both transtextual theme and 
symptomatic meaning acted as a catalyst for me to define and focus on some 
groups of films and figures, and further, subgroups of a couple of groups, towards 
classification with criteria developed for these candidates.  
In doing so, I decided to single out a set of cases as emblematic for each 
group or each subgroup. This decision was made in consideration of three factors, 
for which I am partially inspired by Carroll’s (2009) account on criticism of the 
arts: historical significance, popularity and critical value, and each factor is 
interwoven with the other in the decision-making process. First, historical 
significance is a factor in terms of which we can assess how much influence a film 
or a figure had on its subsequent ones, either explicitly or implicitly, in time. The 
extent of influence can be usually identified in animation-related literature, 
filmmakers’ interviews and other referential sources. For instance, Gertie the 
Dinosaur is so easy for animation scholars to find referred to as something like a 
pathfinder in early animation history. It also works as a case, rather than an 
example, which triggers my inquiry of the way in which animators perform as life-
givers of their artistic creations on screen.  
Second, I take into account the popularity of a film or a figure in the sense 
that it indicates the extent to which a set of transtextual themes are put into play 
within communities of film production and reception like the Tooniverse and the 
Puppetopos. This factor can be perceived through the investigation of the context 
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in which a film was produced—if it is a product by a “Hollywood” studio usually 
oriented for a mass audience, most of transtextual themes in it can be considered 
as already prevalent—as well as a viewer’s own extensive viewing experience and 
publicity materials. For example, Disney’s Pinocchio is my choice among many 
Pinocchio-themed counterparts like The Adventures of Buratino (Ivan Ivanov-Vano, 
Dmitriy Babichenko and Mikhail Botov, 1959, RUS), The Adventures of Pinocchio 
(Giuliano Cenci, 1972, ITL), the Japanese animated television series, Pinocchio: The 
Series (Kashi No Ki No Mokku) (Seitaro Hara, 1972, JPN), Pinocchio 3000 (Daniel 
Robichaud, 2004, CND) and Pinocchio (Enzo D'Alò, 2012, ITL)—as I explain in the 
last subsection of the Methodology, digitally created films are excluded from my 
corpus in this thesis.  
Yet, the phenomenon of popularity varies in magnitude and visibility 
between different zones like the Tooniverse and the Puppetopos, between leading, 
supporting and background figures. There might be some films or figures 
marginalised in the context which it belongs to. For instance, it is quite difficult to 
find The Bachelor Machine referred to in literature and materials relating to 
animation even in the Puppetopos, but the stop-motion animation film addresses 
the issue of perception of humanness or nonhumanness in a radical manner. When 
there are two equivalent candidates, Manipulation (Daniel Greaves, 1991, UK) and 
Cat and Mouse (James Richardson, 1987, US), my choice should be the former film 
because this criticises the way in which animators perform as life-givers of their 
artistic creations. Likewise, I select Jabberwocky among SŠvankmajer’s many films, 
not because it is of historical significance or of popularity but because it abounds 
with dolls, objects and materials in motion on screen which resist any attempt to 
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reduce them to what they are not. For this reason, critical value should be 
considered to bring to the fore a film or a figure in terms of relevance to my 
research aims which include to elucidate and contest the convention of puppet-as-
puppet figures in animation film, and to make clear how puppet-as-puppet figures 
of unconventional kinds work in an alternative way to them. Selected in terms of 
the three factors, all the cases are detailed with respect to what is specifically 
emblematic about them in the early part of each of the following Chapters. 
The criteria for developing the typology of puppet-as-puppet figures can be 
derived in consideration of the three kinds of reasons—structural, historico-
contextual and intentional—for classification that Carroll (2009: Kindle 2222) 
refers to as enabling an objective evaluation of an artwork. In my reading, first, the 
structural reasons suggested by Carroll relate to identifying the formal aspects of 
an artwork which is defined to be an artificial construct in the neoformalist 
assumption. A second kind of reasons that Carroll terms historico-contextual 
address the context within which an artwork is produced, as the scholar asks us “to 
situate it in its art-historical context—whether institutional or more broadly 
cultural” (2009: Kindle 2246). Third, the intentional reasons have to do with 
reading what categories an artist expected an artwork of his or hers to belong to 
(Carroll 2009: Kindle 2268). These three kinds of reasons indicate that it is 
possible to categorise or classify artworks in terms of formal elements, contexts 
and the human agent’s intention. 
In this vein, I define the criteria pertaining to the three reasons for my 
subject, and the categories which each of them engenders. For the formal aspect, I 
take into account the technique of animation which involves the dimension of 
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profilmic elements. Drawing on this criterion in relation to puppet-as-puppet 
figures in animation, I take three categories of films, hand-drawn (two-
dimensional) animation films, stop-motion (three-dimensional) animation films 
and the hybrid (two- and three-dimensional) films with hand-drawn figures and 
live human actors.  
What I bring into focus for the contextual aspect of the figures is the 
convention of classical Hollywood filmmaking, which Thompson regards as “one of 
the most pervasive and helpful backgrounds against which we can examine many 
films” (1988: 24). The film scholar continues: 
 
Historically, the type of filmmaking associated with Hollywood from the 
mid-1910s to the present has been widely seen by audiences and widely 
imitated by other filmmaking nations all over the world. As a result, vast 
numbers of viewers have developed their most normative viewing skills by 
watching classical films. Moreover, many filmmakers who have worked in 
original ways have set up formal systems that play off and challenge those 
normative skills. (Thompson 1988: 24) 
 
In light of Thompson, I derive two categories for my case studies; whether or not 
the film draws on the convention of Hollywood (or its equivalents like anime). 
Further, Crafton (2013: 22) conceptualises the Tooniverse, as the context focused 
on classical hand-drawn animation, that I introduced in the Literature Review. As a 
revision of the Hollywood context, the Tooniverse involves viewers, who Crafton 
(2013: 22) defines as collaborating with animators on the shared ground of a set of 
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belief systems. In addition to the Tooniverse focusing on the involvement of 
viewers, I have conceptualised the Puppetopos above in the subsection about 
Group STM in the Literature Review , in order to underscore the phenomenological 
aspect of the context within which stop-motion animation films are produced and 
received. In my thesis, Hollywood, the Tooniverse and the Puppetopos will work to 
signify the common context of “classical” filmmaking, in relation to the way in 
which each of three respectively stresses the contextual focus: the filmmaking 
convention; the viewer’s involvement and the belief system; the relationship 
between the (animating and viewing) human agent and the profilmic object. 
For the intentional aspect, I consider in what sense a filmmaker or an 
animator seeks to depict puppet-as-puppet figures in each film, because the focus 
of my analysis is individual figures rather than films themselves. As discussed in 
the Literature Review, there are two opposite intentions, anthropocentric and non-
anthropocentric—respectively having a close relationship with anthropomorphic 
and non-anthropomorphic, in defining and depicting puppet-as-puppet figures in 
the film diegesis. One involves ranking them as human simulacra inferior and 
subject to, if sometimes challenging, human characters (similarly, as animal 
simulacra inferior to animal characters) in the film narrative. The other seeks to 
present an alternative to the way in which puppet-as-puppet figures are 
anthropomorphised and then marginalised under the order of such an 
anthropocentric hierarchy—master/slave and real/fake.  
Both intentions differ from each other in terms of narrative motivation. 
This relates and is often due to the context of Hollywood. Observing hand-drawn 
animated films created in Hollywood, Thompson indicates, “Cartoons also imitated 
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live-action films, in that they quickly come to depend on stars (often derived from 
popular comic strips) and narrative” (1988: 110). The cartoon stars should be 
anthropomorphic, as Grodal (1997: 89) suggests that living or anthropomorphic 
figures play an effective role to keep mass audiences interested in films which they 
are viewing. I take these preferences as parallel to anthropocentric intention in 
which puppet-as-puppet figures and their movements tend to be subordinated to 
the film narrative and the characters that perform as living beings in it. In contrast, 
non-anthropocentric intention tends to foreground the formal and kinetic elements 
of figures of that kind in the intention of “parametric narration” (Bordwell 1985; 
Thompson 1988). Later, I will provide more detail of narrative motivation and 
parametric narration in relation to textual analysis. 
 
The four Groups outlined under the subheading of Thesis organisation in the 
Introduction are defined with respect to the three kinds of criteria that I developed 
above (See Table 1.2). The following is the detail of the Groups in which I classify 
films in relation to the puppet-as-puppet figures appearing in them; the 
emblematic cases of each Group will be explained later in the beginning of the 
relevant Chapter. 
 
 Formal aspect Contextual aspect Intentional aspect 
Group INT 
Hybrid of hand-drawn 
animation and live action 






Group CEL Hand-drawn animation 
Group STM 
Stop-motion animation 





Table 1.2 Three aspects of classification for case studies 
 
Group INT (See Figure i-a) centres on the hand-drawn figure of a human or 
an animal as a creation (e.g. Koko the Clown) in interaction with a live human actor 
playing its creator (e.g. Max Fleischer) on screen. In this Group, the term, puppet, 
does not refer to the literal meaning but rather the status of a human or animal 
simulacrum in the film narrative. Both the puppet and the human being appear on 
screen, yet separated from each other in terms of profilmic materiality; one is a 
hand-drawn figure in animation and the other an actor in live action. Within the 
Hollywood context are most of the films which I classify in Group INT.  
Group CEL (See Figure i-b) is a corpus of hand-drawn figures of what I term 
puppet-as-puppet in hand-drawn animation based on the material of celluloid. In 
the film narrative, the puppet-as-puppet figures for the most part are presented or 
implied as inanimate object in human or animal form (e.g. Pinocchio), and ruled by 
human or anthropomorphic animal characters (e.g. Geppetto). The puppet-as-
puppet figures of this Group often shift or drift between inanimate and animate in 
the development of the film narrative. What is important in Group CEL is that the 
puppet-as-puppet figures and the human/animal figures are part of a hand-drawn 
fictional world that share the same profilmic material conditions—in particular, 
cel. Among two-dimensional types of animation, cel animation was the most 
dominant in the film industry—e.g. Hollywood and Japanese anime—of the 
twentieth century (Thompson 1980: 107-108).  
For this reason, there are plenty of candidates likely to be classified in this 
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Group; for example, you can find a human-like mechanical puppet figure in Flip the 
Frog: Techno-Cracked (Ub Iwerks, 1933, US), Superman: The Mechanical Monster 
(Dave Fleischer, 1941, US) and The Nutcracker Prince (Paul Schibli, 1990, CND). 
This situation encourages me to develop a typology of the Group. In my intention of 
the types of Group CEL as parallel to those of Group STM, I will explain how to 
define the typologies of the two Groups, below after defining the rest of the four 
Groups. Yet, it should be noted that not every figure does dovetails exactly and 
idealistically with one of the types, but rather, it can be analysed and identified by 
employing more than one type as a critical tool from the typology I develop for 
Group CEL (and Group STM as well). 
In Group STM (See Figure i-c), my focus is on three-dimensionality and 
tangible materiality. There are a variety of three-dimensional types of animation, 
for example, puppet animation, clay animation and object animation. Primarily 
concerned with the three-dimensionality of these types of animation in contrast to 
the two-dimensionality of cel animation, I define Group STM as a corpus of puppet-
as-puppet figures made, sculpted or built for stop-motion animation. Like those of 
Group CEL, the puppet-as-puppet figures of this Group are presented or implied on 
screen as inanimate object in human or animal form (e.g. the android Hadaly, one 
of the two indiscernible girl-like models in Figure i-c), and ruled by human (and 
possibly anthropomorphic animal) characters (e.g. Edison, the maker of the 
android Hadaly). Already being physical models/puppets with a three-dimensional 
body in space, they shift or drift between inanimate and animate as often as those 
of Group CEL in the development of the film narrative.  
In Group STM, the puppet-as-puppets figure and the human/animal figures 
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are part of a fictional world constructed under the same profilmic material 
conditions—three-dimensional objects or parts of wood, metal, cloth and plastic. 
In the Group, further, even the figure representing a human (e.g. Sowana as the 
android Hadaly’s original, one the two girl-like models in Figure i-c) on screen is a 
physical puppet, which Donald Crafton (2013: 66) notes existed or still exists in the 
real world. In this thesis, I take as crucial this difference between Groups CEL and 
STM. Unlike those of Groups INT and CEL, it is possible that the puppet-as-puppet 
figures of Group STM (and Group PMT, too, for the same reason) not only appear on 
screen but also occupy three-dimensional space, along with live human actors, 
before the camera during shooting. In this case, the human actors can play the 
creators of the puppet-as-puppet figures—yet given different traits from the 
creators seen in Group INT—in the film narrative. Like Group CEL, I develop a 
typology of Group STM because a host of stop-motion animation films have been 
produced within the Hollywood context or on the grounds of its narrative 
convention over the twentieth century; for instance, you can find a human-like 
puppet-as-puppet figure in The Nutcracker (Takeo Nakamura, 1979, JPN) and 
Treevil (Aiju Salminen, Christer Lindström, Aino Ovaskainen, 2002, FIN). 
Lastly, as extending but distinct from Group STM, Group PMT centres on 
the three-dimensional puppet-as-puppet figures (See the dolls in Figure i-d) 
manipulated to move on screen in the filmmaker’s non-anthropomorphic and non-
anthropocentric intention. This intention tends to make uncertain the stop-motion 
animator’s technical and metaphorical mastery over models, objects and materials, 
which is a conventional view in and of stop-motion animation. As in the rest of the 
Groups, the human-like or animal-like shapes of the puppet-as-puppet figures 
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classified in Group PMT do not warrant the imitation of anthropomorphic or 
theriomorphic movement on screen, and further they do not present themselves as 
inferior to, or distinct from human or animal characters, if these appear on screen, 
in the film world not motivated by narrative. The films of the Group are easy to find 
outside of the Hollywood or other equivalent contexts.  
 
 
Typologies of Groups CEL and STM 
In order to develop a set of types of the hand-drawn puppet-as-puppet figures in 
cel animation, I propose two key criteria: (1) primary and secondary animatic 
transitions and (2) interaction with human characters in relation to the film 
narrative. When applied to all the four Groups, the two criteria make clear how 
Groups CEL and STM are different from the rest as seen below in Table 1.3.  
 
 
Animatic transition:  
primary and secondary 
Interaction with characters in the 
film narrative 
Group INT 
Puppet-as-puppet figures do not 
undergo primary but secondary 
animatic transition 
Each of them interacts with the 
on-screen live human actor 
playing the creator of it 
Group CEL 
Puppet-as-puppet figures undergo 
primary and secondary animatic 
transitions in many types of 
separate ways; some of them do not 
undergo any transition 
Some of them interact with 
human or animal figures as 
performing characters in different 
types of situations or response; 
some of them do not 
Group STM 
Group PMT 
Puppet-as-puppet figures elude the 
definition of primary and secondary 
animatic transitions 
No interaction in a conventional 
sense 
Table 1.3 Four Groups in terms of two criteria 
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As addressed in the Literature Review, animatic transition signifies the 
moment at which an individual figure, supposedly inanimate at the profilmic level, 
gains movement on screen. In this thesis, I will call it “primary”, when it does not 
function as the cue of life for the puppet-as-puppet figures, as does for human or 
animal characters, in the film narratives of Group CEL. For this reason, I put 
forward “secondary” animatic transition, which implies a cue of life for a puppet-
as-puppet figure to come to function as much a character as human or (often 
anthropomorphic) animal characters; only when this happens, they can function as 
“live performers” of the kind which is conceptualised by Crafton (2013). The 
criterion of secondary animatic transition asks whether or not a puppet-as-puppet 
figure comes to be a character in the film narrative and in what way its secondary 
animatic transition is visualised and narrativised. Added to this criterion is the way 
in which the puppet-as-puppet figure interacts with human characters and/or 
their functional equivalents, or the latter responds to the former, in the film 
narrative. The figure’s on-screen interaction with human and equivalent characters 




primary and secondary 
Interaction with characters  
in the film narrative 
Type 1 




Subtype (b)  
Only primary transition:  
Passive mode of movement 
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Subtype (c)  
Only primary transition:  
Automatic mode of movement 
Type 2 
Secondary transition’s main principle: 
Shifting to an isolated world 
No interaction except for 
supernatural characters 
Type 3 
No interaction except for the human 
owner and his/her animal friends 
Type 4 
No interaction except for animal or 
marginalised characters 
Type 5 Secondary transition’s main principle: 
Magic 
Enchanted 
Type 6 Cursed 
Type 7 Secondary transition’s main principle: 
Technology 
Equivocal 
Type 8 Deceptive 
Table 1.4 Typology for Group CEL 
 
In terms of the two criteria, I define eight types of the puppet-as-puppet 
figures in Group CEL (See Table 1.4). Type One is depicted as an inanimate object, 
with its status unchanged, throughout the film narrative. In this sense, Type One 
functions as the perceptual baseline from and in contrast to which secondary 
animatic transition is depicted to happen in the other Types. This suggests that the 
rest of the Types can always involve or imply Type One in the film narrative.  
Type One consists of three subtypes in terms of primary animatic 
transition: (a) stationary, (b) passive and (c) automatic. Subtype (a) which I term 
stationary does not involve any movement on screen, in other words, lacking 
primary animatic transition. The passive and automatic Subtypes entail primary 
animatic transition, and nonetheless, no change happens to the status of an 
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inanimate object in the film narrative. The passive Subtype (b) refers to the mode 
in which a puppet-as-puppet figure is depicted as being moved only by external 
forces like gravity in the diegetic world of the film. In this fictional world, the 
automatic Subtype (c) signifies the mode in which it is depicted to move, for 
example, as a clockwork mechanism. Emphasis on their common diegetic status as 
an inanimate object is why I do not define each Subtype as a separate Type. 
All the other seven Types involve secondary animatic transition, in which 
the diegetic status of a puppet-as-puppet figure usually shifts from an inanimate 
object to something close to a character in film. Defining each of the seven Types, 
primarily, I take into account the three principles for secondary animatic transition, 
that is to say, how it happens in the film narrative, which I find conventional within 
the Hollywood and equivalent contexts. A first principle is the shift from the real 
world to an isolated one; a second is magic; and a third is technology. My 
conceptualisation of these three principles are also much informed by Lois Rostow 
Kuznets (1994), Nelson (2001) and Schelde (1993). Observing the moment when 
puppets and toys “come to be alive” in the diegetic worlds of children’s books, 
Kuznets (1994) focuses on the psychological states, “awareness” and “empathy”, of 
human characters, in particular, children, who interact with the objects for playing. 
Nelson’s (2001) study of puppets and human simulacra in religions and 
philosophies places the “premodern” concept of “magic” as central in human 
beings’ involvement with the three-dimensional imitations of themselves. As 
regards “technology”, of great influence is Schelde (1993), among others, who 
discusses “modern” types of human simulacra, robots and androids, in science-
fiction films. In addition, I build on his binary opposition of machines, docile and 
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evil, in developing bifurcations between the ways in which human characters and 
their functional equivalents interact with or respond to simulacra of humans or 
animals in the film diegesis involved in technology and also magic for secondary 
animatic transition.  
Certainly, I do not claim that all puppet-as-puppet figures in animation fit 
into my typology, but I believe that this should be a foundation for analysing many 
different types of puppet-as-puppet figures. Basically, this typology will be applied 
to Group STM with a partial modification according to the specificity of stop-
motion animation. 
When I conduct case studies in each Group using the criteria and the 
factors explained above, I make a selection of emblematic puppet-as-puppet figures 
or the films in which they appear. I will give the detail of the films and the reference 
of their emblematic-ness later in the beginning of each of the following Chapters to 
which the relevant Groups are allocated.  
 
 
Textual analysis of animation films and puppet-as-puppet figures 
Here I explain how to analyse the cases of puppet-as-puppet figures classified in 
the four Groups. My analysis centres on the mode of movement which each case is 
given by the human agents to function according to their intention in the film 
narrative. As any of those cases is located in the film narrative—constructed in 
different styles of narration, I will work with neoformalist film analysis developed 
and applied by David Bordwell in his book, Narration in the Fiction Film (1985) and 
Thompson in her book, Breaking the Glass Armor (1988). In my view, the 
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neoformalist approach is effective in analysing not only a film narrative but also a 
puppet-as-puppet figure functioning in it, because the theoretical stance is to 
acknowledge the role of the viewer who needs to perceive or recognise what 
appears on screen. Ian Christie comments on Bordwell: 
 
Drawing on cognitive psychology, he identifies a hierarchy of schemata by 
which the individual’s perception is organized. Thus, following a film—like 
many other everyday yet complex activities—routinely involves the use of 
already learned prototype and template schemata to identify basic 
situations, characters, and events. (1998: 62) 
 
Some of the puppet-as-puppet figures selected for my case studies function as 
characters, while some of them do not, in the film narrative. Further, they are so 
drawn or built, in varying styles and fashions, as to be photographed frame by 
frame in the production studio. This means that it is a critical process to identify 
and then describe such figures. In the neoformalist approach, they are considered 
to be as meaningful a device as photographic figures representing humans on 
screen in the film narrative.  
Along with the artwork as an artificial construct, the “device” is one of 
neoformalism’s central concepts, which I will adopt in this thesis. Thompson 
defines: 
 
[T]he word device indicates any single element or structure that plays a 
role in the artwork—a camera movement, a frame story, a repeated word, a 
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costume, a theme, and so on. For the neoformalist, all devices of the 
medium and of formal organization are equal in their potential for 
defamiliarization and for being used to build up a filmic system. (1988: 15) 
 
This concept of device helps examine a variety of formal elements, without any 
solution prescribed, in terms of the way in which each of them functions and the 
motivation with which it is employed in the film narrative.  
Thompson applies such an approach even to human actors, who 
undoubtedly, she considers within the locus of live-action films. She indicates, 
“However much they may strike us as being like ‘real people,’ we can always trace 
that impression back to a set of specific, character-creating devices” (1988: 41). In 
other words, a film character is a device, and this is also a construct made of 
multitudinous devices. For Thompson, the neoformalist analysis can and should 
defamiliarise such an impression as “real people”, which is postulated to be the 
result of the perceptual process she calls becoming familiar or automatisation 
(1988: 10-11). In this vein, my analysis of the puppet-as-puppet figures seeks to 
defamiliarise the impression that they are something inanimate or sub/nonhuman 
on screen, as well as identifying what they are used to signify in the viewer’s 
perception.  
As suggested above by Christie (1998:62), neoformalism assumes that the 
film viewer is active. Thompson proposes, “The viewer actively seeks cues in the 
work and responds to them with viewing skills acquired through experience of 
other artworks and of everyday life” (1988: 10). In my reading, the cues are 
audiovisual materials, or devices, mobilised to stimulate the viewer to respond in 
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some way or other. As a kind of cue, the puppet-as-puppet figure’s modes of 
movement are composed, using some of the techniques and the styles of 
animation, which I will associate with the way in which a hand-drawn or built 
figure is perceived as inanimate or sub/nonhuman in the diegetic world of the film. 
From the neoformalist perspective, even techniques, not to mention styles, 
are not considered as dominant in the narrative-motivated film, and this is what I 
work with when examining how the techniques and styles of animation are 
involved in constructing the puppet-as-puppet figures of Groups INT, CEL and STM 
in which I classify narrative-motivated films. As regards the technical aspect of cel-
based classical cartoon animation in her seminal essay, “Ideological Interpretation 
of Implications of the Cel Animation Technique”, Thompson summarises: 
 
We have seen how cartoons use some devices which are potentially very 
disruptive (for example, mixtures of perspective systems, anti-naturalistic 
speed cues). As we might expect within the classical Hollywood system, 
however, narrative and comic motivations smooth over these disruptions. 
Even a film as radical in its devices as Duck Amuck remains quite readable 
to an audience accustomed to watching Daffy in his more characteristic 
films. As always, film techniques and technology are not in themselves 
radical; they become so only when used within the structure of a complete 
film. (1980: 118) 
 
Such narrative motivation is a strong factor in Groups INT, CEL and STM. Unlike 
them, Group PMT deviates radically from the narrative-constructing tendency, for 
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which I work with the neoformalist concept of “parametric cinema”. This type of 
films foreground or “bare” style-related devices or parameters on screen, which 
are defined by Thomson as “certain devices, such as colors, camera movements, 
sonic motifs, [which] will be repeated and varied across the entire work's form” 
(1988: 20). In this sense, Group PMT requires a different set of terms capable of 
describing in the first place the bared parameters of a puppet-as-puppet figure’s 
movements unmotivated by narrative. However, neither Bordwell (1985) nor 
Thompson (1988) is as much concerned with animation film as live-action film. In 
the following, I explain two methods which will be effective for analysing animated 
figures and their movements.  
 
 
Visual analysis of animated figures and their movements 
The difficulty and the possibility of the visual analysis of animated figures are 
indicated by what Ward (2006) terms as “thickening”. Observing animation films 
in which live-action footage was rotoscoped, Ward (2006: 125) points out that 
there is a complex, or thickened, relationship between representing and 
represented in animation. Mentioning Joanna Bouldin’s account of such a 
relationship,34 the animation scholar writes, “[It] stresses that although ‘the real’ 
has a different relationship to animated and live-action representations, with the 
latter having a privileged relationship by virtue of the indexical/conventional 
relationship noted earlier, we can never say that the real is completely absent or 
 
34 Ward refers to Joanna Bouldin (2004) Cadaver of the real: animation, rotoscoping and the 
politics of the body. Animation Journal Vol.12: 7- 31. 
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banished from animation” (p.125).  
Here, Ward’s focus is on profilmic materials, as called the real, which 
existed before the camera for animated documentary filmmaking as his subject, 
but his discussion provide insight into how to approach animated figures which 
involve the multiplicity of materials, techniques and styles. Ward remarks, “It is the 
multiplication of what was originally there—the real people and the situations in 
which they are filmed—that generates meaning” (2006: 125-126). This view gives 
me impetus to take into account profilmic materials as part of animated figures’ 
thickened, multiple aspects, as I am concerned with the way in which the human 
agents deal with materials for drawing or model-making in relation to their 
physical or mechanical conditions.  
Central factors in hand-drawn or cel-based animation are the two-
dimensionality of cel or paper—free from the gravitational field of the real world, 
cel’s transparency and the fluidity of paints; in stop-motion animation, the three-
dimensionality and mechanical linkage of models and objects surrounded in the 
gravitational field. These conditions or capacities are influential on the way in 
which a figure or a model is constructed to imply its diegetic status as an inanimate 
object on screen. Emphasis on the profilmic aspect is also the reason that my thesis 
does not cover films produced using CGI technologies—I will give readers the 
detail of the issue of medium in the last subsection of the Methodology.  
 
My visual analysis also owes its key concepts in part to Panofsky’s Meaning in the 
Visual Arts. In this volume, Panofsky (1982: 40) puts forwards three procedural 
acts for visual analysis in accordance with three strata of an artwork’s subject 
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matters or meanings: natural, conventional and intrinsic. The three analytic acts 
consist of (1) pre-iconographical description, (2) iconographical analysis and (3) 
iconological interpretation. These are not conceptualised by Panofsky for analysis 
of animation and other forms of moving image, but rather, of painting and 
sculpture as the object of study. Despite or due to this supposition, I take them as 
effective because my analysis focuses on hand-drawn figures and three-
dimensional objects at the profilmic level.  
Besides, Panofsky’s concern is with the static image of painting and 
sculpture, while mine is with figures and objects for the most part in motion on 
screen. Therefore, the method of visual analysis used in this thesis will be a 
revision and expanded development of Panofsky to include animation. Indeed, this 
possibility of revision is intrinsic to the art theorist’s conceptualisation of the 
procedure because it is based on the results of his analysis of actions and dynamic 
events, as well as forms, which he observed in everyday life (Panofsky 1982: 26-
28). 
The first act put forward by Panofsky is to identify and describe the 
“primary or natural” subject matter of a visual artwork. Panofsky indicates:  
 
It is apprehended by identifying pure forms, that is: certain configurations 
of line and color, or certain peculiarly shaped lumps of bronze or stone, as 
representations of natural objects such as human beings, animals, plants, 
houses, tools and so forth; by identifying their mutual relations as events; 
and by perceiving such expressional qualities as the mournful character of 




In my thesis, this will be a basic process of making clear how a puppet-as-puppet 
figure is made and what it refers to. The latter I term as “referential puppet” ranges 
from dolls to wind-up toys and robots, and each of them has much effect on the 
way in which the viewer recognises the figures of them on screen in terms of shape 
and motion; in case that a hand-drawn figure on screen intends to represent a hina-
ningyo, the Shintoist ritual object for girls, it is necessary for her or him to 
distinguish a Barbie doll in kimono. In addition, I will attempt to identify and 
interpret the puppet-as-puppet figures at the profilmic level on the one hand and 
the diegetic level on the other: in the case of stop-motion animation, for instance, a 
clay model representing a robot as a kind of puppet is a puppet for the animator to 
manipulate at the profilmic level, while it should be regarded as a robot by the 
other characters at the diegetic level in the film narrative. 
The second act is to examine the “secondary or conventional” subject 
matter of an artwork, as Panofsky notes, by “connect[ing] artistic motifs and 
combinations of artistic motifs (compositions) with themes or concepts” (1982: 
29). The scholar (p.29) adds that visual images function as the carriers of 
conventional meanings. Examination of this kind of meanings in my thesis requires 
to make clear the way in which a type of puppet-as-puppet or subhuman figures 
have been employed in the history, in particular, of animation film and also live-
action film. This pertains to the reason for which in reference to Carroll (2009), I 
classify those figures in the four Groups and develop typologies for Groups CEL and 
STM. 
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The third act is to interpret the “intrinsic” meaning of an artwork. Panofsky 
claims, “It is apprehended by ascertaining those underlying principles which reveal 
the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or philosophical 
persuasion—qualified by one personality and condensed into one work” (1982: 
30). However, this idea of his was not entirely accepted by other scholars, as 
Aumont notes, “This essentialism in Panofsky’s approach has been widely 
criticised, and, more recently, it has been modified to avoid the pitfalls associated 
with the notion of a Zeitgeist” (1997: 190). Such a modified approach is part of 
what I seek to achieve analysing the puppet-as-puppet figures in this thesis, in light 
of Aumont, who goes on to remark, “The interpretation of a work of art seeks above 
all to read the work historically by putting it in its most likely philosophical and 
ideological contexts (but also its material and political contexts)” (p.190).  
Being evaluated to work well for analysis of films as well as the medieval 
arts which occupied much of Panofsky’s scope (Aumont 1997: 191), however, the 
iconological approach presupposing historical conventions is not likely to provide 
sufficient clues to identify the stylistic or technical devices, or parameters, which 
are bared on screen in the cases I classify as unconventional in Group PMT. For this 
Group and in consideration of the parameters like motion and force, I will work 
with the method of film vector analysis, the focus of which is on vectors seen on 
screen. As a term of mechanics, a “vector” is composed of magnitude and direction 
and refers to quantities, like force and velocity, which are used to describe motion.  
In the field of film studies, Zettl provides its definition with clarity: “A 
vector on-screen indicates a main direction that has been established either by 
implication—such as with arrows, things arranged in a line, or people looking in a 
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specific direction—or by actual screen motion, such a man running from screen-
left to screen-right or toward or away from the camera” (2013: 127), going on to 
stress, “Once you have grasped what vectors are and how they interrelate and 
interact with other visual and aural elements, you can use them effectively not only 
to control screen directions but also to build screen space and event energy within 
a single frame or over a series of frames” (p.127). This account suggests that the 
film vector theory will be effective in analysis of animated figures, which are 
constructed with a series of frames, using the technique of the frame-by-frame 
photography.  
As regards film vectors, Zettl (2013: 127) proposes three principal types: 
graphic vectors, index vectors and motion vector, which will help examine and 
describe a variety of on-screen motions in my thesis. In the thesis, I will make use 
in the main of two of them: index vectors and motion vectors. While the latter 
refers to something usually seen to move on screen in projection, the former 
includes, for example, a series of still shots which show blurred images of a 
running object like a motorcycle (See Figure 7.43 in Zettl 2013). It is possible to 
witness such index vectors at the same time seeing motion vectors on screen. Of 
course, this index vector of blur is generated by shooting in live action, and not by 
shooting frame by frame in animation, because in the process of frame-by-frame 
shooting any subject should remain still or be stopped before the camera. In this 
sense, the “blur-index vector” will be a significant token in describing and 
elucidating animated motion vectors from which it is absent. Drawing on the terms 
of film vector analysis, I will describe and analyse the kinetic or kinaesthetic 
parameters which the puppet-as-puppet figures present on screen, primarily for 
 109 
Group PMT and also for relevant cases in the other Groups. 
 
 
Medium of films under analysis 
As suggested above in my explanation of the profilmic aspect in visual analysis, I 
work with films as an analogue medium based on photochemical celluloid 
(accurately, replaced by cellulose acetate and then polyester). Some of the 
animations under examination in this thesis were produced as a series to be 
broadcast on television, but they were made, using celluloid, in the same 
production processes of animation film for theatrical release, which therefore I 
refer to as animated television series or simply animation films. The issue of the 
analogue medium matters in that my research focuses on how materials-based 
drawings or objects are deployed and manipulated in the process of animating. The 
photochemical medium of analogue film warrants the photo-indexicality of the 
profilmic materials, while the environment of digital filmmaking I do not address in 
this thesis threatens it.  
In addition, the technology of computer-generated imagery has substituted 
arrays of electrical signals for celluloid sheets in the production of hand-drawn 
animation. Of course, many hand-drawn animations are still created physically on 
paper and then input into the computer system. Models or puppets employed for 
stop-motion animation are still shot in space, frame by frame, with digital cameras 
and then stored in digital memory devices. Involved in both cases are animators’ 
physical hands. Significantly, digital filmmaking technologies have much in 
common with traditional animation’s techniques and processes of image 
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generation, as Lev Manovich observes focusing on the manual of digital 
filmmaking:  
 
No longer strictly locked in the photographic, cinema opens itself toward 
the painterly. Digital hand-painting is also the most obvious example of the 
return of cinema to its nineteenth-century origins—in this case, the hand-
crafted images of magic lantern slides, the Phenakistiscope, and the 
Zootrope. (2001: 304)35 
 
Notwithstanding I focus specifically on the material-ness and profilmic-ness of 
drawings and models before the camera, and in this intention, my research is not 
engaged in ongoing debates of digital filmmaking. In the light of Manovich cited 
above, however, I hope that my research results contribute to and stimulate 
animation scholars into exploring the specificity and multiplicity of the ways in 
which the images of human and animal simulacra are created, manipulated and 
circulated through technological agency—in particular, digital technology—as well 
as human agency. 
 
 
35 Stressing a manual aspect of the image generation of digital filmmaking, Manovich also 
claims, “Digital cinema is a particular case of animation that uses live-action footage as one of 
its elements” (2001: 302), going on to declaim, “Born from animation, cinema pushed 
animation to its periphery, only in the end to become one particular case of animation” (p.30). 
This will address further debates of what the manual is.  
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Chapter Two 
Interaction between the Live-action Human Animator and the 
Hand-drawn Figure in Group INT 
 
 
In this Chapter, my central concern is the way in which the animator or the human 
agent deals with the hand-drawn figure in human or animal form, as if he can 
“bring it to life”, yet as a puppet in the definitions and implications of the term 
reviewed in Chapter One. For this, I examine a group of films, called Group INT 
(Interaction) in this thesis, which foreground the interaction between a live human 
actor as animator and an animated figure as his artistic creation, both appearing on 
screen, but based on materially and dimensionally different realms.  
Films of this Group are quite familiar in early animation history; Crafton 
observes that early animated films (which he calls classical cartoons) often had a 
tendency to depict and narrate “how animated characters come to exist” (2013: 
70). This tendency involves the narrative device which Crafton terms the hand-of-
the-artist motif (2013: 253). In my view, this device functions for the animator or 
the human agent to perform as a demiurgic creator with mastery over his 
creations. As reviewed in the Introduction, the animator’s artistic or creative status 
tied in with the capacity of animation has been thought of as omnipotent or 
unlimited. Describing and identifying the status which animators or artists assume 
in the film diegesis in Group One, in this Chapter I connect it to the discussions of 
God and His omnipotence which focusing on the seventeenth century, Funkenstein 
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(1989) finds problematised and secularised by educated laypeople in strong 
disputes within the context of European religio-philosophies and sciences.  
This connection aims to clarify how on-screen human agents in animation 
(and also animation studies scholars) appropriate the concepts of a demiurgic 
creator. Such appropriation took place in Christian theology where the concept of 
the Creator-God was influenced by Plato’s discourse of a creator-god called the 
demiurge in the Timaeus (Cornford 1997: 34-35; Lee 1977: 7-9), centuries before 
animated media emerged. This historical background implies that animators’ 
conventional self-figuration as a creator involves Platonic, as well as Christian, 
concepts of the term. What is intriguing with the animators on screen is further 
that they perform as agents of the kinds conceivable in the sciences and 
entertainments of their days and ours as well. Examining their on-screen 
performances of different kinds of agency, I discuss them in terms of the modes, 
“retreat and intervention”, of the divine power that were debated by Descartes, 
Newton and Leibniz among Enlightenment thinkers (Funkenstein 1989). This is 
eventually for evaluating and tackling the ways in which the live-action animators 
interact and deal with their human/animal-like creations as non-living and 
non/subhuman objects rather than living humans or animals.   
With this aim in mind, I analyse Gertie the Dinosaur, the Out of the Inkwell 
series1 and Manipulation. Before entering the analysis, I outline why I select these 
films as effective in Group INT.  
 
1 In this thesis, I focus on those relevant to my subject from the twenty-nine films in the Out of 




Selection of the emblematic cases from Group INT 
First, I select Gertie the Dinosaur among classical cartoons which Crafton (2013) 
discusses in relation to the hand-of-the-artist motif. The animation scholar 
evaluates the hybrid film: 
 
Winsor McCay, the legendary comic strip artist and animated cinema 
pioneer, implicitly critiqued the distribution of animator-animated agency 
in films when presented his avatar as the impresario of an animal act. Gertie 
(Winsor McCay/Box Office Attractions, 1914) pairs the cartoonist with the 
dinosaur of the title. Do animators dominate their fractious creations just as 
animal trainers control their subject? (2013: 59). 
 
Here, Crafton not only addresses the issue of domination and control, that is, the 
issue of power relationship, but also asks the question leading to one of the central 
questions I address in this thesis: in the film, does McCay deal with Gertie as if 
it/she were really a trained animal?  
 Second, the Out of the Inkwell series (1919-1929) features the hand-drawn 
figure named Koko in human form that interacts on screen with its human creator. 
The human-like creation makes a good contrast to the animal-like figure in Gertie 
the Dinosaur. Another distinct point is that the Koko figure appeared in more than 
one hundred films produced over around ten years. Crafton notes: 
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Fleischer’s appearances in the films as the “artist” had made him a celebrity 
in his own right, as a talk on Chicago’s station KYW demonstrated when it 
elicited 3,300 fan letters. Koko dolls were a national craze. (1993: 177) 
 
I believe that such popularity of the series served to familiarise the self-figuration 
of the animator as a demiurgic creator and the way in which the puppet-as-puppet 
figures are exploited in animation films. In this sense, examination of both Max and 
Koko on screen will lead to a deep understanding of the understudied conventions. 
 Lastly, the relatively recent film, Manipulation, has in common the dominant 
tendency with the films which I selected from classical cartoons. Observing the 
interaction played out between Koko and Max Fleischer on screen in Out of the 
Inkwell: The Tantalizing Fly, Fabia Ling-Yuan Lin comments on Manipulation: “This 
strategy of expressing the contest between autonomy and subjection through 
materiality has been continued in more recent hybrid films” (2013: 104). 
Manipulation is more than a continuation of the interaction relying on the binary 
opposition. On the basis of the history of the animators’ self-figuration, Greaves 
criticises the demiurgic performance of the on-screen human animator as creator. 
At the focus of his criticism is the material resisting the artist’s creative mastery in 
quite a serious tone; the film’s description provided by the director states that “the 
creator attempts to destroy him, but the character is having none of it and battles 
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with the creator to survive”.2 The film foregrounds and thematises the materiality 
of an animated figure which drawn in human form on paper, survives the artistic 
mastery, not merely creative but also destructive, of its on-screen human animator 
in live action. 
 
 
2.1. Winsor McCay and His Girl named Gertie in Gertie the Dinosaur 
 
In this section, I examine Gertie the Dinosaur by the animation pioneer Winsor 
McCay. Analysing this silent film, I am concerned in the main with its two specifics. 
One is the intertitled voice of McCay presenting himself as an animator on screen, 
and the other his way of intervening with natural history as well as the life of a 
dead animal. I take the former as functioning as an “acousmêtre” in Michel Chion’s 
(1999) definition of the term, which as I will discuss is pertinent to the Judeo-
Christian concept of God. As regards the latter, in reference to Funkenstein (1989) I 
draw on the debate made by Newton and others of the role of the Creator-God as a 
craftsperson in natural history, which will shed light on what is implied in McCay’s 
on-screen demiurgic performance. Further, I go on to interpret the animator’s 
world-constructing, as well as life-giving, performance in terms of what 
Funkenstein (1989) calls “ergetic” in his discussion of the seventeenth-century 
stance in science.  
 
2 The film description comes from the director Greaves’ website: https://www.daniel-
greaves.com/manipulation (accessed 23 Aug 2019). 
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The film begins with a live-action prologue in which McCay and his friends 
drop into a museum of natural history to find the skeleton of a dinosaur exhibited. 
This museum scene is followed by the intertitle: "Winsor McCay bets . . . that he can 
make the Dinosaurus live again by a series of hand-drawn cartoons". The phrase of 
making a dinosaur live again—it does not simply refer to making it appear to live 
or move—has a double implication. One is to resurrect a dead animal against its 
material and natural condition: fossil bones. The other relates to the level of 
natural history. As shown in the museum scene, it should be noted that dinosaurs 
are a group of reptiles that became extinct from the earth.  
In the early twentieth century when the film was made, the extinct reptiles 
were already known to the public through the exhibitions of their fossils as an 
attraction at eminent museums of natural history in North America (Colbert 1997). 
In the 1910s, furthermore, dinosaurs were featured in science fictions, pulp 
magazines and films (Glut and Brett-Surman 1997: 676). This historical 
background on the basis of which the film was produced and received is significant 
because on-screen McCay's bet in the film is likely to suggest that he will intervene 
in, or wind back, the natural history of the reptiles. I will engage later in the 
animator's mode of exerting power over nature, after I discuss his resurrection of 
an individual animal. 
After declaring that he will make a dinosaur live again, McCay himself is 
shown on screen to draw a couple of backgrounds on paper and the subsequent 
intertitles give technical details of hand-drawn cartoon animation in which the 
animator is engaged. The details include the process in which his cartoon drawings 
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are to be photographed, the huge number of the drawings he created and the 
incremental relationship between each drawing and the one following it. Despite 
some scenes in which we can see a stack of drawings made for his ambitious 
project, no drawing of a dinosaur is clearly shown on screen until McCay and his 
friends gather again in a restaurant where for the first time he introduces to them a 
dinosaur he names Gertie. This delayed appearance of the dinosaur figure is quite 
intentional in terms of the effect of McCay's on screen performed interaction with 
it. 
The way in which the dinosaur figure makes its first appearance on screen 
is as crucial as the way in which McCay interacts with it, in terms of the animator's 
self-figuration as a demiurgic creator. It does not take the form of screening a film. 
McCay starts performing a lightning sketch, as Crafton (1993: 113) notes, in front 
of a large paper panel erected (Figure 2.1). What is the motivation for taking the 
form of a stage performance on screen, despite the preceding technical details of 
hand-drawn animation given to the viewers of the film? It is to emphasise the effect 
of liveness engaging film viewers, rather than the impression of a character 
appearing alive, as Crafton remarks, "Animation's early association with vaudeville 
also anchored the form in the framework of liveness" (2013: 80). Taking this effect 
of liveness, McCay intends and pretends to be someone more than a technical agent 
of hand-drawn animation the details of which were given to us/viewers. On his 
friends' call for making the dinosaur figure on the panel move, McCay tells them 
that Gertie will do whatever he orders; then he takes a step backward to disappear 
out of the screen to the left when the panel fits in the camera frame. In the 
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subsequent intertitle, he speaks to her, "Come out Gertie, and make a pretty bow" 
and finally the hand-drawn Gertie figure begins to appear to move out of a cave; 
this is the moment when the animatic transition of the figure takes place. 
Observing these consecutive scenes, Crafton comments, "In minutes McCay 
convinces the audience that he has resurrected a tangible and lovable animal—a 
triumphant moment for the animator as life giver" (1993: 113).  
The life-giving, demiurgic, moment is reinforced by the device of voice. As a 
silent film, of course, Gertie the Dinosaur does not deliver any voices in a literally 
audible way, but texts assume voices by means of intertitles, double quotation 
marks and editing, along with the live human actors performing as if talking on 
screen. Chion writes of this assumed voice: 
Figure 2.1 McCay drawing Gertie 
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[T]he silent-film spectator . . . imagined the film's voices, in his or her 
individual way. Voices in silent film, because they are implied, are dreamed 
voices. (1999: 8) 
 
Here I am not so much concerned with the assumed voice alone as its “acousmatic” 
effect in the scenes in which the animated Gertie figure performs as told by McCay 
without his on-screen appearance. In Chion’s (1999: 19) definition, an acousmatic 
voice is a voice, the source of which is not visualised on screen and performs a 
demiurgic role in film. Taking into account religio-philosophical backgrounds of the 
acousmatic voice, Chion points out, “This interdiction against looking, which 
transforms the Master, God, or Spirit into an acousmatic voice, permeates a great 
number of religious traditions, most notably Islam and Judaism” (p.19). Chion 
(p.21) gives the name, acousmêtre, to the device which performs an acousmatic 
function in film, going on to put forward the four aspects of its fearful power: 
“ubiquity, panopticism, omniscience, and omnipotence” (p.24). After disappearing 
off screen, and while staying in the live-action world until the hand-drawn figure of 
McCay appears in the same world as the Gertie figure, McCay himself performs as 
an acousmêtre that can exert his power on the drawing of a prehistoric world as 
well as that of the dinosaur, Gertie, because both are presented as drawn by his 
lightning sketch in the film.  
It is not the fearfulness but pleasure of the power, however, that in the film 
the acousmêtre provides for viewers. The acousmatic power is combined with the 
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world-reconstructing power of McCay’s hand-drawn animation. Seeing Disney’s 
Merbabies (Rudolf Ising and Vernon Stallings, 1938, US) produced using the 
technique of hand-drawn cel animation, Eisenstein exclaimed: 
 
How much (imaginary!) divine omnipotence there is in this! What magic of 
reconstructing the world according to one's fantasy and will! (1988: 3) 
 
In Gertie the Dinosaur, the pleasure of the divine power needs to be examined in 
the double structure—the live-action world of human beings and the animated 
world of hand-drawn figures created by McCay—of the film, along with the editing 
strategy. As McCay appears on screen before he becomes an acousmêtre, the 
viewers know that he is a human being the same as them. Based on this knowledge, 
the attraction of the power encourages them to empathise with him as an 
acousmêtre. As soon as the square frame of the screen is filled by the square paper 
panel on which the hand-drawn animation of Gertie is shown, with McCay 
disappearing off screen (Figure 2.2), the viewers are given the same viewing, 
overlooking, position as McCay or at least his reconvened friends in the film. They 
Figure 2.2 Gertie the Dinosaur 
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can see Gertie as McCay sees her/it and they can enjoy power over her/it as McCay 
enjoys.  
Now I turn to the way in which McCay as an acousmêtre interacts with the 
Gertie figure. In terms of the traits of the character which he plays during the 
sequence in which the animation alone is shown on screen, McCay does not 
pretend to be a divine being or God as the greatest Acousmêtre (Chion 1999: 27), 
but rather an animal trainer (Crafton 2013: 59). This type of professional 
performance works well for McCay’s strategy of presenting his hand-drawn 
animation to the audience both inside and outside the film, as if it were a live 
interacting show, and as if the dinosaur figure were a circus animal. In a later part 
of the Gertie animation sequence, the hand-drawn character of McCay appears 
literally as an animal trainer on screen and then rides on the dinosaur figure drawn 
far larger than the McCay figure. Focusing on McCay's circus-like performance, 
Crafton claims: 
 
Animal trainers stimulate humanlike behaviors in their subjects to facilitate 
audiences’ anthropomorphic embodiment of the critters. Those vaudeville 
dogs, monkeys, tigers, and circus fleas go through their motions in a manner 
not unlike the way that toons enact the animators’ scenarios. The trainer 
cracks his or her whip and the beast jumps; the animator moves the gorilla 




Indeed, it is possible to identify as anthropomorphic the following movements by 
Gertie: bowing to the audience, crying at being told “shame on you” by McCay 
offscreen, and nodding and shaking her head in the film's diegetic world. However, 
not every movement makes Gertie looks anthropomorphic. It often looks 
theriomorphic, when she catches a pumpkin and scratches her face and chin with 
her tail while sleeping. Despite no use of the term, theriomorphic, Crafton 
describes Gertie in exactly this way: “Her personality is a cross between a trained 
circus elephant and frisky puppy” (1993: 113).  
Here, it should be noted again that in the film narrative, this animated 
hybrid imitation of human and animal is presented using the device of a circus-like 
performance, which as Crafton (2013:59-60) points out, involves the participation 
of the audience seeing the film in front of the screen. This participation is driven by 
the intertitled words shown as McCay's order to Gertie. They function in two ways. 
One is to define what each movement of Gertie means; the other to communicate 
with viewers in the real world. For example, when she is told to “bow to the 
audience” by McCay in an intertitle, a series of movements which Gertie shows are 
reduced to the verb, bow. This aims at the viewers who can read and understand 
what he says. Engaged in these devices, Crafton (2013: 59-60) as cited above 
compares the interaction between an animal trainer and an animal on stage to that 
between an animator and an animated figure in production, but this is likely to 
conflate circus and animation without helping viewers find the specificities of the 
case in question.  
In this sense, I stress that the Gertie animation sequence in the film was 
123 
entirely produced before being presented to his friends and this is clearly indicated 
through the preceding live-action scenes and intertitles in the film. In a real circus 
show, I argue that it is impossible to put under a human trainer’s control an animal 
that is an autonomous living being in the real world, or at least, real animals are as 
disobedient as animated animal characters like Gertie seem to be, as Bukatman 
(2012: Kindle 3150) claims, as long as they are depicted as acting autonomously in 
film. In contrast, Crafton is quick to reduce the issue of uncontrollability to the 
concept of asymmetrical alliance with which Chris Wilbert3 characterises real 
animals, to argue, “‘Accidental’ and ‘aggressive’ behavior might be rehearsed, as 
when the creatures roar and menace as part of the act, adding thrills and 
enhancing the illusion of danger to trainer and audience” (cited in Crafton 2013: 
60).  
In my view, the Gertie figure is not disobedient nor autonomous; it cannot 
form an alliance with the live-action figure McCay. In Gertie the Dinosaur, no acts 
could be rehearsed but all the drawings were created, photographed, and then 
finished for screening—my central concern here is not a circus show but this 
animation of Gertie in the film. No disobedient behaviours Gertie shows on screen 
are accidental, but were designed to cause viewers’ perceptual, emotional and 
cognitive response of fearing that the hand-drawn reptile figure might attack 
human beings. Such response from the viewers is what McCay aimed at by 
performing as an animal trainer in the film.  
 
3 Crafton cites Wilbert (2000: 238) Anti-this—against-that: resistances along a human—non-
human axis. In: Sharp, Joanne P. et al. (eds) Entanglements of Power: Geographies of 
Domination/Resistance. New York: Psychology Press. 
124 
As a device for communicating with and repositioning the audience as if 
they were in a circus theatre, the disguise of McCay as an animal trainer conceals 
an unrealistic aspect of his “live” depiction of the hand-drawn Gertie figure, when 
considered in terms of the realistic motivation of the Gertie animation sequence, as 
Crafton acclaims, “McCay’s ability to stimulate natural movement was uncanny” 
(1993: 113). The animation scholar is right because, however natural some of 
Gertie’s movements might look, they are the “hybrid” of a dog’s or an elephant ’s 
movements, replacing those of a dinosaur which human beings have not seen alive 
in reality.4  
Further, I find some of those movements violent against Gertie in terms of 
McCay’s realistic motivation in two scenes. One is the scene in which the Gertie 
figure is depicted to devour a thick, tall, hard tree all at once (Figure 2.3), and the 
other to drink all the water in the lake. Both acts would be almost impossible for a 
real animal. If it attempted to do that, its throat, stomach and other organs would 
be damaged. Despite the realistic motivation, in the Gertie animation sequence 
McCay did not depict what would happen to Gertie’s body when she swallowed the 
tree and the lake water in the scenes. This means that he had another motivation, 
which I classify as artistic5 in light of Thompson, who defines: 
 
 
4 John Canemaker tells a story of McCay who planning a scene of Gertie standing up, visited to 
hear from a museum curator or researcher about such a behaviour of dinosaurs and yet failed 
to obtain a useful information. This is cited in Hiromichi Hosoma (2013: 86-87), who indicates 
the source of the story: Canemaker (2005: 171) Winsor McCay: His Life and Art. Rev Exp 
edition. Harry N. Abrams. 
5 In the neoformalist definition, the artistic in this kind of motivation has nothing to do with 
the resultant response from the viewers.  
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Artistic motivation is the most difficult type to define. In one sense, every 
device in an artwork has an artistic motivation, since it functions in part to 
contribute to the creation of the work's abstract, overall shape—its form. 
(1988: 19) 
 
In the two scenes, indeed, McCay uses the formal capacity of the hand-drawn 
animation which enables animators to manipulate lines and other geometrical 
elements into any shapes, any figures. This pertains to the aspect which Eisenstein 
(1988:70) terms plasmatic in his essay on Disney. What I am concerned with is that 
McCay’s artistic motivation with the two scenes ignored the physically negative 
reactions which otherwise Gertie would have been depicted to show in accordance 
Figure 2.3 Gertie the Dinosaur 
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with his on-screen declamation of making the reptile live again. In this sense, I 
claim that in the animated world of his own making, McCay did not make a 
dinosaur live again but rather created a dinosaur-looking “preprogrammed 
machine” which cannot feel hurt by any physical damage. 
Contesting Crafton (1993; 2013) and Bukatman (2012) who both tend to 
foreground Gertie as McCay's titular creation, I bring into focus the other animated 
figures; the sea serpent, the mammoth and the flying lizard, along with the lake and 
the mountains, all drawn on paper. They constitute the world reconstructed by 
McCay in the Gertie animation sequence. In the virtual world of the animation 
sequence, once extinct, dinosaurs and other prehistoric animals are allegedly made 
to live again by the animator. Reconstructing the natural world using techniques of 
hand-drawn animation brings us to the issue of the mode in which McCay performs 
as a demiurgic creator exerting power over nature, as well as a dinosaur, which I 
addressed above in this section. This expanded approach to Gertie the Dinosaur 
also builds on Jonathan Burt’s claim that "the dynamic representations of animals 
on film were . . . an expression of an increased control over all aspects of life" 
(2002: 113).  
As in my review of Descartes and Newton in Chapter One, there are two 
modes, retreat and intervention, of assuming the demiurgic status for an animator 
who wagers reconstructing nature. For the mode of retreat, I draw on the French 
philosopher’s hypothetical cosmology in which God is not needed for nature or the 
world as a machine that, once set in motion, works autonomously (Funkenstein 
1989: 74). In contrast, Newton views God as an industrious craftsperson who 
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continues to intervene in nature because he needs to justify force, motion and 
other mechanical quantities working between distant bodies which in space are 
not mediated by any materials (Funkenstein 1989: 95). Yet, what both and other 
mechanical philosophers of nature have in common is the idea that the human 
being can understand the way in which nature operates, by observing it from the 
mechanistic perspective, even if not knowing what nature itself is. As regards 
Descartes’ view, Funkenstein remarks: 
 
The meaning of laws of nature changed. They became blueprints for the 
construction and reconstruction of nature, more geometrico, out of a 
homogeneous substrate. God constructed it; Descartes tries to reconstruct 
it; and only by so doing will he have understood creation. (1989: 191) 
 
In terms of the epistemology of nature, Funkenstein points out that Newton has a 
similar stance to Descartes: 
 
Of God, Newton, like Descartes, More, or Spinoza, knows several things 
clearly and distinctly. Most of these matters pertain to God’s activity more 
than they do to his essence. They add nonetheless to our knowledge of God, 
in the same way in which we may have precise knowledge of the attractive 
force between bodies without knowing its cause or essence. The attraction 
between bodies, Newton claims, is not an obscure quality, because we know 




This analogy drawn between theology and natural philosophy leads to the 
postulation of knowledge by doing which Funkenstein terms ergetic knowledge 
(1989: 293). “This new ideal, somewhat elusive yet powerful down to our own 
days,” Funkenstein writes, “was the ideal of knowing through doing or knowing by 
construction” (1989: 297). The ergetic ideal of knowing allows the human being to 
perform as a demiurgic figure, in other words, to imitate God, by constructing a 
natural world as a mechanical model, in animation as well as sciences.  
Back to the issue of the two modes, retreat and intervention, of exerting 
such a divine power over the constructed world, the latter mode seems to be 
McCay’s preference in Gertie the Dinosaur. If he intended to have retreated from the 
Gertie animation sequence as a world which he constructs in the film narrative, he 
should have screened the animation sequence as a finished work in front of his 
audience of friends. Instead, McCay assumes the role of an acousmatic animal 
trainer able to cross the material boundary between the live-action world of 
human beings and the animated world of hand-drawn figures presented by him as 
a live show, part of the former world.  
His transgressive interaction on screen results in bringing back the dinosaur 
and other prehistoric animals to the early twentieth-century world of film. This is 
the way the demiurgic intervention is performed by the animator, which I term 
macro-intervention.6 He acts as if he can and does go against the process of natural 
 
6 I will discuss micro-intervention, in contrast to macro-intervention, later in this Chapter. 
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history. In the history of science, however, Newton’s concept of intervention was 
renounced by his contemporaries and later natural philosophers and scientists. In 
particular, P. M. Heimann notes on the views of the Victorian era, “On the basis of 
the principle of the uniformity of nature, Charles Lyell had rejected divine 
interventions in the course of the history of the earth” (1972: 73-74). In discussion 
of the principle, He continues:  
 
[Newton’s view] can be contrasted with Hutton’s view of nature as a self-
contained system, comprising the totality of effects in the universe. The 
activity of nature was intrinsic to the natural order, and the self-sufficiency 
of nature was not to be abrogated by any form of divine action or 
intervention. (1972: 76) 
 
In this sense, analogously, the live-action McCay’s on-screen interactions 
with Gertie abrogates a self-contained or autonomous universe which would be 
otherwise constructed in the Gertie animation sequence. However, this is not the 
case because the animation sequence is a completed film. McCay’s intervention in 
and interaction with his animated world on the paper panel is given as ostensible 
and imitative in the film narrative, as the animator himself explains and shows the 
process of filmmaking to his on-screen friends and us as the audience viewing the 
entire film in front of the screen.  
Of McCay’s interventional attempts, the most critical one is where stopping 
being an acousmêtre, he makes a hand-drawn figure of himself as an animal trainer 
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to appear in the animated world of his own construction, and then shows off his 
power over the Gertie figure on the top of its back (Figure 2.4). Significantly, the 
figure which an animator represents of him or herself in his or her own film is 
termed avatar by Crafton (2013: 277) in discussion of Gertie the Dinosaur and 
other early classical cartoons. Crafton does not seem to be aware that avatar is as 
much a mystical and religious concept as the incarnation of Christianity, and simply 
refers to it as a device of animators’ self-figuration. Like him, I do not intend to 
discuss it in religio-philosophical terms, but according to neoformalist film 
analysis. My emphasis is on the material aspect in which the McCay avatar—
existing along with other animal figures in the world all hand-drawn on paper—is 
not McCay himself in the film. I argue that the McCay avatar should not be 
Figure 2.4 The McCay avatar and Gertie 
131 
identified as the animator but be viewed as an entity separated from him.  
Given that the Gertie figure is a machine preprogrammed by McCay to move 
like an animal and to interact with the animator in the constructed world of hand-
drawn animation, the avatar figure, too, is as preprogrammed a machine as the 
animal figure in terms of materiality and the narrative role, a machine in human 
form preprogrammed to move like an animal trainer whipping at the reptile figure. 
At the same time, the avatar figure can be regarded as if made to live again by 
McCay as Gertie is within the animator’s own vision with the technique of hand-
drawn animation. In these two aspects, it is possible to say that as a living figure 
suddenly created and thrown into the animation-constructed world, the animal 
trainer would be worried about how he can survive surrounded by those 
prehistoric gigantic animals.  
McCay ignores this ontological issue of the hand-drawn human figure so 
that through narrative motivation, the viewers are likely to persuade themselves to 
assume that McCay himself comes into the animated world and then back to the 
live-action world. In terms of the size relationship between the paper panel and the 
restaurant, however, it would be quite unacceptable that whether visible or 
invisible on screen, McCay transforms into the tiny homunculus because this 
transmaterial and transdimensional event is much more likely to damage or 
disturb the reality of the film’s diegetic world primarily based on live action. 
Indeed, there are no cues which suggest such a transformation. When the film cuts 
back into the live-action world of McCay and his friends just after the ending of the 
Gertie animation sequence, no longer at the restaurant is the paper panel on which 
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the prehistoric world ought to remain drawn (Figure 2.5). In the film, as a result, 
the on-screen live-action animator ends up without confronting a critical situation 
that creating life forms, in particular, a human simulacrum, will cause.  
What is the critical situation about this? For instance, if the hand-drawn 
animated figure as McCay’s avatar remains to perform its own role on screen, 
McCay will be no longer needed but replaced by the figure in the belief system in 
which it/he is perceived as alive and also as live by his friends in front of the paper 
panel and viewers in front of the film screen. In this belief system, at the same time, 
it is easy to imagine that the avatar wants to stay alive in the animation-
constructed world after the stage show ends, even if resultantly threatening 
McCay’s status of mastery over it. As regards the eponymous subhuman character’s 
Figure 2.5 There is no paper panel in Gertie the Dinosaur 
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critical situation in Frankenstein (James Whale, 1931, US) in relation to the Judeo-
Christian view, Schelde remarks, “The central issue is that Frankenstein 
transgressed on God’s turf” (1993: 46). He connects this transgressive issue of 
creating human simulacra to Gershom Scholem, who writes: 
 
Golem-making is dangerous; like all major creation it endangers the life of 
the creator—the source of danger . . . lies in the tension which the creative 
process arouses in the creator himself. Mistakes in carrying out the 
directions do not impair the golem, they destroy its creator. (cited in 
Schelde 1993: 47) 7 
 
In his essay focused on animation filmmaking in terms of religious transgression, 
Robert Geal postulates the concept of “a prohibition about humans challenging 
God’s monopoly on creating real life through the aesthetic representation of life, 
and the transgressively monstrous consequences of the breaking the prohibition” 
(2018: 70). These discussions of creating human simulacra such as Frankenstein 
and Golem suggest that the belief system is ambivalent in which something 
inanimate appears to be or to be made alive in animation film. The belief system 
might not always work well in the Tooniverse as Crafton (2013) claims. In the next 
section, I will develop this issue of aesthetic, as well as religio-philosophical, 
transgression while investigating the tensional interaction between animator and 
 
7 Schelde cites Scholem (1969: 190-191) On the Kabbalah and its Symbolism. New York: 
Schocken Books. 
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animated, creator and created, live action and hand-drawn, depicted on screen in 
the Out of the Inkwell series.  
 
 
2.2. Max Fleischer and Koko the Clown in the Out of the Inkwell Series 
 
The Out of the Inkwell series features the on-screen interaction between the live-
action human animator, performed by Max Fleischer, and the hand-drawn human 
figure, created (and later named Koko) by him.8 The clown figure, Koko, is not 
simply hand-drawn but also involves a real human being’s bodily motion as a 
crucial part of its multiple referents to be processed in the Rotoscope. This process 
and its resultant visuals have stimulated remarkable discussions of animation 
aesthetics in relation to the realism of animated documentary (Ward 2006a) and 
the perceptual effect of uncanniness (Miyamoto 2017).  
 
8 It should be noted that Max’s on-screen performance as the creator of the animated figure 
Koko raises an issue around the attribution of the film series. In other words, the question is 
raised as to whether he himself animated, drew frame by frame, Koko and other figures. 
Crafton’s answer to this is: “Max Fleischer is only pretending to be the animator . . . Dave is the 
actual animator, at least in the early films” (1993: 298). Dave Fleischer is Max’s younger 
brother, who also acted for Koko’s body movements to be incorporated into the rotoscoping 
process invented by Max (Fleischer 2005: 18). To be accurate, further, Max’s on-screen 
performance does not necessarily refer to an animator because he seems to be engaged in 
working with a sheet of paper only. While identifying Max on screen as a sketcher or cartoonist 
rather than an animator in Vaudeville, one of the film series, Crafton still observes of him, 
“Sketcher Max plays the role of artist-magician, drawing the clown and bringing it to life” 
(2013: 105), alluding to the Fleischer Brothers’ transtextual motivation in the vaudevillesque 
lightning sketcher. The animation scholar adds that both Max and Dave “operate outside the 
fiction as the constructive agency behind the film, the performers of the animation” (p.105). 
Here emphasis is placed on the Brothers’ common status of agency as the animator’s function. 
Stretching Crafton’s identification of Max in and outside the diegetic world of the episode, 
Vaudeville, I take the on-screen Max, through the twenty-nine films of the series under 
examination, as the functional equivalent of the on-screen animator McCay appearing in Gertie 
the Dinosaur. 
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In this PhD thesis, my primary focus is the clown’s diegetically claimed 
status as a hand-drawn figure and accordingly, the way in which the on-screen 
creator Max as a human being deals with his creation in the narratives of the Out of 
the Inkwell films. In analysis of the human simulacrum assuming subhumanness on 
screen, I build on Grodal’s (1997) study of subhuman characters and their mode of 
behaviour in film, which is quite pertinent to my research focus in that even if 
performed by human actors in live-action film, clowns are located within the film 
scholar ‘s scope of subhuman characters. What is of further interest to me is 
Grodal’s (1997) discussion of “felt totality”. Considering human bodies or figures 
which lack totality in the viewers’ schematic perception, the scholar (1997) 
suggests that felt totality works as a key factor in the effect of uncanniness 
experienced in film and other media. In this section, the concept serves to explain 
the effect of Koko’s rotoscoped body movement and how rotoscope techniques are 
involved in making the hand-drawn clown figure look subhuman as well as, or 
rather than, human. 
Most of the episodes of the film series that I analyse in this thesis are set in 
the animator’s studio where no audiences watch the interaction between him and 
his creation in the film’s world.9 In contrast to McCay, Max does not present his 
interaction with Koko as if it were a live stage show, in the episodes under 
examination. Rather, it is depicted in most of the film series to happen suddenly 
without any plausible explanation given as is by McCay on screen in Gertie the 
 
9 In some episodes, live-action human characters get caught in the antics Koko plays in the 
studio and outside. 
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Dinosaur. Not explicit in the episodes is the declamation that the on-screen 
animator makes a human being live again, nor is the explanation of how he makes 
hand-drawn figures appear to move. “The playful struggle between the animator 
and his creation that typifies the plots”, as Crafton summarises the Out of the 
Inkwell series, “is an allegory expressing the shift in importance away from the 
artist to the work” (1993: 298). This implies that in the series, the Brothers sought 
to structure self-contained narratives in which we see the struggle of power 
developed by the narrative devices of human figures, on the one hand performed 
by live human actors, and on the other processed by animation techniques. 
 
 
Max Fleischer as a demiurgic circus master and a Taylorist scientist 
The Tantalizing Fly, one of the earliest episodes of the film series, begins with Max 
alone drawing a clown on a paper panel in a studio (Figure 2.6). As if intended for 
the gaze of the film’s viewer, the panel is set quite vertically—it would normally 
have been at a more horizontal angle. Further, the camera shifts quickly from an 
objective point of view to Max’s subjective point of view, thereby encouraging the 
Figure 2.6 Max drawing Koko in The Tantalizing Fly 
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viewer to identify him/herself with Max. As soon as the on-screen creator’s 
drawing takes the shape of a human clown, this hand-drawn clown figure Koko 
shows quick reactions to the three-dimensional fly that has annoyed his creator at 
work. Brought into focus in most of the episode, Koko’s interaction with the fly is 
as much a spectacular element as with Max in terms of body performance.  
 Processed by the Rotoscope which Max Fleischer invented for a realistic 
representation of body movements (Fleischer 2005: 15-16), Koko’s body 
performance on screen displays enough instantaneous and continuous 
improvisations to make it look like a live-action filmed actor. Crafton correctly 
describes Koko’s actions as actions which “the neutral movie camera supposedly is 
recording” (2013: 105). However, the impression of live action perceived in the 
clown’s body performance does not necessarily warrant its humanness but rather 
is exploited to make it look less human than Max.  
Of relevance is Grodal’s (1997: 106) notion that includes clowns as a group 
of traditional nonhuman figures. The film scholar indicates that “if the emotions 
repeat simple schemata to an excessive degree, they are perceived as non-human 
and non-spontaneous in the commonsense psychology of films: for example, . . . 
when clowns begin to cry or laugh by reflex” (Grodal 1997: 109). Given that the 
Out of the Inkwell series is a type of comedy—the Fleischer Brothers’ employment 
of such a figure was motivated by the vaudeville entertainment in which 
burlesques and other similar types of shows were enacted (Crafton 2013: 101-
102), the clown figure’s nonhuman or subhuman status can be well seen from 
Grodal’s (1997: 121-122) account of military comedy films, among film genres, 
138 
that even live-action humans are “robotified”, that is, depicted as mechanical, 
nonhuman, and lacking free will and other cues of humanness. These cues and the 
viewer’s response correlate to each other. Grodal also remarks on comedy films 
that “viewers laugh at protagonist failures, thus rejecting empathic identification 
with the protagonists and their acts and motives” (p.176), adding that clowns in 
live action cannot help being a physical object (p.177). This discussion can cover 
the hand-drawn clown figure of the Out of the Inkwell series, whose actions display 
cues of its sub/nonhuman status as the on-screen human artist’s puppet or 
mechanical object, rather than merely looking lifelike.10 Importantly, Grodal’s 
(1997: 122) study of film genres gives a further hint about the on-screen artist, too, 
whose role Max performs as a “higher force” which is mirrored by the hand-drawn 
clown figure’s robotic body movements. In this series of comedy films, the viewers 
should be constructed to identify themselves with the real human Max, because he 
can function as a device for their real-world identification which Grodal (1997: 
176) stresses it is crucial to establish for rejecting an empathetic relationship with 
and laughing at nonhuman performers.  
In Perpetual Motion (Max Fleischer, 1920, US), Max on screen shows a 
mythological and religious body performance so that he might seem to be a 
demiurgic creator, or a higher force. Instead of drawing the homunculus figure on 
paper, he blows some drops of ink on his palm (Figure 2.7). This does not intend to 
dry out the inkblot but to suggest a conventional gesture with which a higher force 
 
10 Crafton considers Koko’s lifelikeness as what the Fleischer Brothers aimed at: “Dave wearing 
a clown suit would be rotoscoped to generate Ko-Ko’s lifelike actions” (2013: 104). 
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like God is supposed to impart soul or life to human beings or human simulacra in 
myths. In the caption of the relevant scene, Crafton describes the gesture as 
“breathing ‘life’ into the inkblot clown” (1993: 168). Breath has long been used as a 
metaphor for soul as Patrick Harpur indicates: 
 
‘Breath’ is the original meaning of the Greek word pneuma, spirit, and a 
connotation of psyche, soul. The notion that the soul leaves the body with 
the dying person’s last breath was a Roman belief—both animus and spiritus 
in Latin imply ‘breath’—which persisted into Elizabethan times and beyond. 
(2010: Kindle 211) 
 
Figure 2.7 Max in Perpetual Motion 
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As suggested above, breathing as the soul/life-giving performance is found in 
Greek mythology. Robert Graves writes of Prometheus’ creation of human beings, 
“He used clay and water of Panopeus in Phocis, and Athene breathed life into 
them” (1992: 34). In the Judeo-Christian worldview, too, it is said that God “formed 
man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and 
man became a living soul” (Genesis 2:7). This Judeo-Christian text of the soul/life-
giving performance is cited when human beings try to bring their humanoid 
creation to life in Yudl Rosenberg’s 1909 story, The Golem and the Wondrous Deeds 
of the Maharal of Prague: 
 
When [the Maharal] was done, all three of us recited in unison the verse: 
“He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and the man became a living 
creature,” for even the atmosphere we inhale must contain fire, water, and 
air, which are the three elements mentioned in the Book of Creation. (2007: 
Kindle 386) 
 
In this ritual of the Golem story, nobody is described as literally imitating God’s 
soul/life-giving gesture, but in Perpetual Motion Max does quite explicitly in an 
attempt to make visible what he is in the film series. This figurative performance 
does not result from any religious motivation of the Fleischer Brothers but from 
the Western convention in which shifting from religious or mystic realms since the 
Reformation and the Renaissance, art and science have been qualified for the 
discourse and the practice, if metaphoric, of bringing human simulacra to life 
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(Nelson 2001; Newman 2007; King 2007). 
It is not only a demiurgic status but also a master status that Max performs 
on screen, with the clown implied as Genie and the inkwell as the magic lamp or 
bottle. This performance can be viewed within the cultural context of the Arabian 
Nights which was introduced as a popular subject in Hollywood and the Western 
film productions (Bernstein 1997: 3) at the time when the Out of the Inkwell series 
was produced.11 In those film productions with the subject, the genie figure says 
 
11 The examples specific to Genie and the magic lamp include the live-action film Aladdin and 
the Wonderful Lamp (Chester and Sidney Franklin, 1917, US) and the animated feature The 
Adventure of Prince Achmed (Lotte Reiniger, 1926, GER), soon followed by the animated short 
ComiColor Cartoons: Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp (1935, US) produced by Ub Iwerks, the 
animated advertisement Aladdin and the Magic Lamp (George Pal, 1936, NL) and the animated 
short Popeye the Sailor: Aladdin and His Wonderful Lamp (Dave Fleischer, 1939, US). 
Figure 2.8 Koko like Genie in The Tantalizing Fly 
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like this cliché phrase: “I am the Slave of the Lamp, Master”. 
The influence of Genie, the slave of the lamp, can be observed in The 
Tantalizing Fly, at the end of which Max on screen slips the clown figure on the 
back of paper into the inkwell (Figure 2.8). In this scene, Koko returns to being 
motionless and as a result, lifeless, but still looks slightly like a three-dimensional 
form while sliding down into the inkwell as a physical object located in the live-
action world which Max inhabits on screen. The overtone of Genie as the magical 
humanoid entity is clearly found in Modelling (Dave Fleischer, 1921, US), False 
Alarm (Dave Fleischer, 1923, US) and other many films, produced after The 
Tantalizing Fly, in the series. In the films, Koko goes back into the inkwell on his 
own accord or in order to escape from trouble.  
Sometimes this seems to occur under Max’s control. At the end of Cartoon 
Factory (Dave Fleischer, 1924, US), for example, Max finally puts the cork into the 
bottle after Koko is thrown into it together with the mechanical soldiers, 
apparently by the human artist’s will for settling the crazy burlesque of his 
creations. Functioning as the original and ultimate place in which he/it should 
belong, the small bottle imparts the animated homunculus figure with the status of 
a slave, and also that of the slave of Max who owns the object. Before discussing 
the complexity of the relationship between master and slave depicted in the Out of 
the Inkwell series, I bring to light a third face, quite distinct from, yet still 
overlapping with the previous two—demiurgic creator and master—of Max’s self-
figuration; he plays an engineer or scientist.  
In Cartoon Factory, Max stops drawing manually and then tests an electrical 
143 
machine to control a drawing pen in a wireless way (Figure 2.9). Given that the 
title includes the word, “factory”, this film in the Out of the Inkwell series implies 
that Max on screen seeks to develop a mechanical production system of animation. 
Indeed, this was a goal of Max’s invention of the Rotoscope, as suggested in the 
inventor’s remark on the technology: “An artist, for example, will simply sit down 
and, with a certain character in mind, draw the figures that are to make it 
animated . . . With only the aid of his imagination an artist cannot, as a rule, get the 
perspective and related motions of reality” (cited in Crafton 1993: 167).12 
Mentioning this comment in relation to the taylorisation of animation production 
developed in the 1910s to the 1920s, Crafton summarises, “In the machine age, 
empirical experience and observation were no longer trustworthy unless 
corroborated, tutored, and reproduced mechanically” (p.167).  
Cartoon Factory can be considered as the epitome of the Taylorist idea 
which Max and his contemporaries shared during the two decades. Completing the 
figure of Koko with the drawing pen connected wirelessly to the knife switch 
 
12 Crafton indicates the source of this remark: The inkwell man (1920) New York Times. 
February 22. 
Figure 2.9 Max and Koko in Cartoon Factory 
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panel, Max connects a wire to the back of Koko, thereby electrifying and controlling 
his creation (Figure 2.9). In the film, this technology is a realisation of the film 
production system which enables human agents to draw and further animate any 
figures mechanically on screen at any instant of time while they are working. 
Following the introductory scenes of Cartoon Factory in which Max tests the 
equipment of mechanically animating figures which he seems to have just 
invented, the humanoid figure, Koko, is depicted as if brought to life by the human 
inventor with electric shocks (Figure 2.10). In this moment, the animatic transition 
of the hand-drawn figure is explicitly introduced as a narrative device, and from 
the perspective of film history, it can be viewed as a precursor of the live-action 
sci-fi horror film, Frankenstein, produced seven years after Cartoon Factory.  
Figure 2.10 The wired Koko in Cartoon Factory 
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Not looking so mad as Doctor Frankenstein in the horror film, Max on 
screen in this film conducts much the same experiment of giving life to a humanoid 
construct with the same power or shock of electricity.13 The character trait of an 
engineer or scientist which Max on screen assumes is also seen with the other 
humanoid figures as well as the wired Koko of Cartoon Factory. The wireless 
drawing pen draws a machine which can make anything real by rendering it either 
in a graphic or photographic way. Among what is rendered by the machine is a 
mechanical soldier on a wheeled podium (Figure 2.11), which shifts from a hand-
drawn figure to a photographic cut-out, to a human actor performing as a robot 
which is put into motion with a pull string mechanism, as is seen in Sheriff Woody 
in Toy Story (John Lasseter, 1995, US).  
It should be noted that when discussing film genres, Grodal (1997: 122) 
takes soldiers, along with robots and clowns, as a subhuman representation. The 
final phase of the soldier figure apparently performed by Max in live action 
displays awkward and staccato body movements as mechanicomorphic. In the 
 
13 For the way in which electricity was considered as a new modern source of life or soul 
around the Enlightenment, see James Delbourgo (2006). 
Figure 2.11 A mechanical soldier in Cartoon Factory 
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film, the human actor’s imitation of a robot seems to be either realised by means of 
non-processed acting, or film shooting or editing. In the latter case, the result is 
likely to remind us of the pixilated movement of the human actors seen in 
Neighbours (Norman McLaren, 1952, CND), and interestingly, this technique is 
described as “animating humans as if puppets” (Purves 2014: Kindle 2978). For 
Max the on-screen character, and further for Max and Dave the two human agents 
of the film series, any figures are merely materials of image engineering, whether 
rendered graphically or photographically and whether shot frame by frame or in 
live action. 
When the burlesque fight takes place going crazy on screen between the 
clown and the robot soldier, one crucial question surfaces in the viewer’s 
perception: which looks less or more human? As the robot soldier is seemingly 
performed by Max, the question leads to problematising the demiurgic as well as 
human status of the on-screen creator Max who drew all the figures and invented 
all the machines in Cartoon Factory. Indeed, the issue of Frankenstein and his 
usurping creation is quite a common theme in other films from the Out of the 
Inkwell series. Now that I have made clear that Max on screen performs a 
demiurgic creator like God, the master of a genie, and a scientist like Frankenstein, 
I turns to the specific ways in which the clown is depicted as sub/nonhuman and 





Why Koko the Clown cannot be like Frankenstein’s monster 
Given Grodal’s (1997) above-cited account of clowns as a typical nonhuman film 
figure, it does not suffice to acclaim that Koko looks alive. Rather, the clown figure 
is depicted and narrated as created, enslaved and engineered, loosely in response 
and contrast to the status of varying types which Max assumes on screen when 
interacting with it. In this sense, I call into question the evaluation of the 
Rotoscope, contesting Crafton who states, “Ko-Ko embodies Dave” (2013: 104). As 
showed above, Koko on screen displays schematic behaviours, which are close to 
the mode of figurative, rather than embodied, performance in Crafton’s (2013) 
definition of the two terms. Max on screen (and further as the producer of the film 
series), is not simply engaged in creating the lifelike action of a figure, but also in 
the mechanical generation system of figures and their movements without relying 
on animators’ imagination or their sense of body movement. This pragmatic 
evaluation of the technique suggests that the Koko figure highlights the process in 
which human bodies are subsumed under the system of image engineering.  
 In Cartoon Factory, the figure of the clown is explicitly depicted as wired to 
the image-engineering system. Being wired to a mechanical system works as a 
narrative device to signify the non/subhuman, or objectified, status of a human 
(and anthropomorphic) figure in conventional films, whether the figure is 
performed by a live human actor or hand-drawn; for instance, the mouse-queen 
robot in Disney’s animated feature The Great Mouse Detective (Ron Clements, 
Burny Mattinson, Dave Michener and John Musker, 1986, US), the mechanised 
young emperor in the Japanese animated series Nadia: The Secret of Blue Water 
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(Hideaki Anno, 1990, JP) and Jason Stryker the mutant connected to metal tubes at 
the back of the neck in X2 (Bryan Singer, 2003, US).  
When Koko shouts, “WOW—Shut it off!!”, at the stronger electric shock 
given by Max on screen, the human creator does not worry about how he might 
hurt his own creation. Although he soon separates the wire from Koko, it is not due 
to the clown’s allusion to any pain, as he knows that it is impossible for any hand-
drawn or engineered figure to feel pain or any other sensations. Rather, Max on 
screen does not need to keep his creation wired because he succeeded in making it 
walk as he wants, and then its walking movement becomes mechanically cycled in 
a faster pace with his strong electrification than it was.  
 Showing mechanicomorphic or theriomorphic movements in Cartoon 
Factory and many other episodes of this film series, Koko is dealt with as an object 
or an animal by Max on screen. In Invisible Ink (1921), Max plays with Koko using 
his clown hat as if playing with a cat using a feather toy, and in trying to catch it, 
the clown shows reflex reactions for a while (Figure 2.12). Despite the suppleness 
of body movement due to the Rotoscope, yet in terms of the behaviour, the human 
figure looks much like a helpless cat that is only made fool of by its master.  
Figure 2.12 Koko in Invisible Ink 
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In Jumping Bean (Dave Fleischer, 1922, US), likewise, the clown walks or 
runs round distractedly in circles, with the top of his head tied and confined to the 
wire-like pen line that was drawn by Max on screen. In the middle of trying to free 
itself from being shackled, Koko’s body becomes twisted to look like a screw’s 
helical line or a thick spring. Soon followed by the contrasting depiction in which 
Koko becomes suddenly happy for obtaining a hat and a costume into which the 
pen line is transformed, the clown figure is characterised by the movements that 
even if supple, are involuntary, instinct-driven and goalless, as a narrative device 
suggesting that it is not or below human, in terms of Grodal’s (1997: 116-117) 
definition of humanness. Such a mode of behaviour for Koko serves to remind the 
viewer of a dog or a monkey; when surprised at the unpredictable movements of 
the beans in Jumping Beans, he jumps up and down by reflex, and when confused 
by a mirror wall in Puzzle (Dave Fleischer, 1923, US), he does not show any 
cognitive ability to understand the reflected figure in the mirror as himself—he 
tries to attacks it only to break the mirror—unlike human beings.  
What is more significant in Jumping Beans is that Max likens Koko to an 
object when he ridicules his non/subhuman creation: “Now You Look Like a 
Jumping Jack”. This intertitled dialogue suggests that the behavioural loop of 
stimulus and response makes Koko look like the well-known mechanical puppet 
toy of a human appearance.14 The clown figure’s schematic movement of surprise 
 
14 A jumping jack might refer to a physical exercise. Not as an object but an activity, however, 
the referent is not well compatible with Max’s phrase, “look like a Jumping Jack”. Further, the 
exercise was not well known to the public around the 1920s when the Out of the Inkwell series 
were produced. For the detail of the exercise, see Connor Heffernan (2015) The history of the 
jumping jack. Available at: https://physicalculturestudy.com/2015/02/23/the-history-of-the-
jumping-jack/ (accessed 26 Aug 2018). 
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or shock is reduced to the mechanical toy’s movement that is simplistically 
repetitive, flat and emotionless.  
Koko’s mechanically repetitive movement is highly visible in the early three 
creator-created interaction scenes of False Alarm (Dave Fleischer, 1923, US). In the 
first scene, we can see the clown try and fail a few times to catch a cane which on 
screen Max drew for him, every time it contracts and expands (or goes down below 
or comes up from the ground), seemingly for itself, yet resulting from the creator’s 
invisible drawing scheme. Next, he is going to walk to the right side of the screen as 
he likes, and quickly interfered with by Max, he repeats the gesture and facial 
expression of anger to his creator to restart his favourite walking routine. We can 
see this set of movements two times; the second time is shorter than the first. 
Third, Koko bursts into a run, and then Max’s hand quickly blocks his path as if it 
were a wall which he cannot jump over. Even his running in the opposite direction 
is interfered with by the blocking hand. Sandwiched between Max’s two hands, and 
after rotating several times, the clown repeats four times the action of raising his 
hands up and down at the same time bending his legs up and down. In the three 
consecutive scenes, some of the clown’s movements might suggest free will and 
emotions as the tokens of humanness. Repeated mechanically and often 
excessively, however, they work in the opposite way which illustrates that those 
anthropomorphic tokens are only pretensions.  
This malfunction of the cues of free will and emotions can be viewed in 
terms of figurative performance. Observing early classical cartoon characters, 
regardless of whether they interact with live human actors as their creators on 
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screen, Crafton notes: 
 
Not that animated performances in the figurative mode were bereft of 
emotion; they simply expressed it using different devices. Performances 
arising from even the most rigidly conventionalized forms may still convey 
feeling by the way of vocabularies of masklike signs and gestures. (2013: 24; 
emphasis mine)  
 
Despite his persistent argument that animated characters perform as effectively as 
live human actors on screen, Crafton as cited above admits that figurative 
performance can make the viewer perceive such characters as fake and eventually 
as sub/nonhuman. The scholar goes on to write of Betty Boop that “her 
movements, gestures, and expressions are formulaic; she is not introspective; we 
don’t bond with her as a thoughtful being” (2013: 26). To be accurate, it is not that 
she is not introspective or thoughtful, but that the human agents of the Betty Boop 
series made the figure of the titular name move in the mode in which it does not 
appear so. No matter how supple or “lifelike” its movement looks, likewise, the 
Koko figure in the figurative, schematic and mechanicomorphic mode refers to its 
status as a puppet, thereby making its cues of free will and emotions ostensible, 
dubious and inauthentic.  
In the Fleischer Brothers’ motivation for using the theriomorphic and 
mechanicomorphic modes of behaviour, Koko is even depicted to foreground and 
self-exploit its own material conditions, drawn-ness and reproducibility, as a 
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narrative device. In Jumping Beans, for instance, Koko reproduces itself 
mechanically by means of a stamp (Figure 2.13). Countlessly multiplied in a flash, 
the copies of the Koko figure move and run in entirely the same way to each other, 
going so far as to march in rows as soldiers do. In this impersonalised and unified 
mode of movement, the copied figures seem to be something mindless or soulless, 
or humanoid robots.  
The mechanical reproduction of one and the same cartoon figure echoes the 
Fleischer Brothers’ Taylorist vision of animation production in the film industry. 
The vision has another aspect of replaceability, as relevant to reproducibility, in 
which the Fleischers can create and supply new cartoon figures that as soon as 
their hand-drawn precedent has lost popularity, are to work for the Tooniverse. 
This is clearly claimed in Koko in 1999 (Dave Fleischer, 1927, US), where Max on 
screen says to Koko, “Now, you are not the only clown in town!” and then brings 
some puzzle-like pieces of paper together into a puppet. Put by on-screen Max onto 
the two-dimensional space of hand-drawn animation, the paper puppet is soon 
transformed into a hand-drawn figure like Koko. In the film, mechanical is not only 
the process of creating new equivalent figures as the materials of animation, but 
Figure 2.13 Koko reproduces it/himself mechanically in Jumping Beans 
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also the futuristic world in which Koko and other characters live, eat and marry 
under the order of automatised system, much the same world as we see in Modern 
Times (Charlie Chaplin, 1936, US).  
Indeed, the Brothers take advantage of the material reality of the clown 
figure for a joke in Koko Needles the Boss (Dave Fleischer, 1927, US). Torn by the 
hangnails of Max on screen with the paper on which Koko is drawn, this clown 
figure asks Max on screen, “Don’t hem and haw, I need surgery FAST!” However, it 
is not surgery but rather possibly glue which the drawn figure lacking human 
anatomy on paper needs—yet glue cannot work because the torn-ness of the paper 
is not real but drawn. The joke continues while the surgical operation which its 
human creator pretends to conduct is depicted using techniques of hand-drawn 
animation. Sewing the torn area of paper, the drawn big and thick needle and 
thread passes through the drawn figure’s ostensible body without any treatment of 
anesthetisation. Not hurt but upset about being sewed, Koko as a figure simply 
moves aside out of the torn area on paper (Figure 2.14). This transmaterial and 
transdimensional joke demonstrates that any performances of the clown on screen 
are an illusory pretension based on the material condition of being drawn in ink 
Figure 2.14 The hand-drawn needle and thread in Koko Needles the Boss 
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frame by frame.  
The exploitation of drawn figures’ material condition is also witnessed by 
Crafton, who comments on early animators including the Fleischer Brothers: “They 
relied on graphic conventions that put their toons’ bodies through gyrations to 
show off their nonhuman anatomical rubbery quality, their imperviousness to 
physical attacks and dismemberment” (Crafton 2013: 28). The animation scholar is 
right in that he points out hand-drawn figures’ graphic-ness and its conventions, 
but in animated film such figures do not have any (literally anatomical) bodies but 
are a constitution of lines and/or paints on the registered area of each paper or 
celluloid sheet.  
Tied in with the schemata of humanness, this body issue helps reconsider 
the recurrent question of the uncanniness of rotoscoped figures in hand-drawn 
animation. Discussing mental models of humanness as relevant to social 
interaction, Grodal writes, “Furthermore, it is characteristic of the models of 
humanness that humanness is depicted as a ‘felt totality’” (1997: 110). Here, the 
concept of “felt totality” suggests that fragmented or disembodied human bodies or 
their images can make it difficult for the viewers to perceive humanness or to 
experience the sensation of the quality in them. Putting forward the human being 
as composed of many different organs and functions, the film scholar continues, 
“Therefore, if we isolate the component parts and functions from the totality, the 
components are very often felt to have a non-human quality which is normally 
connected with lower life-forms, things, and mechanical devices” (p.110).  
In this sense, rotoscoping is a process of isolating or “amputating” a human 
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being’s kinetic part in time from its original body and then transplanting it into a 
drawn figure of a body on screen. Lacking felt totality, even if transplanted into a 
human figure, the rotoscoped body movement can be perceived as something 
non/subhuman or non-living. It visualises the amputated-ness, disembodied-ness 
and constructed-ness of Koko on screen rather than helping the clown figure 
appear alive or human in totality. 
In this section, I elucidated how Koko as a hand-drawn figure is dealt with 
as non/subhuman and further material in the Out of the Inkwell series. This does 
not entirely deny any possible impression of being alive and/or human when the 
viewer perceives the drawn figure of the clown Koko on screen, but rather sheds 
light on the impression of being non/subhuman and the material reality of drawn-
ness which are explicitly shown with the figure in tension with the 
anthropomorphic illusion. Here stops working the impression of autonomy on the 
grounds of which Bukatman (2012) argues cartoon characters come to appear 
alive. He states:  
 
Ko-Ko might refuse to perform as directed, or he might show some 
reluctance to return to the inkwell at cartoon’s end. As I have mentioned, 
these characters do not simply have life; they have a life of their own, and 
this rebelliousness can be read as a further sign of vitality. (2012: Kindle 
337) 
 
This argument touches on the Frankenstein-monster issue dealt with in the 
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previous section on Gertie. Cartoon characters’ autonomy is also observed in the 
Out of the Inkwell series and other animated cartoons by Crafton, who remarks, 
“The toons are created by the animators, become independent beings, and then 
rebel or threaten the creators, in these cases rationalized as digestive and 
cannibalistic motifs” (2013: 284). However, it should be noted that Crafton’s (2013: 
80) emphasis is not on the toons’ being or appearing alive but on their performing 
liveness. By extension, it can be said that Koko is not really autonomous but 
performs autonomy, or rebelliousness, in the diegetic world of the film series, as a 
conventional stimulus for the viewer to laugh at. 
 
Concerning animated characters—regardless of whether they are presented as 
living or non-living, and human or sub/nonhuman—in his study of early animation 
history, Crafton suspects, “the drawings seem to take on an independent life of 
their own” (1993: 298). When this happens, he continues, “The ‘hand of the artist’ 
disappears, its place now occupied by characters who become agents of his will 
and ideas and through which his presence is known” (p.298). This observation 
provides a hint of how a constructed figure in human (or animal) form can make an 
appearance as a subject, at the same time creating its sub/nonhuman counterpart, 
in the viewer’s experience of animation film. Crafton (p.298) sums up as the term 
of “retreat” the disappearance of the on-screen live-action animator behind the 
screen, which reminds us of Descartes’ view of the mode in which God’s power 
works toward the world He created.  
As examined above, in many of the Out of the Inkwell series the on-screen 
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creator Max continues to intervene in how the clown figure Koko moves, how it 
works and how it ceases to be, after he gives rise to it. This mode of the creator’s 
power reveals to the viewer that every time it moves, works and exists, the clown 
figure is not only drawn but also manipulated in time at his will. Crafton’s (1993: 
298) above-cited account suggests that the on-screen visibility of such a creator 
and his power interrupts the construction of a self-contained film narrative in the 
diegetic world where an animated figure can appear to the viewer as a subject 
independent, autonomous and alive. The scholar points out, “The animator opts for 
increasing invisibility while seeming to perform a service for the audience, 
entertaining them with these diverting adorable protagonists” (p.299)—what he 
means by adorable protagonists includes characters representing children and 
(possibly anthropomorphised) animals.  
I connect this observation to the next Chapter Three which takes on the 
animation films in which the hand-drawn human figures usually operate as the 
leading narrative device, with no live human actors as their creator appearing, in 
the development of the film narratives. In the narratives, I analyse the puppet-as-
puppet figures assuming non/subhumanness or simply referring to a thing, in 
contrast to those performing humanness or aliveness. Before entering the next 
Chapter, I examine Greaves’ Manipulation as a critique of the animator’s visible 





2.3. An Animator and His Resisting Creation in Manipulation  
 
For the most part in Manipulation, a live-action human animator on screen tortures 
and fights the human figure which he has just created on paper, only to throw it 
into a trash basket. The antics are played out along with the animator’s actions to 
control the human figure’s every movement—I term such an action micro-
intervention. As a figurative depiction of the animating process with hand 
drawings, all his micro-intervention is resisted and survived by the hand-drawn 
human figure.  
In this sense, Manipulation is the film of an unfinished animation, and this 
theme of unfinished-ness makes the film noticeable in two aspects. First, the film 
Figure 2.15 An animator in Manipulation 
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does not intend to show off any technical achievement of the hand-drawn human 
figure in terms of movement. More significantly, it features the figure’s material 
condition of paper in the process of animating. With these aspects in mind, I 
proceed to analyse how the conventional status of the animator as a demiurgic 
creator is satirised in relation to the figure’s materiality in the film. For this 
analysis, I connect the issue of the animator’s status to the debate which 
Funkenstein (1989) observes was made between Newton and Leibniz about the 
intervention of the Creator-God with the world as a clockwork in terms of His 
(im)perfection. The question of (im)perfection will be also reviewed in terms of 
animation filmmaking from a non-anthropocentric, object-oriented perspective 
informed by minimalism. My intention with this is to evaluate Manipulation as a 
critical commentary on the animator’s self-figuration as an omnipotent god.  
At the beginning of the film, following the point-of-view shots in which the 
animator on screen works at a drawing desk, the viewer sees in a 
phenomenological sense what the animator sees happening on a sheet of paper. 
With the animator’s face off screen, it is quite difficult to identify him except for 
gender (Figure 2.15). This anonymity functions as a cue in which any male 
animator employing the technique of hand-drawn animation can be the on-screen 
animator. He begins to draw a human face on paper, and soon tosses it out to 
disappear out of the screen whose frame matches the sheet of paper—the being-
tossed-out is created using the technique of hand-drawn animation. The careless 
treatment indicates that the animator is not satisfied with his uncompleted 
creation. After tapping on the paper for another idea or approach, he begins to 
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draw legs, feet, a torso, arms and hands, with a head not drawn.  
However, the resultant drawing seems to be still unsatisfactory to the 
serious animator. Tossing out the headless human figure again, further, he 
crumples the sheet of paper once used yet now empty. This course of artistic 
creation demonstrates that the animator is so powerful as to discard and dispose of 
at any time what he created and what he used for it. At this stage, the power is 
depicted to go beyond material reality by means of the technique of hand-drawn 
animation. The animator’s three-dimensional action of tossing the figures out 
results directly in their two-dimensional sliding out of the paper in the film. In a 
realistic sense, this is impossible because once drawn with ink or graphite, the 
figures are physically fixed to the sheet of paper.  
The film’s narrative shifts when all the discarded figures come back onto a 
new sheet of paper to complete the figure of a human body. As if it survived 
without respect to its creator’s artistic decision, the human figure makes a gesture 
of showing itself off with a smile on its face. Then begins a self-contained animation 
for a while without the animator; the figure is depicted as a performing character 
capable of moving for himself and aware of himself. Walking and running around 
voluntarily in a given, virtually three-dimensional, world of paper, he seems to 
notice that his own body is made of roughly drawn lines and lacks a three-
dimensional volume. The character’s autonomy is interrupted by the hands of the 
animator who without hesitation, needles into him with threads through the sheet 
of paper in order to manipulate him like a marionette (Figure 2.16). Impossible in a 
realistic sense, this interruption makes explicit a violent aspect of the animator 
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exploiting the character for his own artistic motivation to the degree that one of the 
character’s feet is severed from the leg while being forced to be badly moved by the 
hands of the animator (Figure 2.16).  
This is also what I pointed out analysing McCay’s way of treating Gertie as a 
circus animal in Gertie the Dinosaur. In this film, Gertie is depicted to swallow a 
thick hard tree and a lot of water under the order of the animator. Although the 
Gertie figure is given as alive in the film narrative, the action of swallowing is not 
perceived as fatal for the nonhuman creation but operates as a device for the 
human audience’s laughter. For this comedic effect, the viewer’s belief system of 
Gertie on screen shifts swiftly from brought-to-life-ness to drawn-ness.  
Manipulation puts into question such an anthropocentric perceptual play by 
Figure 2.16 The figure becomes a marionette in Manipulation 
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showing that the on-screen human animator’s creative execution can hurt, wound 
and injure a human simulacrum which he intends to present as alive. Ignoring that 
the character looks upset, uncomfortable and hurt, the artist does not stop 
manipulating it in a violent way: pulling its arms to the extremes, and flicking it 
with fingers. The human simulacrum finally resists, hits and bites its creator, and 
then the latter tears the former out of the sheet of paper (Figure 2.17).  
Separated from the rest of the sheet, the hand-drawn human figure turns 
into a three-dimensional yet flat puppet and tries to run away from its creator. 
Cruelty reaches the peak; when on the run it slips on spilled red ink, it seems to 
bleed. Thrown into a trash basket, the human figure climbs up from inside it to 
show a cue of survival at the end of the film (Figure 2.18). This is a crucial scene 
Figure 2.17 The animator tears out the figure in Manipulation 
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where the conventional discourse of animation is problematised. The on-screen 
animator eventually gives up bringing the human figure to life, and nonetheless the 
figure appears to move for itself and suggests a cue of life, with the human 
animator gone at the end. Here, the film presents an ironical situation for the 
viewer who promotes animation’s conventional discourse; when someone argues 
that the figure looks and is alive in the animated world,  he should agree that it was 
not brought to life by the on-screen live-action human animator but it is already 
alive as material per se. If this view of materials or artefacts is accepted, there is 
nothing that the on-screen animator struggles for in his studio. Instead of such a 
view, therefore, material resistance is what I bring into focus in this section. 
In the film narrative, the resistant figure’s final survival does not prove the 
Figure 2.18 The figure survives in Manipulation 
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animator’s artistic achievement, nor acclaims animation’s capacity of bringing-
anything-to-life. The on-screen animator’s interaction with the human figure as a 
creation of his signifies almost literally that he fails to achieve his artistic goals. He 
erases what he has just drawn and even dumps the sheet of paper itself on which 
he drew figures, because the drawings are not fit for what he intends to create, or 
simply because he does not like them. For the artist in Manipulation, concepts are 
prior to materials. This is quite a usual event for animators in the real world. For 
instance, we can see an animator crumple and throw away the sheet of paper on 
which he drew a figure in the 1939 documentary entitled How Walt Disney 
Cartoons Are Made.15 Even in the current digital environment of animation 
filmmaking, Stella Dearing16 remarks on her 2017 animation project: “Artists like 
Lean and many of our contemporaries, we started animation with pen and paper, 
they didn’t do anything, except to draw, erase, throw the paper out, draw again for 
eight to 12 hours” (Tomada 2017; emphasis mine).  
Manipulation does not feature the on-screen live-action animator’s 
successful execution but rather his failure to construct a good relationship with his 
creation as material. He struggles in controlling it, only to discard and leave it 
behind. In contrast to this film, Gertie the Dinosaur does not give any cue that some 
drawings of Gertie were erased or thrown away into a trash can, thereby 
 
15 This documentary is available at: https://youtu.be/mhfp6Z8z1cI (accessed 19 Oct 2018). 
For the detail of the documentary, see Open Culture (2011) How Walt Disney cartoons are 
made: 1939 documentary gives an inside look. Available at: 
http://www.openculture.com/2011/04/how_walt_disney_cartoons_are_made_.html (accessed 
19 Oct 2018). 
16 Dearing is senior vice executive president of the animation studio Top Draw Animation, Inc. 
involved in the production of the animation film My Little Pony: The Movie (Jayson Thiessen, 
2017, US/CND).  
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suggesting that the on-screen animator McCay is a flawless creator. In 
Manipulation, on the contrary, the human animator is a self-contradictory creator 
ready at any time to throw away figures which he is alleged to “bring to life”. This 
figuration of an artist as imperfect inflects what Batchelor calls as “the humanist 
ideal of the work of art . . . born from a struggle between a solitary individual and 
his resistant materials” (1997: 68). The film suggests that such a humanist ideal 
leads to anthropocentric violence, thereby belying the human subject’s mastery 
over the sub/nonhuman object.  
Particularly in terms of animation among arts, the imperfectness of the on-
screen animator-creator takes us to where the question is raised of the mode of 
intervention in which God exerts His power on the world. For Newton who put 
forward theological accounts in terms of his laws of motion, God “was by no means 
a lazy gentleman who does not interfere in his creation” (Funkenstein 1989: 95). 
According to Funkenstein, the British natural philosopher “would not have been 
able to account for the instantaneous effect of gravitation” without “[taking] God’s 
spatial omnipresence more and more literally” (1989: 94). As seen in Manipulation 
and also the films by McCay and the Fleischer Brothers I discussed in the preceding 
sections, analogously, the motion of hand-drawn animated human or animal 
figures is likely to be viewed as mirroring the filmmakers’ power or creativity. 
What interests me is the reason for which the intervenient mode in which God 
exerts power was not entirely accepted by Newton’s contemporaries. Funkenstein 
indicates, “Leibniz, who opposed many of Newton’s theological positions, was 
particularly enraged by this image of God as an imperfect watchmaker, the 
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mechanism that he created being in constant need of repair” (1989: 95-96; 
emphasis mine). For Leibniz, God cannot be an imperfect artist.  
Extending from Leibniz’s view, in Manipulation the on-screen animator is an 
imperfect creator. His demiurgic performance of micro-intervention in the motion 
of the drawn human figure is but the token of its incompleteness as well as his 
imperfectness. In the vein of Crafton (1993), such a token was made invisible in 
animation history to make animated figures subjects in self-contained film 
narratives. Several decades after the Out of the Inkwell series, Manipulation is 
intended to make visible again and criticise the anthropocentric view in which the 
anonymous animator still insists on the intervenient, often violent, control of every 
movement of his creation. In this intention of Greaves’, the recalcitrant human 
figure as a material thwarts the idealist animator on screen. 
 
In an attempt to illuminate animators’ privileged status over animated figures and 
materials in animation filmmaking, in this Chapter I have examined the hybrid 
films in which live-action human animators on screen perform as demiurgic 
creators or life-givers with hand-drawn human or animal figures as their creations. 
My analysis of the films reveals that the on-screen animators act as if they gave 
“life” to the figures, but that they still remain to regard and deal with their 
creations as materials or objects. Among the hybrid films under examination, 
further, I evaluate Greaves’ Manipulation as a self-criticism of such a self-
contradictory stance in animation filmmaking. In the following Chapters Three and 
Four, I will turn to puppet-as-puppet figures appearing on screen with and in 
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contrast to human or animal figures, in conventional self-contained narrative films 
made, respectively using the technique of cel-based hand-drawn animation and 
that of stop-motion animation. 
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Chapter Three 
Puppet-as-puppet Figures and Their Modes of Movement in Cel-
based Animation in Group CEL 
 
 
The focus of this Chapter is a group of the hand-drawn figures of puppets 
presented as puppets in conventional, narrative-motivated, cel-based animation 
films, most of which are located in the Tooniverse defined by Crafton (2013). My 
analysis of these figures intends to articulate the ways in which they are discerned 
by the animators and the viewers, as inanimate, fake or non/subhuman, from the 
figures representing humans or (often anthropomorphic) animals as living beings 
in the narratives of the films of that kind. As there are a large number of the figures 
I classify and call as Group CEL, I have developed a typology which helps select and 
analyse the emblematic case(s) of each type. For Group CEL, I suggest eight types of 
puppet-as-puppet figures (See Table 3.1). As discussed in the Methodology, each 
type is defined in terms of the two key criteria: (1) animatic transition and (2) 
interaction with human and/or (anthropomorphic) animal characters.  
Throughout the case studies with the typology in this Chapter, extending 
discussions of the power relationship between creator-animator and created-
animated in Chapter Two, I analyse the ways in which human or animal characters 
as living deal and interact with their simulacra as non-living or fake in the film 
diegesis. In particular, drawing on the discourses of humans, animals and machines 
by Descartes and La Mettrie, this analysis clarifies and evaluates the system of 




primary and secondary 
Interaction with characters in the film narrative 
1 a. No transition:  
Stationary state 
No interaction 
       a             b             c 
b. Only primary transition:  
Passive mode of movement 
c. Only primary transition:  
Automatic mode of movement 
2 Secondary transition’s main 
principle:  
Shifting to a different world 
No interaction except for 
supernatural characters 
3 No interaction except for the 
human owner and his/her 
animal friends 
4 No interaction allowed except 
for animal or marginalised 
characters 
5 Secondary transition’s main 
principle:  
Magic 
Enchanted by the character of 
a higher being in the film’s 
world 
6 Cursed by a diabolic power in 
the film’s world 
7 Secondary transition’s main 
principle:  
Technology 
Equivocal in the film’s world 
8 Deceptive in the film’s world 
Table 3.1 Eight Types of the puppet-as-puppet figures in Group CEL 
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human agents depict the figures of two kinds, living and non-living, real and fake, 
with the cues for the viewers to perceive one from the other as distinct (or to 
misperceive one as the other in some cases). In clarifying those backgrounds, I 
place some cases on the one hand within the film-historical context focused on 
puppets across between animation and live action, and on the other, the socio-
political context involving issues of adopted children and racism, television and the 
nation-state, and corporate power in animation industry. This expanded 
contextualisation will show how a figure and its mode of movement demonstrates 
what an animator or a viewer can see or imagine happening to him/herself or 
someone else in the real world.  
Next, I outline the emblematic cases of the eight types, including three 
subtypes, in Group CEL before analysing them in detail. 
 
 
Selection of the emblematic cases from Group CEL in the Tooniverse 
The emblematic films I have selected for the eight Types come mostly from 
Hollywood studios and other conventional platforms of animation filmmaking like 
Japanese “anime”.1 They include: Pinocchio, The Many Adventures of Winnie the 
Pooh (John Lounsbery and Wolfgang Reitherman, 1977, US) and The Great Mouse 
Detective, all from Disney; Suddenly It’s Spring (Seymour Kneitel, 1944, US) and The 
Enchanted Square (Seymour Kneitel, 1947, US), both featuring the Raggedy Ann 
 
1 Anime is a conventional, yet controversial, term to signify the Japanese industrial platform of 
cel-based hand-drawn animation filmmaking and its stylistic successors. For my postcolonial 
critique of the term, see Kim (2013) The East Asian post-human Prometheus: animated 
mechanical ‘others’. In: Buchan, Suzanne (ed.) Pervasive Animation. New York and London: 
Routledge. 
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doll, in the Noveltoons series; The Mouse and His Child (Charles Swenson and Fred 
Wolf, 1977, US and JPN); The Simpsons: Halloween Special III (Carlos Baeza, 1992, 
US), one episode of the long-running animated sitcom; and the anime TV series, 
Astro Boy (Osamu Tezuka et al., 1963-1966, JPN). 
Central among the films is Disney’s Pinocchio which not only features the 
titular boy character as a wooden puppet but also places the figure of him among a 
broad range of puppet-as-puppet figures, either in human or animal form. 
Bukatman observes: 
 
Geppetto’s workshop is filled with clockwork automata that erupt in a riot 
of limited but cacophonous action. The automata, in their repetitive, 
mechanical actions, are reminiscent of the simple looping image sequences 
of an earlier era’s optical toys, while Pinocchio himself, with his greater 
range of movement, motivation, and expressivity, is more properly 
cinematic, from the moment the Blue Fairy animates him. (2012: Kindle 
3333) 
 
The breadth of types of puppet-as-puppet and other non/subhuman figures found 
in Pinocchio helps me examine some of the eight Types in a cohesive manner. I 
classify and analyse those automata and other puppet-as-puppet figures in 
separate Types, which remain sub/nonhuman in contrast to the puppet boy 
character that is eventually transformed into a “real” boy when Pinocchio comes to 
an end. For much the same reason, The Great Mouse Detective is as good a case as 
Pinocchio, except that the performing characters in the former’s narrative do not 
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include any figures of life-size human beings because it features anthropomorphic 
animal figures.  
 As antithetic to Pinocchio in terms of sub/nonhumanness, Astro Boy is a 
pivotal work, as Frederik L. Schodt writes of the techno-puppet figure of the title: 
 
In a 1986 article in the Journal of the Robotics Society of Japan, Tezuka 
explained that he created Atom [Astro Boy] to be a type of twenty-first-
century reverse “Pinocchio,” a nearly perfect robot who strove to become 
more human (i.e., emotive and illogical), and also to be an interface 
between two different cultures—that of man and that of machine. 
Although Tezuka had never read American novelist Isaac Asimov, who 
worked hard to overturn the “evil” image of metal men in the West, his 
creation—Atom—was a friend of man and lived according to strict rules of 
robot behavior remarkably similar to Asimov’s Three Laws of Robotics. 
(2011: Kindle 1144) 
 
This alternative aspect of Astro Boy to Pinocchio is at the heart of Kim’s (2013) 
essay, which here I build on for analysis of the puppet-as-puppet figures’ 
movements and their religio-philosophical backgrounds and implications by 
placing them among other types of sub/nonhuman equivalents as well as human 
and/or animal characters. 
 Focus on figures of puppets as toy objects also expands my scope to the 
locus where we can find the two Raggedy Ann films of Noveltoons, The Many 
Adventures of Winnie the Pooh and The Mouse and His Child. These are adaptations 
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of well-known children’s books, respectively written by Johnny Gruelle,2 A. A. Milne 
and Russell Hoban. Although each of the books might not be necessarily 
conventional, I put priority on the Hollywood context in which the toy narratives 
were made into animation films.  
In the following sections, I examine puppet-as-puppet figures from the 
above-mentioned emblematic films in the order of Types.  
 
 
3.1. Type One: Inanimate Human-like or Animal-like Objects in Pinocchio 
 
Classified as Type One (T1), many puppet-as-puppet figures are kept as inanimate 
objects in animation films, and accordingly, are not employed as performing 
characters in the films’ narratives. Drawn on paper and/or then celluloid in cel 
animation, not all the T1 figures undergo “animatic transition”, either “primary” or 
“secondary”. Generally marginalised in the film narrative, the T1 figures assume a 
substantially contesting role in my thesis because they do not involve any cues of 
life or soul, that is, cues working for secondary animatic transition, even when 
some of them go through primary animatic transition. Considering the difference of 
the modes of movement shown on screen, I develop three Subtypes in the T1 
figures: (a) stationary state, (b) passive and (c) automatic modes of movement. 
 
2 Tracing back the toy narratives along and across cultures, graphic arts, books and animation 
films, Kuznets comments, “Gruelle’s colorful illustrations of a variety of dolls as well as of other 
creations—like the camel with the wrinkled knees and the paper dragon—have entered into 
the American consciousness, even when his less original narratives are forgotten” (1994: 21). 
What is remarkable in her comment is the popularity of the illustrated figures of Raggedy Ann 
and Andy, and indeed, these figures are easily found in animated shorts, animated television 
series and an animated feature, all produced in conventional show business industry, since 
around the 1940s. 
174 
Emphatically, these three modes of physical cues rely on the rendering ways in 
hand-drawn animation. In analysis of the ways in which those cues trigger the 
viewers to perceive human or animal simulacra on screen simply as objects, I 
clarify the perceptual strategy of the rendering ways, building on Grodal’s (1997) 
discussion of schematic behaviours and the involvement of a “higher force” in term 
of sub/nonhumanness in film. 
 
 
Subtype (a): Geppetto’s figurine of a lady in the stationary state 
In Pinocchio, a female figurine (Figure 3.1) is placed, as a lifeless object, on a shelf 
in the woodcarver Geppetto’s workshop. The way in which the figurine is rendered 
Figure 3.1 The figure of a lady figurine in Pinocchio 
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is visibly different from that in which Jiminy Cricket, an anthropomorphic insect, is 
rendered as an acting character when standing beside it. The outlines of Jiminy’s 
body are drawn clearly black or dark on celluloid. This transparent thin glossy 
material with the Jiminy figure is laid over a sheet of paper on which the 
background is painted. By the time Pinocchio was produced, backgrounds for cel 
animation films in US animation industry were usually painted on heavy paper in 
washes (Klein 1998: 159).  
Unlike Jiminy, the female figurine is rendered with a painterly style of 
brushstrokes, in particular, in terms of depicting the light and shade on the surface 
of its body. Around the painted surface is no clear outline, and this pictorial 
convention makes spectators expect that the figurine will not show any movements 
but remain part of the background, as outlines drawn on celluloid usually operate 
as a visible cue with which spectators can predict what will move and what will not 
on screen in a cel animation film.  
What is peculiar about the figurine is that it shows as much a meaningful 
gaze, facial expression and posture as Jiminy Cricket does (Figure 3.1). In the scene 
in which Geppetto is drawing the face of Pinocchio, the figurine looks as if along 
with Jiminy, it is witnessing the old toymaker at work. However, the figurine 
remains static; it makes no blink of the eyes, nor shows any token of movements in 
time, while Jiminy’s body is depicted to be always in motion. Given that the film 
genre of Pinocchio is a sort of fantasy, there is no reason why the figurine is 
prohibited from transforming, for instance, into a little fairy. If the length of the 
shot with the figurine becomes shorter without the anthropomorphised cricket 
character, it will become less easy to discern whether the figurine is simply meant 
176 
to be an inanimate object or a living fairy character like Tinker Bell in Disney’s 
Peter Pan (Clyde Geronimi, Wilfred Jackson and Hamilton Luske, 1953, US). 
However, Disney animators apparently had no compositional motivation for such 
transformation but rather used the lady-as-figurine figure for a sexist joke.  
As Jiminy watches Geppetto drawing eyes onto Pinocchio’s face, he 
happens to touch the figurine’s hips, unknowingly, to lean against something. In 
embarrassment, the anthropomorphised insect character quickly apologises to it 
as if the figurine were a living human lady. Jiminy’s action raises a simple but 
important question: Why should he apologise to it, although it appears to be an 
inanimate object? Why does he blush at touching it? The anthropomorphic Jiminy 
shows that he has a good knowledge of human or animal simulacra when he takes 
a look around Geppetto’s workshop on entering there. Looking at different types of 
artefacts and noting how they are made, he refers to the words, clocks, music 
boxes, toys, puppets and a marionette, before he encounters the figurine. It is, 
therefore, impossible that Jiminy mistakes this artefact for a real woman who it 
represents in human form. However, his apology to it makes the lower round part 
of the figurine switch to a woman’s hips as a sensitive and supposedly sensual body 
part in Disney artists’ motivation for a joke which intends to cause the audience’s 
laughter.3  
 
3 My question of this sexist joke should address the issue of the relationship between viewing 
and viewed, subject and object, and male and female—Jiminy is a male character. The question 
can be rephrased: In what way is it that the joke works and what belief systems are shared in 
the Tooniverse of Group CEL? David Freedberg comments on the sensuality of human 
simulacra in sculptures and paintings: “In many cases the image came alive because the 
beholder wanted it to do so” (1989: 320). When he describes images as coming alive, he refers 
to the effect in which “we may want to touch them as if they were real” (p.49). In the effect 
driven by the beholder’s desire or wish, the status of a human simulacrum shifts from an 
inanimate object to what it represents. I claim that Jiminy’s touching the figurine’s quite 
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The nonhuman insect character’s gentle apology for his vulgar behaviour 
does not work to transform the figurine into a real lady, but as a joke due to his 
simply perceptual fallacy, loosely grounded on the look of a tramp like Charlie 
Chaplin. What is noteworthy about this joke is that perceptual ambiguity is 
involved in the figurine which is reminiscent of pottery figurines mass-produced 
for market in the real world. The joke is not only sexist but also functions to warn 
the viewers, who are ready to define themselves to be human beings superior to 
the insect character, that they should be able to discern real from fake in the 
diegetic world of Pinocchio filled with human (and animal) simulacra. 
 
 
Subtype (b): Stromboli’s marionettes in the passive mode of movement 
In the scene where a puppet play is performed under the order of the show master 
Stromboli in Pinocchio, we can see the figures of marionettes as themselves, each 
with a different national (German, French and Russian) trope, not going through 
secondary, but only primary, animatic transition. This means that they are given 
cues of movement without those of life by their animators in production. The 
marionette figures are hand-drawn on cel like the Pinocchio figure—this figure 
undergoes both transitions, but their look and movement are rendered in a 
different way from those of the protagonist figure. On the Stromboli stage, for 
 
exaggerated hip part is driven by the same wish shared in the Tooniverse of Group CEL. 
Examining discourses of the myth of Pygmalion and his female simulacrum, Freedberg 
suggests that in such a wish surface two fears. One is the fear of the real body, which “forms the 
basis of the innumerable reservations that terminate in censorship” (Freedberg 1989: 344). 
This fear of sexuality lurks around Jiminy’s physical contact with the figurine. It is at this 
moment that the viewers remind themselves again of the belief system that the figurine is not 
real but fake. The other fear is of the blasphemous imitation of God creating life, particularly in 
Western and Islamic cultures (Freedberg 1989:359).  
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example, the figure of the German girl puppet (Figure 3.2) is depicted to move on 
the stage, but to remain an inanimate object in contrast to the Pinocchio figure 
which already underwent secondary transition. The former’s status is 
demonstrated through some specific visible cues designed by Disney animators in 
accordance with the belief system of puppets as inanimate objects they shared, as 
Frank Thomas and Ollie Johnston involved in the production of Pinocchio state:  
 
If the eyes remain constant throughout a scene, the character will be 
consistent and look like the model sheet, but he also will look like a doll 
with painted eyes. This quality was used purposely in Pinocchio, first when 
the puppet was lifeless, and later when he was dancing with the 
Figure 3.2 The figure of a marionette in Pinocchio 
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marionettes in Stromboli’s show. The eyes presented an interesting 
problem since Pinocchio was still a wooden puppet even though he had 
been brought to life, and part of the device that made him puppetlike was 
to keep his eyes as constant as possible, giving him a wide, innocent stare. 
Now he was working with real puppets whose eyes were only paint, and 
there was a fine line to be drawn between the lifeless and the living, while 
keeping both as puppets. (1981: 445; emphasis mine) 
 
Besides the motionless and unfocused eyes, more visual cues are employed for the 
same motivation. The German girl puppet’s face lacks emotions without any change 
in time. When the girl puppet’s singing performance is featured in the scene, 
further, the cue of its supposedly painted mouth also serves the Disney animators’ 
strategy for the effect of making something look inanimate, which in terms of lip 
movement is not depicted to sync along with the lyrics, but remains closed and 
stationary. The effect of all the cues is reinforced by parameters like shot size, 
framing and camera angle. They are shown at a relatively high angle from a place 
which is much closer to the stage than the seats where the audience look up from 
in the Stromboli theatre. 
Significantly when it comes to the definition of Subtype (b), the girl 
puppet’s body movements are rendered in a passive mode as subject to two 
external forces; one is gravity and the other the manipulation of puppeteering 
human characters who are supposedly out of sight over or behind the stage in the 
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show scene.4 In particular, the puppet seems absolutely vulnerable and 
subordinate to the force of the strings when its entire body is suspended over the 
stage for a moment to the degree that its neck is arched backward (Figure 3.3). The 
passive mode of movements is intended to impose on the figure of the German girl 
puppet the kinaesthetic impression of lacking internal force which is likely to be 
 
4 For a hand-drawn figure of an animal-like puppet as a puppet, see Peter Pan, in which 
Michael, the youngest of the three Darling children, always carries a teddy bear with him. In the 
film, the teddy-bear figure is marginalised to illustrate the infancy of its owner Michael. In the 
scene of the protagonists’ final fight with pirates, the stuffed puppet is used by Michael as a 
sort of weapon tool. Entirely seized by two external forces, the human owner’s physical action 
and gravity, it is so much squashed and stretched by a cannonball, which he has just put inside 
it, that its soft-looking body gets almost torn out around its neck. No cues are given to show the 
puppet’s pain, disturbance and resistance. If the viewers are not familiarised with the cues of 
not implying a real living bear but a stuffed bear, they will be shocked at the way in which the 
boy character treats what looks like an innocent bear cub. 
Figure 3.3 The marionette suspended over the stage in Pinocchio 
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called will, intention or soul in a figurative sense.5  
However, what is it that Thomas and Johnston refer to as “real puppets” 
above? In a technical aspect, real puppets for theatrical performance are not 
necessarily given motionless eyes and mouths but movable ones. Take a look at the 
scene of puppetry, “Lonely Goatherd”, created by puppeteers Bill Baird and Cora 
Baird, in the live-action musical film, The Sound of Music (Robert Wise, 1965, US), 
and we can see the marionettes’ eyes, eyelids, mouths and even cheeks moving in 
the scene. Such puppets with movable parts might not have been compatible with 
the reality of puppets which Disney animators sought. However, Thompson notes 
that in Hollywood classics, realism is “used as a secondary motivating force, a 
backup to the main compositional justification” (1988: 54). In other words, 
realistic motivation in conventional live-action films usually serves to make 
viewers immersed in the film narrative. By extension, I claim that puppets with 
movable parts did not suit the Disney animators’ compositional justification to 
draw the line between both puppet-as-puppet figures; “lifeless” on the one hand 
and “alive” on the other.  
Further, it is necessary to reconsider whether real marionettes seem to 
move passively in puppetry. In their study of puppet plays performed on a stage in 
which Elizabeth Ann Jochum and Todd Murphey acknowledge an intersubjective 




5 The inanimacy of the German girl puppet on screen is amplified by the stage participation of 
more puppets looking the same as it and dancing in the same way together. 
6 Jochum and Murphey cites Gross (2011: 63). For the details of this reference, see the 
Bibliography. 
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The puppeteer knows he cannot control each limb separately, and thereby 
imitate in perfect detail the natural movements of human bodies. Rather, 
the manipulator learns to yield himself to the specific weight, the pendular 
motion and momentum of that thing suspended from strings. That’s where 
the puppet’s soul is found, in its merely physical center of gravity, which is 
the line of its spirit. (cited in Jochum and Murphey 2014: Kindle 310) 
  
In light of Gross, it can be said that the Disney animators ignored the specificity and 
the dynamics of the performance presented with “real puppets” on stage, for the 
purpose of making the Stromboli marionettes look inanimate.  
 
 
Subtype (c): Geppetto’s automata in the automatic mode of movement 
A good example of Subtype (c) in Type One is automata, a variety of which is 
displayed in Pinocchio. Like the puppet-as-puppet figures of Subtype (b), they do 
not go through secondary animatic transition but primary animatic transition. A 
substantial difference is that in contrast to Subtype (b), Subtype (c) is not shown to 
be moved entirely subject to external forces, but to move by themselves with their 
“internal mechanism”. Driven by this internal, yet preprogrammed, mechanism in 
the film diegesis, the figures of this Subtype are characterised with the automatic 
mode of movement that suggests the lack of autonomy. 
There are two forms of automata, music boxes and clocks, in Pinocchio. 
First, we see Geppetto playing a music box with four orchestra puppets (Figure 3.4) 
when he is going to try out his Pinocchio marionette with strings. Following this, 
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clocks are shown to inform that it is nine o’clock when anthropomorphic and 
theriomorphic puppets engaged with them start to move according to the clock 
chime.  
Unlike marionettes suspended and manipulated with visible strings, the 
miniature puppets as part of automata show seemingly independent movements 
on screen. This can be said to be a two-dimensional pictorial representation of a 
real automaton. Yet the Disney animators seem to have attempted to discern 
between hand-drawn human and subhuman figures on screen in terms of the mode 
of movement. The orchestra puppets are rendered to show over-staccato 
movements, which I call mechanicomorphic in this thesis. Furthermore, their 
convulsionary movements are repeated over and over in a short time period. These 
Figure 3.4 The figure of an automaton in Pinocchio 
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dynamic traits are also emphasised by the human-like and animal-like puppets set 
in clocks. As it is nine o’clock, each of all the clock puppets should perform a set of 
pre-determined movements nine times. Their moving performance does not 
function as a cue of being brought to life, but rather, as that of not being a real life.  
Making clear the line between the two different cues, the Disney animators 
go so far as to go into and reveal the inside of the music box; the gears, rods, a 
spring and a bellow are shown to work for creating the music sounds as well as the 
orchestra puppets’ body movements, when Jiminy hurries under the box to hide 
himself from Geppetto approaching to it. The endoscopic revelation of the inner 
mechanism makes the viewers notice that the orchestra puppets and their music-
playing movements are not real but an illusion or fake, not autonomous but subject 
to a hidden larger mechanical system—later in this subsection I will connect this 
system to the higher power of Geppetto. This pedagogical approach towards the 
representation of visual objects is similar to that of the Renaissance artists who 
studied anatomy for painting or sculpting the human body (Gombrich 2011: 215). 
The duality of the automata represented on screen is shown by different depicting 
techniques. Their visible moving parts are drawn in dark outlines and solid colours 
on cel, but their unmoving cases rigged with the hidden parts inside painted as 
part of backgrounds on paper. 
Supposing that those sophisticated automata were all made by Geppetto in 
the film narrative, their narrative function is to accentuate his knowledge, 
ingenuity and mastery of machinery. He is not so much a wood-carver as a 
toymaker or watchmaker. The old craftsman also seems to be the ruler of his 
mechanical miniature creations of human and animal simulacra. When playing the 
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music box, he exclaims, “Music, professor!”, as if he commands the conductor 
puppet set on the box; at the same time his real command is shown as the action of 
pushing the start button on the box. The “higher power” of the simulacra realm 
lives alone without any human beings except a cat and a goldfish before the Blue 
Fairy brings to life Pinocchio who he is to call son.  
Alone without a family in his workshop, such a male figure who has great 
knowledge and skills with machines can be viewed from the perspective of a 
Romantic scientist, on whom Schelde remarks: 
 
[He] is also the practical cousin of the Great Artist invented by the 
Romantic movement. The science fiction scientist emerged as a literary 
figure in the nineteenth century at about the same time as the Romantic 
artist did. Both the artist and the scientific genius grew out of the Romantic 
obsession with the individual, the remarkable loner, the genius who single-
handedly changes the world and creates mighty works. (1993: 31) 
 
While Schelde (1993: 32) refers to Dr. Frankenstein as a Romantic scientist, 
Geppetto in Pinocchio does not explicitly pursue the same goal as him, but only 
wishes on a star that the wooden human-sized puppet should be a real boy as a 
son, without relying on his own technology. His status as a higher power remains 
confined to the miniature world of mechanical simulacra he has created. This issue 
of his status is also where the Pinocchio figure requires examination. I will come 




3.2. Type Two: An Oneiric Doll in Suddenly It’s Spring 
 
In my definition, puppet-as-puppet figures of Type Two, Type Three and Type Four 
not only go through both primary and secondary animatic transitions, but also 
have in common the main principle for secondary animatic transition taking place 
in the film narrative: shifting from one world to another. Specifically, the T2 figures 
lack interaction with human (or animal) characters in the diegetic world of the 
film. What is of particular interest in this Type is that a puppet-as-puppet figure’s 
secondary animatic transition can work as a catalyst to transform the experience of 
viewing an animated film world into something that is implied in Vivian Sobchack’s 
(1992) concept of cinema as “window”. In this section, I examine how the 
anthropocentric view of puppets as sub/nonhuman objects limits the 
epistemological effect of this concept. 
The emblematic case which I examine for Type Two is the 1944 animated 
short, Suddenly It’s Spring. This film was produced by Famous Studios whose artists 
had worked in the Fleischer Studios before the Fleischer Brothers leaving them. As 
a competitor of Disney, the Fleischer Studios obtained rights to the Raggedy Ann 
stories in 1940 to produce the animated short, Raggedy Ann and Raggedy Andy 
(Dave Fleischer, 1940, US) (Canemaker 1977: 71).  
In Suddenly It’s Spring, we see a human girl in a bed with a rag doll the 
figure of which was already known as Raggedy Ann to the audience of those days. 
The little girl is sick, as is suggested by the conversation between her mother and a 
doctor. When they go out of the room, the Ann doll cuts in to show a drop of water 
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falling down out of its left eye part in a close-up shot (Figure 3.5). The viewers of 
the film should perceive the cue of a round bright figure moving and sparkling as a 
drop of tear which the doll sheds, if they would like to immerse themselves in the 
film narrative. This is the moment when the Ann doll undergoes secondary 
animatic transition. The doll’s primary animatic transition is not clearly presented 
on screen, but the viewers would be enough initiated or familiarised to assume 
that the doll figure will be depicted as being moved in a passive mode: Subtype (b) 
of Type One. 
What is remarkable in Raggedy Ann’s secondary animatic transition is that 
it takes place while the mother and the doctor are absent, with the girl left alone 
sleeping or unconscious in bed. Weeping sadly in this scene are not only the Ann 
Figure 3.5 The figure of Raggedy Ann in Suddenly It’s Spring 
188 
doll but also other toys and puppets in human or animal form in the room. Human 
characters’ absence or unawareness is a central cue which operates to suggest that 
toys and puppets have their own secret world. For the cue to work, two additional 
strategies are employed; one is framing and the other deploying cel and the 
background.  
First, the mother and the doctor in conversation are only seen up to 
around the height of their chests without their faces being shown (Figure 3.6). 
Excluding the human gaze off screen, this framing is quite familiarised in classical 
cartoons usually featuring nonhuman animal characters to the extent that the 
convention was parodied in the film, Who Framed Roger Rabbit (Robert Zemeckis, 
1988, US), in which a lady character with her two legs alone shown on screen is 
Figure 3.6 The girl’s mother and a doctor in Suddenly It’s Spring 
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revealed to be literally a figure of two legs after shooting in a film studio. Second, 
the Ann doll is drawn on cel while the human girl painted in the same way as the 
background on paper (See Figure 3.5). The two figures are separated from each 
other by the way in which the materials in cel animation are deployed for different 
narrative functions; the doll should sooner or later turn out to be a performing 
character with anthropomorphic cues of body movement, and the sick human girl 
should be kept without noticing the secret world which the doll and its fellows 
inhabit.  
In Suddenly It’s Spring, those stylistic strategies trigger us to feel as if we 
can see what the two grownups cannot see. In other words, the film works as a 
window through which we can peek at a different world from the human 
characters’ world representing ours.7 Here I appropriate the term of the window 
which Sobchack (1992) conceptualises as one of three metaphors of cinema. 
Focusing on live-action film, she remarks that “the window as metaphor is 
emblematic of the transcendental realism that informs realist film theory and its 
belief in the film object as perception-in-itself—objectivity freed from entailment 
with the prejudicial investments of human being” (1992: 16), going on to refer to 
the belief as “[leading] to the realist celebration of what it describes as ‘objective 
empiricism’” (p.16).  
When it comes to animation, however, mentioning Bill Nichols,8 Annabelle 
Honess Roe (2013: 22) claims that animation is free from the indexical bind of the 
live-action footage used for conventional documentary in a conventional manner. 
 
7 A digital example of such window effect in the experience of film viewing is the 3-D CG 
animation film, Toy Story (1995). 
8 Roe cites Nichols (1991: 149) Representing Reality: Issues and Concepts in Documentary. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.  
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As a conventional hand-drawn animation, Suddenly It’s Spring is obviously free 
from the logic of photo-indexicality. This means that what the viewers see happen 
on screen in the film has not necessarily happened in the real world. Discussing 
possibilities of the use of animation in documentary filmmaking, however, Roe 
(2013) stresses the role of iconicity (instead of photo-indexicality) and the iconic 
image’s capacity of evocation. As regards evocation as a function of animation in 
animated documentaries, Roe explains, “By visualising these invisible aspects 
[ideas, feelings and sensibilities] of life, often in an abstract or symbolic style, 
animation that functions in this evocative way allows us to imagine the world from 
someone else’s perspective” (2013: 25). Toys and dolls’ secret world should be 
considered as part of such invisible aspects of life. The effect of evocation for 
viewers of animation film can be pertinent to the events which in reality they have 
not seen that on screen are happening to the toys and dolls left alone when no 
human beings or characters exist in one and the same place as them.  
Yet, Suddenly It’s Spring follows a convention of fantasy with puppets 
rather than developing the effect of evocation which Roe (2013) seeks to theorise 
in her study of animated documentary. After secondary animatic transition at the 
same time when it shifts from the world of the human characters to that of the toys, 
the Ann doll visits anthropomorphic deities of weather in the sky. The introduction 
of such mythological narrative devices goes beyond the degree to which the 
viewers keep interested in seeking to find what the toys’ world is like. The toys’ 
secret world itself is not a focus in the narrative of the film, where the Ann doll and 
other toys are depicted to feel sad about the human girl’s bad physical condition; 
this motivates the Ann doll to travel up to the sky where it is to see the 
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anthropomorphic character of the sun. Their emotions and performances are 
mobilised under the anthropocentric value system of the human agents engaged in 
the production of the film. Obedient to the human owner are the Ann doll and its 
fellow toys unlike what Bukatman (2012) finds to be disobedient in comics and 
animation films.  
Only the cue of obedience underlies through all the narrative of the film. 
During the journey in which the doll finds a way to help the sick girl, its 
anthropomorphic body movements are impossible to discern from those of the 
human characters, not to mention that it is depicted to talk and think as well as 
human beings do. These anthropomorphic cues are withdrawn as soon as the doll 
achieves her goal. At the end of the film, the little human owner awakes in her 
Figure 3.7 The human figure and the doll figure in Suddenly It’s Spring 
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sickbed to play with her lovely toys, while the motionless and expressionless face 
and eyes of the Ann doll is shown as its initial condition again in a medium shot 
(Figure 3.7). Emphasis is put on the difference, by means of drawing style, between 
the figure of the Ann doll and that of the human girl, both depicted on cel in one 
and the same shot. The doll’s geometrical form of fixed eye pupils like chipped 
“buttons” make it look more non/subhuman, in contrast to the girl’s eyes with 
slightly wandering pupils and irises drawn in a realistic style.  
What will happen if when the human girl awakes to play with the Ann doll, 
it does not quit the mode of movement in which it performs much like human 
characters in a different world? This imagination has been exploited in the 
Hollywood live-action horror film, Child’s Play (Tom Holland, 1988, US) and its 
sequels. In the 1988 film, a boy doll as a toy object suddenly begins to move and 
talk independently in the real world inhabited by human beings, and its human-like 
abilities are depicted as a result of being possessed by a serial killer’s soul. 
Observing the horror film, Nelson indicates, “Killer puppets like Chucky clearly 
embody the long-standing Protestant dictum that what is not of this world is of the 
Devil” (2001: 259), after relating this issue of human simulacra to the modern 
psychological concept of projection: “[W]hat we now interpret as a person's 
subjective psychological complex was formerly regarded as the objective intrusion 
of a ‘demon’ or evil spirit” (p.207). In light of Nelson, such a religious attitude of 
human simulacra as objects is not defunct in the West of the late twentieth century 
up to the early twenty-first century. In such a convention of puppets, Suddenly It’s 
Spring ends without fear that the doll (and other toys) might usurp the audience’s 
real world as well as the diegetic world of the film, with the belief system 
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reaffirmed that such artefacts cannot move autonomously nor be alive.  
 
 
3.3. Type Three: Empathetic Objects: Raggedy Ann and Winnie the Pooh 
 
In this section, I analyse two cases for Type Three; one is another Raggedy Ann 
film, The Enchanted Square, and the other Disney’s The Many Adventures of Winnie 
the Pooh. The former’s narrative revolves for the most part around the interaction 
between a human girl and a rag doll which undergoes secondary animatic 
transition in an imaginary world of which only she seems to be aware, or a world 
created by her imagination. What is intriguing in this case is that the human girl’s 
interaction with the doll is involved with “touching”. I inquire into this physical act 
in term of the unchanging status of the doll as an object in the film diegesis.  
 As regards the latter case, I focus on the ways in which puppet-as-puppet 
figures in animal form are rendered to make a visible, if not so explicit, contrast to 
animal figures, both inhabiting an imaginary realm under the power of a human 
boy. In Type Three, this boy and other children as human characters can be said as 
a life-giver of their puppets. Drawing on Kuznets’ (1994) discussion of this case, I 
seek to examine the power relationship between both—not the very concept of life. 
 
 
Desire and a girl doll in The Enchanted Square 
Produced by Famous Studios, The Enchanted Square has no relationship with the 
preceding film, Suddenly It’s Spring, in terms of narrative, and yet, similarly, the 
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figure of the Ann doll undergoes secondary animatic transition during which the 
shift takes place from human characters’ world to an imaginary world. Primary 
animatic transition happens to the doll figure in the passive mode of movement 
when a policeman picks up the Ann doll from a trashcan and carries it in his hand. 
In the passive mode, the doll seems to be flaccid and suspended by the policeman’s 
hand until it is given to a human girl. 
Distinct from Suddenly It’s Spring, The Enchanted Square involves the Ann 
doll’s interaction with the human girl named Billie (Figure 3.8). The doll even 
speaks to Billie in the real world for a short while before it plays and dances with 
her in the imaginary world. It is almost impossible to discern the difference in the 
mode of movement between the doll figure and the human figure. Moving from the 
Figure 3.8 Raggedy Ann and a human girl in The Enchanted Square 
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human beings’ real world to the imaginary world in the film, further, the doll’s body 
becomes as large as Billie’s. The shape of the pupils, the nose and the fingers is the 
only cue indicating that the Ann doll is not as human as Billie; its pupils look like 
chipped buttons, its nose a red triangular lump, and its fingers mittens, which are 
also seen in Suddenly It’s Spring. Obviously, these visible traits are central elements 
for the viewers to identify the hand-drawn figure of a doll as the Raggedy Ann doll 
which was a popular icon at that time when The Enchanted Square was produced.  
Appearing to be a celebration of the friendship between a doll and a 
human girl, the film includes a couple of complex narrative devices. First, the girl 
Billie is blind. She cannot see the doll in a realistic sense. As the doll suggests to her 
in the film, it is only imagination that makes her able to see something. Thus, 
psychologised are all the fantastic events that Billie sees, with the viewers seeing 
what is seen through her interaction with the doll; in the film’s real world, she 
would fall down and be injured if she ran and jumped, as seen in the sequences 
where she runs and jumps with the doll in the imaginary world. The psychological 
device of imagination serves to enchant the situation of the slum in which Billie 
lives with mother.9 Furthermore, the doll was not bought as a new toy in a shop, 
but picked up from a trashcan by the policeman. Blindness functions as a crucial 
device to prevent the girl from recognising how very dirty or damaged the doll is, 
as well as spurring her to imagine with it a fantastic world like an amusement park. 
Billie’s imagination goes on to reveal her clandestine desire, being rich, when a 
wealthy-looking blonde lady is envisioned as her mother who she has not ever seen 
 
9 In addition, she does not seem to live with father because the kind-hearted policeman 
presents the doll to her, possibly for a chance to talk to her mother. 
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in the real world.  
Turning to the Ann doll, this anthropomorphic object interacts with Billie 
alone. The individual-specific interaction is also the device to psychologise the 
doll’s on-screen anthropomorphic mode of movement into what happens in its 
human owner or partner’s mind. What is particular about their interaction is that it 
accompanies the sensation of touch. When it encourages her to touch its body 
(Figure 3.9), the scene is given in the subjective point of view that is Billie’s, with 
her right hand lighted, thereby consequently taking the viewers to the place of 
Billie. Although the scene tempts me to address the issue of touching as seeing, this 
is where I should focus more on how the film relies on and exploits the status of the 
Ann doll as a non/subhuman object, which is to say, the viewers’ belief system of 
Figure 3.9 The human girl touches the girl doll in The Enchanted Square 
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its status is triggered to work in the scene. If it is not perceived as an object relying 
on the pertinent cues, a fear of sensuality in the viewers is likely to loom on the cue 
of the girl character touching the body of the doll figure, even if pictorially 
represented, almost indiscernible from the hand-drawn figures of human 
characters in the film—as discussed above about the scene with Jiminy touching 
the hip of the lady figurine in the preceding subsection of Subtype (a). It would be 
acceptable as long as the girl-like figure is believed not as a real girl but a doll. This 
belief is confirmed in the film by the dialogue, between Ann and Billie, of how the 
doll was made.  
 
 
Puppets abandoned in The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
In The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh as another case of Type Two, unlike The 
Enchanted Square, there is no puppet-as-puppet figure in human form, but the 
teddy bear named Pooh and the other stuffed animal puppets appear as puppets. 
As in the Raggedy Ann film, these puppet-as-puppet figures interact with the only 
human character named Christopher Robin (and also with non-puppet animal 
characters).  
Further, the Disney film has a complex structure of frame narrative in an 
audio-visual manner. It begins with the live-action footage of a child’s room where 
the physical puppets of Pooh and his fellows are placed. As the camera pans to the 
right, the Winnie-the-Pooh book appears on screen, with another physical puppet 
of Pooh set by it (Figure 3.10). This footage is narrated by an acousmatic person 
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whose voice sounds male and elderly. According to him, the room is Christopher 
Robin’s.  
However, who is the narrator? There are two possible answers to the 
question. One is Christopher’s father, who tells the viewers stories about his little 
son. The other is Christopher himself, who now old, recalls his childhood fantasy. 
As a grown-up, either is expected to distinguish the real world given in the live-
action footage from the imaginary world given in hand-drawn animation. Indeed, 
the narrator says in the introductory live-action footage: “They all live together in a 
wonderful world of make-believe”.  
The framed narrative structure of the film becomes more complicated by 
the mode of movement in which the Winnie-the-Pooh book opens or is opened, 
Figure 3.10 A physical model of Pooh in The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
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when the camera cuts from the shot seen in Figure 3.10 to the next shot. In this 
shot, the book is not opened by any visible human hand, but arguably, by the hand 
of the acousmatic narrator as invisible and omnipresent—using techniques of 
hand-drawn animation with the photorealistic background in which the Pooh 
puppet and other toys are included. Alluding to the acousmatic narrator’s point of 
view, the camera movement makes the viewer’s eyes move together with his to 
look over the book. Nestled within the enveloping live-action footage, the framing 
book cover and following pages on screen function as a liminal or transitional 
device in viewing experience, as Paula T. Connolly observes the self-opening pages 
of the book seen in Disney’s animated feature films: “That these framing pages hold 
both verbal and illustrated texts provides a liminal area of book/film and directs an 
exchange of medium to move the reader to become a reader/viewer, negotiating 
both words and pictures for a short time before transitioning fully into the ‘moving 
pictures’ of film” (2015: 181). The acousmêtre’s voice, sight and hand makes the 
viewer be immersed in the hand-drawn, animated world that comes to appear 
from behind the book cover. In addition to these audio-visual devices, the verbal 
phrases by the invisible narrator serve the same effect. For example, he tells in the 
introductory live-action sequence: “This could be the room of any small boy . . . Like 
most small boys, Christopher Robin has toy animals to play with”,10 as if the viewer 
might have been one such boy in his childhood. 
In terms of the acousmatic narrator and the transition from live action to 
animation, The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh can be compared with Gertie 
 
10 This way of narrating raises the issue of gender. In this thesis, I focus on the aspect of the 
child. 
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the Dinosaur. In both, the acousmatic narrator encourages the viewers to cross the 
line between photorealistic live action and hand-drawn animation. In Disney’s 
Pooh film, however, the narrator is completely invisible and does not perform as a 
demiurgic creator. This function is what as discussed in Chapter Two, Crafton 
(1993: 288-299) observes in the retreat of the artist behind the screen. The scholar 
summarises: 
 
[H]is invisibility does not mean he no longer exists. It is just that his 
function has changed. His statements are no longer about his relation to 
his drawing, but about concerns shared with his audience. He is 
representing himself as a fabulist. (1993: 299) 
 
In Disney’s Pooh film, as a result, the animatic transition of hand-drawn figures is 
not ordered by any live-action animators on screen—they are hiding as storytellers 
behind screen. Rather, it is not only hand-drawn figures but also the Winnie-the-
Pooh book itself to which animatic transition happens in the film. What is further 
significant is that in the animated world of/in the book, everything is given as 
hand-drawn; for a short while after the book cover is unfolded, even the 
Christopher figure playing on the swings appears to be suspended in the air which 
as hand-drawn on screen, is soon to show animatic transition with 
anthropomorphic cues of movements operating to make the viewers sure that it 
represents nothing but a human being. He communicates with animal characters or 
animal-like characters, all living in an isolated world, where he is the only human 
being.  
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When it comes to the other figures in animal form, including the Pooh 
figure, it is not so easy to determine whether each of them represents a living being 
or not as the figure of Christopher. When the first two pages of the book are 
animated, the viewers will see a donkey-like figure while this is being drawn 
without any visible artist’s hand on screen, and yet this is not the figure of a 
donkey. Taking a closer look at it, we can find it to be the figure of a donkey-like 
puppet which has a thin line on the centre of its face and also on its legs looking 
like those of a rag doll (Figure 3.11). The lines seem to be representations of 
stitches, and are found in the figures of the other toy animals. In the case of the 
Pooh figure, the lines look conspicuous around the joints between its hindlegs and 
pelvis (Figure 3.12).  
Figure 3.11 The figure of an animal toy in The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
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According to the Disney animators Thomas and Johnston, drawing eyes is 
one of the most influential ways which they used to make a difference of 
impression between the hand-drawn figures of living animals and those of toy 
animals. In particular, they suggest that bifurcating them can be achieved by how to 
deploy the devices of pupil, sclera and iris with respect to parameters like size, 
colour and movement (Thomas and Johnston 1981: 446-449). Recollecting how 
much effort they made to change the design of eyes in an attempt to give Mickey 
Mouse cues of life, both animators consider Pooh as the opposite: 
 
On Winnie the Pooh, we had less of a problem than we had with Mickey, 
because he was a stuffed toy and was not expected to have eyes that 
Figure 3.12 The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
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wandered on his face. It seemed appropriate for him to turn his head in the 
direction of his “looks,” and this actually gave him a less sophisticated 
feeling that was in keeping with a “bear of very little brain.” (Thomas and 
Johnston 1981: 448) 
 
This makes clear that in the film toy animals were not so dealt with as to look like 
living animals, even when animated to move on screen. They are depicted to show 
fewer cues of life than their living counterparts. Pooh’s eyes lack irises and sclerae, 
and his eye movements lack the cue of wandering. The objectifying device which 
Thomas and Johnston call button eyes (p.448) is applied to the other stuffed toy 
animals, too, except the donkey toy named Eeyore. Only Eeyore has the white 
sclerae and black pupils like the figures of living animals: Rabbit, Owl and Gopher. 
As its eyes cannot wander owing to the Disney animators’ way of 
rendering, the Pooh figure has to turn its head around from the neck to give a cue 
of looking at something. The mode of this limited body movement seems to be 
based on the physical reality of stuffed toy animals. In reality, such a toy is usually 
given button eyes without any ability of sight, and its body is not given jointed body 
parts; playing with it, therefore, a human child would twist its head part around 
the neck part if he or she wants to make it appear to gaze at something. In addition, 
Pooh’s hands and feet are depicted to look like mittens without separate fingers 
and toes except thumbs. This way of rendering is intended to add cues of Pooh and 
the other toy animals being objects.  
In the film, the most evident case of it is the figure of Tigger, as a toy animal 
which looks like a tiger, which always bounces up and down. This 
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mechanicomorphic mode of movement does not seem to be under the control of 
Tigger itself. As the tiger-like toy figure on screen says, “Their tops are made out of 
rubber, their bottoms are made out of springs”, its movement is depicted as 
subordinated both to the elastic property of the springs included in the body and to 
the gravitational field. This passive mode of movement pertains to Subtype (b) of 
Type One. In the diegetic world of the film, the Tigger figure is a slight revelation of 
the status of a toy animal as a mechanical object and further, as one of the products 
manufactured in factories. 
Unlike Pooh and the other toy animals, Rabbit, Owl and Gopher presented 
as non-puppet, living animals in the film have as separate and long fingers as 
human beings. Although it represents a bird that has only wings and feathers, even 
Figure 3.13 The figure of a living animal in The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh 
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the figure of Owl is so depicted that its hand-drawn wings might look like human 
fingers. Along with the wandering movement of the hand-drawn eyes with pupils 
and sclerae clearly separated, the variety of gestures composed of the subtle 
movements of those hand-drawn fingers serve to demonstrate that the figures of 
the living animals have non-verbal communication ability as well as emotion. In the 
film, the figure named Gopher shows the gesture of attention by raising up its index 
finger (Figure 3.13). Obviously, such body movements of the hand-drawn animal 
figures surpass those of the real animals they represent. When Disney animators 
depicted the bodies of those animal figures as alive, realistic motivation in the 
human agents stopped working in order to give them more cues of humanness 
rather than animalness.  
Now I turn to the question of the sole human figure of Christopher who is 
in close communication with those toy animals—and in a loose contact with living 
animals—in the film narrative. The featured interaction between the young human 
figure and toy animal figures are depicted only in the animated book world which 
is enveloped by the live-action footage, and narrated by an acousmêtre in the past 
tense. The past tense of narration implies that no animatic transition happens to 
the physical Pooh puppet and the others seen in the live-action footage at the 
moment when the camera shifts from the live-action world to the animated book 
world. What seems to exist and happens in the book world is narrated as the 
childhood memories of Christopher, as suggested by Kuznets (1994: 47) who goes 
so far as to identify the fictional character with Milne, the author of the Winnie-the-
Pooh books.  
As for the status of the Christopher character in his world of childhood 
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memories, Kuznets notes, “[I]n the Pooh books he rules over . . . a society of small 
beings” (1994: 51), continuing, “[T]he child is a god amid the toys and animals” 
(p.51). By extension, the Christopher character in Disney’s Pooh film plays a god-
like role without whom the toy animals would not come into being in the animated 
book world. This is why the (only secondary) animatic transition of the boy figure 
is followed by that of the toy-animal figures (along with the living-animal figures). 
As the ruler of his self-immured world, Christopher is always relied on by the toy 
animals whenever they are in need, and further, he hosts and presides over the 
party celebrating Pooh as a hero. This interpretation of the film narrative leads to 
the conclusion that all the voices, body movements and often mischievous 
behaviours of the toy animals are the imaginative creations of their young human 
owner. On the other hand, the living animals do not play as central a role as the toy 
animals in his monarchical imagination, but assume the role of human grown-ups 
who discipline children (implied by the toy animals in the film) and are often 
annoyed by their unintended mischief. 
The film narrative comes to the critical moment when Christopher should 
go to school in the last chapter of the animated book world. The human boy asks, 
“Pooh, promise you won’t forget me ever?” Then Pooh answers to him, “Oh, I won’t, 
Christopher, I promise”. This implies that at a stage of growth, the boy has to leave 
Pooh and the other toys, as Kuznets indicates that “in Western culture, children are 
not allowed to identify with objects like toys” (1994: 43). Despite no more 
identification with toys, in the film the voice-over narrator tells: “Wherever they go 
and whatever happens to them on the way, in that enchanted place on top of the 
forest a little bear will always be waiting”.  
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But how and why is it that once left behind by its human owner, the toy 
object waits always for him? I derive this question from the account by Kuznets 
who observes, “The story’s denial of genuine conflict implies that childhood itself is 
Edenic” (1994: 52), going on to add that the Christopher character lacks 
“emotional anguish and psychic pain” (p.52). Unlike the scholar, I turn to focus on 
Pooh that is almost abandoned by Christopher in the film narrative.  
Distinct from the perspective of the Western culture, a Japanese view of 
puppets helps reconsider the ending of Pooh in the film. In the view, human 
owners are not entirely qualified to discard those objects with which they have 
formed and kept a particular relationship; as introduced in the Literature Review 
(See footnote 32), the factor of relationship is one reason why the ritual of ningyo 
kuyo is promoted and conducted in Japan. According to Komatsu’s (2003: 150-151) 
study of Japanese folklore, artefacts as well as puppets have been thought to 
become demons or get possessed by ghosts, named tsukumogami, in anger and 
hostility, when discarded by the human beings who have used them in every-day 
life for a long time.11 In the film, Pooh and the other toy animals can be viewed 
from this belief of tsukumogami, and then it is tempting to assume that promising 
never to forget Christopher, in the film Pooh will finally turn angry at the human 
boy if he does not come back, betraying its trust.  
No wonder Disney’s Pooh film ends up showing the physical Pooh puppet 
which seems to manifest itself as an inanimate object, without any cue of speaking 
and moving independently, in the live-action footage of Christopher’s childhood 
 
11 Traced back to the twelfth century in Japan, the belief of tsukumogami appeared in the age 
when human owners or users became able to dispose of artefacts driven by an advanced 
system of trading and manufacturing (Komatsu 2003: 157). 
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room. Or, what can stop us from imagining that as with Raggedy Ann, the doll in 
The Enchanted Square, in the film’s world Pooh might be thrown away into a 
trashcan to find another young owner who is to form a new relationship with it? 
 
 
3.4. Type Four: Perihuman Toys in The Mouse and His Child 
 
In The Mouse and His Child, like Disney’s Pooh film, the puppet-as-puppet figures in 
animal form are given secondary animatic transition at the shifting moment from 
the human-centric, real world to a different world where those figures can 
communicate with the figures of living animals. Unlike the Pooh film, however, this 
film does not involve any human character in the imaginary world which I term as 
“perihuman” in this thesis. In the perihuman world, too, puppets and toys as 
objects in animal form are depicted in a different way to animals as living, in 
particular, in terms of autonomy and the ability of self-feeding, or self-winding, for 
the wind-up puppets. As automata, this Type of puppet-as-puppet figures are well 
pertinent to Descartes’ view of humanity, life and machine and that of his radical 
opponent, La Mettrie. In this sense, my analysis of the puppet-as-puppet figures in 
The Mouse and His Child aims to clarify the film’s preoccupation with the 
anthropocentric Cartesian view, and further to problematise this by building on La 
Mettrie’s “mechanist” materialism. 
I mean by the term, perihuman, what exists and happens around human 
characters yet beyond their perception in the film narrative. Such a perihuman 
world is also seen in the girl’s room in Suddenly It’s Spring which I analysed above, 
209 
but in The Mouse and His Child there are no puppets and toys that serve their 
human owners; in this sense, the film has a possibility to demonstrate the non-
anthropocentric in the puppet-as-puppet figure. Rather, they are depicted to be 
wasted by human beings, and further, be enslaved by living animals. The 
perihuman world is a metaphoric miniature of the real world which either human 
characters or the viewers inhabit.  
As human, only an unnamed tramp character with a dog has a momentary 
interfacial contact with the puppets and toys to the extent that he remains an 
observer to mediate loosely between the viewers of the film and the perihuman 
world. It is not certain that what he sees in his gaze at the objects is the perihuman 
world which as the viewers, we see in the film. As this film is properly based on 
Figure 3.14 The wind-up toy mice in The Mouse and His Child 
210 
Hoban’s story, of much relevance is Kuznets’ account that in the children’s book, 
the author Hoban “creates a world at the margins of the human one, reflecting 
human needs and desires but imagining a secret existence that humans neither 
control for the most part nor benefit from” (1994: 169). 
In the film, the central puppet-as-puppet figure is a pair of clockwork 
mouse-like toys that have the relationship of father and son (Figure 3.14). In the 
scene in which the toy mice are taken out of a box, wound up and then put on a 
table by a human clerk in a toy shop, their primary animatic transition is at first 
depicted in the passive mode of movement: Subtype (b), Type One. Also included in 
the scene is the stationary state: Subtype (a), Type One. Before being wound up, in 
addition, they are seen to stand motionless on the table for five seconds. Once 
wound up, the toy mice start to move in repetition for themselves in the automatic 
mode of movement: Subtype (c) of Type One. All these modes function as the cue 
that they are simply inanimate objects. The impression of being inanimate is also 
consolidated by their expressionless button eyes and clear lines around joints, 
surrounded by the other toys and puppets that are rendered in the same way as the 
background painted on paper.  
Secondary animatic transition is depicted to occur to those objects in a 
perihuman time and space. At midnight when human characters are absent from 
the shop, they start to move and then talk for themselves. What is interesting in the 
film is that secondary animatic transition does not entirely set them free from the 
material conditions prescribed by their human makers in toy factories. Even after 
secondary animatic transition, the hands of the father toy mouse and those of the 
son toy mouse remain connected and fixed to each other. They are depicted as able 
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to see, hear, talk and think like human beings, while their locomotion is subject to 
the spring-driven mechanism. If the father toy mouse on whose back the winder is 
set is not wound up, they cannot move or walk. However, they are still able to move 
their lips and make facial expressions. Even once wound up, they only move 
repetitively in a circle, with the father mouse swinging the son mouse up and 
down. This dual condition of those toys echoes the Cartesian view of soul and body 
(certainly for human beings). The father-and-son toy mice seem to have 
consciousness and the capability of self-awareness as an anthropocentric token of 
soul. As soon as secondary animatic transition takes place, the son toy mouse asks 
his father, “Where are we?” and then, “What are we?”  
However, the toy mice learn soon that all the toys are destined to serve the 
human beings who buy them. When the son toy mouse says, “I think [sic] would 
rather stay here . . .”, the clock character teaches him, “Thinking is not part of your 
job”. The narrative of this film reveals that even in the perihuman world, puppets 
and toys remain to be seized by anthropocentric orders and beliefs. The perihuman 
world seems to be ruled by anthropomorphic animals capable of moving freely by 
their own will unlike the toys and puppets. With no rotating winder set on their 
bodies and given dark pupils and white sclerae, the figures of anthropomorphic 
animals as natural are to be clearly discerned from the figures of toy animals as 
artificial. The former is not depicted as confined to preprogrammed repetitive 
movements as is the latter; even if the toy mice appear to dance like human beings, 
the dancing-like movement is not theirs but is a toy function imposed on them by 
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their human makers in the film’s diegetic world.12  
In the perihuman world, Manny is a villainous rat character that rules his 
own realm. The tyrant gathers, enslaves, exploits and disposes of wind-up toys, 
including the father-and-son toy mice, as mechanical labour force in his realm 
(Figure 3.15). The rat and other animal characters have absolute power over the 
animal-like puppets because the former can wind up the latter; the puppets cannot 
wind themselves up. The power relationship between living animals and puppet 
 
12 This impression of being a machine is reinforced by the way in which their costumes are 
animated in relation to their body movements. The toy mice’s rigid-looking jackets and 
trousers are depicted as part of their tin-looking bodies, without any cues that separate arms 
and legs might be put into them. Unlike them, for instance, the scarf and the glove, respectively 
worn by the living animal characters, Manny Rat and Frog, are animated in the passive mode of 
movement, according to, yet quite free from the body movement which the two characters 
perform in an anthropomorphic mode. These dynamic cues also function to indicate that alive 
on screen are not the costumes as objects but the anthropomorphic animals wearing them. 
Figure 3.15 The enslaved toys in The Mouse and His Child 
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animals seen in this film is an analogy of that between human and sub/nonhuman 
in the real world as well as fictional worlds. Kuznets postulates four motifs in toy 
narratives, one of which is: 
 
When manipulated by human beings—adults or children—toys embody all 
the temptations and responsibilities of power. As characters with whom 
humans identify, they also suggest the relatively powerless relationship of 
human beings to known or unseen forces: their dreadful vulnerability. 
(1994: 2) 
 
In The Mouse and His Child, the wind-up puppets epitomise this motif in a double 
sense; on the one hand, they are manufactured and consumed under human power, 
and on the other, captured and enslaved under the anthropomorphic animal power. 
The pivotal moment in the film is when the self-winding ability which the 
father toy mouse wants is realised in the later part of the film. Repaired and 
reconstructed separately by Muskrat, the living animal character that has as much 
philosophical and scientific knowledges as human beings, both the father and the 
son toy mice obtain not only autonomy but also bodily individuality. Their 
substantial transformation is likely to threaten the human world as well as the 
animal world in the film because the two toy mice do not have to wait for human or 
animal masters to wind them up. This is the sense in which Hoban’s story adapted 
into this film is described by Kuznets as “veering from androcentricity” (1994: 
169).  
Nonetheless, the film does not go so far as to transgress the horizon of the 
214 
anthropocentric belief in which puppets in human or animal form are imagined to 
speak and talk only while human beings or their perception are absent. Collapsing 
the realm of the rat tyrant Manny, the self-winding puppets celebrate with living 
animals the finished construction of their own new home isolated from the human 
world, instead of going back to the human world to show off their mechanical 
movements in full autonomy. The small perihuman realm the puppets have built in 
a doll house is kept isolated from, and unknown to the human world.  
Depicted within such a perihuman horizon is the “operation” through 
which the two toy mice acquire the self-winding ability. The operation must be a 
focal point for the viewer who looks forward to seeing how the toy gets 
autonomous in technological terms, because the film emphasises the reality of the 
toy’s material condition in its diegetic world before reaching that point. For 
instance, a hawk snatches the toy mice as a prey, but it soon notices that they are 
not real mice because of the tin surface of their bodies. In another scene, the 
viewers can hear of the mechanical-ness and the material properties of the inside 
of the tin body. Exhausted from chopping a tree, the father toy mouse says, “I feel 
tainted and rusty in my motor”. In the operation scene, however, the 
Figure 3.16 The winding key disappears in The Mouse and His Child 
215 
transformation of the toy mice is not treated in a technologically serious way but 
rather in a Méliès-esque fashion with a cartoon symbol of sparkling (Figure 3.16); 
the colours of their body surface get repainted clearer and then the winding key on 
the back of the father toy mouse gets removed in only a few seconds on screen. 
The operation scene also demonstrates a belief system into which the 
viewers should be initiated in enjoying the film in the Tooniverse. While 
reconstructed, the father toy mouse’s disembodied head part utters, “Son”, with a 
slight movement to show he has consciousness. “Papa”, utters the son’s awakened 
head part, too, once set on the body of the father (Figure 3.17). However, their 
dialogues are odd in that the father and his son are not anthropomorphic living 
animals but mechanical toys with mouse-like heads and human-like torso, arms 
Figure 3.17 The son’s head and the father’s body in The Mouse and His Child 
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and legs; the family status of each toy mouse does not have to be defined by its 
head part. In those dialogues, intended to suggest the quality of consciousness, lies 
the Cartesian view that the human soul dwells in the head or brains (Maclean 
2006: lix). Contesting this view which privileges human beings against 
anthropomorphic automata, La Mettrie’s view is that human beings are machines: 
“The human body is a machine which winds itself up, a living picture of perpetual 
motion” (1747/1996: 7). Discussing La Mettrie’s view of humanity, Aram Vartanian 
writes of his man-machine discourse: “The metaphysical and theological concept of 
a spiritual soul is made to designate simply ceartain [sic] effects of organic matter 
in motion” (1999: 46).  
Here I do not attempt to enter the locus in which debates have been long 
made of the human being, but rather look into the figures of the toy mice from La 
Mettrie’s materialist perspective in that they perform anthropomorphic automata 
with a partial appearance of a mouse in the film’s world. Despite bringing into 
focus the self-winding mechanical puppets, the Cartesian concept of a spiritual soul 
is not abandoned in The Mouse and His Child. This is why in the film the toy mice 
heads are not depicted as broken, while their bodies, arms and legs are depicted as 
entirely broken into pieces to show all the internal mechanical parts; and why in 
repairing them, Muskrat does not peek into the inside (not drawn by animators in 
production) of the father toy mouse’s head, while the inside (drawn by the 
animators) of the toy’s mechanical belly is exposed to us through Muskrat’s 




3.5. Type Five: An Enchanted and Enlightening Marionette in Pinocchio 
 
In Disney’s film, Pinocchio, the hand-drawn figure of the titular puppet starts from 
the status of an inanimate object to achieve the status of a human being at the end 
of the film narrative, in contrast to the cases selected for the other Types. In my 
typology of puppet-as-puppet figures for Group CEL, emphatically, the final 
achievement of “humanisation” or transformation into a “real” life in the film 
narrative is not a necessary condition. In this sense, however, Pinocchio can serve 
as a problematic case to make clear a distinct way in which animators and other 
human agents collaborate to envision subhumanness or non-living-ness in the 
Tooniverse built on hand-drawn cel animation.  
At the centre of the narrative is the Cartesian view of life, humanity and 
reason (or rational soul), in terms of which after secondary animatic transition, the 
wooden puppet is told that it was given “life” and yet is not “real” in terms of 
reason. Intriguingly, however, the visual and narrative foci converge on the “body”. 
Given La Mettrie’s material-oriented opposition to Descartes, Pinocchio or his body 
drawn in human form can be considered as a perceptual, discursive battlefield 
between living and non-living, human and non/subhuman, real and fake. In this 
section, I seek to suggest an alternative viewing skill with Pinocchio to the 
conventional discourse that human simulacra should become “real”, thereby 
addressing an issue of transracial adoption in terms of which I consider the puppet 
boy as being adopted by a human being. 
In Type Five (and also Type Six), there is no shift from one world to 
another while secondary animatic transition happens to the figure of a puppet as a 
218 
puppet in a film. Instead, magical power or a magical being’s intervention is 
involved in secondary animatic transition as the main principle of the transitional 
happening, and then, in the film narrative the puppet is depicted as able to interact 
with any human (and anthropomorphic animal) characters.  
As an emblematic case of Type Five, Pinocchio is initially given the status 
equivalent to the lady figurine which I examined above as the case of Subtype (a), 
Type One. Its eyes are aimless and motionless; and its upper body seems to lean on 
the wall, thereby suggesting that no self-controlling force exists in Pinocchio 
(Figure 3.18). In addition, its joints around the neck and the knee are drawn in 
dark lines as a cue of the mechanical-ness of a marionette body. Further, this 
puppet on screen does not show any response to Jiminy who gazes at and touches 
Figure 3.18 Pinocchio 
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it. Most of all, the cue of no mouth on its face suggests that the puppet-making is 
not finished in the film narrative.  
Without (or despite) the transtextual motivation in which Carlo Collodi’s 
original novel of great international popularity was adapted to Disney’s animation 
film (Kaufman 2015:17-18), the hand-drawn figure of Pinocchio would still be 
likely to invoke fear—it might be a dead boy’s corpse, in particular, for the vague 
stare of its eyes with pupils, irises and sclerae detailed—in a viewer because it 
represents a life-size human boy. The soother of such fear would be Jiminy, as a 
voyeuristic device, who kindly notes of Pinocchio’s material status, “Good piece of 
wood”, when he looks closely at the marionette before either primary or secondary 
animatic transition.  
Shortly, Jiminy’s observation of a human being’s workshop is interrupted 
by Geppetto coming to finish making his new marionette which he is to name 
Pinocchio. The puppet’s primary animatic transition takes place in the passive 
movement—Subtype (b), Type One, when the old watchmaker puppeteers it on 
screen, singing “Little Wooden Head”. Emphasis is often put on the way which his 
puppeteering makes the marionette seem inanimate. For example, Geppetto 
manipulates it into walking with a stoop, which accentuates the limpness of the 
wooden body so that it might seem unable to resist gravitational force in the world 
of the film.13 At this stage of primary animatic transition, no animation of the 
 
13 Limpness is also a conventional token which is employed to indicate the status of automata 
when human dancers perform them on stage or in film. In Coppélia, the ballet by Léo Delibes, 
staged by the Royal Ballet in 2000, for example, Swanhilda (performed by Leanne Benjamin) 
tricks Dr. Coppelius into mistaking her for Coppélia by pretending to be the female automaton, 
when she frequently displays limp body movements. Discussing the live-action dance film, The 
Sandman (The Quay Brothers and William Tuckett, 2000, UK), partially based on the ballet 
Coppélia, Crow also points out, “Performed by Tamara Rojo, this Olympia moves with both 
mechanical rigidity and dollish limpness” (2006: 58).  
220 
Pinocchio figure works for the effect of looking like coming alive on screen. It is 
only the cat Figaro and the goldfish Cleo, as nonhuman animals, that mistake the 
marionette for a living being in the film.  
Pinocchio’s secondary animatic transition occurs when the Blue Fairy gives 
it something like life in the film narrative. Following the visual effect animation of 
sparkling light circles as a cue of a magical event, the marionette is depicted as if he 
woke from sleep with the behavioural cue of blinking and rubbing his sleepy eyes. 
Given the Western context within which the film was produced, this performance is 
likely to echo the concept of captured or taken souls that Patrick Harpur (2010: 
Kindle 2731) refers to as once pan-European before Europe was christened (Kindle 
541). Harpur points out, “In Irish folklore, for instance, it is said that when a young 
man or woman is taken by the fairies they leave behind a ‘log’, or else ‘the likeness 
of their body or a body in their likeness’” (2010: Kindle 270). Interpreted from the 
perspective of the pre-Christian folktale, the cue of Pinocchio’s waking in the film 
suggests a possibility that after kidnapping a boy’s soul in another place, the Blue 
Fairy returns it to a wrong body which Geppetto has just built out of logs in a wish 
to have his own son. If so, Pinocchio’s secondary transition will arouse from the 
viewers troublesome questions like these: who and where is the human boy whose 
soul was taken by the Fairy? what will happen to him if the soul is not brought back 
to him? 
Yet, the film narrative does not respond to such questions of the proper 
ownership of the soul. Instead, it takes a pivotal step at the moment when the Blue 
Fairy tells Pinocchio that she has given it “life”—not a soul—and notably that he/it 
is not a “real” boy. Her remark addresses an intriguing question: What is the 
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difference between the life and the realness of a boy such as Pinocchio that can and 
do move, walk and talk? Morality is the answer from the fairy (Bukatman 2012: 
Kindle 3352). The narrative motivation for this seems to be valid, as the 
protagonist Pinocchio will develop an overt interaction and relationship with not 
only Geppetto but also other characters, humans and anthropomorphic animals, 
co-inhabiting in the diegetic world of the film produced within the Hollywood 
context. What is peculiar about the fairy’s view is that morality is not inherent to 
life itself and the latter is phony without the former.  
Here works again the Cartesian view of life as a philosophical background 
or belief system. As discussed by Kim (2013: 177), the concept of morality is 
reduced to reason in Descartes. As regards how to judge something in question, 
according to Maclean, “He consistently recommended the ‘light of reason’ as the 
best guide” (2006: xxiv). For the French philosopher, life is considered as separated 
from the faculty of reason because living beings like nonhuman animals are 
machines, as Des Chene remarks, “Time and again he insists that machines can 
simulate all the functions of life” (2001: 10). In this sense, the Blue Fairy can be said 
to be a follower of Descartes. When giving only life and no faculty of reason to the 
puppet, the fairy does not perform a demiurgic role, as Descartes claims, “God has 
given each of us an inner light to distinguish the true from the false” (1637/2006: 
24).  
In this Cartesian view, the film narrative keeps Pinocchio to be a subhuman 
animal, after secondary animatic transition, that lacks morality or the faculty of 
reason. His on-screen ability of talking, as well as moving and walking, is regarded 
as nothing but a mechanical-animal simulation. This belief system squares with the 
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narrative development in which Pinocchio, along with other real human boys, is 
transformed into a donkey, as a nonhuman animal, after all his delinquency and 
debauchery on Pleasure Island, a place exempted from rules and morality.  
Sold to circuses or salt mines as is shown in a later part of the film (Figure 
3.19), the donkeys into which boys are transformed can read as a kind of slave 
labour. While not focusing on enslavement but rather the working class, M. Keith 
Booker (2010: 12) cites Nicholas Sammond, who points out: 
 
[I]ndulgence in the pleasures of the working class, of vaudeville, or of pool 
halls and amusement parks, led to a life as a beast of burden. Ultimately, 
one was either a manager or managed, and the choices one made 
Figure 3.19 Children transformed into animals in Pinocchio 
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determined the outcome. (cited in Booker 2010: 12)14 
 
As with the vampire in Nosferatu (F. W. Murnau, 1922, GER), the frightening scene 
in which the human figures are shown to transform into nonhuman beasts can be a 
reflection of Disney films which, Booker writes, “tended to dismiss and denigrate 
working-class culture” (2010: 12).  
Yet, it should be noted that Pinocchio is not a horror film but a children’s 
film. In terms of film genres, Grodal observes Pinocchio and other Disney/Pixar 
characters: 
 
The business of attracting children's attention and allowing them to follow 
the action involves a further field of options. In the physical portrayal of 
agency, it seems that salience is important; differences in character and 
function are often enhanced by using different animals or other highly 
salient objects. It is easier to distinguish an aggressive character from a 
friendly one if the aggressor is a wolf or cat and the friendly one is a piglet 
or a mouse. The ability to display key emotions through the innate features 
of body language like posture and facial expressions is very important, and 
exaggerated body language is used to highlight the characters’ emotions. 
(2009: Kindle 384) 
 
The salience of Pinocchio, as the hero of the film, with whom children are expected 
 
14 Booker cites Sammond (2005: 78) Babes in Tomorrowland: Walt Disney and the Making of 
the American Child, 1930-1960. Durham, NC: Duke UP. 
224 
to identify, seems to work successfully, as Bukatman comments in a personal tone:  
 
As soon as he can move and talk he becomes a figure of identification, so 
from an audience standpoint he doesn’t need to become any realer, 
demonstrating that the combination of animateness and voice is a 
sufficient indicator of life. In fact, I’m always slightly disturbed when he 
does become a real boy at the film’s end—I miss that little wooden boy. 
(2012: Kindle 3338). 
 
This unhesitant evaluation of the animation of Pinocchio as a not-yet-real boy 
prompts the reconsideration of the way in which the Disney animators designed 
and animated the boy figure in terms of both life and not-yet-real-ness. Thomas 
and Johnston mention a directorial note of the design of Pinocchio, which indicates: 
 
When Pinocchio is a puppet, before he comes to life, we are going to have 
the black line where his neck joins because it looks mechanical, but when 
he comes to life, it spoils the cuteness to have those lines in black so we 
just ink this in the same color as his neck so you don’t get any hard edge 
here. (1981: 277; emphasis mine)  
 
What interests me in this note is that the Disney animators were concerned with 
how Pinocchio looks on screen. Therefore, the question should be raised of why 
they kept Pinocchio having the lines around the knee joints and wooden straight 
edges along the arms and legs after he comes to life in relation to the film narrative.  
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With the cues of woodenness, the Pinocchio figure nonetheless shows as 
much flexibility and elasticity on screen as human or animal figures in terms of 
body movement. The physical properties are virtually obtained using the 
techniques of two-dimensional hand-drawn animation, involving the medium of 
celluloid. In the case of stop-motion animation, as a matter of fact, it is impossible 
that a puppet model made of real wood walks and jumps in as flexible and elastic a 
way as Disney’s celluloid figure representing a puppet. As indicated in Bukatman’s 
(2012: Kindle 3338) above-cited passage, Pinocchio as a not-yet-real boy surpasses 
the real boy named the same as the puppet, who is to appear at the end of the film.  
 The sensation of the hybridity of Pinocchio’s body on screen is not the 
problem which I am going to tackle. Given the film’s genre as fantasy, the wooden 
puppet jumping and dancing in such a supple way on screen is as much acceptable 
as the same puppet moving without manipulating strings. The very problem is the 
manner in which the Disney animators deal with such cues in the scene (Figure 
3.20) where Pinocchio is transformed into a real boy from whose body disappear 
all the joint lines, wooden lines and the unusually long nose, as well as the donkey 
ears and tail. As resulting from his hedonistic behaviours on Pleasure Island, these 
Figure 3.20 Transforming into a “real” boy in Pinocchio 
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half-spellbound animal body sections deserve to vanish as a token of reward for his 
“brave, truthful and unselfish” behaviour, as with Pinocchio’s nose made longer and 
longer by the Blue Fairy to punish his lies in the film. Unlike them, the 
mechanical/wooden marks on the figure of Pinocchio’s body as not-yet-real should 
have nothing to do with what the boy was, is and will be, for the Cartesian 
perspective. As I discussed above, reason and morality are divorced from the very 
concept of life that is mechanical in the Cartesian view. However, the fairy links 
morality with the issue of body, machine, life, as she says to Pinocchio, “Remember 
a boy who won’t be good might just as well be made of wood”. Might it be that the 
fairy is not a Cartesian agent in the world of the film?  
Such a question should be raised of the Disney animators, as human 
agents, along with the viewers in the Tooniverse. It is evident that the former 
agents were concerned with what Pinocchio’s body should be and look like, going 
so far as to make the fairy consequently transmute its material of wood into flesh, 
by means of the animating process of changing lines and colours frame by frame on 
the transparent medium of celluloid. As Kim (2013: 178) suggests citing Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri,15 this scene of transmutation is likely to involve racism 
which, drawing on human biology, has marginalised colonised non-Western people 
as other-than-human. In other words, the new look of Pinocchio can act as the 
lesson that the body is the ultimate condition for an adopted child such as him to 
be a real human being, however well he behaves himself in a given world. Soleil S. 
Groh reports the case of transracial adoptees in the United States: “Although 
Chinese adoptees can sometimes prefer to claim this ‘white identity’, which can 
 
15 Hardt and Negri (2001: 258). Jeguk (Empire). Yoon, Soo-Jong (trans.) Seoul: Ehak 
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often be described as being a ‘banana’ or ‘Twinkie’, meaning the adoptee is ‘yellow’ 
on the outside and ‘white’ on the inside, Asians are still vulnerable to racism and 
discrimination” (2018: 19).16 
When it comes to the body, La Mettrie’s view of human beings and their 
faculty of reason provides a different insight into what Pinocchio was, is and will 
be. Suggesting that the materialist philosopher’s stance converges on the body, 
Vartanian states: 
 
La Mettrie did not claim that animals, much less their human counterparts, 
were mechanical contrivances in the Cartesian sense, that is, automata 
lacking consciousness, feeling, and intelligence. On the contrary, the gist of 
his position was that those mental powers, real in man and beast alike, 
were products of their organization seen as a mechanical system. (1999: 
58) 
 
In addition, Vartanian (1999: 85) stresses that for La Mettrie, the machine means 
to be independent, autonomous and self-determining. Viewed from this 
perspective, and also as Bukatman claims that “it is precisely Pinocchio’s 
misbehavior that makes him real, that makes him human” (2010: Kindle 3357), 
Pinocchio can be said to have already been a real human boy before the 
transmutation of his body; the Blue Fairy lied to him in the Lamettrian sense. At the 
end of the film, Pinocchio is no more disobedient to be subsumed under the 
 
16 Groh mentions J. P. Lee, R. M. Lee, A. W. Hu & O. M. Kim (2015). Ethnic identity as a 
moderator against discrimination for transracially and transnationally adopted Korean 
American adolescents. Asian American Journal of Psychology 6(2): 154-163. 
228 
anthropocentric order of the Tooniverse and beyond.  
 
 
3.6. Type Six: A Cursed Toy in The Simpsons: Halloween Special III 
 
In Pinocchio, no human and anthropomorphic animal characters are threatened by 
the subhuman wooden puppet, but rather the latter is threatened by some of the 
former. Unlike this case of Type Five, in the film narrative the cases of Type Six 
threaten human (and anthropomorphic animal) characters who seem unlikely to 
hope that puppets as inanimate objects move with their own will, not to mention 
coming to life. This is the ground on which I separate Type Six from Type Five as 
discrete in my typology of Group CEL. Despite its similarity to Type Five of the 
main principle, magic, in which occurs secondary animatic transition, Type Six is 
usually mobilised to arouse negative, horrible and aversive, response in the 
viewers of a given film, as well as in the human characters appearing in it.  
In terms of genre, this Type is a preference in horror films, on which 
Grodal remarks that “the extreme fear is caused by the lack of normal means to 
control the monster” (1997: 249). In order for such fear to work well, as discussed 
by Grodal (p.246) using what he terms “cognitive dissonance”, devices of horror 
films should be deployed to challenge the belief system of reality, scientifically 
verifiable, that both human protagonists and viewers have in common and take for 
granted in their everyday life. In analysis of the case of Type Six, I examine how 
such cognitive dissonance is aroused in the viewers with cues of a puppet-as-
puppet figure’s body movement out of “human control”. 
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As an emblematic case of this Type, I have selected The Simpsons: 
Halloween Special III (Carlos Baeza, 1992, US; a.k.a. Treehouse of Horror III), one 
episode of the animated situation comedy, The Simpsons (Created by Matt 
Groening, 1989-to date, US).17 In the Special episode as part of the series whose 
genre is comedy, and whose narrative is focused on a middle-class US family and its 
neighbours, a puppet-as-puppet figure named Krusty the Clown is employed as a 
conventional device of horror films to serve the strategy of causing laughter from 
the viewers of the series. At the same time, the series’ genre of comedy can be a 
facilitator to exploit a variety of the devices of horror films likely to be restricted 
for the mainstream television audiences.  
The figure of Krusty representing a clown doll bears a good comparison to 
Koko the Clown that is made to undergo animatic transition by the on-screen live-
action human artist Max Fleischer who assumes a demiurgic role, yet adopting 
modern scientific knowledge and technology, in the Out of the Inkwell series. In 
Clown without Pity, one segment of the Special episode, a Chinese-looking old 
shopkeeper (Figure 3.21) is involved in the unwished (secondary) animatic 
transition of Krusty, a doll which Homer, the father character of the Simpsons, buys 
for his son Bart in a shop actually not for toys or gifts. The shopkeeper says to his 
wrong customer: “We sell forbidden objects”. The Chinese-ness of the sinister 
shopkeeper is reinforced by the use of a Chinese-sounding tune played when 
 
17 This animated comedy show was at first broadcast through mainstream television networks 
in the United States (Norris 2014: 227-229), extending its international popularity up to South 
Korea and Japan. 
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Homer enters the shop, named “House of Evil”, to find a birthday present for his 
son. The combination of evil-ness and Chinese-ness addresses the issue of what 
Simon During (2002) calls black magic. Considered as dangerous and threatening 
to modern societies and communities, During writes, black magic “is familiar in 
both witchcraft and colonized territories” (2002: Kindle 571). Probably, realistic 
motivation for horror might have been an influential factor in preferring a Chinese 
man to a witch because there are Chinese towns and also traditional Chinese 
medicine shops found in the United States.  
 In the narrative, however, the Chinese-looking shopkeeper does not work 
as a “direct” agent who brings Krusty to secondary animatic transition. This 
transition is depicted after the scenes with Krusty in the stationary state (Subtype 
Figure 3.21 The Chinese-looking shopkeeper in Halloween Special III 
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(a), Type One) and then in the automatic mode of movement (Subtype (c), Type 
One). This automatic mode functions to indicate Krusty as a pull-string talking doll. 
The narrative device for Krusty’s secondary animatic transition is given as a curse, 
or black magic, by the old shopkeeper, which as a modern middle-class man Homer 
is not willing to believe in. As a token of the curse, one day, Krusty changes all of 
sudden its preprogrammed dialogues, and further moves for itself to point at 
Homer with its index finger when he is holding it up. In this scene, the hand-drawn 
figures of the doll’s eyes and pupils looking in extremely different directions are 
utilised to suggest the impression of craziness, as well as subhumanness and 
lifelessness, as indicated by Thomas and Johnston (1981: 446).  
What is typical about the body movement of Krusty after its secondary 
animatic transition is that it shows greater abilities than the material condition of 
its body can allow. Resisting gravity, it can jump and fly to kill Homer and it looks 
even like it weighs much more than him when it knocks him down and pushes his 
head into a dog bowl (Figure 3.22). In the diegetic world of the episode, except for 
the concept of magic, it is not easy to explain where the doll’s paraphysical power 
originates from, despite its small-sized body within which no overpowering 
Figure 3.22 The doll’s paraphysical movements in Halloween Special III 
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mechanical structure or parts is expected to be built. As Eric G. Wilson describes 
black magic as “sinister efforts to control the will of another” (2006: 130), the 
Krusty doll seems to be controlled or possessed by what it is not—the object as 
inanimate and lacking will would be much more vulnerable to such efforts. This 
irrational situation brings about cognitive dissonance in both the viewers and the 
protagonists who make effort to figure it out in the belief system of modern 
science, without admitting the premodern, non-scientific, notion of the curse.  
 What I am concerned with here is not the verification of the religious 
notion that goes beyond the scope of my thesis, but rather it is the way of 
animating the hand-drawn figure of Krusty. Coming to the perception of any human 
characters living everyday life in the film diegesis, and also to that of the viewers 
initiated to experience the diegetic world on television by identifying with them, 
the figure of a doll moving and talking with its own will can raise an 
epistemological issue—cognitive dissonance—of the inanimacy of an 
anthropomorphic object. Framed in the greater context of a sitcom, the 
exaggeration of the doll’s power comes quite close to defamiliarising the 
conventional way of exploiting the two-dimensional condition of hand-drawn 
animation where there are no physical properties or laws, like gravity, as 
experienced in the three-dimensional world.  
In the Clown without Pity segment, however, the cue of defamiliarisation or 
cognitive dissonance is not intended to tackle the viewers’ everyday sense of 
human-like objects such as the talking doll Krusty, but rather helps to reproduce 
the modern Western-centric society’s convention in which events or materials used 
as such a cue are imagined and marginalised as evil and non-Western. The ending 
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of the segment is a clear illustration of the society’s dominant belief. Homer finally 
ends up getting rid of any threat by learning how to control the doll with the slide 
switch between “Good” and “Evil” set on its back (Figure 3.23). The human 
character, Homer, is no longer terrified of the doll as long as he can control it. Yet, 
he should consider any possible accident by which the switch on the doll’s back 
might slide to the mode of Evil and then get broken beyond recovery.  
 
 
3.7. Type Seven: A Posthuman Android in Astro Boy 
 
In Type Seven (and also Type Eight), science or technology is the main principle of 
Figure 3.23 The doll under the human control in Halloween Special III 
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secondary animatic transition. This type of puppet-as-puppet figures in human 
form have an overt interaction and communication with any human characters in 
the diegetic world of the film: except the main principle, Type Seven has much in 
common with Type Five. Yet, the former Type builds on the discourse that 
technology can and will redefine the “humanity” itself of the real world in a post-
Cartesian or postmodern sense (Haraway 1991).  
When I analyse the case, Astro Boy, of Type Six in consideration of such a 
discourse, I focus on the way in which the boundary becomes thin between puppet-
as-puppet figures in human form and human figures on screen, not only in terms of 
narrative but also in terms of the mode of body movement. For this dynamic 
aspect, one of the most influential factors is “limited animation”, and both as a set 
of techniques and a style, this has been tied in with television as a nation-wide 
media platform in Japan and other countries (Lamarre 2018). My analysis of the 
puppet-as-puppet figure named Astro Boy embraces the socio-cultural 
implications of television to shed light on how its body movement was circulated in 
the involvement of a nation in the age of technology.  
The emblematic case of Type Seven is Astro Boy, the Japanese animated 
television series, which Marc Steinberg evaluates: “The emergence of anime with 
Tetsuwan Atomu (Astro Boy; 1963-66), the first made-in-Japan, thirty-minute, 
weekly television animation show, which went on air on January 1, 1963, proved a 
tipping point in the development of transmedia relations in postwar Japanese 
visual culture” (2012: Kindle 68). In particular, this series has also been of great 
influence on what human simulacra of the future will be like in the real world—
specifically in the field of engineering in Japan (Schodt 2011: Kindle 1287). Being 
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aware that it consists of around 193 episodes, in this thesis I focus on Episode One, 
entitled “Astro Boy Is Born”, where an establishing depiction is made of the 
secondary, as well as primary, animatic transition of the titular puppet-as-puppet 
figure.  
Set in the early twenty-first century Japan in the film diegesis, Astro Boy is 
an android boy invented by Tenma, the scientist and the minister of the National 
Science Agency, as a surrogate for his dead son. The male scientist has in common 
two motifs with Victor Frankenstein, the protagonist of Mary W. Shelly’s novel, 
Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus (1818). One is the death of the scientist’s 
beloved family member, and the other his desire of creating life by means of science 
and technology. Unlike Frankenstein, however, Tenma enjoys his “official” power to 
order the experts of the Agency to develop his Frankensteinian project, mobilising 
the established technology of the future, without violating ethical norms, as the 
predecessor Frankenstein does, by building the humanoid out of inorganic 
materials.  
While being built in a laboratory, Astro Boy makes a first appearance on 
screen in the stationery mode (Subtype (a), Type One). The technique of editing 
outlines the process of building the android. At the early stage, viewers can see its 
inside structure which is composed of artificial body parts resembling human 
counterparts, for instance, the arm bones, the empty thorax, the pelvis, the chin 
bone and the skull without eyeballs (Figure 3.24a). Such an anatomical depiction 
serves to make the viewers recognise the boy figure as a mechanical being. 
Following the scene in which artificial eyeballs are inserted into the eye sockets, 
the android boy is seen to lie on an operation bed, with the body almost finished 
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but still wired, and also with the eyes closed as if it were sleeping (Figure 3.24b).  
Primary animatic transition is not depicted to occur to the boy in a 
separate way. Rather, there is no clear distinction seen between primary and 
secondary animatic transitions at the moment when the mechanical eyes open, the 
right arm is raised up and the upper body gets up. This series of movements can be 
read: on the one hand merely as the cue of an inanimate object moving in the 
automatic mode (Subtype (c), Type One); and on the other as the cue of secondary 
animatic transition during which the android figure will come to look more like its 
human counterparts appearing in the TV series. This ambiguity in the mode of 
movement suggests that in the science-fiction world of the animated television 
series, technology is so much developed as to make unclear the difference between 
both impressions of being inanimate and coming to life. 
In either mode, however, the android is still depicted to seem less than 
human on screen at the moment of “birth”. It does not support itself on the 
operation bed with either hand when raising the upper body, but the body rises up 
in a constant slow speed around the axis of the waist (Figure 3.25a). This 
movement makes it appear to lack the “totality” of an organic body, with the upper 
Figure 3.24 Astro Boy; left (a), right (b) 
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body separated from the lower one, as if individually driven by separate powerful 
built-in servomotors. Booted up, the android gets out the operation bed and then 
falling down over and over, seems to deal with the legs as if uncontrollable (Figure 
3.25b). Succeeding in walking at last, it shows a slightly similar mode of locomotive 
movements to the monstrous figure that in the 1931 film, Frankenstein, impressed 
the audience with its way of stomping in an aimless and stiff manner. When hugged 
by its creator-father Tenma, it does not present any cue of reaction in terms of 
facial expression, eye blink and gesture.  
Tenma is not a patient father, nor a self-aware scientist. After all his 
pleasure with his surrogate son, he eventually gets too anxious and angry to deny 
the nonhumanness of Astro Boy which lacks the development of the human body. It 
is impossible that any artificial abilities, intelligence, emotion and even morality, of 
the android satisfies the creator-father, for whom the focus is only the ungrowing 
inorganic body, in contrast to the Blue Fairy concerned with morality as the 
foremost issue in Pinocchio. In the diegetic world of Astro Boy, the android boy 
befalls another adversity; he has to accept the human-centric order under which 
regardless of their quasi-human or almost human abilities, androids are dealt with 
Figure 3.25 Astro Boy; left (a), right (b) 
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as commodities or slaves. This means that Tenma must be already aware that his 
surrogate son is not allowed to go to school, nor to be employed, nor to open a 
bank account. Tenma’s fantasy of the father-son relationship concludes when he 
hands over Astro Boy as a piece of stuff to the human master of a robot circus.  
In the Astro Boy narrative, the ultimate issue for the android slaves is not 
the artificial body but rather the law. At the end of Episode One, all androids are 
liberated from slavery by being granted equal-to-human rights on a global scale; 
along with them, Astro Boy gains the status equal to human beings. This is where 
this anime series calls into question what is human. Despite the declaration of 
equal-to-human rights for androids, some of these ex-slaves keep protesting or 
seek to take revenge for violence, cruelty and discrimination by human beings, 
throughout the anime series.18 In many of its episodes, the state-of-the-art android 
Astro Boy serves to mediate socio-political conflicts between humans and 
androids; no clear explanation is made of the reason that he remains to be a 
relatively docile friend of human beings. 
The equivocality of Astro Boy in the narrative as the mediator between two 
opposing groups also triggers the re-examination of how to define humanity in 
epistemic, ontological, as well as socio-political, terms. In the future world of the 
anime series, electronic brains are depicted to emulate human brains. In Episode 
139, further, the National Science Agency begins to take action for the physical 
development of android bodies, which is to transplant the electronic brain from 
one body into another body designed to match each of the human life stages.  
 
18 As discussed by Kim (2013: 178), for Tezuka, the enslaved androids were an analogy of 
African-American people in US, and also of the Japanese under the US Occupation (1945-1952). 
239 
Technologies like artificial organs and transplantation are likely to 
undermine the conventional definition of humanity. Observing the crisis of human 
beings and their bodies in the sci-fi horror live-action film, Parts: The Clonus Horror 
(Robert F. Fiveson, 1979, US), Schelde notes, “Bodies are no longer self-contained 
organ complexes; they are loci of medical and scientific experimentation” (1993: 
207). He continues: 
 
We are rapidly approaching a point where bodies are regarded and treated 
as machines that can be repaired and given spare parts. The problem, as sf 
[science fiction] sees it, has to do with the notion of self, of soul: the 
essence of individuality that makes Me distinctly different from You. If I 
have the kidney, lung, blood, or heart of another person, am I myself or that 
person? (1993: 207) 
 
In Astro Boy, such an ontological crisis of humanity is transposed into the 
optimistic vision in which the future world sees androids more and more 
emulating, or even surpassing human beings. Astro Boy is repaired over and over 
every time his body is destroyed fighting enemies. In Episode 139, he remains 
simply what he was, even after his electronic brain is transplanted for testing into a 
mechanical adult body.19 
 The optimism of technology or the scepticism of humanity in Astro Boy is 
 
19 In the same episode, it is human beings that pretend to be what they are not. It is revealed 
that one of them, a human detective wears a wig and in fact is bald. Yet, this is soon followed by 
his confession, with the gesture of revealing only to his television audience, that his bald head, 
too, is a disguise. When his hidden hair is shown in the end, this real-or-fake game is still open 
to a perceptual challenge; the hidden hair might be fake. 
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visually accentuated by the technique of limited animation and also was promoted 
by the media platform of television. Pioneered by the artists of United Productions 
of America in the 1940s (Maltin 1987: 332-333), limited animation was introduced 
by Tezuka to the production of Astro Boy, in an attempt to meet the needs of a 
television-oriented animation production system in the 1960s. Rejecting the 
technique and the style of full animation supposedly using twenty-four discrete 
sheets drawn per second, Tezuka pushed ahead with dropping the number of 
drawings to three or four sheets per second (Ito et al. 2002: 44-45).  
As a result, the use of limited animation does not enable viewers to easily 
discern between human and android figures, in terms of the mode of movement, 
for the most part throughout the animation television series. Both figures of 
humans and androids present choppy and jerky movements, and even remain 
stationary and fixed. Created by the reuse of many sets of cel drawings,20 
furthermore, the figures of humans as well as androids show the same patterns of 
facial expressions, postures and gestures in one and the same episode and from 
one episode to another every week. These schematic body movements are likely to 
pertain to those which Descartes (1637/2006) observes in the automata of his 
days; the human simulacra show only the same responses, in repetition, to any 
external stimuli in different situations.  
 The diegetic world of Astro Boy is not set in the seventeenth century but in 
the early twenty-first century, the next age which is to build on the techno-
scientific achievements and potentials of the twentieth century. As regards the 
human condition of the future world envisioned in sci-fi films, Schelde asks, “Can 
 
20 The system for such reuse of cel drawings is called “bank” in Japanese animation industry. 
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humans remain human in a world where more and more of our time is spent 
interacting with machines and technology?” (1993: 118), going on to note, 
“Working with a machine means that the machine determines the tempo, the 
rhythm, and the duration of the work session” (p.126). In this vein, Astro Boy’s 
vision of such an industrialised and technologised world is implied by the human 
figures depicted to move on screen like their subhuman counterparts in terms of 
the tempo, the rhythm and the duration of the body movement.  
At the time when Astro Boy was in production, postwar Japanese society 
was witnessing television as a new media, instead of cinema, to become the leading 
player of national narration (Kang and Yoshimi 2001: 128-129). Along with the 
refrigerator and the washing machine, television was called one of “Three Sacred 
Treasures”, which traditionally signify three mythological items symbolic of 
Tennoh’s prestige. Sang-jung Kang and Shunya Yoshimi (2001: 132) point out that 
in Japan, the modern and postwar version of Three Sacred Treasures functioned to 
nationalise technology, at the same time technologising Japan. Combined with the 
media technology of television, the Astro Boy figure can be said to work as an 
analogy of new Japanese nation, as well as new humans, to problematise the 
established orders and the definition of humanity.  
 
 
3.8. Type Eight: A Deceptive Imitation in The Great Mouse Detective 
 
As mentioned above, technology is the main principle of secondary animatic 
transition that Type Eight (T8) has in common with Type Seven (T7). The puppet-
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as-puppet figures of the former Type are also similar to those of the latter Type in 
terms of their overt interaction with the figures of living beings as performing 
characters in the diegetic world of a given film. Unlike the T7 figures, however, the 
T8 figures are employed as a deceptive narrative device, which once believed as a 
living being by on-screen viewers, are revealed to be fake, without implying any 
vision in which technology might revise the definition of humanity.  
In this section, the case under examination is the automaton Queen of 
Disney’s 1986 animated film, The Great Mouse Detective. What is peculiar about 
this film is that Hiram Flaversham, the creator and behind-the-stage animator of the 
automaton, is not depicted as its master but a victim of Ratigan, the higher, 
political, power controlling and exploiting both of them in the narrative. Focusing 
on this peculiarity and in reference to the Disney animators’ account, I connect the 
automaton figure’s body movement to the discussion of hypnotism in Robert 
Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920, GER). The “somnambulist” figures found 
in both films help interpret a hierarchical change in the power relations between 
animator and animated, creator and created, controller and controlled. 
 In the film narrative, the automaton is created as a copy of the Queen of the 
Mice by the toy maker Hiram who was kidnapped by Ratigan, the villain scheming 
to seize control of the British mousedom. The mice inhabit the world of human 
beings and their kingdom is apparently similar to the perihuman world of the 
puppets and the anthropomorphic animals seen in The Mouse and His Child (as a 
case of Type Four in Section 3.4). In the Disney film drawing on the tradition of the 
Sherlock Holmes stories, however, the rodent world is depicted as thoroughly 
separated from and parallel to the human world in the film narrative. At the same 
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time, the mouse detective character named Basil assumes a perfect replacement of 
Holmes in miniature; this strategy of characterisation is applied to his mouse 
sidekick Dawson and the other anthropomorphised animal characters. Arguably, 
the animation film could have been created with life-size human characters; but it 
is not. What then is the effect of anthropomorphism in the film? With this question 
in mind, I proceed to analyse how the figure of the automaton Queen is dealt with 
in contrast to the figures of living beings in the film.  
 The automaton makes its initial appearance in the scene where it is being 
built by the captive Hiram (Figure 3.26). As is the android boy figure in Episode 
One of Astro Boy, it is shown with the internal condition of its body—including the 
head part—exposed in an anatomical manner to make certain the impression that 
it is an assembly of cogs and bolts—which are conventional visual tokens of 
machines, as different from the living characters in the film. In this scene, Hiram 
Figure 3.26 The automaton Queen and the toymaker in The Great Mouse Detective 
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does not remain a toy maker, but shifts to become an engineer capable of creating a 
full-size android in terms of the rodent world.  
As with Astro Boy, secondary animatic transition occurs to the engineer’s 
creation, without primary animatic transition (Subtype (b) or (c), Type One) 
depicted clearly on screen, when it comes out of a present box that Ratigan’s 
henchmen in disguise have brought to the Queen. At first, the automaton stands 
erect and stationary with its eyes closed for a while (Subtype (a), Type One), and 
then suddenly starts to show an intense convulsion at the same time opening the 
eyes wide. The suddenness of the body movement presents the impression that it 
is drastically driven by an external power rather than waking up on its own from 
sleep. However, it does not remain as an inanimate object, as do the miniature 
automata set on the music boxes and the clocks in Pinocchio (Subtype (c), Type 
One). Interestingly, it bursts into chasing the Queen, stretching out its arms and 
Figure 3.27 The real Queen and the fake Queen in The Great Mouse Detective 
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showing its open palms, with its aimless eyes fixed (Figure 3.27)—at the early 
stage of the chase, it is not yet clearly revealed that the automaton, like a stringed 
puppet, is manipulated by Hiram through console and wire under the order of 
Ratigan. The reaching or target-aiming gesture of the mechanical figure looking 
aimless and blank in awkward movements adds another imagery of subhumanness 
to the mouse-like yet anthropomorphic automaton.  
 What is noteworthy about adding cues of subhumanness is the way in 
which the Disney animators conceptualised automata in terms of body 
performance. In discussing the wooden puppet boy as an inanimate object in 
Pinocchio, Thomas and Johnston states: 
 
When an actor has to portray a robot or a sleepwalker, the first thing he 
does is to fix his eyes in a stare, a lifeless gaze with no movement. (1981: 
445) 
 
Here, the animators introduce the figure of a sleepwalker to their account of 
lifelessness and subhumaness in relation to body performance. Given that the 
Tooniverse has long been related to the history of live-action film, the most striking 
of such somnambulist figures can be said to be Cesare, the human character 
performed by a human actor for the most part, in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari.  
Adding Cesare as a forth type, along with the mummy, the golem and the 
automaton, to his android typology, Wilson indicates, “Under the hypnotic control 
of Caligari, Cesare is a human transformed into a machine” (2006: 125). In his 
essay on the German expressionist film, Stefan Andriopoulos traces such an 
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account back to the late nineteenth-century neurologist Georges Gilles de la 
Tourette, who described a hypnotised sleeper as “a true automaton . . . obeying all 
expressions of his magnetizer’s will” (cited in Andriopoulos 2009: Kindle 448)21. 
Andriopoulos goes on to comment on Cesare: “The androgynous medium slowly 
steps forward, like a puppet that is held by invisible strings” (2009: Kindle 453).  
The hypnotised sleeper Cesare is literally presented as the model of a 
puppet in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. A real effigy is used in the scene where in 
fright a few officers find a figure like Cesare when investigating Dr. Caligari’s 
subject (Figure 3.28). The film achieves the desired effect of horror by 
undermining viewers’ perception to the extent that they suspect that from the 
 
21 Andriopoulos cites Tourette (1887: 96). L’hypnotisme et les états analogues au point de vue 
médicolégale. Paris: E. Plon. 
Figure 3.28 The Cesare effigy in The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari 
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beginning Cesare may have been performed by the effigy rather than an actor who 
they have believed to be human. In the chasing scene of The Great Mouse Detective, 
the automaton Queen’s aiming gesture in contrast to its aimless eyes evokes the 
viewing experience of hypnotists and hypnotised victims or criminals, many of 
whom, as Andriopoulos (2009: Kindle 373) indicates, were already enacted in 
many films between the late nineteenth century and the 1920s.  
Despite the performance of Vincent Price cast for the voice of the villain 
Ratigan, however, horror is not the film’s goal within the convention of the 
Tooniverse. Manipulated through an invisible, to be accurate, unnoticeable string 
as Ratigan commands, the automaton Queen is eventually reduced to a mechanical 
tool rather than a hypnotised victim. The chasing scene cuts to the full shot in 
which Ratigan is ordering Hiram to remote-control the mechanical mouse. At this 
stage, this mouse is perceived as only an inanimate object (close to Subtype (c), 
Type One) in terms of the diegetic status by us, the viewers of the film, as well as 
the Ratigan crew and the captive engineer.  
 In the film narrative, the mechanical object is staged later as the Queen for 
people gathering to celebrate her Jubilee. They believe that the automaton is the 
Queen, no matter how much convulsion its body makes in speech, no matter how 
poor its voice quality is. While the Queen is about to be murdered, it deceives 
people into accepting that Ratigan is the new leader of the mousedom. The 
automaton is not a hypnotised victim; in this Jubilee scene, instead, it works as a 
hypnotising tool. The hypnotised are the people (as mice) characters that are the 
audience of the Jubilee play enacted by Ratigan. Such a hypnotising effect on the 
audience is where Andriopoulos stretches his account of Cesare to the film 
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medium. The scholar points out, “[E]arly theories of film described the new 
medium itself as exerting an irresistible, hypnotic influence on its spellbound 
audiences” (2009: Kindle 377). What is more relevant to the Tooniverse is his 
citation of the French physician Hippolyte Bernheim, who stated, “The 
hallucinations generated by suggestion can be as clear as reality; the hypnotised 
person, even though he knows that it is a hallucination, cannot escape it” (cited in 
Andriopoulos 2009: Kindle 605).22 In this vein, arguably, the audience of the 
Queen’s Jubilee ceremony are not simply the victims, but rather the participants, or 
co-animators in Crafton’s definition of the term, of the political show.  
 This political film also presents a peculiar change in the relationship 
between the creator and his artistic creation. As examined in Chapter Two, McCay, 
the Fleischer Brothers and even Greaves play the self-motivated, as well as 
independent and autonomous, creators of their creations, which are simulacra of 
life, in their films. Unlike them, in The Great Mouse Detective Hiram is not a self-
motivated but forced creator of the Queen simulacrum; through the microphone 
connected to the voice-making part built in the automaton, still less, he cannot tell 
his own story but is forced to deliver the voice of Ratigan, the true behind-the-
scenes producer of the political show. Given that most of such on-screen animators 
disappeared out of screen to perform as storytellers by means of the narrative 
device of the character between the 1920s and the 1930s (Crafton 1993: 298-299), 
Hiram can be an allegory of the Disney animators who under managerial control 
struggled for their status as an artist or creator to animate figures and tell a story 
 
22 Andriopoulos indicates the two sources of this citation: Bernheim (1888: 57) De la 
suggestion et ses applications à la thérapeutique. Deuxième édition. Paris: O. Doin. (Original 
work published 1886); ——. (1964: 40) Hypnosis and Suggestion. Herter, Christian A. (trans.) 
New York: University Books. 
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behind screen relying on them on screen. 
 Of course, the Disney film paves its conventional pathway which should 
not keep the mice audience on screen (and also possibly young children viewers of 
the film in theatres) in such a politically serious hallucination. The fake play is 
stopped by the heroes, and then, the fake Queen is abused for their counter-attack 
against the villains. With everything going to resolution, the harsh treatment by the 
detective hero Basil of the automaton brings about its entire destruction (Figure 
3.29). The depiction of destruction is grotesque to the degree that the torso is 
completely shattered into pieces while the eyeballs and teeth are kept in their 
original places as are their human equivalent organ parts; it looks like an 
anatomical model lacking the felt totality. This is where the visual device of 
anthropomorphism begins to work in the convention of the Tooniverse; it serves to 
mitigate the viewers’ fear or horror on the grounds that the hand-drawn figure is 
Figure 3.29 The automaton Queen destroyed in The Great Mouse Detective 
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only the mechanical imitation of a mouse in the film’s diegetic world. There should 
be no more hallucination of the fake Queen. In the vein of Andriopoulos, however, it 
should still be noted that the Disney film itself is also a hypnotising locus where the 
viewers co-animate as alive the hand-drawn figures of Basil, Ratigan and the other 
anthropomorphic animals. In this sense, the true victim is the automaton Queen.  
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Chapter Four 




In this Chapter, I focus on a selection of built or sculpted puppets presented as 
puppets in stop-motion puppet animation films.1 I classify these as conventional in 
that they are motivated by narrative. My analysis is to elucidate how in the 
narrative of each film the puppets as puppets are distinguished from the puppets 
signifying humans or animals, in terms of movement as well as form. As defined in 
the Methodology, and as with Group CEL in Chapter Three, this is focused in 
particular on the two aspects which are the key criteria defining the typology of 
Group STM (Stop-motion). One is (1) the puppet-as-puppet figures’ primary and 
secondary animatic transitions, and the other (2) their interaction with human 
and/or (anthropomorphic) animal characters in the film narrative. They are also 
influential factors in selecting the emblematic case(s) of each Type from Group 
STM which is located in the Puppetopos.  
 As I conceptualised in the Literature Review, the Puppetopos helps to make 
articulate the two points of Group STM in relation/contrast to the Tooniverse 
where Group CEL is located. One is the media specificity of each of the two 
different animation techniques. The other is, nonetheless, that the former has the 
convention of anthropomorphism in common with the latter. This enables me to  
 
1 Puppet animation is often called model animation. In this thesis, too, I accept such use of two 
terms. Also, puppets are called models at the profilmic level when I stress the thee-




primary and secondary 
Interaction with characters in the film narrative 
1 a. No transition:
Stationary state 
No interaction 
 a   b   c 
b. Primary transition:
Passive mode of movement 
c. Primary transition: 
Automatic mode of movement 
2 Secondary transition’s main 
principle:  
Shifting to a different world 
No interaction except for 
supernatural characters 
3 No interaction except for the 
owner (and his/her animal 
friends) 
4 No interaction except for the 
animal or marginalised 
characters 
5 Secondary transition’s main 
principle: 
Magic 
Disenchanted by the character 
of a higher being in the film’s 
world 
6 Cursed by a diabolic power in 
the film’s world 
7 Secondary transition’s main 
principle: 
Technology 
Equivocal in the film’s world 
8 Deceptive in the film’s world 
Table 4.1 Eight Types of the puppet-as-puppet figures in Group STM 
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appropriate the typology of Group CEL in this Chapter. Building on the eight types 
of Group CEL, I redefine the counterpart of each Type for Group STM, in 
consideration of its emblematic case (See Table 4.1). When I refer to the 
counterpart here, it does not mean that one is the exact equivalent of the other. 
Rather, I define some types of Group STM so that each of them might serve to 
contest its counterpart in Group CEL.  
 Throughout the case studies I conduct with the typology of Group STM in 
this Chapter, I will draw on two theoretical paradigms in addition to those which I 
worked with in the previous Chapters. First comes from Romanticism which 
Scullion (2009) studies focusing on the response of human beings, authors or their 
protagonists, to human simulacra like automata and their body movements in 
Romantic literary texts. As discussed by Scullion (2009), in particular, “Romantic 
Irony” will be a key concept in understanding how such human simulacra threaten 
the human beings’ subjectivity and individuality both in the real world and fictional 
worlds. In the Puppetopos, puppet-as-puppet figures can bring human animators 
or creators to a similar kind of crisis, furthermore, in a multiple way, in that the 
figures functioning as humans or animals cannot avoid presenting themselves as 
much simulacra, simply puppets, as puppet-as-puppet figures on screen. As regards 
a second paradigm for this Chapter, I build on phenomenological accounts of 
bodies and touch because such an ontological crisis in a human being is observed 
where they intersect in production of stop-motion animation. In terms of my 
hypotheses, the critical moments should be analysed with respect to the parameter 
of the mode of movement on screen. In stop-motion animation, figures’ movements 
are composed by the animators manipulating their three-dimensional bodies in the 
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real world where gravity works. In this physical and kinetic sense, I will also apply 
the method of film vector analysis to the cases selected. Next, I briefly explain how 




Selection of the emblematic cases from Group STM 
Here I outline the emblematic status of each selected case in the Puppetopos. First, 
three of them are feature films produced in the Hollywood film industry and 
distributed in the US and abroad: Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer (Larry Roemer, 
1964, US), Santa Claus Is Comin' to Town (Arthur Rankin Jr. and Jules Bass, 1970, 
US) and The Nightmare before Christmas (Henry Selick, 1993, US). These films are 
marked in common by the theme of Christmas, the day when Santa Claus is 
imagined to present toys or puppets to people. Further, The Nightmare before 
Christmas exemplifies the extensiveness with which Rudolph The Red-Nosed 
Reindeer was received and had influence in the zone I term the Puppetopos. As a 
producer of the Disney film, Tim Burton recollects:  
 
Like a lot of people, I grew up loving the animated specials like Rudolph the 
Red-Nosed Reindeer and How the Grinch Stole Christmas that appeared on 
TV every year. I wanted to create something with the same kind of feeling 
and warmth. (1993: 8) 
 
This recollection is a remarkable hint that Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer has 
255 
been of great influence and popularity in the Puppetopos.  
The Rudolph film was animated by Tadahito Mochinaga, the Japanese 
pioneer of stop-motion animation, and by the crew of his MOM Productions in 
Japan.2 Its loose sequel, Santa Claus Is Comin' to Town, was animated by their 
succeeding team based in Japan. Since Mochinaga’s pioneering work in the 1950s, 
the Puppetopos has seen as a steady development in Japan as the rest of the world, 
with the Japanese stop-motion animators neighbouring the anime industry. I select 
Iwai’s animated short film, The Bachelor Machines, as the case in which the 
Puppetopos and the Tooniverse intersect. More significantly, the film is deeply 
inspired in terms of narrative motivation by both La Mettrie’s man-machine 
discourse and Villiers de l’Isle-Adam’s 1886 science fiction novel entitled 
Tomorrow’s Eve (L'EÈ ve future). Invented by a Frankensteinian cyborg scientist in 
the film, both models of the android girl and her original as human challenge the 
viewer’s perceptual attempt to discern between real and fake, human and 
nonhuman, in the development of the film narrative loosely based on the French 
novel.  
Nick Park’s stop-motion clay puppet animation, A Close Shave (1995, UK), 
is the third film in the Wallace and Gromit series that was created in Aardman 
Animations, the studio well known for the representation of hyper-realistic mouth 
movements as well as body movements. Interviewed by Kevin McDonald (1996) in 
1995 when A Close Shave was in shooting, Park evinced his own close encounter 
with the Hollywood film industry, while significantly distinguishing himself from 
 
2 Christmas has been celebrated, not necessarily in a religious but rather often in a secular 
sense, with the present-giving tradition accepted, in Japan since at least the mid-twentieth 
century, to the extent that it is regarded as a nation-wide event today. 
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SŠvankmajer and the Quay Brothers. As regards these animators, which I classify in 
Group PMT, the clay animator Park states that “they are working in a completely 
different field to us” (McDonald 1996: 71). What is relevant to my research subject 
regarding the third Wallace and Gromit film is that the clay model of a robot dog 
appears in contrast to the clay model of Gromit representing a “real” dog.  
From among the films of Aardman Animations, I select another film, 
Purves’ Next (1989, UK), featuring the hyper-realistic puppet representation of 
William Shakespeare and Peter Hall, the English theatre director who was alive 
when it was released. In this film, the model of the legendary playwright performs 
with the model of a “naked” dummy, with a sharp contrast drawn between both 
puppets. 
The Mascot (Ladislaw Starewicz, 1933, FR) is a film by the stop-motion 
animation pioneer Starewicz, who Simon Pummell observes, “obsessively played 
with binary opposites: life/death . . . human/animal, fascination/repulsion, live-
action/animation, fantasy/realism” (1996: 125). In the film which tells of a puppet-
as-puppet dog seeking to save its maker’s sick daughter, Starewicz combines the 
animation of a variety of physical puppets with the live action of human actors, 
both existing in the same three-dimensional space, yet separated from each other 
in the development of the film narrative. I will examine this conventional narrative, 
as an early case of Group STM, typical of the binary opposition between the human 
subject and the sub/nonhuman object in the hybridity of live action and stop-
motion animation. 
 Roman Kachanov’s The Mitten (1967, RUS) will be the case that I contrast 
to Disney’s The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh analysed in the previous 
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Chapter. Internationally well known as the director of the puppet animation film 
series with an animal character named Cheburashka,3 Kachanov did a long stint in 
Soyuzmultfilm, the studio noted as “the Soviet answer to Snow White and Mickey 
Mouse” (BBC 2003). Indeed, the then Soviet studio released the Winnie-the-Pooh 
trilogy of hand-drawn animation films directed by Fyodor Khitruk between 1969 
and 1972, while Disney’s three Pooh featurettes were between 1966 and 1974. 
Using stop-motion animation unlike both the Pooh series, Kachanov’s The Mitten 
epitomises a different vision of the empathetic relationship between a child and an 
inanimate object. 
Finally, Trnka’s The Hand is the most challenging of the cases under 
analysis in the typology of Group STM, because the built model of a potter or 
sculptor who initially appears as human on screen is turned into a stringed puppet 
by the figure of a human hand performed, as if live-action, by a human actor. Purves 
remarks, “Trnka’s multilayered film The Hand (1965) also features a wonderful 
reversal of the creator and created story, with the eponymous Hand telling the 
sculptor what to create: a huge monstrous image of the Hand” (2014: Kindle 2541). 
This film might seem to deviate from the two criteria in terms of which I allot 
Pinocchio to Type Five in Group CEL, because secondary animatic transition occurs 
to the puppet-as-puppet figure in the reverse direction. My intention in selecting 
The Hand is to accentuate the puppet-as-puppet model’s relationship with the 
higher being that is able to not only make secondary animatic transition occur to, 
but also withdraw it from a sub/nonhuman object, thereby drawing a sharp 
 
3 The film series directed by Kachanov consists of Cheburashka: Gena the Crocodile (1969), 
Cheburashka (1972), Shapoklyak (1974) and Cheburashka Goes to School (1983).  
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contrast to Pinocchio’s relationship with the fairy.  
 
 
4.1. Type One: Inanimate Objects 
 
In Group STM, according to my methodological intention, Type One has much in 
common with that in Group CEL. This means that what I analyse with Type One in 
the first place is the way in which despite cues of movement, the puppet-as-puppet 
figures in human or animal form do not arouse any impression of life in contrast to 
the figures signifying “real” and “living” humans or animals. Importantly, viewers 
and animators are still aware that the latter figures are as “fake” and “non-living” as 
the former ones because both explicitly present themselves as built objects or 
three-dimensional artefacts on screen. As I show in this section, their common 
materiality is often managed and manipulated for the strategy of discernment 
through formal elements like the texture and size of a model, and the number of 
models looking alike. In other words, a critical moment is likely to surface in the 
viewers’ perception when those elements do not seem to be clearly different 
between two kinds of models. In addition, I examine two Subtypes, (b) passive and 
(c) automatic, in Type One in terms of kinetic elements. These help to draw 
attention to the “stop-motion-animated-ness” of three-dimensional models and 
their film vectors, which I also seek to differentiate from the kinetic quality of such 




Subtype (a): Stationary state in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town is a fiction film of how Santa Claus and Christmas 
customs came into being. The story focuses on toys which the fictional character 
Santa delivers to people. In the film, several elf brothers make toys, many of which 
are literally puppets like the models of elves. Unlike the latter, however, the puppet-
as-puppet models we can see on the shelves in the elves’ workshop (Figure 4.1) are 
presented as inanimate objects in the stationary state, which I classify in Subtype 
(a) of Type One: no animatic transition nor interaction. In the musical sequence, 
"The First Toymakers to the King" (Figure 4.1), the elf queen Tanta is seen along 
with the plush dolls, in the form of a blonde human girl, which are stored on a shelf. 
At the profilmic level, both Tanta and the girl dolls are three dimensional objects 
Figure 4.1 Puppets and toys as Christmas presents in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
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and also puppets, only differing from each other in terms of movement, dialogue, 
size, materials and number.  
First, in terms of movement and dialogue, I analyse and tackle the film’s 
way of discerning the models of the dolls from those of humans (elves as such). The 
girl dolls do not present any movements on screen, in which sense I describe the 
state of Subtype (a) as stationary. Throughout the film, however, we can see such 
stationary models, which are not necessarily presented as inanimate puppets per 
se but as living human beings in the film narrative. In one scene (Figure 4.2), for 
instance, three soldiers are standing motionless and also speechless on the right 
and left sides of the screen, while the main protagonist Kris (to be Santa Claus) and 
the city ruler with a homburg hat on are moving and talking. It is not impossible 
Figure 4.2 The models of three soldiers in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
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that in the fictional world the soldier models seem to be portable sculptures, but 
they are located on the continuum of the soldier characters looking alike, the 
models of whom are stop-motion animated to move and talk in the convention of 
the cues of life. The models of the doll girls are not given such a continuum until the 
film comes to an end, even though their eyelids are animated for a moment to 
wink—as a joke in animation—at Tanta while she is passing by to behold them. 
Second, the dolls’ size can be considered as a cue of the status of inanimate 
objects. Yet, its effect is quite limited in differentiating between the elf queen as 
alive and the girl dolls as inanimate because in the film the elves themselves are 
presented as a type of human-like beings shorter or smaller than the characters of 
usual human beings, for instance, Santa Claus, Jessica and Special Delivery Kluger. 
In the fantasy film using miniature puppets and sets, either the smallness of size or 
the shortness of height is unlikely to have influence on the impression of the 
inanimacy of a puppet which appears on screen and existed before the camera. 
 Third, in the film the models of the girl dolls are made in a different fashion 
in terms of materials from the models of the elf queen and other performing 
characters. Seemingly, the models of the dolls are seemingly made of one and the 
same kind of textile or fabric, which is applied to all their hair, eyes, noses, skin and 
even costumes (Figure 4.3). Unlike them, the model of the elf queen presents 
clearly different cues of materials. Her smooth and slightly glossy face seems to be 
made of plastic; her hair is made of thin fibres; and her glimmering tiara and 
earrings are intended to suggest the quality of silver. The multiplicity and 
heterogeneity of the materials used for the queen puppet serve as a cue for the 
impression that it is alive. 
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 In my view, the final and determinate factor is the number of the puppets 
which are designed in the same fashion. There are four girl dolls looking the same 
on screen, with respect to colour, hair style, facial expression, posture and other 
design elements; beside them, there are four kangaroo puppets looking the same 
on the shelf (Figure 4.1; Figure 4.3). The elves’ toy-making workshop does not look 
large enough to be a factory, but such a series of puppets makes each of them lack 
individuality, thereby appearing as if mass-produced in a factory. As cited above, 
the stop-motion puppet/model animator Lord (2008:9) defines the specificity of 
his field in terms of the unlikeliness of mass-production or cloning. This suggests 
that a stop-motion animator forms or prefers an individual or personal—physical 
and tactile—relationship with each puppet/model whose copies are not made to 
Figure 4.3 The four girl dolls and the elf queen in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
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give a similar chance of relationship to other animators. The impression of cloned-
ness is used to divest the girl dolls of the possibility that one of them might come to 
be a living and performing character on screen in the development of the film 
narrative as a fantasy. The concept of the mass-production of puppets is revised or 
twisted in The Nightmare before Christmas, and this will be discussed with the case 
of Type Six in Section 4.6.  
 
 
Subtype (b): Passive Mode of Movement in Next 
In Next, we see only three puppets on screen. Two of them are the hyper-realistic 
representations of Shakespeare and Peter Hall, which are intended to imitate 
Figure 4.4 The Shakespeare model and the dummy model in Next 
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human beings, particularly in terms of body movement. The rest is a dummy, 
equivalent in size to the two other models, with which the Shakespeare model 
performs on stage in the film’s diegesis (Figure 4.4). This dummy model undergoes 
primary animatic transition in the passive mode of movement without any 
interaction with the two models of human beings. 
With the whole body patched with rags, the dummy model is in human 
form but badly lacks details. Its hand parts are in the form of a mitten, its eye parts 
look like buttons of different colours, and there is no token of a nose on its face. 
Furthermore, it sometimes looks naked, as it is decorated with some costume 
props by the Shakespeare model. These are visible cues to encourage the viewers 
to discern the dummy model from the two others.  
Figure 4.5 The dummy model performing with the Shakespeare model in Next 
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Performing many plays successively on stage, the Shakespeare model uses 
the dummy model as his co-performer. The dummy sometimes looks as if it were in 
interaction with its user, for instance, at the moment when clinging on to him 
(Figure 4.5). For the most part in the film, however, the human-like prop is 
manipulated as an inanimate object. In the section, “All’s Well That Ends Well”, the 
Shakespeare model swings the dummy’s arm, pretending that it smacks his face 
(Figure 4.6a). Given this cue of being-manipulated-on-stage that is visible to the 
viewers, the dummy’s performance or pose of clinging can be reduced to the 
Shakespeare character’s performing artistry in the film’s diegesis. While appearing 
subject to the performer’s manipulating force, the dummy model is stop-motion 
animated to appear to be in the gravitational field. In the section, “Julius Caesar”, it 
seems to lack the ability of supporting itself or keeping its given posture because it 
soon gets bent or falls down when not held by the Shakespeare model (Figure 
4.6b).  
Might it be that no armature is built in the dummy model? Such a 
possibility goes beyond imagination. The dummy’s movement of getting bent or 
falling down cannot be shot in live action at the same time the Shakespeare model 
Figure 4.6 The dummy shows passive movements in Next; left (a), right (b) 
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is stop-motion animated to move on screen. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that the dummy’s passive body movements are the result of animating, frame by 
frame, with its body supported by a built-in armature whenever shot by the 
camera. Animated is not only the Shakespeare model’s active movements but also 
the dummy’s passive movements. This animated-ness is to bring back into question 
the dummy’s passive movements afterwards in the film. 
 As the film narrative develops and in particular arriving at the final section, 
“Cymbeline” (Figure 4.7), the Shakespeare character gets surpassed by grandiose 
backgrounds and lighting, the electromechanical equipment of which seems to 
exceed the capacity of the performing character who manipulates the dummy on 
stage. The grandiosity of the stage implies that there are two “higher powers” 
Figure 4.7 Higher powers implied behind the Shakespeare model in Next 
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invisible to the viewers. One power comes from the characters of stage crew in the 
film’s diegesis, but there is no narrative motivation in which they help the 
Shakespeare character’s audition in such a grandiose way.  
The other is the invisible hand of the animator that as part of the diegetic 
world, manipulates all the elements including the acting Shakespeare model and 
the passive dummy model before the camera. Viewed from the animator’s higher 
status as a manipulator, the Shakespeare character is a passive object, under his 
manipulation, which appears to assume the role of a living performer on screen; 
and it can be said in Crafton’s (2013) definition of the live performer that the 
dummy on screen is as much a “performer” as the Shakespeare model, which 
assumes the role of a passive and non-living object. In this sense, one of the two 
models is the “double” of the other.  
 The ontological double-ness of either the manipulator or the manipulated 
applies to the relationship, supposedly unique, between the stop-motion animator 
and the physical puppet in the Puppetopos, as Purves comments, “The relationship 
between puppet and animator is quite unique, with both supplying equal parts of 
the performance” (2014: Kindle 2947). Observing the way in which the human 
creator is related to his/her subhuman creation in history and fiction, Wilson 
(2006: 4) suggests two categories of subhumanness; one is an unseemly double 
and the other an ideal double. I consider the latter as relevant to the Shakespeare 
model with which a perfection of body movement and performance is sought. 
Wilson notes: 
 
In the latter case—the android as double of conscious ideals—the artificial 
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human externalizes its maker’s spiritual yearnings: impossible notions of 
perfection, visions of a paradisiacal condition never known on earth. But 
this artifice, even though it might have been fashioned as a sort of idol to 
be worshipped and imitated, often becomes a reminder of distance and 
division—the gap between the actual and the ideal, the discord between 
matter and spirit. (2006: 4-5) 
 
Assuming the ideal double of its stop-motion animator, or its hypnotist in Pojar’s 
use of the term (See Moins 1997: 202), in the Puppetopos, the Shakespeare model 
serves the animator to realise any difficult performances like a rotating jump, using 
the technique of stop-motion animation, as shown in ballet or figure skating 
(Figure 4.8). As indicated by Wilson, however, its seemingly perfect performance of 
a pirouette is likely to evoke the gap between the material passiveness of the 
Shakespeare model manipulated by an animator and the on-screen phenomenal 
Figure 4.8 The dummy model performing the role of a dummy in Next 
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activeness of the Shakespeare character realised with the utmost precision by the 
animator. The dummy model plays an unseemly double that embodies the 
clandestine passiveness and non-living-ness of the Shakespeare model, as well as 
being used to accentuate its splendid activeness and living-ness.  
 
 
Subtype (c): Automatic Mode of Movement in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
In the musical sequence "The First Toymakers to the King" in Santa Claus Is Comin’ 
to Town, the models of two automata are shown as part of the products made by 
the elf toy makers (Figure 4.9). Set on the podium supposed to be a music box, one 
is the miniature puppet of a ballerina; and the other that of a clown, which makes 
its appearance, following the ballerina, in a dissolve. When they show a pirouette 
or a similar rotation in a fixed pose, without any change in facial expression, their 
primary transition takes place in the automatic mode of movement. In addition to 
their dry and flat automatic movement, the rotating handle set to the right side of 
the music box is shown.  
 The two puppets’ status as an inanimate object is presented in the first 
Figure 4.9 The models of automata in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town 
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place by means of the stiffness of the pose which looks as if fossilised in the middle 
of motion. As is called by the elf queen singing in the musical sequence, the 
ballerina puppet’s movement is not a pirouette in a precise sense; but it is only a 
simplistic rotation at a fixed moment while performing the ballet movement. The 
automata puppets’ diegetic status is reinforced by another way in which the model 
of the ballerina is replaced with that of the clown on the same music box in the 
middle of the mechanical rotation in a dissolve. The implication of the replacement 
can be considered in terms of the uniqueness of the relationship between animator 
and puppet, as claimed by Purves (2014: Kindle 2947). The uniqueness of the 
ballerina model and the clown model is usurped by the dissolved replacement of 
the former with the latter on screen in two ways. On the one hand, both are dealt 
with as functional equivalents to each other by the animators of the film, on the 
grounds of their common status as toys for human beings in the diegetic world of 
the film. On the other, neither of the two models is allowed to keep a fixed 
relationship with the music box; they are but a replaceable part of the automaton-
form toy. These two aspects serve to build up the impression that they are products 
manufactured in a toy factory. Indeed, toys and puppets are produced by a group of 
elf craftspeople, unlike Pinocchio that is made as a unique model by one and the 
same toy maker, Geppetto, to be his son in Disney’s film of the same name. 
 What I am concerned with in this case is that no internal clockwork 
mechanism of the music box is shown, as it is with Subtype (c) in Pinocchio, the 
counterpart of Group CEL. My point is the inside-ness of the music box that viewers 
can expect to see in stop-motion animation because the models did or still do exist 
in the same world as they do. In the viewers’ perception, they are structured in 
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three dimensions and therefore, there should be something behind and inside 
them in space. In an interview with Buchan, the Quay Brothers emphasise this 
unique trait of stop-motion animation as distinct from cel animation: 
 
Cel animation showing a screw coming out of the ground would only be a 
screw coming out of the ground in two-dimensionality. The point is that it 
can’t be a clean screw, either. The important thing is that you felt that it 
was buried there for centuries, and it’s sort of become unmoored, like 
migration. (Buchan 2011: 86) 
 
Such a temporal-spatial capacity of stop-motion puppets, models and 
objects is hardly seen in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town. This film is focused on 
tracing the surface of the objects, what they should look like on screen, rather than 
presenting them as they are. As I discussed above, the representational focus is 
clearly demonstrated in the models of the jewels, worn by the elf queen on screen, 
which are forged to achieve the impression of what they should seem to be rather 
than what they are.  
In such an illusionistic strategy of production, arguably, the snow seen in 
many scenes of the film cannot be real but must be made of materials like tiny 
particles of polystyrene, to make the illusion of what looks like snow, because snow 
cannot withstand lighting in the shooting studio. For the effect of snow in her book 
aiming at providing conventional skills of stop-motion animation, Susannah Shaw 
indicates, “Make a first pass using polystyrene beads or shredded paper against a 
black background, this time lit from the front” (2004: 148). This can be said to be 
272 
one of the conventions of stop-motion animation, in which three-dimensional 
objects and their material and physical potentialities should be subsumed to serve 
the film narrative. Discussing how to make credible a fictional world crafted with 
the animation technique, Purves also remarks, “We have to be careful that ill-
chosen fabrics or props or textures do not counteract the illusion” (2014: Kindle 
327). 
Stop-motion animation’s convention of creating an illusion is applied to the 
movement of the automaton models that looks automatic on screen in Santa Claus 
Is Comin’ to Town. Their mechanicomorphic cue of movement traces the motion of 
a pirouette, yet in quite a simple and flat way, to enhance the contrasting 
impression that only the puppets of the performing characters are alive in the film 
narrative. Furthermore, the quality of the automatic movement does not seem to 
stem from a real clockwork mechanism; if this is built in the music box, its 
movement has to be shot and shown in live action. The stuttering movement can be 
said to be a result of stop-motion animation.  
As an alternative, might it be possible to insert the live action of a real 
automaton in the scene? the answer for such a conventional stop-motion animation 
film is negative, because a portion of live action is likely to damage the illusion of 
the animated movement of the characters to function as living in the film narrative, 
as Purves admits, “[E]ven the most sophisticated stop-motion is noticeable when 
placed alongside live action” (2014: Kindle 509).  
What is even worse about the option is that the stop-motion models as live 
performing characters can be exposed to the effect of estrangement in which their 
manipulated-ness comes to surface on screen. Despite the illusionistic feats of stop-
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motion animation which he has been engaged with, Purves concedes, “It still works 
for quirky creations and mechanical objects in a live-action setting, when the 
movement needs to be different, or with a suitable distancing or ironic devices 
such as dream characters, but it can no longer blend seamlessly with live-action 
footage” (2014: Kindle 525). This concession suggests that if it were inserted, the 
live-action automaton of a ballerina would make the elf queen and the other 
characters on screen shift from the status of a living performer to that of a 
mechanical object, which is also what they are. 
 
 
4.2. Type Two: An Oneiric Doll in The Mascot 
 
Starewicz’s The Mascot is a film composed of stop-motion animation and live 
action. In the film, a live-action woman manufactures many puppets or toys 
representing humans and animals, which are all initially presented as objects in 
inanimacy. As is in the hybrid films of Group INT that I analysed in Chapter Two, 
the dimensional heterogeneity of profilmic materials is not involved in this film 
because live action and stop-motion animation share the physical property of 
three-dimensionality at the profilmic level. This sense in which I select The Mascot 
as a case of Group STM, instead of classifying it in a separate group, is also found in 
Purves’ account: “Stop-motion has also pretended to be live action in stunts too 
dangerous for the actors to perform—or when the logistics were just too 
complicated and expensive to do it for real” (2014: Kindle 455). His account about 
the use of stop-motion animation for special effects in live-action film indicates 
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that stop-motion models have obtained the status of part of the same space and 
time as the elements of the live-action footage that are usually foregrounded in 
films. 
 In analysis of puppet-as-puppet figures in the film The Mascot, I 
foreground one enigmatic vestige which I find is pertinent to the limited-ness and 
finitude of the animator’s agentic power. This is intended to highlight two aspects 
in his or her relationship with objects in Group STM and also Group PMT. One is 
that a stop-motion model’s body movement is a series of the vestiges generated in 
time through the bodily, manual, tactile intervention of the animator who 
supposedly keeps staying near and working with it, and the other that he or she is 
part of a larger field in which gravity and other external—not only natural but also 
cultural—forces act beyond his control. I clarify these aspects with the method of 
film vector analysis. 
In The Mascot, stop-motion miniature models of animals and humans are 
not employed to pretend to be live-action animal and human performers for special 
effects, but rather presented as puppets or toys in the human world which is 
seemingly set in 1930s Paris shot in live action. As first, the models as puppets 
shown on screen are being made in live action by a woman at her home the setting 
of which is reminiscent of a sweatshop. The film cuts to the model of a puppy 
puppet which she is sewing. In this shot, it is presented as an inanimate object in 
the stationary state (Subtype (a), Type One; Figure 4.10). This mode shifts soon to 
the puppet’s secondary animatic transition when the woman in sorrow for her sick 
daughter sheds tears onto the puppy puppet’s body which she is stitching. As soon 
as her tears are absorbed into the body, the puppet is stop-motion animated to 
275 
blink and then this is followed by the animated movement of its neck and eyeballs 
to imply it is staring at the woman. However, it presents itself again in the 
stationary state, with the eyes unseeing and the body drooping as tokens of being 
an object, when the woman’s hand approaches it in order to finish stitching. This 
switching between the different statuses functions as a device indicating that the 
puppet undergoes secondary animatic transition outside the scope of human 
awareness in the film narrative.  
Its secondary animatic transition is not merely the event in which the dog-
like object becomes a moving imitation of a living dog. The behaviours of the puppy 
puppet are more anthropomorphised than theriomorphised in a schematic sense. 
For example, its forelegs and paws are stop-motion animated to move like human 
Figure 4.10 The puppet as a puppy puppet in The Mascot 
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arms and fingers when hung as a car pendant; it loosens the ribbon tied around the 
neck, with a variety of facial expressions that human beings are likely to show in 
need or in trouble; and when it becomes determined to jump down from the 
running car, it even covers its own face with its hand/paw, as a human being does 
when in trouble or feeling fear. It also shows infrequently theriomorphic 
behaviours, for instance, peeing on a policeman’s shoes by raising up its hindleg, as 
male dogs do. In doing so, the puppy puppet seems to pretend to be a real dog so 
that human beings in the street might not notice the dog-like puppet capable of 
locomotion. This implies that the theriomorphic behaviour of the animal-like 
puppet is acceptable and not transgressive within the scope of human awareness in 
the diegetic world of the film.  
In the film, the sporadic happenings/withdrawal of secondary animatic 
transition also accentuate the way in which it is treated as an inanimate object. 
When the first cue of the transition shifts quickly to Subtype (a) of Type One, the 
puppy puppet is not stop-motion animated to show any slight, for instance, painful, 
response while the abdominal area of its body is stitched with a needle by the 
woman. With the subsequent cues, anthropomorphic gestures and facial 
expressions, of secondary animatic transition intermittently given not to the on-
screen human beings but to the viewers, the puppy puppet is shown hung around 
the neck in a car as a car pendant, which might seem to be quite a cruel treatment 
to a viewer who keeps perceiving it as something alive and not as an object, with 
the fear aroused in him or her that it might suffocate to death—even though this is 
an impossible event for such an object. This perceptual play is also the case of the 
clown puppet among the other anthropomorphic puppets in the film. Soon after 
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escaping from the vehicle delivering the puppets from the toy maker’s place to a 
shop, the clown puppet is hit over the neck by car wheels, consequently with its 
head cut. The bold destruction of the human simulacrum can be allowed on the 
perceptual grounds that it is not performed by a live human actor but is an 
inanimate object at the profilmic level.  
For this reason, secondary animatic transition has to operate so long as the 
models of animal and human simulacra do not make it impossible for the viewers 
to discern them from real humans and animals. In Type Two, the discerning device 
is the on-screen human beings’ constant unawareness, whether they are awakened 
or not, of the anthropomorphic movements the puppets display as cues of life on 
screen. Moving to a different world unknown to human characters, these puppets 
do not interact with them but with the models implying a devil and other 
supernatural beings.  
This interaction takes the puppets to a mysterious part of the non-
anthropocentric world. Even when the puppy puppet serves to the sick girl the 
orange which it obtained to help her, the scene does not suggest any possibility of 
interaction in which with her eyes closed, the girl takes the orange pieces the 
puppet throws into her mouth. On the next day, she is shown on screen playing 
happily with the puppy puppet, which no longer presents any cues of 
anthropomorphic or theriomorphic movements to the viewer but is passively 
moved subject to her body movement of playing with it in her arms. This passive 
mode of movement functions to suggest that the faithful puppy puppet is but an 
inanimate object (Subtype (b), Type One) in the film narrative.  
In The Mascot, there are enigmatic marks seen on screen in the movements 
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which the puppets display after secondary animatic transition happening 
sporadically. They are motion vectors appearing to be shot in live action, which I 
call “live motion vectors” hereafter. When the puppy puppet jumps down from the 
window ledge onto the sick girl lying in bed, for example, the motion of its jumping 
down presents blur-index vectors (See the still frames in Figure 4.11), which can 
be generated when it is shot in live action and not when it is stop-motion animated 
with its position changed bit by bit. In Next, the Shakespeare model’s rotating jump 
as a motion vector is constructed using stop-motion animation techniques, which I 
call an “animated motion vector” hereafter, and as a result, does not leave any blur-
index vectors (See the still frames in Figure 4.8). Although he does not refer to 
motion vectors or index vectors, Purves, the director of Next, provides a relevant 
account: 
 
In live action, a moving object leaves a trailing blur on a frame of film, 
which helps suggest the direction of movement. Whoosh lines on cartoons 
Figure 4.11 Blur-index vectors in The Mascot 
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have a similar effect, as do ‘go faster’ stripes on cars. In stop-motion, we 
don’t usually have the luxury to blur the image, but we can give characters 
props or costume details, such as scarves that will trail behind, suggesting 
the direction of the movement. The way the environment reacts will help—
leaves blowing in the wake of a moving object will also suggest not just the 
direction of movement but also the speed. (2014: Kindle 237) 
 
As indicated by Purves, it is almost impossible to leave blur-index vectors on still 
film frames, only by shooting an object changed from one position to another, 
because the photochemical marks derive from a quick change of quantity in the 
direction or speed of motion. Therefore, the reasonable inference is that the puppy 
puppet’s trailing blurs, or its blur-index vectors, on screen were not generated in 
the process of stop-motion animation but rather in the process of live-action 
shooting.  
What is enigmatic about the live motion vector and blur-index vectors of 
the puppet is that they inflect the canine object’s anthropomorphic or 
theriomorphic autonomy on screen in terms of the mode of movement and the 
diegetic status. Those vectors make the puppet appear to be thrown in live action 
by an animator—possibly Starewicz himself—off screen, rather than jumping 
down with its own momentum and volition on screen. This mode of movement 
itself can be said to be passive, and yet does not involve primary animatic 
transition if it was shot in live action.  
Whenever in The Mascot some puppets display sporadically live motion 
vectors, along with their corollary blur-index vectors, the invisible hand of the 
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human agent manifests itself in the form of those film vectors. Indicated by the 
filmed trajectory of an object released from the stop-motion animator’s hand, the 
photochemical vestiges of human agency tell us that there are moments which do 
not allow him to keep full control of the motion of puppets in the process of stop-
motion animation filmmaking. As suggested in Purves’ above-cited comment, 
gravity is the most influential of environmental factors, which does not necessarily 
help stop-motion animators in production.  
Such an unstable relationship between animator and animated at the 
profilmic level of stop-motion animation echoes that between the puppet-making 
woman and the puppets, as she cannot keep a stable relationship with the artefacts 
which should be sold and consumed in the toy market, in the diegetic world of the 
film set in the 1930s. How can we tell the stop-motion models of the puppets and 
toys from the puppets and toys sold as commodities in market? Despite the happy 
end of the film, the little daughter might not able to keep the lovely puppy puppet 
to herself because her mother has to sell it as a commodity in market. This realistic 
narrative setting with the puppets helps to broaden the meaning of the models of 
the devil and the other diabolical beings with which the puppy puppet and its toy 
fellows interact in an isolated infernal realm (Figure 4.12). The diabolical models 
are made of a variety of different materials sometimes looking natural and 
sometimes artificial. This formal condition tempts interpretation of these horrible 
models as an imagined demonisation of the puppets and other artefacts themselves 
that were all consumed and wasted by human beings, rather than as simply 
signifying demons, in the film diegesis. 
As a vulnerable labourer, the toymaker, too, is as subordinated to the toy 
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market as are the puppets, and cannot help but continue to make puppets, without 
being able to do anything for her sick daughter. It can be said that the mother’s 
oneiric proxy is the puppy puppet going under secondary animatic transition to 
help her daughter without the awareness of human beings in the film narrative. 
However, the film’s romantic dream is often so vulnerable to the physical reality of 
gravity that the puppy puppet turns out to be but an object of inanimacy and 
passivity, whenever it shows live motion vectors and their entailing blur-index 




Figure 4.12 A variety of diabolical models in The Mascot 
282 
4.3. Type Three: An Empathetic Object in The Mitten 
 
In The Mitten, the main principle for secondary animatic transition is shifting from 
the real, anthropocentric, world, set in 1960s USSR,4 to an isolated imaginary 
world where a little human girl plays with the dog that her mitten was transformed 
into. The narrative of this stop-motion animation film is largely parallel to its 
counterparts, The Enchanted Square and The Many Adventures of Winnie the Pooh, 
in Group CEL in terms of interaction with only the human owner. Yet, there are a 
few differences between them. It is not the models of puppets either in human or 
animal form, but the model of an object—a mitten—that is employed to interact 
with its human owner through two animatic transitions in The Mitten.  
What is critical in this case is that the mitten turning into a dog as fake 
cannot avoid competing with a real dog in the film narrative. In this, the girl simply 
wants a dog, and at the end of the film, she will get a chance to choose between a 
real dog and the dog living only in her imagination. Intriguingly, the film ends 
without indicating her final decision. This is where I address the issue of “Romantic 
Irony”. Another issue in my analysis of the film is the “double-ness” of the 
relationship between creator and created; at the diegetic level between the girl and 
her imaginary dog, and at the profilmic level between an animator(s) and the 
model of the girl’s imaginary dog—actually mitten. I consider this issue of human 
agency at both levels in terms of the “path” which a stop-motion model follows 
 
4 One clue for this 1967 film’s historical setting is the representation of a refrigerator seen in 
the girl character’s home. The appliance is reported to have begun to be diffuse throughout 
USSR in the 1960s. For detail, see Atlant (2014) 
https://atlant.by/bt.atlant.by/news/detail.php?ID=164942&SECTION_ID=14184# (accessed 
15 March 2019). 
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moving on screen and in production. 
As soon as appearing in the film, the mitten model is stop-motion 
animated to be dragged by the girl holding the braided tie attached to it, in the 
passive mode of movement (Subtype (b), Type One); this is the first moment when 
primary animatic transition happens to the object. And the mitten model goes 
under secondary animatic transition when transformed into a dog in the girl’ wish 
to have a dog. At the beginning of the film, the girl’s mother denies her a dog. 
Helpless, she imagines walking a dog in the street by dragging the mitten across 
the ground and then, the object is transformed into a dog in her imagination. 
Secondary animatic transition is depicted to happen to the mitten model at the 
same time as its transformation in a dissolve (Figure 4.13). First, the mitten model 
starts suddenly to wriggle and then run fast for itself in a random way. Next, it 
turns back to run toward the girl and then with the transforming dissolve, the dog 
model comes to appear on screen, stop-motion animated to wag its tail and prick 
its ears.  
Here, one question can be raised of whether the resultant status of its 
transformation is a real dog or a puppet dog, because in the film every dog model, 
either presented as real or fake, cannot be discerned from each other in terms of 
the materials which it is made of and the way in which it is stop-motion animated 
Figure 4.13 The fabric object transformed into a dog in The Mitten 
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to move. For instance, the model of the black puppy (Figure 4.14b) which the girl 
sees at her friend’s is presented as real in the film narrative and yet displays 
formal, material and behavioural similarities to that of the transformed red dog 
(Figure 4.14a). Both have button eyes and fabric bodies and show schematic 
behaviours of caninity. 
 After transformation, the other human characters as well as the girl are 
depicted to recognise and interact with her imaginary dog as usual or real, in 
particular, in a dog contest in which the girl takes part with it. However, this does 
not literally mean that the mitten was transformed into a real dog in the world of 
the film. Rather, my reading of the narrative is that all the contest and its 
participants are what the girl’s imagination created in an attempt to spend time 
playing with her imaginary dog in a variety of ways.  
The girl’s imagination comes to a crisis when the tail of her imaginary dog 
is caught on something sharp, while running down from the slide in the contest. 
With its tail unravelled as one thread of wool (Figure 4.15), the accident reveals the 
material reality of the girl’s imaginary dog being made of fabrics, both at the 
profilmic and diegetic levels. The revelation leads the imaginary dog, as a model, to 
Figure 4.14 The girl’s imaginary dog and a real dog in The Mitten; left (a), right (b) 
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stop moving for itself and then this canine model is brought to the stationary state 
(Subtype (a), Type One), remaining limp for a moment which a viewer might 
perceive as dead if he or she has enough identified with the girl character for the 
effect of secondary animatic transition in the film narrative.  
 This is where I need to analyse the way in which the girl’s imagination 
works in the diegetic world of the film. Despite the revelation, the girl persists in 
her own imagination which transforms the mitten into an imaginary dog. In the 
course of the scenes in which the girl takes care of the imaginary dog at her home, 
the film turns to focus on the girl’s imagination-driven behaviours, there being no 
longer the model of the puppy puppet but that of the mitten seen on screen. In one 
of the scenes, the girl puts the mitten on the brim of the dish, imagining that it 
Figure 4.15 The imaginary dog reveals its material reality in The Mitten 
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drinks milk she provides (Figure 4.16). This is a clear clue of the way in which the 
girl plays with the mitten she imagines to be a dog in the film narrative. It is the 
girl’s manipulation for mimicry which makes the mitten appear to herself as a dog. 
As observed above, the girl’s mimicry is also seen in the scene where she performs 
walking a dog by dragging the mitten across the ground. While the dog runs for the 
contest and fetches the hidden stick in her imaginary realm, therefore, the girl 
must have raised, put down and moved the mitten from one position to another, in 
an attempt to make it hold poses so as to look as she imagines.  
Yet, the film’s narrative motivation does not present the scenes in which 
she imitatively manipulates with her hands the puppy puppet into which the 
mitten was transformed. It is intended to visualise and narrativise animation’s 
Figure 4.16 The girl manipulates the object as if a dog in The Mitten 
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conventional discourse that any object can be brought to life in the art/media form. 
Given that in The Mitten the stop-motion animators and their hands are not made 
visible on screen while manipulating all the models, the relationship, both 
imaginary and physically manipulative, between the girl and her mitten, provides 
an insight into that between the human agents and the models they are to perform 
and interact with in production. The models are vulnerable to stop-motion 
animators’ physical manipulation and the unpredictable risks latent in the 
environment where they are put for animating. If an animator wants to keep his or 
her unique relationship with a model, he should not abuse it in production because 
if severely damaged, it has to be replaced with its clone.  
Indeed, this case is seen between the girl and her mitten-dog in the later 
part of the Mitten. Damaged while running in the contest, the mitten-dog no longer 
functions to meet the girl’s longing for a dog, with its secondary animatic transition 
reversed on screen; the imaginary dog is presented as transformed back into the 
mitten as an inanimate object when she comes back to it with a bowl of milk at her 
home. Seeing her daughter imagine the mitten to be a dog and feeling sorry for 
denying her a dog, the mother is going to bring back a real puppy from her 
neighbour, which looks much like the puppy, as a puppet, into which the mitten is 
transformed. Interestingly, there is no cue which makes it clear that the girl accepts 
the real dog at the end of the film. Such a cue is likely to disturb the relationship, 
supposedly unique and irreplaceable, between the stop-motion animator and the 
model of the mitten-dog at the profilmic level, as well as that between the girl and 
the mitten-dog at the diegetic level.  
This doubled disturbance is revealed by the facial expressions (Figure 
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4.17a), like sadness or grimace, and the gesture of depression (Figure 4.17b), that 
the girl’s imaginary dog shows on screen after being materially damaged during 
the dog contest. Furthermore, it walks around in circles, as if at a loss, while the girl 
is finding milk in the kitchen. In the film narrative, those body movements imply 
that the imaginary dog feels anxious that something might happen to its 
relationship with the girl because it failed to satisfy her expectations, and then that 
she might come to want a real dog rather than the imaginary one which is but an 
object in reality.  
Given that Purves notes, “[I]t is important to revel in the direct contact 
between puppet and puppeteer” (2014: Kindle 396), the canine model’s body 
movements of depression and anxiety should also be considered to stem from the 
physically intersubjective experience of the stop-motion animators engaged in the 
production of the film. While in a slightly reluctant way Purves reiterates, “The 
contact between a human hand and the puppet gives the animation so much ‘soul’, 
to use a clichéd word” (2014: Kindle 397), this word can and should be replaced 
with “ghost”, in terms of which Crow (2006) seeks to illuminate the out-of-control, 
compulsive and convulsive aspect of the “gestures” performed in repetition by, and 
Figure 4.17 The imaginary dog’s anxiety and depression in The Mitten; left (a), right (b) 
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circulated through human bodies and the stop-motion models, too, which 
animators’ bodies are supposedly connected with and extended to.  
The replacement of soul with ghost helps to shed light on the stop-motion 
animators’ artistic “irony” shaded by the conventional emphasis on their artistic 
mastery or control of stop-motion models and other materials. The artistic irony is 
involved in the binary opposition between real and imaginary, real or fake, soul or 
material, in terms of which in The Mitten the human agents feature the human girl 
character’s imagination that brings to life the mitten as an object. The crucial 
moment in the narrative comes when the mother is going to bring the real dog for 
her daughter. At this moment, the stop-motion animators cannot help being located 
between the fantasy they imagine and seek in animation production and the 
materiality and artificiality on which it is based. They do know that in the film the 
model of even the dog presented as real is not of substantial difference at the 
profilmic level from that of the dog as imagined by the girl character.  
Their ironical situation can be viewed from Scullion’s (2009) discussion of 
Romantic Irony that she finds to be demonstrated by Hoffmann’s kinaesthetic 
motifs. The author defines Romantic Irony as “involv[ing] continuous oscillation 
rather than finite synthesis” (Scullion 2009: 1), for an “artist to maintain a state of 
balance between the spiritual and the material” (p.15). Such artistic oscillation 
between binary opposites is found in ambiguity in which as analysed above, the 
model of the girl’s imaginary dog is dealt with, in relation to that of the neighbour’s 
real dog that looks much the same as the former, except for a few design elements 
in The Mitten. In the oscillation, not given is the clear cue in which the girl will 
accept the real dog that her mother has obtained at the end of the film. Observing 
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the kinaesthetic and spastic motifs of the protagonist Nathaniel in Hoffmann’s The 
Sandman, Scullion reads the character as the epitome of Romantic Irony: “He 
chooses to move along a continuum, instead of delimiting himself, in binary 
fashion, to the mundane on the one side or the infinite on the other” (2009: 17). By 
extension, such a state of Romantic Irony is demonstrated by the body movements 
that the model of the mitten-dog shows on screen in the mode of motoric jerkiness 
and repetition—making grimaces and walking around in circles. These movements 
lurk in the manipulating hands of the stop-motion animators of the film motivated 
by the narrative of bringing-any-object-to-life, as well as those of the girl 
transforming an object into a living being in her own imaginary and isolated realm.  
 
 
4.4 Type Four: Perihuman Toys in Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer 
 
In this Christmas-themed film, the puppet-as-puppet models are employed to 
assume the role of the toys which Santa Claus delivers as the holiday presents to 
children on Christmas Eve; the legendary figure and other living beings are stop-
motion animated using three-dimensional models. In particular, the puppet-as-
puppet models of Type Four are presented as the toys which were discarded by 
human beings because of their malfunction, and now are living in a perihuman 
realm in the film diegesis. One of the most dramatic scenes occurs when the toys 
stop (or are stopped from) moving, talking and singing because Santa Claus is 
going to take them as Christmas presents to human children. Secondary animatic 
transition suddenly withdraws from them, and then, the peculiar film vectors of 
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their movements problematise the conventional discourse of animators’ 
omnipotent or perfect God-like mastery over materials. With the crucial, “reverse-
transitional”, “life-taking”, moment both for the models and the animators in mind, 
I analyse the shape and movement of the models signifying toys or puppets in 
terms of the aesthetic strategy of discerning between living and non-living, real and 
fake.  
The film revolves around Santa, his fellow elves and reindeers living in 
Christmas Town located at the North Pole. This geographic specification is given by 
the stop-motion model of the snowman narrator that functions to establish a film 
world in which the viewers and their real world are connected with Christmas 
Town and its inhabitants. Another device for the same function is the introductory 
news-reel sequence, composed of black and white live-action footage, which 
reports at the beginning of the film that Christmas is in crisis because of bad 
weather.  
The puppet-as-puppet models I will analyse in this section are given the 
status of the toys manufactured as Christmas gifts and considered as objects by the 
elves of Christmas Town. I focus on a group of puppets or toys among those objects, 
which are shown to stay in the perihuman realm where only the discarded toys are 
accepted eternally. Ruled by a griffin-like beast, the realm is where the inanimate 
puppets and toys go under secondary animatic transition and then temporarily 
interact with a limited number of animal and human characters (including elves) in 
the diegetic world of the film. 
The two critical events are simultaneously presented when the three 
protagonists respectively named Rudolph (a reindeer), Hermey (an elf) and Yukon 
292 
(a human being) happen to reach the perihuman realm in the course of their 
incidental meeting up and wandering together. Each of the visitors regard himself 
as strange as do the other members of his own community; Rudolph for his red-
glowing nose, Hermey for his wishing to be a dentist unlike the other elves devoted 
to toy making, and Yukon for his reckless wandering to find gold and silver. On 
arriving at the realm, they find a lot of gift boxes, from which the models of puppets 
and toys are stop-motion animated to come out on their own to talk to the visitors 
about what the place is and why they stay there.  
With secondary animatic transition taking place, the models of the puppets 
and toys begin to show anthropomorphic body movements in a varying degree 
with respect to the difference of their forms, which are to be classified in three 
Figure 4.18 Discarded puppets and toys in Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer 
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kinds of forms: human, animal and mechanical (Figure 4.18). For example, the 
model of a girl puppet seen at the centre of Figure 4.18 is stop-motion animated to 
move its mouth, arms and torso so that it might look like it is talking, singing and 
expressing herself. Standing erect, the model of an elephant puppet, too, on the 
right side is stop-motion animated to move its mouth, neck, forelegs and torso for 
the same effect as the model of the girl puppet, yet showing a smaller range of 
motion than the model in human form. The models of a toy airplane and a toy train 
on the left side are stop-motion animated to show simple movements, respectively 
like turning around in circles and rolling from side to side. The mode of their 
mechanicomorphic movements are difficult to discern from the automatic mode of 
movements seen in Subtype (c) of Type One. However, the models of the 
mechanicomorphic toys are given eyes, along with mouths stop-motion animated 
to move delicately as if they sing on screen like the model of the girl puppet. This 
implies that the film relies on anthropomorphism to provide viewers with the 
impression that any kinds of models look alive on screen. 
At the same time, it should be noted that the model of the girl puppet is not 
given so many tokens of humanness as are the models of human characters 
Hermey and Yukon. While the eyes of the Hermey model are composed of sclerae 
and pupils, displaying eye movements and eye blinks (Figure 4.19a), the girl-
puppet model is given button eyes without any eye movement and eye blink. The 
hand is another token which makes the latter look less human than the former. In 
contrast to the hands of the Hermey model which are given entirely separate 
fingers to show hand and finger gestures in detail, those of the girl-as-puppet 
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model look like mittens.  
As the viewers are preconditioned in the film narrative which indicates 
that the girl-as-puppet model is placed where discarded toys are gathered, its 
mitten-like hands would not lead them to perceive it to be a human being with 
syndactyly, but rather accentuate the impression that it is a puppet partially in 
human form. The Yukon model is given the same button eyes as is the girl-as-
puppet model, but they do not damage Yukon’s diegetic status as a human in any 
substantial degree (Figure 4.19b). In the film narrative, human mastery over 
animals and objects is demonstrated in the scenes where Yukon uses a whip to 
command his sled dogs without any hesitation—he also carries a pistol with him. 
Expected from these scenes, the mature male character’s possible threat to animal 
characters can be rather mitigated by the button eyes which make him look less 
human on screen in contrast to Hermey as his functional equivalent. 
The pivotal moment for the discarded puppets and toys comes when asked 
by Rudolph, Santa visits the perihuman realm to deliver them to children, who 
might not mind their formal and functional condition supposed to be abnormal, on 
Christmas Eve. What I am concerned with here is that Santa, the only human 
Figure 4.19 The living characters’ eyes in Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer; 
left (a), right (b) 
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character in the delivering scenes, does not put the puppets and toys into his gift 
bag. Rather, the models of them are stop-motion animated to apparently put 
themselves into the gift bag (Figure 4.20). At this moment, however, an external yet 
invisible force seems to be exerted on the models because there is no cue showing 
that they move body parts like arms or legs for such an action; instead, the whole 
body of each of the models is quickly lifted up in the air and then put into the bag. 
For example, the model of a soldier puppet is seen to be suspended in the air 
without any blur-index vector (as marked with a white circle by me in Figure 4.20). 
This animated motion vector of the body indicates the kinetic passivity of the 
soldier puppet as an inanimate object, as with the dummy model in Next in Subtype 
(b) of Type One, but unlike the latter, in this film there is no clear clue indicating 
Figure 4.20 An unidentified force exerted on the toys in Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer 
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the diegetic source of the force which lifts up and puts down their bodies. How can 
we explain what the passivity of the stop-motion models is due to?  
One possibility motivated by the narrative is that Santa has magical power 
capable of moving things without physical contact, and in the opposite way to 
secondary animatic transition, his magical power turns the puppets and toys back 
to objects per se lacking locomotive ability at the moment of leaving the perihuman 
realm. At this reverse-transitional moment, the models of the puppets and toys are 
not stop-motion animated to fear or resist this reversal. This might be justified by 
the anthropocentric view in which they are depicted to aspire to be adopted and 
played with by human children, above all because they are factory products for the 
purpose, in the film narrative.  
Besides this narrative-based explanation, it is also possible to consider the 
models’ passive mode of movement as the performance of the stop-motion 
animators engaged in the film. The models’ kinetic passivity seen on screen does 
not necessarily imply the artistic perfection but rather the imperfection of the 
animators, because the human agents could have stop-motion animated the 
models’ arms or legs in detail so that they might show great joy at the realisation of 
their aspiration, going on their own into Santa’s gift bag. However, such an attempt 
must have been thwarted by the condition of material and formal limit that the 
production crew imposed on the models for the impression of inanimacy or 
objecthood. As seen in Figure 4.20, for example, the model of the soldier puppet 
lacks enough movable arms and legs for stop-motion animation of detailed 
locomotive movements. Here my point is not that the animators should have stop-
motion animated the models, with their secondary animatic transition kept valid. 
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Rather, it is that the resultant mode of movement the models show on screen is the 
literal appearance of force which the animators’ invisible hands under physical and 
kinetic limitations exerted on the models in front of the camera in production. 
Significantly, it reveals that the animators themselves along with their 
manipulating force are part of a larger field of forces acting beyond their control.  
 
 
4.5. Type Five: A Disenchanting and Revelatory Puppet in The Hand 
 
As analysed above, the invisible stop-motion animator’s physical and kinetic 
contact with a model can be found in its mode of movement on screen. Most 
models are puppets at the profilmic level in stop-motion animation. Type Five is 
focused on the way in which the puppet’s secondary animatic transition and 
interaction with the characters of human or “higher” beings plays on and further 
inflects the profilmic aspect unique to stop-motion animation. The animated short, 
The Hand, is a case of this Type in Group STM, and this selection is particularly 
intended to make a sharp contrast to Pinocchio, the counterpart of Group CEL.  
 A central focus in The Hand is “Romantic Irony”. In this concept, the human 
agency of stop-motion animation is supposed to manifest itself as unstable and 
anxious, oscillating between real and fake, subject and object. My analysis of the 
case centres on a model whose initial status implying a living human being 
switches later to an object, or the model itself. This disenchanting, demagicalising, 
shift is depicted to take place through the intervention of the figure of a human 
hand which seems to be that of a real human being. In my analysis, not only is the 
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anthropomorphic model considered as a powerless artist or animator who 
desperately resists the intervention and order of the hand figure as an external 
power, but also the latter as a stop-motion animator or puppeteer who in his or her 
self-figuration as the Creator-God, manipulates the former finally to take “life”—
nullifying secondary animatic transition—from the resisting object in human form.  
At the beginning of the film, we see a physical puppet, looking like a clown, 
put on the bed in a room. There is no cue which shows the puppet move while the 
camera moves around in the room; the puppet is presented in the stationary state 
(Subtype (a), Type One) for a while. Without any clear cue of primary animatic 
transition, secondary animatic transition takes place when the puppet is made to 
open its eyes. What is unusual in the convention of the Puppetopos is that the 
opening of the eyes is not presented by stop-motion animation but by editing; the 
film cuts from the shot of the closed eye to that of the opened eyes. This 
unusualness serves to discourage the viewers from defining the puppet to be a 
human character living in the film world.  
This obscurity is reinforced by the setting of the diegetic world in which 
the puppet is placed. From the perspective of the conventional stop-motion 
animation, the physical puppet appears to live alone, making pots, in the room, 
without interaction with other physical puppets. While the camera shows only the 
inside of the room, the window and the door are kept closed for most of the time. 
Even when either of them is sometimes opened, nothing is seen through it; it looks 
completely dark outside (Figure 4.21). These devices of film setting serve to make 
it difficult for the viewers to find any clear reference for determining whether the 
puppet represents a human or presents itself as a puppet in the film world, while 
299 
the film is located within the anthropomorphic and anthropocentric convention of 
the Puppetopos. Without such referential cues, the viewers are triggered to 
oscillate between two levels, diegetic and profilmic, of the perception of the 
puppet. At the former level, the viewers can perceive a clown as waking up in the 
bed and giving water to a flower in the film world of three dimension on screen, as 
they take such actions in the real world of three dimension. The movements 
signifying such human activities are constructed with smoothness and delicacy.  
At the latter level, the viewers can perceive the puppet as an object 
animated by an animator off screen in the same three-dimensional world as they 
exist, and this impression is also reinforced by the way in which the puppet looks 
and moves on screen. Not showing any facial expression, the puppet’s face is 
Figure 4.21 The clown-like puppet and its/his room in The Hand 
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designed in a geometrical, rather than realistic, fashion, and its vacant and fixed 
eyes do not show any blinks, any movements. The puppet often shows robot-like, 
mechanicomorphic movements; it is stop-motion animated to exercise with 
jumping jacks as a type of gymnastics and to perform pirouettes. These movements 
are not necessarily motivated by narrative, but rather, interrelates with the 
puppet’s appearance of a clown which assumes sub/nonhumanness (Grodal 1997).  
The puppet’s robot-like movements are also observed when it is stop-
motion animated to make pots; the rotation of the potter’s wheel and the repeated 
wheel-kicking of its legs and feet appear to be incorporated into a larger pot-
making mechanism. Without any on-screen references, except for 
anthropomorphic behaviours, to help identify its diegetic status as a human 
character, and evoking its own profilmic status as a puppet per se, the clown-like 
puppet can be said to have already undergone secondary animatic transition 
before the beginning of the film. And the narrative develops in the opposite 
direction to Disney’s Pinocchio. 
The pivotal event occurs with the realistic figure of a human hand in a 
glove, which seems to be part of a living human being in a diegetic as well as 
profilmic aspect, partially because it extends to the arm beyond the frame that the 
camera provides, and not least because its movements show off great subtleties 
which otherwise would not have been achieved when shot together with the stop-
motion model animated frame by frame; however, the hand’s on-screen 
movements seem to be pixilated rather than shot in live action because they 
involve staccato cues as motion vectors. One day, the hand figure comes to order 
the clown puppet to create a sculpture of a hand (Figure 4.22). Resisting the 
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sudden order, however, it perseveres with making pots. While following the 
narrative convention which introduces the antagonist to come into conflict—so to 
speak, oppression of creative freedom—with the protagonist, the film does not 
explain why the clown puppet is so obsessed with making pots as an activity 
irrelevant to the appearance of a clown, but rather, the film narrative gains more 
obscurity with the order of the hand figure that is as much irrelevant to the 
puppet’s appearance as making pots.  
Further, the photo-indexicality of the hand figure on screen accentuates 
the profilmic artificiality of the clown puppet as a miniature model in contrast to 
the antagonist. These formal and narrative obscurities add fluidity to the status of 
the only puppet seen on screen oscillating between the subhuman object and the 
Figure 4.22 The hand figure and the clown-like puppet in The Hand 
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human subject in the diegetic world of the film. 
In this oscillation, the film narrative shifts finally to focus on the clown 
puppet resisting the tyranny of the human hand. I read the hand’s manual violence 
as a stop-motion animator’s power controlling and manipulating puppets in 
production—later in this film, the hand figure comes to play a puppeteer of a 
marionette. The hand and its power are also read in the historico-political context 
by Fauzi Naeim and Nurul Lina, who note, “There is no doubt that the intrinsic 
allegory of the huge hand stands for the Czechoslovak communist government, and 
Trnka uses this film as a critique of the State’s oppression of artistic expression” 
(2015: 106). Although the context of my reading is different from of that within 
which the two authors locate the antagonistic device, their interpretation echoes 
the sense of the power relationship in which I consider the hand figure to be a 
stop-motion animator even compared with God in the conventional discourse of 
the Puppetopos; Shaw describes stop-motion animation as “it’s more like playing 
God” (2004: 1). The figure of the human hand embodies the tyranny of the power 
that animators are (self-)qualified to wield in animating objects. 
In the film narrative of The Hand, the clown puppet does not perform as 
Figure 4.23 Index and motion vectors shown by the puppet in The Hand 
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ordered by the hand figure. This makes the puppet seem to have its own free will. 
Forcing the persistently resistant puppet to create a sculpture of a hand, the hand 
figure finally grabs and drags it by the head to the potter’s wheel (Figure 4.23), and 
this way of the hand figure exercising power brings the puppet to the status of an 
inanimate object in two aspects. In physico-aesthetic terms, the body movements 
displayed by the clown puppet look limp and powerless, with all its body parts, in 
particular, the arms (as marked with two red arrows by me in Figure 4.23), 
functioning as index and motion vectors to make visible the line of gravity, the 
force pulling them down to the floor.  
In discursive terms, such a careless, indiscriminate way of dealing with the 
puppet the viewers want to believe to be alive on screen would be so inacceptable 
for them in the Puppetopos that they need to transpose the clown puppet from the 
state of being apparently alive to that of being originally inanimate. In this 
transposition, secondary animatic transition is clearly withdrawn from the puppet 
on screen at the same time when replaced with primary animatic transition in the 
passive mode of movement (Subtype (b), Type One). I term as disenchanting the 
reverse transition in which a stop-motion model shifts from its initial state of 
Figure 4.24 The clown-like puppet as a marionette in The Hand 
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completed secondary animatic transition, even if unstable and ambiguous, to one 
of three Subtypes of Type One.  
In the later part of the film, the stop-motion puppet becomes disenchanted 
to the extent that the hand figure is shown to control it with strings as if a 
marionette on stage in a puppet play (Figure 4.24). When the hand figure on screen 
plays the puppeteer of it as a marionette in a literal way, its isolated room is also 
revealed to be part of a set, as if built for a puppet theatre (Figure 4.25). In the later 
course of its running away from the hand figure, the puppet shifts to the status of 
an object entirely subordinated to the physical movement of the puppeteering 
hand. According to every single movement of the hand figure, the clown puppet is 
stop-motion animated to sculpt a gigantic hand.  
Figure 4.25 The puppet’s room turns out to be a set in The Hand 
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Some of the puppetry scenes still include the moments when for the 
viewers familiarised with reading implicit meanings of a film, the puppet looks like 
a human being who is exploited by a higher power oppressing his creative freedom. 
They can say that he looks completely exhausted, when lying on the floor beside 
the hand sculpture, with no force of the hand figure exerting it through strings; 
they can say he weeps as traces of tears are represented by the running colours of 
the circles painted around the eyes. When we focus on the referential meaning of 
each of these scenes in which secondary animatic transition is almost withdrawn 
from the puppet, the puppet is not in exhaustion but rather is simply placed on the 
floor for a moment because the hand figure is taking a rest after an intensive 
manipulation of the clown-like object; the smudged colours of the face are not 
traces of tears, but rather are due to the hand figure touching it in manipulation. 
 Placing emphasis on referential meanings helps to shed light on the 
relationship between the film’s stop-motion animator(s) and the clown puppet, 
which is usually supposed to be unique in the convention of the Puppetopos. What 
matters in this emphasis is that not only the clown puppet but also the puppeteering 
hand figure is a psychological self-projection and a phenomenological extension of 
the director Trnka and his animating crew identifying themselves as omnipotent, as 
Trnka himself states, “Puppet films are truly unlimited in their possibilities; they can 
express themselves with the greatest force precisely when the realistic expression 
of the cinematographic image often faces insurmountable obstacles” (Sadoul 1972: 
255). Also given that in stop-motion animation filmmaking, Shaw stresses, “You have 
to get inside that puppet and first make it live, then make it perform” (2004: 1), the 
hand figure, too, must be part of what the human agents got inside in the production 
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of The Hand. 
In the film, indeed, the clown puppet is depicted as able to express himself 
by creating its own favourite pots. Controlling and mastering him for the creation of 
a sculpture that the film’s animators depict him resisting, the manual agent 
presented as a hand relegates the clown puppet to the status of an object on screen, 
at times in the stationary state, and at times in the passive mode of movement. This 
depiction implies that Trnka or the animators were aware of the possibility of the 
resistance of the puppets as materials in front of the camera. In other words, it might 
be the oppression of an expressive possibility proper to a specific puppet that a stop-
motion animator seeks to make it live and perform on-screen only in the manners 
which he or she believes are perfect. If stop-motion animation films are really 
unlimited as is noted by Trnka, the obstacle is the finiteness of human agency. This 
is embodied by the resisting clown puppet under the hand’s oppressive power in the 
film, onto which Trnka projected himself as an artist resisting the state (Fauzi Naeim 
and Nurul Lina 2015: 106). The crux is that in the Puppetopos the stop-motion 
animator cannot help but face the finiteness of his or her own creative agency as well 
as objectifying puppets which in production he or she claims to form a unique 
relationship with and further to get inside.  
Finiteness and creativity bring death to the clown puppet that is stop-
motion animated to play an artist in the diegetic world of the film, even though it 
recovers secondary animatic transition again when starting to run away from the 
hand figure after the forced completion of a hand sculpture. However, “death” is not 
a proper concept to the puppet almost dealt with as an object in the later part of the 
film; this cannot die nor be dead. Rather, it should be said that primary and 
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secondary animatic transitions are all withdrawn from the puppet. The puppet 
cannot foreground the impression of being dead but rather being simply stationary, 
when appearing on screen along with and in contrast to the figure of the human hand 
for the cue of aliveness or liveness provided by the organic body part of a living 
human actor. As an epitome of Romantic Irony (Scullion 2009), the clown puppet is 
a disenchanting revelation of human agency oscillating between materiality and 
creativity, supposed to be respectively finite and infinite, yet in the aspiration for or 
the anxiety about the reversal of the supposition, in stop-motion animation.  
 
 
4.6. Type Six: Haunted Toys in The Nightmare before Christmas 
 
This section is intended to show that when going through secondary animatic 
transition, not every puppet-as-puppet model either in human or animal form 
fascinates and is welcome to human beings in the film narrative as well as the real 
world. If not under the human control, the former is likely to terrify the latter, as 
demonstrated with the counterpart of Group CEL in the previous Chapter. What is 
particular about the case which I analyse here is that the protagonists are not 
human but supernatural, diabolic characters, who make usual toys and puppets 
horrible like themselves. This narrative addresses the issue of the relationship 
between possessing and possessed, haunting and haunted.  
In the film narrative of The Nightmare before Christmas, two supernatural 
realms are depicted as separate from the human world. One is Christmas Town in 
which Santa Claus and elves live and work in perfect order for the annual Christian 
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holiday, and the other Halloween town whose population is composed of demons 
and monsters indulged in fun and raves. Weary of Halloween celebrated in the 
same fashion and pattern every year, Jack Skellington, the leader of Halloween 
town, decides to prepare with the population of the town his own edition of the 
year’s Christmas celebration, after he comes back from Christmas Town which he 
happened to visit. The preparation revolves around the holiday presents, including 
puppets and other toys, which they are going to deliver to children. Once delivered 
in the human world, the models of those puppets and toys are stop-motion 
animated to move on screen in the way which human characters do not expect in 
the film. These puppet-as-puppet models are the cases which I take as Type Six in 
this section. 
Preparing the Christmas celebration, yet lacking ideas of the holiday 
convention, Jack and his fellows begin with physically analysing the puppets and 
Figure 4.26 The model of a girl doll in The Nightmare before Christmas 
309 
toys which they obtained from Christmas Town. In the experimenting scenes 
involving primary animatic transition, the models of puppets and toys are 
presented as inanimate objects on screen. For example, the model of a girl doll is 
stop-motion animated to be moved when held in Jack’s hand in the passive mode of 
movement (Subtype (b), Type One; Figure 4.26). What is significant is that 
examining the doll as an object, Jack calls into question what the object means and 
where its meaning comes from, while singing: “These dolls and toys confuse me . . . 
/ Simple objects nothing more / But something’s hidden through a door. Though I 
do not have the key / Something’s here I cannot see / What does it mean”. 
In the film, the demons and monsters of Halloween town seem to lack 
anthropocentric views of the anthropomorphic or theriomorphic puppets and toys 
created either in the human world or Christmas Town. For example, the sound that 
the baby doll makes is not understood as crying by the vampires (Figure 4.27), as 
Figure 4.27 The model of a crying baby doll in The Nightmare before Christmas 
310 
they ask Jack: “What kind of noise is that for a baby to make?” In comic motivation, 
this question would work as a hilarious device to make the characters of Halloween 
town seem nonhuman and emotionless, as different from both the viewers in the 
real world and the human characters in the film’s world.  
Given that Jack is the protagonist in the film narrative, however, the 
viewers are tempted to identify with the demonic skeletal character challenging 
conventions and seeking something new. In this sense, the vampires’ conversation 
with him about the sound of the baby doll can be said to defamiliarise the viewers’ 
conventional way of perceiving the anthropomorphic artefact; indeed, the doll is 
not a real baby and it is impossible for it to cry. This material reality of the doll is 
also accentuated by the way in which it looks and moves. The model of the baby 
doll is clearly and visibly given marionette lines on its face part for emphasis on 
being a doll on screen, and swayed in the hand of one of the vampires, it shows the 
eye parts moving up and the mouth-and-chin part moving down, as an imitation of 
a real baby waking up and crying, in the automatic mode of movement (Subtype 
(c), Type One; Figure 4.27). 
Defamiliarising the puppets presented as puppets in the film goes so far as 
Figure 4.28 The puppets damaged in The Nightmare before Christmas; 
 left (a), right (b) 
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to physically damage them, thereby revealing that they are inanimate objects in an 
anatomical sense. Jack cuts with an X-Acto knife the belly of a teddy-bear puppet 
under examination as if dissecting the body of a real bear on a surgical bed (Figure 
4.28a). While Jack and his Halloween fellows modify and remodel the puppets and 
toys they supposedly collected from somewhere outside their town, the one-eye 
bandaged monster cuts the neck of a girl doll on screen as if killing a human being 
with a guillotine (Figure 4.28b). Thoroughly dealt with as objects by the animators 
in production as well as the Halloween towners on screen, the teddy-bear puppet 
and the girl doll function to spur the viewers to remind and reconvince themselves 
that those puppets are only inanimate objects, as it would otherwise be too scary 
or too uncomfortable to see them damaged in the stop-motion animation’s 
convention of perceiving puppets as living beings on screen. This defamiliarising 
strategy does not work for the models of the Halloween towners as nonhuman 
(and supernatural) in the film diegesis, for they need to function as live performers, 
in Crafton’s (2013) sense of the term, to make the narrative develop.  
 In the development of the narrative, the instigation of secondary animatic 
transition to the puppet-as-puppet models is suggested by Jack who says of the 
baby doll: “Perhaps it can be improved”. This verbal cue excites in the viewers 
expectations of how the puppets and toys will be remodelled and transformed by 
the Halloween towners who become enthusiastic about scaring and frightening 
human characters in the film’s world. Once delivered by Jack to each home on 
Christmas Eve, the “improved” puppets and toys burst out moving by themselves, 
followed by the scenes in which the human characters run away from them in 
horror. Certainly, the puppets and toys are redesigned to look scary or awfully 
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different from what is expected of Christmas presents, as seen in the scenes of 
Santa Claus and elves producing them in Christmas Town. A further point is their 
unexpected and unpredictable movement. For instance, the model of the duck built 
on the wheeled podium is stop-motion animated to run after a human children 
characters on the handrail of a staircase (Figure 4.29). Along with it, the model of a 
vampire-like puppet is stop-motion animated to fly chasing the children (Figure 
4.29). The movement of those objects goes beyond both human control and/or 
natural laws, the two realistic conditions that should be supposed to work in the 
film’s human world depicted to be clean, safe and in order on screen, a world 
where human characters live equipped with modern technologies and institutions 
like housing estates, electricity, telephones, broadcasting stations, anti-aircraft 
artillery, radar systems, an army and the police. In the modern world, the children 
run away from the puppets and toys bursting into motion in a manner which they 
Figure 4.29 The models of haunted puppets and toys in The Nightmare before Christmas 
313 
must have not expected.  
How about the viewers? They must be aware that Jack and the other 
characters are models built like the puppets as puppets—the baby doll, the girl doll 
and the teddy bear—on screen. The question is asked: do the stop-motion 
animated models of the latter seem to the viewers to provide as much impression 
of life as the models of the former? To answer this question which is the central 
issue of my PhD thesis, it is necessary to take into account what kind of force is 
imagined to make those puppets and toys as objects move by themselves and in 
what mode it is depicted to move them in the film narrative. In my reading of the 
narrative, the on-screen supernatural movement of the puppets and toys as objects 
stem from the magical, demonic, power of the Halloween towners, in particular, 
including vampires, werewolves and zombies, all involved in remodelling and 
modifying those objects. The powers of these supernatural monsters have the trait 
of infectiousness in common and this is what I am tempted to focus on as the 
source of the demonic haunting power to make the puppets and toys move by 
themselves.  
Among those monsters of infection and contagion, vampires have been 
imagined as able to pervade and possess human victims and objects with their 
power, as discussed by Thomas Elsaesser (2009: Kindle 1792) who in his chapter 
on the live-action horror film, Nosferatu, observes that a horror of epidemic and 
infection is both epitomised and instigated by the vampire’s power and 
associations like rats and local soil in the German film. Nosferatu’s horrible power 
is not only demonstrated by animals and materials but also by an object. Using the 
technique of stop-motion animation, the coffin lid (Figure 4.30) is moved on screen 
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by Nosferatu without any physical manipulation to cover the coffin in which he lies 
when leaving Transylvania for England (Pramaggiore and Wallis 2005: 108). In the 
film narrative of The Nightmare before Christmas, likewise, the on-screen human-
terrifying movement of the puppets and toys as objects can be seen as manipulated 
at a distance by the paraphysical power of the vampires and other monsters of 
Halloween town.5  
Turning to the issue of the mode in which the monsters exert such a power, 
the models of the puppets and toys are not stop-motion animated to provide the 
impression that they have their own will or consciousness; rather, they appear to 
lack them. The models of the flying little vampire and the wheeled duck are not 
 
5 The transtextual background of jack-o’-lantern helps it be possible to infer that in the film 
Jack, too, has such a magical power if he made a deal with Satan. 
Figure 4.30 The coffin stop-motion animated in Nosferatu 
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given any change of facial expression or any movement of its eye parts (Figure 
4.29). For this reason, their mode of movement seems to be close to automatic as 
seen in the case of Subtype (c), Type One. However, Type Six should still be 
discerned from Subtype (c) because the former is depicted as capable of aiming at 
the targets, that is, human characters in the diegetic world of the film. In the 
narrative, it would not be important to human characters, running away from the 
scary puppets and toys, whether these objects have moving eyeballs or changing 
facial expression; at any rate, they will be scary and horrible.  
If they do, Jack and his Halloween fellows get troubled and threated 
because the objects themselves can become monsters that are not to be 
distinguished from the monsters of Halloween town, both as stop-motion models 
on screen. In other words, the Halloween monsters’ power of animating, 
possessing, haunting objects can seriously threaten their own subjectivity and 
identity grounded in Halloween town, as well as the human beings in the film’s 
world. Eventually, the models of the puppets and toys are not so stop-motion 




4.7. Type Seven: A Posthuman Android in The Bachelor Machines 
 
With the narrative loosely based on Villiers’ novel, Tomorrow’s Eve, and with the 
film title inspired by Marcel Duchamp’s artwork, The Bride Stripped Bare by Her 
Bachelors, Even, or The Large Glass (1915–1923), Iwai’s stop-motion animated 
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short film, The Bachelor Machines, introduces two girl models that look much like 
each other. Given those transtextual motivations of the film, one of them can be 
considered to be the female android Hadaly and the other Sowana the human 
woman as its original. This means that one of the two girl models should function 
as a puppet per se, or a human simulacrum, while the other should function as a 
human being, in the diegetic world of the film. The former is the case which I 
classify in Type Seven of Group STM. 
 As indicated above, this case problematises the viewers’ perception in 
terms of the binary opposition between real and fake, original and copy, in which 
the filmmaker minimises cues serving to discern the model of a human girl from 
the model of its/her simulacrum as an android. The former seems to be as much an 
object as the latter so that both look mechanical, non/subhuman and fake. Another 
problematic is the model signifying a (supposed-to-be) human creator-scientist 
with mechanical body parts in the film. I focus my analysis of these models on the 
technology of reproduction or mass-production which both blur the boundary 
between humans and their simulacra and further threaten human identity and 
individuality. 
The film narrative revolves around the depiction of a mysterious, erotic 
process in which the cyborg doctor named Edison seeks to implant into Hadaly a 
substance extracted from Sowana, in order to make the female android much 
closer to humanity. Yet, it is obviously impossible to discern the Hadaly model and 
the Sowana model because both are designed to present the sameness of materials, 
colours, textures and shape on screen (Figure 4.31). This strategy of the model 
design intends to bring about perceptual ambiguity in the viewers who are 
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tempted to decide which is human and which is subhuman. In the beginning 
sequence of the film, two models are shown only with their moving legs raised up 
on screen, and although this implies that secondary animatic transition already 
occurred to Hadaly as the puppet-as-puppet model, their synchronised movement 
leads the viewers to fail to make clear which of the two models it is. Further, 
neither model shows cues of facial expression, eye movement and lips movement 
to help the viewers differentiate the Sowana model as human from the Hadaly 
model as subhuman. 
As the film narrative develops, three cues of differentiation are given to the 
viewers. First, Hadaly shows the cue of supposedly menstrual blood, while Sowana 
does not; and the former shows the cue of mechanical parts built in the belly 
(Figure 4.32), while the latter is engaged in the disembodied type of bachelor 
machine to extract an essential substance from female human beings. Despite these 
cues, for the most part of the film the Sowana model is not dealt with to establish 
its diegetic status as human. The surface texture of its body is not enough 
elaborated to provide the illusion of human skin; the ball joints of the fingers and 
other body parts like elbows and knees are exposed to the sight of the viewers.  
Figure 4.31 The models of Hadaly and Sowana in The Bachelor Machines 
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The film’s intentional rejection of the illusory representation of a human 
being goes so far as to present the cue of the genitals of Sowana when she is made 
naked by the humanoid type of bachelor machine before being engaged in the 
disembodied type of bachelor machine (Figure 4.33). The genitals are represented 
by a small roughly-made cut with a chisel on the pubis of the Sowana model. 
Arguably, this is where the cue of representation presents itself as a material cue 
and cannot be what it appears to be and in reality is not. When seen through the 
sight of the male character, Edison, who is easy for some viewers to identify with, 
the striking exhibition of genital nudity functions as a radical catalyst for them to 
abandon their persistent assumption that motivated by the narrative, the model is 
a human being or girl, and soon to shift to reminding themselves of the profilmic 
Figure 4.32 The Hadaly model in The Bachelor Machines 
319 
reality that it is nothing but a built model.  
Such materialistic cues suggest that in the film diegesis, the human 
character Sowana, too, might be in fact an android like Hadaly that has in common 
the profilmic condition of being a built model. If this assumption is true, it is not 
that Sowana is exploited to provide a human essence to Hadaly, but that the latter 
is a mechanical reproduction of the former which is also a mechanical 
reproduction of another human simulacrum in the film narrative. In this sense, 
Edison’s bachelor machines can be said to be part of a factory for the mass-
production of gynomorphic techno-puppets in the diegetic world of the film. 
 In the factory, Edison does not work as the Pygmalionesque creator of a 
female simulacrum but rather the manager of the system of mass-production. 
Figure 4.33 The Sowana model naked in The Bachelor Machines 
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There is no unique relationship between the human agent assumed by the Edison 
model and his products implied by the models of Hadaly and Sowana. As seen in 
many scenes where Sowana and Hadaly are engaged in the system of bachelor 
machines, further, the power which Edison exercises over the techno-puppets is 
mediated by mechanical devices. Suggesting that the techno-manager has a naked 
prosthetic hand, and not given any cues of facial expression, eye movement and lip 
movement (Figure 4.34), the Edison model looks by far more mechanical than, and 
as subhuman as, the model of Hadaly with cogs and gears hidden in the body. 
These cues jeopardise the diegetic status of Edison that should function as the 
human subject in the narrative, thereby spurring the viewers to suspect that even 
the supposed-to-be human scientist character might be an android.  
Figure 4.34 The Edison model with a prosthetic hand in The Bachelor Machines 
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 This Lamettrian suspicion was not unfamiliar to the viewers in 1998 when 
The Bachelor Machines was released, as seen in the films classified in the genre of 
cyberpunk; to name a few, Blade Runner (Ridley Scott, 1982, US) and Ghost in the 
Shell (Mamoru Oshii, 1995, JPN), respectively for the most part composed of live-
action footage and of hand-drawn drawings. Paul Jackson defines the genre as 
“[c]yberpunk futures have commonly presented societies so intrinsically connected 
to technology that boundaries between man and machine become blurred” (2009: 
Kindles 4004). My concern in this section is that The Bachelor Machines is a film 
made using the technique of stop-motion animation, by which stop-motion 
animators are conventionally tempted to have a unique relationship with each 
model through tactile interaction with it. The anthropomorphic, gynomorphic 
models of the film portray a human agent suffering from difficulty in forming such 
a unique relationship with his or her creations, both subsumed into the structure 
of machine and technology, in the irony that in the film he or she envisions 
technology making human simulacra more human. 
 
 
4.8. Type Eight: A Deceptive Imitation in A Close Shave  
 
In A Close Shave, the third film of the Wallace and Gromit series, the dog named 
Preston is revealed to be a robot and not a real dog in the later part of the film 
(Figure 4.35). This deceptive robot is the case which I classify in Type Eight of 
Group STM. As I demonstrate, this case follows the convention of the “evil” machine 
(Schelde 1993) in which a puppet-as-puppet model is not qualified to be 
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disobedient, autonomous and have free will, but rather is considered to be out of 
order, out of human or anthropocentric control. In analysis of the case, I challenge 
such a viewing skill, thereby call into question the status or identity of one of the 
two titular characters in the film diegesis: Gromit. The question is whether the dog 
is a robot or not in the sense that he is as much an intelligent anthropomorphic dog 
as the dog-like robot Preston seems to. Further, the former lives with the human 
“inventor” Wallace. 
When it comes to theriomorphism, the Wallace and Gromit series features 
animal characters that do not simply represent animals but also move and behave 
like human characters on screen. Above all, Gromit, one of the film’s protagonists, 
looks like a dog, but he is shown to knit a sweater, play puzzle games and read 
Figure 4.35 The robot dog Preston in A Close Shave 
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books; he is also depicted to be arrested and sent to jail in the same manner as are 
human characters. This strategy of compounding anthropomorphism and 
theriomorphism gives Gromit a status apparently equal to Wallace and the other 
human characters in the film narrative.  
Such a strategy is employed as a narrative device to play tricks on what 
Preston is. When initially appearing in the film, the (not-yet-revealed) dog 
character’s face is shown overshadowed, except for the eyes, in the side-view 
mirror (Figure 4.36). He still looks human because of his staring, determined eyes 
which are composed of completely separate eyeball parts—white sclerae, green 
irises and dark pupils—like those of Wallace and the other human characters in 
this and preceding films in the series. When the film cuts to Preston’s whole face, 
Figure 4.36 Preston’s first appearance in A Close Shave 
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still with its more-than-half part overshadowed, the dog-like face turns to serve as 
a clue for the viewers to perceive him as a character of a “living” and “real” dog like 
Gromit. Preston functions as such for a while to make the narrative develop against 
the two claimed protagonists, Gromit and Wallace, in the genre convention of crime 
films; the dog-like antagonist rustles sheep with his human accomplice, 
Wendolene, and further schemes to make a false charge of Gromit being a killer of a 
sheep.  
Preston’s real identity in the narrative is finally revealed in a verbal way 
when Wendolene changes her mind to stop his criminal activities in which she has 
participated in order to keep her shop. The verbal cues are presented by the shop 
owner who says to Preston: “Daddy didn’t create you for this! You’re supposed to 
protect me!” Given the preceding scene in which she tells Wallace that her dead 
father was an inventor like him, her dialogues imply that Preston is not a real dog 
but a robot with a canine appearance, whose preprogrammed role is close to a 
servant of the human creator-inventor and/or his beloved daughter. This servant 
robot has a transtextual reference in film history, which is Robby the Robot in the 
Figure 4.37 The scientist and Robby in Forbidden Planet 
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1956 live-action sci-fi film, Forbidden Planet (Fred M. Wilcox, US).6 In this film, 
Robby is depicted as a completely obedient machine which Dr. Morbius created and 
programmed so as to be unable to attack or kill human beings. When as a test he 
orders Robby to fire a ray gun at human soldiers, mechanical troubles happens so 
that it might fail to follow the order (Figure 4.37).  
 Unlike Robby, Preston no longer obeys the order of Wendolene, the 
innocent human master who tries to stop him from rustling sheep; or even his 
disobedience can read as an action to protect her as the owner of the wool shop. In 
the later scenes in which Gromit and Wallace seek to save her and the rustled 
 
6 In the course of the production of A Close Shave, Park, the director of the film, referred to 
Forbidden Planet among the US and the UK sci-fi films of the 1950s that were involved in 
forming his film tastes (McDonald 1996: 62). 
Figure 4.38 The robot dog Preston destroyed in A Close Shave 
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sheep from Preston, the robot goes so far as to kill the anthropomorphic dog 
character and even the human characters. In the course of hand-to-hand fights, the 
robot’s fake flesh gets stripped off from the mechanical endoskeleton (Figure 4.35). 
After all these fights, the robot is destroyed into pieces being jammed by a 
protagonist into the machine for the mass-production of canned dog food (Figure 
4.38). This is the moment when secondary animatic transition is withdrawn from 
the robot model. 
 This destruction is a clear indication of the way in which Park and the 
other stop-motion animators of A Close Shave consider and deal with Preston as an 
inanimate and fake object with the appearance of a dog. Jammed into the machine 
for dog food production, the Preston model as a robot is so crushed that the 
eyeballs jump out of the head, and later, all the decomposed metal parts of the body 
are put into empty cans, originally for dog food, one by one carried periodically by 
the roller conveyor belt. In these scenes, the robot model is not stop-motion 
animated to provide the impression that as an intelligent robot Preston is “aware” 
of what is happening to it and what as a result it will be, not to mention the 
impression that it feels pain in the destructive process.  
In the film narrative, Preston’s unawareness of the fatal events happening 
to itself is pretty contradictory to intelligence and other relevant abilities that the 
robot shows off reading a newspaper, devising schemes and modifying Wallace’s 
invention. Given those intelligent abilities, the robot can be said to be one of the 
greatest inventions, in terms of Descartes’ notion of automata, that have ever been 
created by human beings in the diegetic world of the film. Both in the film’s world 
and the Puppetopos, however, its ability of disobeying the human master’s order is 
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not applauded as a free will, but rather, rejected as threatening and harmful. The 
ending of the film shows that entirely shattered, Preston is rebuilt into an obedient, 
harmless robot, with the previous arms and legs replaced with four wheels, under 
Wendolene’s full remote control (Figure 4.39).  
 What I am concerned with in this ending is Gromit, the counterpart of 
Preston. Once an anthropomorphic dog, the latter was initially believed to be as 
intelligent, alive and real as the former by all the characters (except for Wendolene 
and her dead father) in the film’s world and also by the viewers in the real world; 
the truth is that Preston is not alive nor real. The secret and the revelation of what 
Preston is can apply to Gromit himself; in other words, he might be a not-yet-
revealed robot. However, there is no cue suggesting Gromit’s anxiety of the 
Figure 4.39 Preston remodelled in A Close Shave 
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possibility that he might be a preprogrammed robot as is Preston. It is certain that 
such cues are not necessary for Gromit, only if he keeps being or playing an 
obedient servant of Wallace in the film. No Romantic Irony is found in A Close Shave 
where the dog model as well as the robot model is employed to function for the 
anthropocentric order of the world demonstrated by Wallace and Wendolene. 
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Chapter Five 
The Non-anthropomorphic Puppet-as-puppet Figures and Their 
Modes of Movement in Group PMT 
 
 
In this Chapter, I focus on cases which I classify in Group PMT (Parametric) as 
alternative to Group STM in a direct sense and to Group INT in an indirect sense. 
While being technically based on stop-motion animation as in Group STM, in Group 
PMT the puppet-as-puppet models are presented on screen as objects per se and 
are not intended to represent and narrativise what they are not; for instance, the 
case of Type Seven in Group STM, the Hadaly puppet is presented as a “puppet” and 
yet the status and meaning of the puppet is subsumed under the convention of the 
“android” narrative.  
To put it in neoformalist terms, the puppet-as-puppet models in Group 
PMT function as “bared devices”, or as “quasi-agents” in terms of Bennett (2010: 
Kindle 65), without being motivated by narrative. Unlike Group STM, Group PMT 
consists of the puppet-as-puppet models that are stop-motion animated to go 
beyond the anthropocentric hierarchy of soul/life over matter, subject over object, 
human over sub/nonhuman, not to mention real over fake, which I will show in 
this Chapter.  
 As an indirect alternative to Group INT, Group PMT foregrounds the 
movements of objects with which stop-motion animators, invisible on screen, 
interact. In the latter Group, the objects are not employed to display the power 
relationship which the animators imagine forming with them in production, and 
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also that which the human live actors performing as animators show interacting 
with them on screen. Rather, as I will show later in this Chapter, they work as what 
Bennett (2010) calls “quasi-agents”, to make visible external forces surrounding 
and acting on them in the first place. Further, the quasi-agents insinuate that there 
is something affective and effective in and around themselves on and across screen, 
something that I believe Bennett (2010: Kindle 219) conceptualises as “thing-
power” in the philosophy of vital materialism.  
The thing-power, according to Bennett, “gestures toward the strange 
ability of ordinary, man-made items to exceed their status as objects and to 
manifest traces of independence or aliveness, constituting the outside of our own 
experience” (2010: Kindle 219). Bennett’s philosophical conceptualisation of thing-
power is also an attempt to make it possible “to experience the relationship 
between persons and other materialities more horizontally . . . to take a step 
toward a more ecological sensibility” (Kindle 452). The more horizontal 
relationship between human beings and things is what in Group PMT the human 
agents as theurgic—as defined in the Literature Review—seek to envision and 
present manipulating and interacting with the puppet-as-puppet models, in other 
words, the puppet-as-thing models. Given that the political philosopher (Bennett 
2010: Kindle 134) refers to films as one way to develop and promote such a 
sensibility, I claim that those models appearing in stop-motion animation films can 
produce a similar effect.  
In this Group, the theurgic agents’ pursuit of non-anthropocentric 
relationships with things leads to revising, modulating and defamiliarising the 
impression of aliveness demonstrated by the puppet-as-puppet figures or models 
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that I analysed with Groups INT, CEL and STM. My analysis of Group PMT focuses 
on “trajectories”, or paths, which each model as a quasi-agent draws in the form of 
index and motion vectors, interacting with an invisible animator(s) in the on-
screen three-dimensional space. In the course of analysis, I will strive against the 
anthropomorphic reduction of the trajectory stop-motion animated to refer to 
itself as something unknown to the viewers, and this is why I developed the term, 
trajectory, which is similar yet alternative to the mode of movement likely to 
highlight the figurative qualities (such as life or soul) that a model is supposed to 
demonstrate by moving on screen like something that it looks like and yet is not.  
Such trajectories and paths also function as unconventional kinds of 
kinaesthetic cues to insinuate what models on screen are and can be as themselves, 
when appearing to move, without being subsumed under the conventional concept 
of animation-can-bring-something (or even anything)-to-life. In this Chapter, I will 
show that those cues help the models to surface as things or quasi-agents in terms 
of Bennett’s vital materialism, eluding the bifurcating definition of primary and 
secondary animatic transitions that works in the other Groups. 
 
 
Selection of the emblematic cases from Group PMT 
The cases which I consider as emblematic in Group PMT centre on SŠvankmajer, the 
Quay Brothers and Kawamoto. As cited in the Literature Review, these filmmakers 
have evinced unconventional, non-anthropocentric views of puppets, and further, 
for the first two, artefacts and objects are as significant as, and equivalent to 
puppets, even if they are not in human or animal form. Their unconventionality can 
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be contextualised in terms of the opposing stance which each of them took towards 
mainstream film production and narrative style.  
According to Hames in the seminal volume on the Czech filmmaker, 
“SŠvankmajer tends to distance himself from the Czech animated school” (1995a: 
27). In Hames’ (pp.25-26) account of Czech animation history, the school refers to 
the major tradition of puppet animation developed and led by Trnka, Karel Zeman, 
Hermı́na Týrlová, and Pojar among many animation filmmakers in Czechoslovakia. 
Instead of becoming engaged in the school which contributed to the formation of 
the Puppetopos, SŠvankmajer has shown affinity with avant-garde art and 
experimental film movements. In his film-historical contextualisation of the 
unconventional filmmaker, Hames points out, “SŠvankmajer’s early films were . . . 
produced in the same political and cultural context as those of the [Czechoslovak] 
New Wave” (p.36). It was in the late 1960s that the filmmaker made his directorial 
debut, a few years after the New Wave made an appearance in the country. As the 
author comments, importantly, “A uniform characteristic of most of the New Wave 
films was a rejection of classical narrative” (Hames 1995a: 27).  
Based in the UK for decades since leaving the US in which they were born 
and raised, and also known for their artistic proximity to the Czech filmmaker, the 
Quay Brothers identify their way of filmmaking as different from Hollywood and 
other conventional filmmaking. Interviewing the Brothers, Buchan (2011) clarifies 
it in two aspects. First, she notes the disorienting effect of their films: “They easily 
justify giving this kind of uncertainty to their audiences, pointing out the difference 
between this and guided cinematic forms of suspense that follow Hollywood 
conventions” (2011: 146). Another aspect is that the Brothers do not prefer to 
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employ dialogue in a conventional fashion easy to find in Hollywood or its 
contextual/industrial equivalent. Discussing the Quays’ filmmaking in terms of the 
use of dialogues, Buchan notes that its unconventionality “not only makes their 
work distinct from live-action, dialogue-driven narrative, but it also sets them 
apart from many animators damned to what the Quays call the ‘ghetto-ized, 
anodyne cliché-ridden dosage of children’s television, an absolute swamp of 
banality, where all the characters are inevitably docile bogus flunkies wrapped 
around well-known actor’s voices’” (2011: 168).1 Certainly, it is quite easy to find 
puppets/models made to assume the role of such characters in Group STM as 
analysed in Chapter Four. 
Compared to SŠvankmajer and the Quay Brothers, the Japanese puppet 
filmmaker Kawamoto might be found relatively close to the Puppetopos because 
many of his films seem to involve a kind of narrative. But this should not prevent us 
from experiencing the sensibility that he forms on screen interacting with puppets. 
Early in his career, Kawamoto learned much of the art of puppet animation from 
Mochinaga and Trnka, both referred to respectively in my analysis of Rudolph The 
Red-Nosed Reindeer and The Hand in Chapter Four. However, his frequent 
recollection of what Trnka talked to him about does not draw attention to how to 
construct film narratives but rather how to work with puppets. As I will scrutinise 
the latter issue in this Chapter, it is worthwhile here to look at how Kawamoto 
identified his art of puppet animation filmmaking in relation to film narration and 
other types of puppet animation which I classify in Group STM, as part of the 
 
1 Buchan indicate the source of the Quays’ comment: Quay Brothers (1986: 1) In Deciphering 
the Pharmacist’s Prescription “On Lip-Reading Puppets”. London. Unpublished manuscript. 
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Puppetopos. Renowned for the Trilogy of Absurdity (Fujori Sanbusaku), the 
Japanese animator noted:  
 
I am attracted to absurd narratives. Usually, a result is supposed to follow a 
suitable cause, and it is scary that only an unexpected horrible result 
comes out without any cause given. This often happens in the real world, 
even if you would not like to imagine it. I aim to depict such absurdity to 
make my audience horrified” (Okada 1998a: 148; English translation 
mine).  
 
It was Eisenstein that Kawamoto (Okada 1998b: 158) referred to as influential on 
his way of film editing, and this implies that his film narration tends to go beyond 
conventional styles. Observing stop-motion animation films by Purves, Park and 
Lord, all involved in Aardman Animations, on the other hand, Kawamoto (Okada 
1998b: 153-154) distinguished his stance from theirs in that they animated 
puppets as surrogates for human beings or actors in terms of on-screen 
performance. 
Drawing on these evidences that help to position SŠvankmajer, the Quay 
Brothers and Kawamoto outside the Puppetopos, I choose and focus on one of the 
films by each of them in terms of high relevance to my central subject of puppet-as-
puppet models and its mode of movement: SŠvankmajer’s 1971 short film, 
Jabberwocky, the Quays’ 1986 short film, Street of Crocodiles and Kawamoto’s 1972 




5.1. Energised Eloquent Objects in Jabberwocky 
 
In analysis of the film, Jabberwocky, I draw on the concept of “faktura”, developed 
by the Russian avant-garde (Gough 1999; Meyer 2000) and associated with 
Minimalism (Meyer 2000), in terms of which a three-dimensional figure’s 
movement on screen is foregrounded and bared as a vestige, or a “trajectory”, left 
behind and accumulated on film in time through the physical, tactile interaction 
between the animator and the figure in production. This “bared” trajectory arouses 
in the viewers an unfamiliar, non-anthropomorphic and non-anthropocentric, 
sensation of objects seen in motion on screen and of human interaction and 
intervention with them. Describing the trajectory with the method of film vector 
analysis, I interpret such a sensation in terms of the vital-materialist concept of 
“thing-power” which Bennett (2010) puts forward to stress that materials and 
objects assume “agency” outside human awareness. 
For the most part, this film shows many objects in human form moving, 
without any human character in a clear interaction with them, on screen: bisque 
Figure 5.1 A human girl in Jabberwocky 
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dolls, paper dolls, toy soldiers, a jumping jack, a trapeze clown toy and a pocket 
knife decorated with a lady figure. Only in an early scene whose setting is a room 
full of objects, a real girl is shown for an instant to move around in flickering or 
stroboscopically (Figure 5.1). This optical effect makes her a series of photographic 
cut-out figures rather than an on-screen live performer. Even while appearing on 
screen, she keeps marginalised; leaning on a wall and being in a corner soon after 
her failing to catch a doll moving, as if it escapes from her, on the floor in the room. 
At the centre of the film are not living human beings but inanimate objects.  
Many of the objects are stop-motion animated in a series of scenes to move 
by and for themselves, and this might be reduced to the conventional discourse 
that animators or human agents have the demiurgic power of giving life to 
inanimate objects in animation. For example, we see the white gloves move, as if 
being taken off, from the hands of a bisque doll (Figure 5.2). From the conventional 
perspective, it would be said that the doll plays a living baby girl and takes off her 
gloves on screen. Might it be that secondary animatic transition has occurred to the 
doll? However, a close look reveals that the doll’s hands and fingers are not given 
any slight schematic cues of movement to imply their taking off gloves while this 
Figure 5.2 The doll’s gloves moving in Jabberwocky 
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action takes place. In terms of motion vectors, the gloves seem to be stop-motion 
animated to be pulled off by a human hand invisible on screen.  
A similar mode of movement suggesting the action of an external force on 
an object in the diegetic world of a film is usually shown in Subtype (b) of Type 
One, whose mode of movement is passive in Group STM. The passive mode serves 
to trigger primary animatic transition to indicate that the object is inanimate, 
whatever it might look like, as subject to either gravity or a human character’s body 
movements. However, the gloves’ movement of being-pulled-off is not easy to 
identify as passive because it does not involve any visible cues of a human 
character exerting a force on them. 
The kinaesthetic mystery of the gloves gets deeper and deeper by the 
close-up face of the doll whose eyes are opening (Figure 5.3). Not functioning as a 
narrative-motivated device but as a parametric one, the eyes’ movement is a 
mystery which allows varied and incompatible ways of explaining its technical and 
semantic aspects. First, it is uncertain that the eyes were stop-motion animated to 
open on screen. The opening movement does not involve kinetic cues of enough 
clarity to judge that it was created using techniques of stop-motion animation. 
Figure 5.3 The doll’s eyes moving in Jabberwocky 
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Given that dolls of that type were first given moveable eyes to suggest sleepy-ness 
in the nineteenth century,2 it might have been filmed in live action while the baby 
doll is moved to raise and lower the eyes by an off-screen human agent at the 
profilmic level. In the film, however, the moving eyes on screen do not serve for 
such an anthropomorphic and anthropocentric aim—sleepy-ness, but rather 
simply show their own mechanical-ness. At the diegetic level, the moving eyes are 
likely to work as a cue implying that the doll is played with by the girl who 
appeared once in the early scene, or an invisible girl whose acousmatic voice is 
heard to read Lewis Carroll’s poem Jabberwocky.3 When this effect of the cue is 
successful, the eyes’ movement is identified to be passive as in Subtype (b) of Type 
One.  
The duration of the moving eyes is soon interrupted by the cut to the 
movement of a stroller in the room where nobody is found. Further, the stroller in 
which the doll seems to be seated is stop-motion animated to move by itself. Its 
locomotive movement is not given any cue of secondary animatic transition but 
kept literal and aimless; at the same time being not given any cue of primary 
animatic transition because no human character is implied as exerting physical 
force on the stroller, nor any mechanical system as activating its automatic 
locomotion. The fact about the three consecutive movements—the gloves, the eyes 
and the stroller—is that each of the objects are moving itself on screen while it was 
moved by human agents in production using either the technique of stop-motion 
 
2 Museum of American Heritage (2005) The mechanics of dolls. Available at: 
http://www.moah.org/dolls/dolls.html (accessed 3 May 2019). 
3 The information of the voice is given in DVD: Columbia Music Entertainment (2005) 
Shuvankumaieru ‘Jabawokki’ sono hoka no tanpen (SŠvankmajer’s Jabberwocky and other short 
films). COBM-5311. Columbia Music Entertainment. 
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animation or live-action shooting; further, it might still exist somewhere in the real 
world. But where and what are the meanings of those and other movements seen 
in the film? What is SŠvankmajer’s artistic motivation for them? 
Figure 5.4 The pocket knife in Jabberwocky; top-left (a), top-right (b),  
middle-left (c), middle-right (d), bottom-left (e), bottom-right (f) 
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To answer this question, I proceed to analyse the most remarkable 
movement of a pocket knife, with a decoration of a female figure, that is presented 
in the later part of the film (Figure 5.4). At the centre of the screen frame, the 
camera initially focuses on the wooden figure of a human lady set on the round 
metal podium (Figure 5.4a), which does not necessarily manifest itself as a pocket 
knife, and this can prompt the viewers to expect it to display anthropomorphic 
movements on screen. However, the object is stop-motion animated to turn around 
on the same spot and then the blade comes out from the handle which forms part 
of the back of the lady figure. This is the moment when the object raises a question 
in the minds of the viewers: will it function and move as a lady or a knife on 
screen? 
Shortly, the object is stop-motion animated to roll forward and then to 
jump up from the spot in which the spear point has been stuck in the tabletop 
(Figure 5.4b-c). On falling onto the top of the table, it is stop-motion animated to 
jump up, flying and spinning in the air, and fall again and again in different 
directions (Figure 5.4d-e). This series of movements are not anthropomorphically 
nuanced but aimless, lacking narrative motivation. The most puzzling moment 
comes at the moment when the lady pocket knife stops finally moving on falling 
onto the table. Blood flows out from the back of the lady, that is, the handle of the 
knife, as soon as the blade is stop-motion animated to go back into it (Figure 5.4f). 
For the viewers familiarised with the anthropomorphic convention of Group STM, 
the physiological event and element will be attributed to the lady figure as their 
source; they might say, “She is injured”. However, it should be remembered that 
when the blade comes out of the figure part that is also the handle part, the lady 
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figure does not bleed. Further, no cue is given to imply that any emotional or 
physical responses to the crucial event might happen from within either the pocket 
knife or the lady figure. The bleeding event should be explained in a different way, 
which is also to find the answer to the questions of the aimless movements 
presented throughout the film. 
Building on film vector analysis as the helpful method, the trajectories 
along which the lady pocket knife moves on and around the table in the film are not 
subject to gravity because in the first place it jumps up against gravity and then 
does not follow a parabolic path at every falling motion when gravity alone acts on 
the projectile. This observation leads me to assume that in the film’s world an 
external force should grab, raise and lower the knife against gravity; yet the 
anthropomorphic source of the force is invisible on screen at the diegetic level. 
There are two possible answers. One of them is that SŠvankmajer or his co-working 
stop-motion animators are working as the source of the external force that did 
exist there, even if invisible on screen. From this perspective, the trajectories, or 
paths, which the object shows moving on screen are considered to be the material 
traces which they left on film, interacting with and exerting force on it frame by 
frame before the camera.  
I call the filmed traces faktura in and of stop-motion animation, in James 
Meyer’s (2000) definition of the term. Contextualising Minimalism and its aesthetic 
stances in relation to Russian Constructivism, Meyer indicates that as a key concept 
of the early twentieth-century art movement, faktura is “a revelation of an object’s 
literal materiality, and konstruktsiia (construction), an organization dictated by 
function and the physical nature of the chosen materials” (2000: 19). According to 
342 
Maria Gough’s (1999: 36) essay on faktura, this concept was developed to reveal 
and release the made-ness of artworks. By extension, many of the trajectories and 
paths seen in Jabberwocky can be said to be a revelation of the made-ness or 
constructed-ness, including animated-ness, of the movements.  
In the film, the made-ness of movements is also accentuated by the 
juxtaposition of live action and animation that Michael O’Pray (1995: 52) refers to 
as a trait of SŠvankmajer’s manneristic film style. As one of the most significant 
examples, a trapeze clown toy moving on screen is presented in live action, which 
shows motion vectors and blur-index vectors unique to live-action shooting (Figure 
5.5). The literal and aimless movement of the anthropomorphic doll not only 
makes a sharp contrast to the very animated-ness of the animated movements 
preceding and following the live-action shot, but also suggests that there should 
exist a live human being or a crewmember, if not visible on screen, moving or 
exerting force on it, off screen. In other words, force in production was exerted and 
in projection is shown being exerted on it by him or her. 
Turning back to the scene with the lady pocket knife, the concept of faktura 
encourages me to infer that a human agent in production should be the source of 
Figure 5.5 Blur-index vectors and live-motion vectors in Jabberwocky 
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bleeding as an event taking place on the continuum of the trajectories and paths 
that his or her hands did follow together with the object which he or she did 
manipulate as itself in production. In brief, he or she really did bleed in production; 
it is human blood on screen. Considered in terms of faktura, the event might make 
some of the viewers feel too squeamish to accept as bared or raw, even if the blood 
is not specified as real in the film—it might be a little bit of red paint or a pig’s 
blood. Observing the living bodies and organic materials used in the three-
dimensional artworks of the twentieth century, by analogy, Tom Flynn (1998: 160) 
describes them as disturbingly radical; one of his cases is Mark Quinn’s sculptural 
work entitled Self, which was modelled of the artist’s own blood in the form of a 
human head.  
However, this does not give a sufficient answer to the questions of 
SŠvankmajer and his crew’s artistic motivation: why should the objects be dolls and 
toys, and why should they and their movements be set against a room and not a 
studio (re-)presented as such? These questions spur me to assume a diegetic figure 
as the anthropomorphic source that exerts force on the lady pocket knife in the film 
which even if not motivated by narrative, features a few thematic threads, in 
particular, the acousmatic voice of a supposedly little girl reading Carroll’s poem, 
and the playful, mischievous and naughty force seen in the movements of the toys 
on screen. Following the threads, a child (or children) surfaces as the figure that 
once played with the old toys now left alone in the room. František Dryje describes 
Jabberwocky as “interpreted personal memories of the world of childhood” (1995: 
135). Yet, the author does not afford to draw enough attention to the aspect of 
objecthood with which the child forms an interactive and intersubjective surface—
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what SŠvankmajer (Hames 1995: 110) calls tactile memory4—that I seek to clarify 
in terms of force as well as movement in this thesis.  
Given the concept of memory, instead of faktura, the invisible figure of a 
human child should be considered as no longer staying and playing with the toys in 
the diegetic world of the film. In the room, nonetheless, they are shown to keep 
moving on screen without any human physical intervention. Does this mean that 
the film is grounded in the “old-animistic” belief of objects as already ensouled or 
alive? Such an interpretation is to ignore the specifics of movements which the 
objects show on screen, the details of the trajectories and paths formed between 
them and the body of the human subject touching them in time.  
With the concept of touching in mind, I argue that in the film, the energy 
transmitted from the human subject to the toys through physical contact is 
envisioned as the cause which makes them keep moving. The energised objects 
include not only the toys but also objects and materials such as a stroller, apples, 
clothes irons, coffee grinders, spoons, chalk and paper. SŠvankmajer stresses, “I have 
already spoken about the ‘eloquence’ of objects and their ability to carry latent 
meanings into which they ‘invest’ time, touch and the ‘manipulation of human 
sensibility’” (1995: 111). For the filmmaker, objects speak and endure, while 
touching and affecting, as well as being touched and affected by, human beings. 
This is the sense that Roger Cardinal comments, “SŠvankmajer . . . prefers his 
curiosities to bear traces of usage” (1995: 85), going on to cite the filmmaker who 
 
4 In an interview with Hames, the filmmaker states, “As the results of my study showed, there 
does exist something akin to ‘tactile memory’ which penetrates the remotest corners of our 
childhood; from there it is reflected in the form of an analogy with the slightest tactile 
stimulation or the provocation of tactile imagination, encouraging the ‘tactile art’ of 
communication” (Hames 1995b: 110). 
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notes, “The more an object has been touched, the richer its contents”5 (p.85). 
While in Jabberwocky, the objects either in human or nonhuman form are 
not stop-motion animated to imitate the localised6 body movement of the human 
subject in an attempt to provide the impression of being alive—for the same 
reason, no movement of an object implies secondary animatic transition, it is 
movement itself, as a temporal event composed on film through objects touching 
and being touched, that functions to affect the viewers: the gloves of the bisque doll 
pull themselves off from the hands, with wiggling wrinkles shown on them, as if 
they are being taken off from the hands by a child, or me, looking at and touching 
them off screen; their eyes move as if they are being moved by him or me at play; 
the lady pocket knife jumps up, spins, flies and falls as if they are being made to do 
that by him or me. These physical events are presented as not separated from the 
“real” world which the viewers including me inhabit, in particular by editing the 
live-action shot (Figure 5.6b) of the paper airplanes flying out of the window of the 
room toward the street outside, before and after showing them taking off and 
 
5 Cardinal cites this from Vratislav Effenberger (1987) SŠvankmajer on The Fall of the House of 
Usher. Gaby Dowdell (trans.) Afterimage 13: 33. 
6 My use of the term, localised, is influenced by Lamarre (2013.) 
Figure 5.6 The paper airplanes in Jabberwocky; left (a), right (b) 
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flying out by themselves through the window in stop motion animation (Figure 
5.6a). Shown in the live-action shot are buildings under the sky, which seem to be 
so raw and unprocessed as to suggest that the paper airplanes can be seen by 
anyone inhabiting or passing by the town and streets connected with the world 
where we live.  
The affect that the Jabberwocky objects are intended by SŠvankmajer to 
have on human beings reminds me of what Bennett (2010: Kindles 151) calls 
“impersonal affect” or “material vibrancy” in her philosophy of vital materialism. 
For the philosopher, the concepts are “not a spiritual supplement or ‘life force’ 
added to the matter said to house it” (Bennett 2010: Kindle 151). She adds, “I 
equate affect with materiality, rather than posit a separate force that can enter and 
animate a physical body” (Kindle 151). In this and other accounts, Bennett uses the 
term, “body”, to signify not only human bodies but also nonhuman ones. In 
particular, her definition of the nonhuman bodies goes so far as to embrace “the 
minerality of our bones, or the metal of our blood, or the electricity of our neurons” 
(Bennett 2010: Kindle 463). In my reading of the political philosopher, bodies are 
defined as something exerting force, something affecting or vibrating, not 
necessarily perceived in an anthropomorphic way. Bennett suggests, “[A]ll bodies 
are kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations” 
(2010: Kindle 508).  
Drawing on the affect or capacity of the nonhuman bodies she defines as 
quasi-agents, I observe that the toys and objects moving in Jabberwocky embody 
the way in which they work as quasi-agents, without being subsumed under 
anthropomorphic, anthropocentric and narrative-oriented orders. The stop-motion 
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animated (and filmed) embodiments can be interpreted in the sense that Bennett 
revisits the old notion of “deodand”, seeking to identify the quasi-agency of objects, 
or thing-power: 
 
Agentic capacity is now seen as differentially distributed across a wider 
range of ontological types. This idea is also expressed in the notion of 
“deodand,” a figure of English law from about 1200 until it was abolished 
in 1846. In cases of accidental death or injury to a human, the nonhuman 
actant, for example, the carving knife that fell into human flesh or the 
carriage that trampled the leg of a pedestrian—became deodand (literally, 
“that which must be given to God”). (2010: Kindle 439).  
 
Like the carving knife, in Jabberwocky the lady pocket knife sticks in the top of the 
table and injures human fingers (if invisible on screen) when the blade slips. This 
and other objects are stop-motion animated to display the movements and events 
that each of them does induce and allow human beings to get engaged in making 
happen: the bisque doll wears a pair of fabric gloves, whose material flexibility and 
structural separateness enable the stop-motion animators to touch and pull them 
off from the hands. Bennett acknowledges that such a thing-power is “less 
masterful than agency but more active than recalcitrance” (2010: Kindle 433), 
going on to problematise the very concept of mastery in an attempt to make the 
relationship between the human subject and the nonhuman object more 
horizontal, which will otherwise remain marginalised out of human sensibility in 
the hierarchy of the former over the latter (Kindle 452).  
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Jabberwocky problematises the viewers’ sensibility familiarised in the 
conventional discourses: animation can bring something (or even anything) to life; 
and animators can perform the role of a demiurgic creator masterful of objects and 
materials. In the film, SŠvankmajer with his animation crew does not seek to show 
the puppets and other objects moving on screen in the anthropomorphic ways that 
make them look alive or ensouled from the anthropocentric perspective. 
Emphatically, his focus is to make bared and visible the trajectories and their 
subtleties, such as jumping, running, hovering, flying, grinding and wiggling, drawn 
in time by physical forces exerted and transmitted between two kinds of agents, 
human beings and things, surrounded by and resisting the gravitational field of the 
earth. Either as memories or traces of the agentic forces, those trajectories can 
inflect, twist and defamiliarise the ways in which the viewers sense the effect of the 
gravitational field that has been visualised in the first place to serve 
anthropocentric movements and narratives in the convention of Group STM.  
Not completely retreating from the field of forces, if not visible, in 
Jabberwocky, the theurgic agents of the film manifest themselves as intervening in 
the movement of the puppet-as-puppet figures, as do the demiurgic agents of 
Group INT I analysed in Chapter Two. This is where I find Bennett’s concept of the 
quasi-agent pertinent to my case study of Jabberwocky. Building on Bruno Latour,7 
Bennett (2010: Kindle 435) elaborates on her concept of a quasi-agent as an 
“intervener”. Unlike the demiurgic counterparts in Group INT, the theurgic agents 
in the film do not consider the figures to be the sub/nonhuman slaves of a human 
 
7 Bennet cites Latour (2004: 75) Politics of Nature: How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy. 
Porter, Catherine (trans.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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master. Rather, they intervene in the field of forces and the physico-aesthetic events 
taking place therein both at the profilmic and diegetic level. 
 
 
5.2. Objects as Distributive Agents in Street of Crocodiles 
 
Stretching much of the discussion made above, in this section I analyse the case of 
Street of Crocodiles as pertinent to another vital-materialist concept of “distributive 
agency” (Bennett 2010). As indicated by this term itself, it suggests an alternative 
perspective to the convention of attributing an animated figure’s movement on 
screen to an animator as a human agent whether the result is, so to speak, perfect 
or not. In the case, such a concept is concretised in the movement, or kinetic 
trajectory, of models, puppets and objects which inhabit their own world, without 
any anthropomorphic centre or mastery—models which Buchan (2011) finds to be 
of insecticity. Here, I consider insecticity as a non-anthropocentric possibility of 
theriomorphism. Using techniques of camerawork and editing, the case also 
problematises our viewing experience of the “thing realm” which unknown forces 
seem to diffuse and circulate throughout, and therefore, I connect this effect to 
Buchan’s (2013) conceptualisation of a “cinema of apprehension”.  
Loosely based on the Polish writer Bruno Schulz’s story and as a “notably 
nonnarrative film” (Buchan 2011: 34), Street of Crocodiles starts with the live-
action shot in which an elderly man enters a theatre, who seems to keep the place. 
Approaching a construction like a kinetoscope combined with an antique bellows 
camera among the dusty-looking objects left alone on the stage, he looks into it 
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(Figure 5.7), and intercut with razor blades and pulleys, goes on to spit into it from 
the top. Cutting to the spit going down into the construction, the film takes the 
viewers to the realm of puppets separate in a degree from the human world shot in 
live action. The puppets are presented as puppets in contrast to the old keeper 
performed by a live human actor.  
In a vague causality implied by editing, the spit is shown to set into motion 
razor blades, gears, pulleys and hydraulic cylinders in the kinetoscopic 
construction (or an old kinetoscope patched up) so that the machinery delivers a 
“force” to a puppet-as-puppet model through strings, one of which seems to be tied 
to the model’s wrist. At first, the body of the Schulz model8 is kept flabby, in 
 
8 I borrow this name for the protagonist model from Buchan (2011). 
Figure 5.7 The human keeper and the kinetoscopic construction in Street of Crocodiles 
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particular with the head lowered so extremely that it appears to be literally a 
model or puppet. When the delivered force shakes its hand as a cue of primary 
animatic transition, the puppet is quickly stop-motion animated to raise the limp 
head and then to become concerned with the string tied to the wrist, as if it is given 
what is called consciousness (Figure 5.8), which is likely to function as cues of 
secondary animatic transition—I will analyse this in detail below. It is not only this 
intriguing nexus but also a pair of scissors that implies a thin, mysterious 
connection in a material way between the realm of the puppet and that of the 
human keeper, while it seems impossible for the kinetoscopic construction to hold 
the puppet realm in terms of the scale. Crosscutting of the human keeper holding 
scissors with the Schulz puppet in the construction suggests that the former is 
Figure 5.8 The Schulz model in Street of Crocodiles 
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cutting the string tied to the wrist of the latter across the boundary between both 
realms. Once the string is cut, the puppet is stop-motion animated to begin to 
wander in the miniature realm. 
While Weihe observes the supposed secondary animatic transition of the 
Schulz puppet as “awakening and emancipation from its strings” (2006: 45), 
however, the puppet on screen does not move in the anthropomorphic mode of 
movement in comparison to its anthropomorphic look. Above all, it is not stop-
motion animated to express any human-like response to strange events happening 
around it. There is no cue of surprise, uneasiness, perplexity and bewilderment 
seen in the face of the puppet, for example, when a randomly knotted string gets 
detangled smoothly without any material recalcitrance (Figure 5.9a) and the dusty, 
murky glass screen gets raised without any visible or identifiable source of force 
for the ascending movement (Figure 5.9b). This less anthropomorphic impression 
is also reinforced by the way in which the body of the puppet is built. The puppet’s 
head is not made of latex or other conventional materials but of plaster (Buchan 
2011: 111). Except for the main limb joints like the elbows and the knees, the face 
and most of the body parts seem to be quite stiff and rigid.  
Figure 5.9 The string and the glass screen in Street of Crocodiles; left (a), right (b) 
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Despite such unpredictable, inexplicable events in succession, the 
protagonist does not even try to escape from them, but rather, simply keeps 
moving around, in a degree as if tracking the moving strings engaged in pulleys and 
other visual or auditory stimuli. In particular, coming out between the two walls 
(Figure 5.10), it moves forward with the upper body lowered, almost as if crawling 
or scurrying, and this mode of movements make it look like an animal, further an 
“insect”, in taxes, for instance, phototaxis or phonotaxis. Finding such an insect-like 
trope with respect to puppet design in the Quay Brothers’ films, Buchan indicates, 
“Besides the anthropomorphic puppets, automata, and simulacra, the Quays have 
consistently used what I call insecticity in their films, where insectlike figures 
feature prominently” (2011: 113). Focusing on the Brothers’ puppets of an insect-
like design, the scholar describes their body movement, on the one hand as 
“scurried, instinctually autistic actions”, and on the other as “angular and darting 
movements and unexpected gestures [which] contribute to the unease of watching 
them” (Buchan 2011: 114). I believe that such modes of movement apply not only 
for the puppets of an insect-like design but also those of a human-like design in the 
work of the filmmakers, and in this sense, extending Buchan’s account of insecticity 
Figure 5.10 The Schulz puppet in Street of Crocodiles 
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to the aspect of puppet movement, I will call “insectomorphic” the mode in which 
the Schulz puppet is stop-motion animated to move.  
When insectomorphism is a variation of theriomorphism, the latter mode 
of movement is found in Group STM, particularly in the cases, The Mascot and The 
Mitten, respectively of Types Two and Three. The dog-like models as puppets in 
both films are stop-motion animated in the first place to serve their human masters 
in the anthropocentric narratives, as I analysed in Chapter Four. The Quays’ 
predilection for insecticity has nothing to do with such anthropocentrism and 
intends to defamiliarise the viewing experience and skills formed in the 
Puppetopos. Citing Roberto Aita’s interview with them,9 Buchan remarks:  
 
Instead of using insectlike puppets to illustrate familiar aspects of human 
behavior, the Quays draw the viewer into a world that provides few 
comforting familiarities. The “autonomous and self-sufficient world” is 
isolated . . . (2011: 114) 
 
Her account of the isolated world prompts me to compare Street of Crocodiles to 
The Mascot, the case of Type Two, and Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer, the case of 
Type Four, both classified in Group STM. In Starewicz’ The Mascot, the canomorphic 
and other models as puppets go under and perform after secondary animatic 
transition unknown to human characters. Although remaining in the human world 
without having their own physically separate realm, the puppets as puppets are 
 
9 Aita (2001) Brothers Quay: In Absentia. Totaro, Donato (trans.) Off-Screen. Available at: 
http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/quay.html. 
355 
depicted as inhabiting a realm isolated completely from the world where human 
awareness works. In Rudolph The Red-Nosed Reindeer, the discarded puppets as 
puppets after secondary animatic transition are shown to live in a physically 
isolated island, for toys alone, which I call perihuman. The island does not allow 
any living creatures to stay, and there is no exception for Yukon, Hermey and 
Rudolph, the human and animal characters marginalised in their own world, who 
happen to reach the perihuman realm. In both films, the puppets are depicted in 
the main to commit themselves to human interests: bringing an orange to the 
human toy maker’s sick daughter in the former, and longing for being owned and 
played with by human children in the latter.  
 In Street of Crocodiles, the puppet realm is in the awareness of the human 
keeper who does not look particular or exceptional, and this implies that the world 
can be exposed to any human beings only if they visit the theatre. Further, he is not 
surprised at the realm when looking at it through the construction. It is the 
inhabitants of the puppet realm who seem to be unaware of the other realm. They 
do not notice that they are observed by someone outside their realm, or it might be 
that they simply do not care about the outside. The Quays provide a noticeable hint 
of how insecticity can be related to the isolated-ness of the puppet realm which 
they envision: 
 
A little like when we observe the world of insects, and we wonder where 
the logic of their actions comes from. They can not talk to us to explain what 
they are doing; it is a bizarre miracle. So, watching one of our films is like 
observing the insect world. The same type of logic is found in the ballet, 
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where there is no dialogue and everything is based on the language of 
gestures, the music, the lighting, and the sound. (cited in Buchan 2011: 
114; emphasis mine).10  
 
In this comment, the filmmakers suggest that insecticity and the insectomorphic 
mode of movement function respectively as a concept and a parameter to construct 
a film world, using stop-motion animation, that is independent of and not 
motivated by human viewers’ interests, and further that exists outside human 
cognition. With the outsideness of a film world in mind, and reconsidering 
kinaesthetic insectomorphism, I proceed to clarify a non-anthropocentric logic of 
the actions and gestures that are shown by puppets and also objects working as the 
puppets’ functional equivalents, like screws and gears, in Street of Crocodiles. 
Besides the Schulz puppet, first, there are more puppet-as-puppet models 
with a human-like or animal-like appearance in the film. Featured among them are 
the models of tailor puppets,11 whose ceramic heads look alike; yet unlike the 
leading tailor puppet which has a torso and four limbs like a human being, each of 
the rest of them has the lower body part composed of a drawer, a box and small 
wheels. When the Schulz puppet comes to their place, the leading tailor puppet is 
shown to wind strings or threads on its arm from a pulley and then to seemingly 
make a gesture to tell the protagonist to enter there (Figure 5.11). In the place 
where threads and cloth are stored, the tailor puppets take out the plaster head 
 
10 Aita (2001) Brothers Quay: In Absentia. Totaro, Donato (trans.) Off-Screen. Available at: 
http://www.horschamp.qc.ca/new_offscreen/quay.html. 
11 For this way of referring to the puppets, I draw on Buchan (2011), and yet my use of the 
word, tailor, does not intend to signify any anthropomorphic role of the puppets in the film 
which is not motivated by narrative. 
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from the Schulz puppet to replace it with a ceramic head similar to, yet larger than 
their ceramic heads, while dressmaker pins stick themselves into the torso of the 
Schulz puppet. Further, they put fluff in the cavity of the ceramic head and then pull 
it out of it through the empty eye sockets, the mouth and the open top of the head.  
All the stop-motion animated actions of the tailor puppets and the 
dressmaker pins look like a kind of ritual performance, whose meaning is quite 
difficult for the viewers to grasp, because the narration of the film is parametric. 
Nonetheless, an anthropocentric viewer familiarised in the Puppetopos would seek 
to rank the tailor puppets at the top—as superior to the pins—in a supposed order 
of the realm of puppets and objects, in part because they have an anthropomorphic 
appearance. For example, when the Schulz puppet enters the tailors’ place, the 
Figure 5.11 A tailor puppet in Street of Crocodiles 
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leading tailor puppet opens a small box, from which several dressmaker pins come 
out to run along the right arm, shoulder and left arm of the tailor puppet (Figure 
5.12). In the convention of the Puppetopos, the viewer is quick to consider the 
anthropomorphic puppet to conjure and manipulate the pins without touching 
them, at the same time identifying the former as the master of the latter; the 
movement of pins on screen is reduced to the mastery of the anthropomorphic 
figure. However, the mastery of the tailor puppets over the pins and other 
materials becomes questionable in a later scene.  
After all the ritual performance with the Schulz puppet, each of the tailor 
puppets is shown to suddenly stop performing in an autonomous way with a 
variety of kinetic details and to begin repeating the rotation of an arm in a circular, 
mechanical fashion on the shoulder joint, with the head tilted limp (Figure 5.13a). 
The posture and the gesture make the puppets appear to be mechanical objects 
lacking consciousness and will. Their mode of movement looks similar to what I 
define to be the automatic mode (Subtype (c), Type One) in Group STM, which 
causes them to shift from the status of the anthropomorphic master of non-
anthropomorphic objects to that of an automaton in Descartes’ sense of the term. 
Figure 5.12 Tailor puppets and dressmaker pins in Street of Crocodiles 
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As I discussed in Chapter Four, a puppet-as-puppet model’s automatic mode of 
movement suggests that it is engaged in a clockwork mechanism or other higher 
power systems, from which its movement stems.  
However, no such mechanism or system is implied for the tailor puppets, 
as the entire emptiness of their heads is likely to thwart the viewers’ expectation 
that there might be any mechanically refined power source built in their outdated 
puppet bodies. A similar impression is made by a tailor puppet whose lower body 
is the wheeled box composed of a drawer and a glass chamber. Like the head, the 
drawer and the chamber seem to be all empty; mysteriously, further, the box is 
depicted as a transformer of materials in which a metal screw turns into a thread. 
Even when the kinetoscopic construction is considered to be a larger mechanism 
or system which is kept by human beings as higher powers, the tailor puppets are 
not depicted as connected to the system, for instance, through a cable.  
As a possible answer to the question of what is the power source for the 
tailor puppets’ movement that was once autonomous and is now automatic, a clue 
in close-up is given while the circular motion of the arms is repeated (Figure 
5.13b). It is a screw fixed in the shoulder joint of a tailor puppet whose arm rotates 
Figure 5.13 The tailor puppets and the screws in Street of Crocodiles; left (a), right (b) 
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in a circular way. In many scenes preceding the close-up of the screw, the metal 
materials of that sort are stop-motion animated to pull themselves out of window 
ledges, larger mechanical parts and wooden floors, to roll over and over as if 
running, to fall from above and even to fix themselves in floors. As mentioned in the 
Literature Review, Weihe describes the movement of the screws as an abstract 
artwork:  
 
It is shown in its essential ‘screwyness’ and observed merely for the sake 
of its specific grammar of movement—a left hand turn means appearing as 
a shape, a right-hand turn means disappearing into the wood” (2006: 45).  
 
This observation attempts to decontextualise the screws and their movements that 
are located in the complexity, heterogeneity and uncertainty of objects and forces. 
In my observation, the autonomy and directionality of locomotive movement 
impart to the screws the impression of being insects, for example, ants. 
Significantly, this impression of the screws is connected with a tailor puppet 
repeating the rotation of an arm by the shot, with a rack focus (Figure 5.14a -> b), 
Figure 5.14 The shot with a rack focus in Street of Crocodiles; left (a), right (b) 
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during which the focus of the lens shifts from a screw rotating by itself (in the 
foreground) to the screw fixed in the puppet’s shoulder joint (in the background). 
This shot suggests that all the autonomous movements of the screws might be a 
power source which enables the tailor puppets to perform their ritual and other 
acts.  
The tiny materials do not seem to be the sole power source. Given that they 
are transformed into strings/threads in the glass chambers of the tailor puppets, 
the latter can be said to have a power. In this sense, the strings moving through 
pulleys throughout the film move by themselves and further put the puppet realm 
into motion inside the construction, rather than being pulled by another power 
higher or larger than them. In the film, the screws and the strings function as a kind 
of agent, in other words, quasi-agents which have thing-powers in terms of Bennett 
(2010).  
In Jabberwocky, too, the puppets and objects are stop-motion animated to 
perform as quasi-agents, which make visible and bared the forces that they are 
exerted by and exerting on the animators as human agents in production. Even 
though being kept in one and the same room, however, they are presented on 
screen in a discrete way, in particular in terms of editing, so that their agentic 
capacities are disconnected in the film. In contrast to this case, in Street of 
Crocodiles puppets and objects are depicted to move and function in a loosely 
implied connection as if they have their own logic of engagement. The tailor 
puppets cannot move without the screws, and some of these metal parts are 
transformed into the strings through the glass chambers of the tailor puppets. 
Moving throughout the inside of the kinetoscopic construction, the strings move 
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the pulleys as well as being moved by them, which would stop moving without the 
screws. As a terminal of the chains of the movement, the leading tailor puppet 
winds strings on a spool by moving its arms; the winding force is delivered to 
something connected to the strings. In the chains where forces and energies are 
circulated from body to body, it is not easy for the viewers to identify what is the 
subject of the mysterious realm and whether one movement is the cause of the 
other.  
The chains of the quasi-agents and their agentic capacities in the film can 
be considered in terms of “distributive agency”, a central concept of vital 
materialism put forward by Bennett, who notes, “A theory of distributive agency, in 
contrast, does not posit a subject as the root cause of an effect” (2010: Kindle 883). 
The theory relates to another concept called “assemblage” by the philosopher, who 
states:  
 
[A]n idea I will put to work for a vital materialism, is this: bodies enhance 
their power in or as a heterogeneous assemblage. What this suggests for 
the concept of agency is that the efficacy or effectivity to which that term 
has traditionally referred becomes distributed across an ontologically 
heterogeneous field, rather than being a capacity localized in a human 
body or in a collective produced (only) by human efforts. (2010: Kindle 
672) 
 
This vital-materialist notion of agentic capacities distributed in heterogeneous, not 
only human but also non-human, bodies pertains to the sensibility in which the 
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Quay Brothers show the movements of things, ranging from a puppet to a tiny 
dandelion fluff in the film. Turning back to the detangling of the knotted string in 
the earlier scene (Figure 5.9) I discussed above, the string is not merely pulled by 
two forces of tension connected to its extremes—if so, it will become more tightly 
tangled, but also the fabric material detangles itself in its own capacity on the 
continuum of distributive agency in a heterogeneous field. Even such materials 
assume power inside the construction, and therefore the puppet realm should be 
renamed, for instance, the thing realm, where anthropomorphic puppets like the 
tailors lose privileges over non-anthropomorphic, non-puppet objects, both 
intervening in the way their realm operates. 
As suggested in the Quay Brothers’ above-mentioned comment about the 
insect world (cited in Buchan 2011: 114), the operating logic of the thing realm is 
unknown to the viewers. It is an embodiment of outsideness for and beyond them, 
even though visible on screen. In Street of Crocodiles, the sense of outsideness is 
also heightened by the events happening in a scientifically and experientially 
unusual direction. For example, an ice cube comes to appear from a puddle of 
water; and levitating in varying velocities and trajectories from the ground, 
dandelion fluffs gather around to form a dandelion clock. In terms of our everyday 
experience, these events are likely to take place in the opposite direction. Almost 
impossible is that a puddle of water turns into an ice cube without an ice cube tray 
even when the temperature suddenly reaches zero degrees Celsius, and that the 
fluffs soar up against gravity. These paraphysical events serve as cues implying that 
there is a twisted and contorted field of forces and energies in the thing realm. 
The theme of outsideness, or otherness, underlying the film gives impetus 
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for me to revisit the Schulz puppet in relation to the other puppets and objects that 
as discussed above, elude the definition of primary and secondary animatic 
transitions. What I attempt here is to question Weihe’s (2006: 45) description of 
the Schulz puppet’s booting-up as awakening from slumber. When the puppet 
begins to raise up the head, with the hand cut from the string by scissors, in the 
early scene, this inception of the puppet as a mover should not be simply reduced 
to such an anthropomorphic convention. For this reason, I also stress that the 
puppet’s mode of movement is more insectomorphic than anthropomorphic alone. 
In the film, the puppet seems to have constantly existed in the kinetoscopic 
construction even before the human keeper comes on stage, and therefore, it 
should be considered as a part of the thing realm in which puppets and objects 
Figure 5.15 The two puppets’ synchronised movement in Street of Crocodiles 
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move, function, act and intervene in assemblages.  
Its status is also suggested by two cues; one is the synchronised way in 
which the Schulz puppet and the leading tailor puppet move at the moment when 
the former is about to enter the latter’s place (Figure 5.15). The tailor puppet in the 
foreground moves in the same way, almost at the same time, as the Schulz puppet 
moves in the background, and in particular, their synchronisation of body 
movement is shown to happen side by side, while the one is not looking at the 
other. Both seem to be in a degree connected with each other. The other cue is that 
the Schulz puppet picks and keeps a screw in a striped box (Figure 5.16). The 
screw is taken from the puppet and later replaced with a “screw shoe” by the tailor 
puppets, which are to transform the metal part into strings/threads. This exchange 
Figure 5.16 A screw into the box of the Schulz puppet in Street of Crocodiles 
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of objects implies that the former is as much engaged in an agentic function as are 
the tailor puppets. The Schulz puppet is part of the thing realm. 
Here, it should be remembered that the Schulz puppet boots up when the 
human keeper is about to peep into the thing realm in the kinetoscopic 
construction, and the viewers are initially given cues, like an over-the-shoulder-
shot and the keeper’s point-of-view shot, to see the mysterious realm as what is 
seen through his eyes. In this sense, the realm itself can be said to be what a 
kinetoscope film portrays inside the viewing device. In an interview,12 the Quay 
Brothers make clear that they intended the human keeper’s saliva to be a 
replacement of a coin as the admission fee (cited in Buchan 2011: 180). In other 
words, what we and the keeper see is not the thing realm itself but rather, the 
filmic image of it.  
The kinetoscope film—fictitious as created by the Quay Brothers for Street 
of Crocodiles—of the thing realm is full of incomprehensible events, while it is 
certain that the objects appearing in the film did and might still exist somewhere in 
the real world. This perceptual conflict between the events and the object pertains 
to the concept of a cinema of apprehension put forward by Buchan (2013) in her 
essay on Street of Crocodiles. Buchan notes that the concept brings spectatorship to 
focus in this way: 
 
I develop a somatic, epistemological and aesthetic proposal for the 
viewer's reaction to these vitalist machines: what I call ‘a cinema of 
 
12 Buchan indicates the source of their comment: Bradley Rust Gray (unpaginated) The audible 
filament [Hearing the Brothers Quay]. Unpublished Thesis (undated, no pagination). 
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apprehension’, a performative and actively engaged paradigm of 
spectatorship for puppet animation distinct from live-action cinema, and 
animistic animation.13 (2011: 14).  
 
Importantly, the quality of a cinema of apprehension is doubled by the framing 
device of the film, which is the live-action human keeper peeping into the 
kinetoscope in the theatre. On the one hand, we are basically located as the viewers 
of the whole film, and on the other, triggered to identify with the human keeper’s 
view point by the techniques of camerawork and editing, we come to perform the 
viewers of the kinetoscope film in the film diegesis. The concept should be applied 
to the kinetoscope film seen by him and also us, the viewers, as well as to the whole 
film of Street of Crocodiles. 
With this doubled cinema of apprehension in mind, and in order to clarify 
how it affects the viewers in the real world, I draw on what Gunning (2007) calls 
the mode of apprehension in his essay about photographs of “ghosts”. Here, it 
should be remembered that as indicated in the Literature Review, the concepts and 
discourses about ghosts have not only referred to human beings but also objects or 
artefacts. Gunning states: 
 
Spirit Photography juxtaposes physical presence with its contrary, a 
phantom-like transformation of the human body that does not remove it 
from our vision but does render it somehow unreal. Instead of simply 
 
13 In my reading, Buchan’s term of animistic animation intends to distinguish the Quays’ non-
anthropomorphic puppet animation from two dimensional, cel-based, hand-drawn animation 
in which the discourse of something-coming-to-life prevails. 
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being present, the phantom occupies the ontologically ambiguous status of 
“haunting”—enduring and troubling in its uncanny claim on our 
awareness and sense of presence yet also unfamiliar and difficult to 
integrate into everyday space and time. (2007: 100) 
 
Like Gunning’s, my focus is on the juxtaposition of the materially extant bodies, as 
physical presence, of the puppets and other objects in Street of Crocodiles, with the 
immaterial, or quasi-material, movements which transform the bodies into 
something even unreal and paraphysical, ranging from the insectomorphic 
behaviours of the Schulz puppet with a human-like appearance to the reverse 
motion of the melting ice cube.  
This ghost-like movement of the sub/nonhuman bodies can be viewed 
from Crow’s (2006: 49-50) account that such gestures or body movements are 
ghosts possessing bodies in motion and moving from body to body in circulation. 
Citing film scholar Lesley Stern,14 Crow suggests gestures as “wandering homeless 
ghosts [that] take up residence in alien bodies, there to play out the repetition is 
their destiny” (p.49). In this sense, both the puppet and the object in Street of 
Crocodiles are possessed by ghosts, which we see on screen in an irresistible 
attraction and in an irremovable suspicion, that is, in apprehension.  
The sense of apprehension is heightened by the ambiguous cues likely to 
be taken by a viewer as live action. The cues allude to a live human being existing in 
the thing realm (despite his or her awareness that it is impossible in terms of  
 
14 Crow indicates the source of this citation: Lesley Stern (2002) Putting on a show, or the 
ghostliness of gesture. Sense of Cinema, July-August. Available at: 
http://www.senseofcinema.com/contents/02/21/sd_stern.html. 
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scale) at the diegetic level, or to a human agent intervening therein, for 
manipulating in live action rather than for animating, at the profilmic level. For 
example, the rubber band is shown to be quickly released from the state of tension 
(Figure 5.17a), and the motion vector and the trajectory of the release arouses in a 
viewer the sensation that there might have existed a human agent to exert force on 
the object whose elasticity is too difficult a physical property for him or her to 
control for frame-by-frame photography. The effect of this kinetic cue does not 
remain at the profilmic level but goes so far as to evoke in the viewer a feeling that 
a “real” human being has just left there at the diegetic level.  
Another example is the human (possibly female) hand caressing or 
stroking the breasts of a female effigy (Figure 5.17b). As no clear cue is given for 
identification of whether it was animated or shot in live action, the moving hand 
figure of subtle nuances stimulates a viewer to suspect that it might be a real 
human being’s and accordingly, that in the thing realm there might be a human 
being (or actor) who is as large/small as the puppets and objects, thereby 
disturbing the normal sense of scale that they are familiarised with in the 
convention of the Puppetopos. It is because if the female effigy is as large as a 
Figure 5.17 The rubber band and the effigy in Street of Crocodiles; left (a), right (b) 
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human being, the other puppets and objects as its functional equivalent might be 
by far larger than the viewers expect.  
However, neither of the human beings presents him/herself on screen, but 
rather is seemingly marginalised in terms of the agentic role and capacity both at 
the profilmic and diegetic levels. In the former aspect, unlike the human agents 
playing demiurgic life-giving creators of their puppet-as-puppet figures in Group 
INT, the Quay Brothers do not intend to assume such a capacity. Instead, they seek 
to evoke the material, formal and functional capacities that are unique and 
inherent to the rubber band and other objects they touch and are touched by. This 
serves to make those objects on screen look as if they are not processed but are 
presented as they are, even when cognitive dissonance happens to the viewers 
seeing their incomprehensible movements and events in the thing realm as a 
kinetoscope film.  
As discussed with the case of the rotoscoped hand-drawn figure, Koko the 
Clown, in Chapter Two, the ambiguous figure of the human hand (Figure 5.17b) 
carries uncanny implications in terms of humanness and its “felt totality” (Grodal 
1997: 110). As the film does not clearly show the diegetic identity and the material 
property of the hand figure, the question of whose hand the figure can be brings 
me to two possible answers, each creating a resultant sensation of difference in a 
viewer to whom the fragmented figure of the body part seems to be in live action. 
First, it is the female effigy that stokes the breasts with the hand which seems to be 
a female one. The effigy is the hybrid of an inorganic body alive with an organic 
arm, and this is likely to arouse a sense of horror (as well as a sensual effect) in the 
viewer concerned that the rest of the original human body is lost in the thing 
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realm. The other possibility is that a human woman exists in the thing realm where 
human beings are not given the status of a master or ruler; rather, they are the 
subjects of the tailor puppets whose place is full of anatomical illustrations of 
human bodies. In either case, humanness and its bodily totality are seriously 
threatened by the tailor puppets or other nonhuman agents amputating and 
suturing human body parts in the same way as the head of the Schulz puppet.  
The film does not enable the viewers to find a place for anthropocentric 
comfort even in the human realm where the keeper peeps into the thing realm. 
Above all, the keeper does not assume the entirety of humanness when dropping 
saliva, instead of inserting a coin, into the kinetoscope (Figure 5.18a). The saliva 
associates him with a bug which vomits saliva, and this association leads to the 
flies appearing in the thing realm; one is shown scurrying and flitting around a 
bottle (Figure 5.18b), and the other is put by a tailor puppet on the mouth of the 
Schulz puppet whose head has just been replaced with another. This association of 
his saliva with those flies15 locates even the human keeper somewhere, with the 
 
15 It is also reported that associated with magical effect, human saliva was employed for rituals 
 
Figure 5.18 The keeper’s saliva and a fly in Street of Crocodiles; left (a), right (b) 
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wall becoming diaphanous, between both realms. In this sense, the whole film of 
Street of Crocodile is a doubled cinema of apprehension. 
 
 
5.3. Puppets and Puppeteers as Serving Agents in The Demon 
 
Extending from the discussions and findings with the two previous cases, this 
section foregrounds the vital-materialist view of things as an “intervener”. Viewed 
from this perspective, it is not only animators but also objects and materials that 
take part in the process of creating movements in animation film. In the case of The 
Demon, the animator Kawamoto borrows the sensibility and the kinetic vocabulary 
of intervening puppets from bunraku in which human puppeteers have developed 
a non-anthropocentric, object-oriented relationship with puppets for centuries. 
This relationship is influenced and concretised by the material constitution and 
mechanical structure of puppet bodies, the system of puppeteering them, and the 
structure of the stage on which both puppeteers and puppets perform. In terms of 
puppets themselves, I also consider it within religio-philosophical contexts like 
Shintoism in Japan.16 With these traditions in mind, I analyse the case to illuminate 
theurgic agency which Kawamoto demonstrates in stop-motion animation. 
Based on one of the Japanese collection of tales, Konjaku Monogatari, 
written in the twelfth century at the latest, The Demon involves three puppets, in 
 
in China, Arabia, Greece and Ethiopia (Best 1976). My analysis of the human keeper’s saliva 
focuses on the Quays’ interest in insects and Buchan’s account of insecticity.  
16 It should be noted that Shintoism is not a discrete religion but has been combined or mixed 
with Buddhism over centuries (Ama 1996). This combination is usually called shibutsu-shugo 
(syncretism of kami and buddhas).  
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human form, stop-motion animated to perform respectively as two brothers and 
their old mother. What I am much concerned with is that in the film the director 
and animator Kawamoto sought to employ the puppet design of bunraku, a form of 
traditional Japanese puppet theatre (Okada 1998a: 148; Anonymous 2007: 39). 
The employment of the design of bunraku puppets implicates a way which the 
director took in exploring the movements of puppet bodies in stop-motion 
animation. In terms of puppets’ body movement, Kawamoto states: 
 
The point is not to make it [the movement of the puppet] look like human, 
but create it . . . This issue is similar to that of bunraku. In their early days, 
bunraku puppeteers tried to make the movements of puppets close to 
those of human beings, but it was impossible. Instead, they turned to 
seeking the essence of movement by excluding unnecessary movements. 
(2015: 113; English translation mine) 
 
Here, Kawamoto emphasises that a puppet’s performance should not be an 
imitation of a human being’s, but rather be created or found in a proper way to the 
puppet itself. In this vein, the body movements of the three puppets in The Demon 
are, as I will show in this section, intended to build on those of the bunraku 
puppets, thereby not representing those of human beings while demonstrating a 
non-anthropocentric sensibility of objects in human form. This is why I classify 
them as puppet-as-puppet models in Group PMT. 
 In an early part of The Demon, one of the most distinct, unconventional 
body movements is seen when the two brothers walk heading to a forest for 
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hunting deer (Figure 5.19). Each puppet’s walking is presented with the arm and 
leg joints functioning as the pivots of the locomotive movement. The right lower 
arm is put horizontally across the belly while being bent at the elbow almost 
perpendicular to the right upper arm. The left arm seems to be kept perpendicular 
to the ground while being slightly bent at the left elbow as if some strain is applied 
to the body parts. The two legs of each puppet are bent at the knees raised up in 
varying degrees. With this stylised form of posture kept and also with the right and 
left legs alternately moving up and down, the two puppets begin to walk forward 
frame left, but do not show any change, any progress in location when viewed in 
relation to the background elements on screen. Quite synchronised between both 
puppets, the walking movement is intended to highlight their presence (on screen) 
Figure 5.19 The two brothers walking in The Demon; clockwise from the top left 
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as performers rather than imitating the way in which a human being walks.  
This kind of body movement is seen in what is called roppo, a pattern of 
body movement (kata) which while moving ahead, a puppet displays with the arms 
and legs in bunraku. When I asked if roppo signifies walking in the interview with 
me, the leader and puppeteer of the ningyo-joruri troupe named Saruhachi-za, 
Hachirobei Nishihashi17 noted, “So to speak, when a puppet asserts itself as if 
saying, ‘Here I am’” (2019). The roppo-style walking is employed to give a strong 
impression of “being-there-ness” to bunraku puppets on stage. 
Tied in with the bunraku-style design and the roppo-style walking 
movement of the puppets, the background serves to evoke the presence of a 
different type of agency on screen. In particular, it lacks the ground on which the 
puppets should be made to step, and therefore, in the roppo-style movement, their 
bodies appear to be hovering or floating in mid-air. Given the theatricality of the 
bunraku puppetry, this impression of levitation stimulates the viewers to remind 
themselves of the bunraku puppets hoisted against gravity by puppeteers in the 
stage set which instead of the floor for puppets to step on, holds the pit (funazoko) 
that is hidden behind the waist-high partition (tesuri) between the stage and the 
audience.  
In the pit, bunraku puppeteers normally manipulate puppets by pushing 
them upward manually or with rods. Further, a bunraku puppet for a leading role 
 
17 After studying theatre studies in Waseda University, Nishihashi began bunraku puppetry 
training under Minosuke Yoshida in 1970 and worked as a bunraku puppeteer with the stage 
name of Minoshi Yoshida for nine years. In 1979 when he left the bunraku world, he moved to 
the island of Sado, where old forms of performing arts have remained for several centuries, and 
he has since then been engaged in bunya ningyo, an old form of Japanese puppetry. In 1995, he 
launched his own puppetry troupe, Saruhachi-za, to revive Buddhist storytelling art, while 
collaborating with old forms of Japanese music and Western music.  
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involves three puppeteers: the main puppeteer (omozukai) hoists the upper body 
of the puppet with his left hand inserted into the chest through the hole in the back 
of the torso while his right hand supports and controls the right hand (Adachi 
1985: 34; Gross 2011: 70); using a control rod, the left puppeteer (hidarizukai) is 
responsible for the left hand (Adachi 1985: 34); the leg puppeteer (ashizukai) 
supports and manipulates the legs and feet with his hands (p.51). In addition, the 
bodies of the three puppeteers are clothed in black as if they are part of the 
background or the shadows of the puppets,18 except that the main puppeteer 
exposes his face without the black hood on. 
For example, the puppet of the leading character Kamiya is manipulated to 
walk in mid-air (See the puppet with a white hood on in Figure 5.20), when he 
hangs around the Gay Quarter at the beginning of Scene Two in the bunraku play 
Shinju Ten No Amijima (The love suicides at Amijima).19 As a result, the leading 
 
18 Shutaro Miyake (2005: 302) notes that the puppeteers clad from head to toe in black can be 
regarded as the shadows of the puppets operated by them on stage.  
19 This bunraku play is included in NHK (2008) NHK Special: Ningen Kokuho Futari, Yoshida 
Tamao Takemoto Sumitayu (NHK Special: Two Living National Treasures, Yoshida Tamao and 
Takemoto Sumitayu) (DVD). NSDS-11876. NHK Enterprises. 
Figure 5.20 Kamiya walking in the bunraku play Shinju Ten No Amijima 
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puppet appears to drift or hover with all the main body parts constantly supported 
up by the vectors of forces working in the opposite direction to gravity. Not given 
any floor in a literal sense, the puppet bodies hoisted to move create the sensation 
of anti-gravitational levitation.  
In the marionette theatre, forces surrounding and working on puppet 
bodies create a different sensation of force field. In The Nut Cracker,20 for example, 
we can see the legs of a boy puppet limp when they touch the stage floor (Figure 
5.21) in the introductory scene where several wooden puppets of boys and girls 
dance in front of the entrance of Clara’s residence on Christmas Eve. Such limpness 
is due to the reaction force that the floor imparts on the puppet’s feet which at the 
same time are imparting an action force on it from the falling motion of the wooden 
body parts. The strings set to the puppet body do not seem to be able to control all 
 
20 This marionette play is included in Salzburg Marionette Theatre (2012) The 
Nutcracker/Casse-noisette (DVD). 10132. Bel Air Edition.  
Figure 5.21 A marionette on the ground in The Nut Cracker 
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the body parts at the same time against the reaction force from the floor and the 
force of gravity. 
The kinetic sensation of levitation experienced in the bunraku puppetry is 
simulated by the puppets of the brothers which in The Demon are shown moving, 
with the black blank background functioning to nullify the very concept of a 
ground; this kind of body movement is also shown in the subsequent scene in 
which they go up a hill. It is via this sensation that the background evokes the 
presence of heterogeneous agency. At the profilmic level of the film, the floating 
movement of the puppet bodies cannot happen without the intervention of human 
agents. Here, the focus is the very sensation of floating rather than the moving 
puppets, which evokes the presence of (simulated) bunraku or bunraku-style 
puppeteers, as well as stop-motion animators, as human agents invisible on screen.  
Some readers might remind themselves that unlike the film, The Demon, 
the bunraku theatre allows puppeteers to appear and perform alongside puppets 
on stage. The very presence of the human agents in bunraku is a key to clarify the 
way in which the film activates the heterogeneous spectatorship to defamiliarise 
the convention of human agency easy to experience in the Puppetopos. Observing 
the bunraku puppeteers’ onstage visibility in relation to spectatorship, Dassia N. 
Posner remarks: 
 
Particularly in performance modes where the puppeteer is fully visible, 
such as bunraku, most of the pleasure in watching lies in the mind’s 
oscillations between remembering and forgetting that the puppeteer is 
there, between believing in and marveling at the fiction being created. 
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(2014: Kindle 5746) 
 
This account points out that the viewer’s mind can shift at any time between the 
two opposite modes, remembering and forgetting, in terms of the onstage visibility 
of human agency. In other words, the bunraku machinery has capacity to activate a 
perceptual processor in the viewer’s mind, which can marginalise something 
visible to disappear out of sight. Such a perceptual process is shown by the 
experiment which a psychologist Dobromir Rahnev and his research team 
conducted to find how the frontal cortex involved in thinking and making decisions 
operates with respect to visual perception (Georgia Institute of Technology 2016). 
In the report, “Out of mind, out of sight”, about the result achieved from their 
experiment, the researchers indicate, “Sometimes the frontal cortex isn't expecting 
to see something, so although it's in plain sight, it blots it out of consciousness” 
(Georgia Institute of Technology 2016).  
In Kawamoto’s film, The Demon, the cue of levitation triggers in the reverse 
direction the perceptual event which is supposed to happen in viewing a bunraku 
play. During the event, a viewer’s mind alternates between apprehending that 
there might be a human agent somewhere behind the puppets in the dark and 
recognising that there is nothing but the human-like objects on screen. When the 
presence of a human agent comes into a viewer’s perceptual scope, the supposed 
agency does not only involve stop-motion animating. It also implies puppeteering 
because such human agency is evoked by the puppets’ bunraku-style body 
movements—these are of course constructed using the technique of stop-motion 
animation—throughout the film.  
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As I observed with the roppo walking above, the bunraku-style body 
movements are not imitative of human beings but rather in the filmmaker’s 
puppet-oriented intention, are proper or inherent to each puppet body. Here, I 
analyse two examples of the puppet-specific body movement which demonstrates 
the animator Kawamoto’s intention that is to evoke the sensation of puppeteering. 
In the scene where the younger brother is in danger with his head grabbed by a 
demon (Figure 5.22a), the elder brother tries to help him. Given that the former is 
spatially set left while the latter right in the scene, the viewers motivated by 
narrative are likely to expect for the elder brother’s eyes to follow the direction to 
the upper right of the frame. However, his eyes are seemingly cast in different 
Figure 5.22 The directions in which the elder brother is looking in The Demon;  
top left (a), top left (b), bottom left (c), bottom right (d) 
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directions: upper left (Figure 5.22b); upper right (Figure 5.22c); lower left; and 
almost straight toward the camera (Figure 5.22d). The puppet’s aimless, vacant 
eyes are subject to the movement of the head turning around on the neck, which 
can perplex the viewers familiarised with the anthropomorphic movement of 
puppets’ eyeballs or other relevant body parts to provide the impression of gazing. 
This disorienting movement of the puppet’s gaze can be said to be a kind of 
figurative performance in Crafton’s (2013) use of the term, which is for the most 
part due to the structure of the bunraku puppet body. Although some puppets for 
leading roles in bunraku are equipped with the movable eyes, mouth and 
eyebrows,21 the neck is still a central joint part on which a puppeteer can swing, 
wobble and shake the head of a puppet, by means of a thick rod and elastic strings 
that are built in the head of most puppets.  
 In the same scene, Kawamoto employs another body movement unique to 
the bunraku puppeteering. Just before the demon appears stealthily, the elder 
brother puppet is stop-motion animated to show instructive gestures when telling 
the younger brother puppet to do something for deer hunting. In the course of the 
gestures, the puppet’s right hand on screen is raised up higher than expected and 
then, as if pulled by an elastic rubber band, is slightly moved up and down the 
point where an instruction is shown with the index finger (Figure 5.23). Such a 
vibrating pause for quite a short period of time is seen between the two opposite 
vectors of momentum whenever the hand-and-arm movement is presented as a 
unit of gesture. This is an influence from the bunraku puppeteering usually 
 
21 In addition, Adachi points out that in bunraku, “many heads do not have mobile faces” 
(1985: 34). 
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involving three operators for one puppet. In the interview when I inquired how the 
bunraku puppeteering is related to the pause, Nishihashi explained: 
 
In the case of bunraku, one puppet is manipulated by three puppeteers. It 
means that the main puppeteer needs to send the left or the leg puppeteer 
the signs that he will move on to the next action, and I think the signs 
result in the pause. For instance, he should first pull the puppet’s head to 
the left slightly before he brings the puppet to the right. And he first pulls 
the head to the right a bit when he wants the left puppeteer to raise the 
puppet’s left hand. This slight movement cues the left puppeteer to 
prepare himself to raise the left hand. (2019; English translation mine) 
Figure 5.23 The elder brother’s gestures (left) in The Demon; clockwise from the top left 
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This bunraku-specific trajectory of body movement emulated in The Demon relates 
to Kawamoto’s non-anthropocentric view of the relationship between animator 
and animated. In an interview with Emiko Okada, Kawamoto makes a religio-
philosophical, Shintoist remark of what puppets are: 
 
They might be the most mysterious thing that human beings have ever 
made. We would be in trouble without them, even if there is no difference 
whether we have them or not. They might be something that fills the 
emptiness inexplicable in human mental life. Puppets would become 
necessary as a medium between the human world (ningenkai) and the 
spirit world (reikai). (Okada 1998b: 159; English translation mine) 
 
Here, the stop-motion animator and puppet maker notes that puppets are more 
than simply objects, which go beyond human beings’ comprehension. His 
indication of puppets’ capacity to engage in the human world echoes the concept of 
thing-power that Bennett (2010) seeks to establish in her vital-materialist 
consideration of nonhuman—or quite-not-human in Bennett’s (2010) sense of this 
term—things as quasi-agents and interveners between the human realm and 
beyond. Shintoism is not located so far from the scope of the philosopher, who 
defines vital materialism as “a doctrine has affinities with several nonmodern (and 
often discredited) modes of thought, including animism, the Romantic quest for 
Nature, and vitalism” (Bennett 2010: 243).  
Kawamoto goes so far as to reverse the anthropocentric view of the role of 
384 
animators working with puppets. Probably in terms of the conventional discourse 
of animation as bringing something to life, Okada asks in the interview with 
Kawamoto what it means to impart life to them when they are like yorishiro. 
According to the Shinto priest Yamakage, the Shintoist term, yorishiro, signifies “a 
spiritual antenna for the spirit of kami to descend in order to manifest its 
presence” (2006: 66). He adds, “There are several types of yorishiro, including 
trees, stones, rocks, or in some cases animals” (p.66). Further, hitokata, albeit 
“inorganic” objects, are considered to function as yorishiro, which are the relatives 
of ningyo (human simulacra) in the Japanese language and religious tradition. The 
principal view of life and kami in Shintoism is outlined by Yamakage, who writes: 
 
Japanese spirituality has always recognized that Kami come in different 
forms, shapes and sizes and have different roles and functions. The 
spiritual dimension, the world of Kami, permeates all life forms, including 
humans, animals, and plants. All forms of life are interconnected and 
interdependent. (2006: 210) 
 
Okada’s use of the term, life, is likely to rely on this Shintoist view, in which 
yorishiro can be said to become a life form when kami dwells in the ritual object. 
What I am much concerned with here is not the problematic term, life, which 
Okada refers to, but the way in which Kawamoto redefines the role of animators 
within the context of filmmaking. Kawamoto answers her question: 
 
I think that life is inherent to each puppet when it is made. That is to say, it 
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already has life, and a puppet animation film finally comes into being when 
all the film crew, including animators and the lighting department, get 
engaged in helping the life radiate. (Okada 1998b: 159-160; English 
translation mine) 
 
In his redefinition, animators are not expected to add to a puppet something 
crucial, often called “life” in the convention of both the Tooniverse and the 
Puppetopos, that would make it perform a diegetic role motivated by narrative. 
Rather, they should serve as co-agents, or co-intervenors, for each puppet to reveal 
something, inherent to itself, to the degree that the (human) viewers can notice 
something that would often trigger them to call it life or soul.  
In consideration of the two more groups of human agents for music and 
verbal narration, as well as puppeteers, in bunraku, Keene finds in much the same 
tone as Kawamoto that the bunraku puppeteer: 
 
does not use the puppet to express his own conceptions; he enables it to 
express its own emotions by imparting the strength of his body. We can 
forget his presence more easily than a chanter’s or a samisen player’s 
because he is hardly more than an extension of the puppet. He should be as 
impersonal as the electric current which indifferently makes a train run on 
its tracks . . . (1990: 159).  
 
This is also the sense in which as the director and sole animator of The Demon, 
Kawamoto cites bunraku for the design and body movement of puppets. The 
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traditional Japanese puppet play is rich with such impersonal styles and patterns 
(kata), which entails the puppet-specific trajectories of bodies, that he believes 
should be central to the aesthetics of puppet animation. As the animator 
comments, “Therefore, performance proper to puppets should not be realistic but 
stylistic” (Okada 1998a: 148).  
In the film, Kawamoto’s stylistic strategy of stop-motion animation helps 
the puppets elude the definition of primary and secondary animatic transitions. It 
does not intend to provide the perfection of puppets imitating human body 
movements as a demonstration of the human mastery of inert objects. Walking and 
gesturing on screen in a human-like, yet bunraku-inspired, fashion, the puppets of 
the brothers under my analysis stimulate the sensation, or apprehension, that 
behind them might be human agents, staying invisible and impersonal, who in their 
capacity of theurgic agency, are supposed to help the objects present themselves in 
front of the viewers’ eyes. 
This kind of sensibility put forward and demonstrated by Kawamoto is 
what Bennett finds in human agents working with objects and materials in 
different professional fields: “Instead of a formative power detachable from matter, 
artisans (and mechanics, cooks, builders, cleaners, and anyone else intimate with 
things) encounter a creative materiality with incipient tendencies and propensities, 
which are variably enacted depending on the other forces, affects, or bodies with 
which they come into close contact”(2010: Kindle 1267). In this vital-materialist 
account, the scholar stresses that objects and materials have their own potential 
energy of creativity, which will come to take a form in interaction with human 
agents. In Okada’s recollection, indeed, Kawamoto, who himself sculpts and makes 
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puppets, said, “When I make the head of Komei [a puppet’s role name], it sounds as 
if the puppet says to me, ‘This is not my face’” (Okada 1998b: 160).  
My focus is not to reduce the animator and puppet maker’s artistry to a 
specific, known-as-Japanese, view of puppets and objects. Rather, I have sought to 
place his way of stop-motion animating within a larger philosophical locus of vital 
materialism which can extend to Shintoism or East Asian thinking. Kawamoto’s 
film, The Demon, shows that puppets’ body movements already lie in the bodies, 
the materials of which they are made and the way in which the materials are 
incorporated into a body, and it suggests that stop-motion animators should find 





In this PhD thesis, I have examined and analysed the puppet-as-puppet figures, 
classified into four Groups, in terms of the mode of movement, while questioning 
and problematising two conventional notions: (1) animation can bring anything to 
life, and (2) in animation, movement is synonymous with life. In conducting this 
research, I have made explicit contributions to animation studies, which I 
summarise as follows.  
First, through this research I developed demonstrably well-defined 
terminology and methodology both of which were applied to the analysis of the 
puppet-as-puppet figures and their movements on screen. As my analysis 
embraces the figures signifying not only puppets-as-puppets but also humans and 
animals, I have demonstrated that the terminology and methodology I have 
proposed is applicable to a wider range of figures in animation. In particular, 
primary and secondary animatic transitions function to clarify the different modes 
of movement (including the stationary state) displayed by the puppet-as-puppet 
figures in animation, as well as to distinguish them from live action, thereby 
shedding light on the specifics of movement which cannot be simply reduced to a 
unitary concept of movement. A further application of the two terms is that the 
element of transition included in them stresses the changeability of the mode of 
movement imparted to a figure in animation. As shown in my analysis, most of the 
puppet-as-puppet figures display the change between different modes of 
movement in time, and this has a significant effect on the impression of each figure 
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being perceived as animate or inanimate, and frequently oscillating between both.  
In addition to the above, I furthered the development of the methodology 
which, expanding on extant theories, works in a specific and proper way for 
animation. Given that animation studies has suffered from the multifaceted-ness of 
animated figures and visuals, being created with a variety of techniques of 
animation, I demonstrated the effect and validity of my methods of classification 
and typology that I applied to the analysis of the puppet-as-puppet figures. 
Furthermore, I progressed the use of neoformalist film analysis and film vector 
analysis for animation studies, particularly in terms of describing, analysing and 
interpreting the not-narrative-motivated movement of three-dimensional figures 
as a parametric device, in relation to gravity and other forces. In doing so, I also 
made clear that the vector quantity described by both a magnitude and a direction 
is far more effective than the scalar quantity described by a magnitude alone in the 
analysis of animated movement. I am sure that the systematised terminology, 
taxonomy and methodology I have set out in the thesis will make a significant and 
influential contribution to future research in animation studies and other fields of 
the studies related to moving images as well. 
Another aspect of my work is the application of this systematised 
terminology and methodology to my case studies. I have sought to emphasise that 
the impression referred to as life or coming-to-life in animation studies is not 
monosemic but polysemic, and therefore, that the specific movements of animated 
figures require scholarly investigation rather than reliance on clichéd and reductive 
general terms such as “life”, “soul” or “anima”. Indeed, my analysis proves that the 
meanings of figural movement in animation can be examined with respect to the 
390 
parameter of the mode which demonstrates the concepts implied by the figure 
itself and the context where it is located. For example, the puppet as one of my 
critical foci led to the examination of how the modes of movement displayed by 
some puppet-as-puppet figures in narrative-motivated films are deeply influenced 
by and reproduce the Cartesian view of humans, animals and machines. 
By conducting the case studies in Chapter Two, I sought to supersede the 
neoformalist assumption of human agency by redefining the self-figuration of 
animators as a demiurgic creator. Importantly, Chapter Four demonstrates the 
difficulty of considering animators as the “sole origin” in the creation of animated 
figures’ movement. In tactile manipulation and interaction, rather, the human 
agents’ bodies are often possessed by the models which they seek to make re-
perform as puppets per se on screen in sub/nonhuman modes of body movement. 
At the same time, some of the human agents inflect, contest, modify, revise and 
develop, on screen and in shooting, the sensibilities of movement by animating 
hand-drawn figures or built models. I also proved in Chapter Five that we need 
another concept of “theurgic” for animators who do not claim to be the sole 
demiurgic creator of a figure in animation. 
 
These findings serve to clarify the problems with the two key notions I set out 
above: (1) animation can bring something and even anything to life, and (2) 
movement has a synonymous relationship with life in animation. In order to 
demonstrate the problematics of these, I developed and worked with three main 
hypotheses focused on the puppet-as-puppet figure: (1) the puppet-as-puppet 
figure is depicted as different from the figure representing a human or an 
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(anthropomorphic) animal in the diegetic world of the animation film and also the 
hybrid film of animation and live action, (2) this difference is visualised by the 
movement, as well as the form, of the figure, and (3) the mode of movement 
interrelates with how the animator or human agent envisages the figure both in 
production and in projection. An additional hypothesis is that such human 
involvement with the puppet-as-puppet figure in animation is grounded in the 
discourses and traditions about the definition of humanity and puppets as human 
simulacra. With these hypotheses in mind, I analysed the cases I selected as 
emblematic from each of the four Groups from Chapters Two to Five.  
In Chapter Two, I analysed a selection of films from Group INT 
(Interaction), in which the live-action human animator creates and interacts with a 
hand-drawn human or animal simulacrum on screen. Both in Gertie the Dinosaur 
and the Out of the Inkwell series, each animator on screen is depicted in his 
demiurgic performance to achieve the perfection of life creation using the 
techniques of hand-drawn animation (and the Rotoscope also, in the latter case). 
My analysis proved that the animator does not consider the human/animal 
simulacra to be alive because of the way in which they are dealt with and exploited 
on the grounds of the material reality that they are hand-drawn. In particular, I 
clarified that in the Out of the Inkwell series, the hand-drawn figure Koko is 
depicted to look and move as if a fairy-tale slave, a robot, an animal and a 
mechanical toy. Also, it proved that such sub/nonhuman traits of the Koko figure 
are cued in a concoction of theriomorphic and mechanicomorphic, as well as 
anthropomorphic, modes of movement. Depicting his drawn figure in this way, the 
live-action human animator Max Fleischer envisions himself as a Taylorist engineer 
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who aims at the mechanical (re)production system of drawing and animating 
figures. Following these findings, I proceeded to analyse the hand-drawn human-
like figure, appearing in Manipulation as a recent case, which is depicted to resist 
being its animator-creator’s marionette and to survive his decision of discarding it 
for his artistic ambition. The analysis revealed that the film focuses in a self-
reflexive way on the animator’s unfulfilled mastery over his unfinished creation 
and on the hand-drawn human figure which without appearing in a completed film, 
is disposed of as materials useless to the human agent. From this analysis of Group 
INT, I succeeded in elucidating the conventional power relationship which the 
animator in production is likely to form with his or her human-like or animal-like 
figures as materials or puppets for animation filmmaking. 
The focus in Chapter Three was on a selection of the conventional, 
narrative-motivated cel-based animation films which I classified in Group CEL, 
drawing on Crafton’s concept of the Tooniverse. Considering the vastness of this 
Group, I developed a typology to help articulate the specificity of each case, in 
accordance with the key criteria, (1) primary and secondary animatic transitions 
and (2) interaction with other characters, both considered in relation to the mode 
of movement and narrative motivation. Particularly in the case of the first criterion, 
my experience of film viewing as well as the literature review led me to put 
forward three factors, (1) shifting to a different world, (2) magic and (3) 
technology, for the happening of secondary animatic transition which I define as 
being tied in with the film narrative. Interestingly, each of the three factors also 
relates to the convention in which animation itself is referred to as imagination, 
magic and technology in the Tooniverse, and these are narrativised in the 
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animation films motivated by the narrative of puppets and human/animal 
simulacra.  
Examining the case(s) of each of the eight Types (with the three Subtypes 
included in Type One) in terms of the mode of movement, I showed that the two 
problematic notions ignore and marginalise the capacity of animation which can 
make human-like or animal-like figures appear to be inanimate objects on screen 
and the complexity of the relationship between the mode of movement and the 
impression of life.  
First, although the cue, passive or automatic, of movement for primary 
animatic transition is given to the puppet-as-puppet figures in Group CEL, they do 
not provide any impression of “coming-to-life” but remain non-living objects. In 
two cases—the lady figurine in Pinocchio and Pooh in The Many Adventures of 
Winnie the Pooh, even primary animatic transition is not given, thereby making 
them remain in the stationary state; interestingly, the latter film begins with the 
live-action sequence where the physical three-dimensional models of Pooh are 
displayed on screen to provide the impression of an inanimate object in a photo-
indexical manner.  
Second, when the cue of movement for secondary animatic transition is 
given to the puppet-as-puppet figures from Types Two to Eight in the Group, they 
seem to gain the quality of life for a while, but in the development of the film 
narrative, are subsumed under the dominant discourses or traditions in which 
puppets, even if appearing as alive as human or animal characters on screen in 
motion, are defined to be not real but fake—furthermore, not in the waking but 
dreaming state (Raggedy Ann), not for maturity but for childhood (Pooh), not at 
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the centre but periphery of the human world (the wind-up puppets in The Mouse 
and His Child), not human but subhuman (Pinocchio and Astro Boy), not good but 
evil (Krusty), not the original but a deceptive copy (the automaton Queen).  
Drawing in the main on the Cartesian view of humanity and La Mettrie’s 
man-machine discourse as its radical materialist counterpart, I discussed and 
tackled the way in which the mechanicomorphic and/or paraphysical cues given to 
each puppet-as-puppet figure are used to reproduce such binary oppositions 
shackling it in the film narrative. The most remarkable cues of that kind include 
convulsive and repetitive body movement, the body’s locomotion and/or levitation 
against gravity, and a limited range of the body movement. For the same effect, 
Raggedy Ann, Pinocchio and Pooh are given formal cues of differentiation as a 
priority, rather than kinetic cues, which centre on the direction of the gaze, the 
discreteness of the limb joint, and the shape of the eyeball and the hand/foreleg.  
In this discussion, I also shed light on the diegetic role and status of the 
human or (anthropomorphic) animal characters much engaged in interaction with 
the puppet-as-puppet figures in the film narrative. They can be classified in two 
groups. First, Pinocchio, Astro Boy and the automaton Queen are of one group, 
created by toymakers or engineers in the film narrative. Notably, such diegetic 
roles are performed by the on-screen live-action animator Max Fleischer in the Out 
of the Inkwell series. To put it conversely, those human or anthropomorphic animal 
characters making toys and engineering machines can be said to function as the 
proxy of an animator or human agent who envisions him or herself under the 
conventional notion that animation can bring something inanimate to life. Second, 
Raggedy Ann, Pooh, the wind-up toy mice and Krusty are depicted or implied as 
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products to be sold and bought in mass markets. In other words, it is in the 
capacity of a consumer or an owner that the human characters interact with them.  
In Chapter Four, I analysed a selection of the conventional, narrative-
motivated stop-motion puppet animation films which I classified in Group STM 
(Stop-motion). For this analysis, I defined the Puppetopos, as the stop-motion 
counterpart of the Tooniverse, in which the animation films created using physical 
puppets/models have been produced and received in such an extensive way as to 
form and familiarise conventions. Considering the extensiveness of the 
Puppetopos, and modifying the typology of Group CEL, I developed the typology of 
Group STM. At the same time, I also accounted for the media specificity of stop-
motion animation, focusing on the way in which the animator interacts with the 
puppet/model in a physical and tactile way and on the resultant relationship of 
uniqueness and irreplaceability between animator and animated emphasised in 
the Puppetopos. In terms of these, I elaborated the spectatorship proper to stop-
motion animation, as distinct from that of hand-drawn animation. 
As with Group CEL in Chapter Two, my analysis demonstrated that the 
problematic notions do not generally apply to Group STM. Although primary 
animatic transition occurs to the puppet-as-puppet models in the Group, the 
kinetic event does not lead to the impression of being alive but rather being an 
inanimate object. In all the eight Types, as I showed, the animators involved could 
and did make models or objects—conventionally perceived as non-living by the 
viewers in the real world—appear to be non-living, by choosing either of the two 
modes, passive or automatic, of endowing them with movement or by leaving them 
stationary. Further, I made clear that such an impression is created by an 
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interwoven operation of the puppet body’s movement, size relationship and 
material constitution, and the number of the puppet bodies of the same design or 
series, as conspicuously seen in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town. A noteworthy point 
about the kinetic cues is not what the figure is in reality but rather what it seems to 
be on screen. As seen in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town, the automata-like, non-
automatic models are preferred to real automata in motion. It is because in 
production the models should be controlled frame by frame by animators, and in 
narrative motivation, demonstrate on screen what it should seem to be rather than 
what it is. 
When secondary animatic transition happens to the puppet-as-puppet 
models from Types Two to Eight of Group STM, most cases show a similar tendency 
to those of Group CEL. In the film narrative, for a while, the effect of secondary 
animatic transition keeps them performing as much as the other models signifying 
living humans or (anthropomorphic) animals, but it is brought to a halt when being 
no longer required in the development of the narrative. Even while the effect 
functions in the narrative, the puppet-as-puppet models’ diegetic status as fake 
and/or inanimate is implied by mechanicomorphic cues (the repetitiveness or 
limitedness of body movement) and paraphysical ones (the body’s levitation 
against gravity). I also showed that as in Group CEL, some models’ fake-ness 
and/or inanimacy in Group STM are reinforced by the cues of its reproducibility 
and replaceability under the order of the factory system and the mass market 
implied in the film narrative, which is obviously seen in The Mascot, Rudolph The 
Red-Nosed Reindeer and The Nightmare before Christmas.  
These similar tendencies between Groups STM and CEL is what I aimed to 
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find developing the typology of each Group. The aim was to bring to light how 
extensive influence anthropocentric views, including the Cartesian stance, of 
puppets and objects have on the way in which they are not fully animated in the 
widest and densest sense of the term but are used to reproduce and reinforce the 
sensation of being not only fake and inanimate but also servile (the puppy puppet 
in The Mascot), imaginary (the fabric dog in The Mitten), peripheral (the discarded 
toys in Santa Claus Is Comin’ to Town), and evil (Preston the robot dog). 
Applying the typology in analysis, I intended to accentuate the specificity 
of Group STM as distinct from Group CEL based on the transparent material of cel. 
This intention influenced my selection of the cases to be examined. Analysing the 
puppet-as-puppet models’ mode of movement in relation to the film narrative, and 
considering that most figures used in stop-motion animation are puppets and 
objects, I demonstrated the cases to be symptomatic of the animator or human 
agent’s relationship with the model/puppet that is pertinent to phenomenological 
body extension and connection formed through touching and being touched. The 
most remarkable case is The Hand which I selected as Type Five. The film shows 
that the puppet-as-puppet model on screen can be an analogy of a human agent 
drifting between the status of a creative artist animating puppets and that of a 
puppet being animated or puppeteered by a higher power in production, as well as 
a presentation of the puppet itself shifting between the status of an autonomously 
performing character and that of an object enslaved and victimised by the 
manipulating power of the hand in the film diegesis. Building on the studies of the 
Romantic literature on puppets or human simulacra, I interpreted those 
symptomatic cases, in terms of Romantic irony, as addressing or problematising 
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the issue of the artist’s mastery over materials on which his or her work is 
grounded and relies.  
Chapters Three and Four reveal that the mode of movement in animation 
drifts on a continuum of the impression of living-ness and non-living-ness, tied in 
with the hierarchical impression of humanness and sub/nonhumanness. These 
animated impressions can make something deserve to be called human or less/not 
human, inasmuch as we persist in the notion that animation can bring something 
to “life”. This brings me to the claim that animation can manipulate and control our 
sensibilities of humanness or sub/nonhumanness, as well as those of life or non-
life. In this sense, the puppet-as-puppet figure in animation is obviously effective in 
defamiliarising and revising our sensibilities not only in terms of aesthetic 
experience but also ethical and political performances, as shown in the figures or 
models of Koko, Pinocchio, Preston, and other unnamed puppets and toys. 
The fifth and final Chapter is focused on three cases, Jabberwocky, Street of 
Crocodiles and The Demon, from Group PMT (Parametric). My central aim with 
them was to describe each puppet-as-puppet model and its movement, both as 
bared, naked parameters in so proper a way that the description might not reduce 
the parameters to a narrative by which none of the films is motivated, as well as to 
the conventional notion of animation-bringing-something-to-life. Applying the 
method of film vector analysis and the Minimalist/Constructivist concept of faktura 
throughout all the three films, I succeeded in describing the way in which drawing 
trajectories in space, a puppet or an object on screen embodies not only 
movements but also multiple forces as vector quantities.  
In doing so, I interpreted and evaluated the sensation created by the 
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trajectories and other bared parameters in terms of the political philosopher 
Bennett’s vital materialism, in the first place, among other non-anthropocentric 
views. Applying to my subject the recent philosophical concepts about the human 
being’s non-anthropocentric relationship with objects, materials and things, 
including puppets, I showed that the puppet-as-puppet models in three films 
function to evoke a peculiar sensation in the viewers, while defamiliarising the 
viewing skills formed in the Puppetopos. The sensation aroused by those models is 
that what we see happening on screen was not created by a human agent(s) alone, 
but might have been involved and still be involved in puppets or objects as quasi-
agents. In the viewing field where a spectator is experiencing the sensation, 
animators or human agents are not envisioned being a demiurgic creator to 
determine the movement of puppets/objects and its concomitant effect of either 
animacy or inanimacy; instead, they are redefined to be another kind of agent I call 
theurgic.  
 
Finally, I am aware that I do not focus on possible cases of non-anthropocentric 
puppet-as-puppet figures in two-dimensional cel animation, while discussing both 
of the anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric cases in three-dimensional stop-
motion animation. As discussed with Group PMT in Chapter Five, the non-
anthropocentric is not considered to stand alone but to involve the experience of a 
human agent’s physical and tactile interaction with puppets and objects in three-
dimensional space. I do not deny that there is a counterpart of Group PMT in cel-
based and/or hand-drawn animation. However, they are outside the scope of this 
thesis which aims to specifically research the puppet-as-puppet figure and its 
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mode of movement, rather than attempting to find or define every one-to-one 
correspondence between different groups of animation films. Moreover, I have 
chosen not to deal with figures which have botanical appearances in this thesis, 
partially because it was difficult to find a large number of cases of phytomorphic 
figures signifying puppets in animation films. I hope that such counterparts and 
figures not discussed in this thesis are discovered and discussed in future research 
in animation studies or other relevant disciplines, drawing or expanding on 
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